This dissertation argues that the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 is in significant respects outdated and therefore insufficient to protect the moral rights of authors in the context of generative artificial intelligence. Generative AI challenges traditional assumptions of authorship and originality, meaning many AI outputs fall outside the Act’s conception of a ‘work’. Consequently, the rights of attribution and integrity may not arise where AI-generated material does not meet the copyright threshold. The right to object to false attribution is only triggered where the misattributed material is a work or part of a work; therefore, if an output is not a ‘work’, s84 cannot operate. Even where outputs are treated as ‘computer-generated works’, the author is imputed, and moral rights attach only to natural persons. This departs from the theoretical underpinnings of Locke and Hegel, raising questions about whether a human-centred regime can function as authorship becomes increasingly automated.