**UNIVERSITY OF CHICHESTER**

Department of Arts and Humanities

# The Critical Citizen:
# A Method Through Rousseau, Dewey and Freire

by

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# ABSTRACT

In this thesis I develop a model of the citizen which offers a resolution to the tension between the individual and society.  This is done in two interconnected parts.  In the first part of the thesis I establish the form of the citizen through a comparative analysis of the manifestation of the tension between the individual and society in the politico-educational projects of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire in conversation with contemporary debates on the citizen.  I identify the impact and influence that Rousseau, Dewey and Freire have had on the contemporary debate, address their shortcomings through critical comparison and strengthen that conception within the context of the contemporary citizen.  The conclusion is a citizen that is defined and discovered by the subjects that seek to embody its values.  It is a bottom-up model that I call the Critical Citizen.

In the second part of the thesis I investigate what model of education is suited for the development of the Critical Citizen and the political conditions necessary for its realisation.  I offer an interactional and an institutional response to this investigation which addresses the relationships between members of a school as well as the relationship between the school and society.  Both responses are developed through an analysis of authority as an instantiation of the tension between the individual and society, and of democratic education as a potential resolution to the problem of authority.  I conclude my investigation with two radical recommendations, the first interactional and the second institutional, which is informed by the politico-educational projects of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire and the methodology which underpins their practice.  I argue in favour of the large-scale incorporation of internally democratic schooling in schools in the UK and the federated disestablishment of education and state in order to protect the individuals subject to education from the coercive force of the state and of the free market.

DEPARTMENT OF ARTS AND HUMANITIES

Philosophy and Education

Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Neil Wilcock

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## DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP

I, Neil Wilcock

declare that the thesis entitled

The Critical Citizen: A Method Through Rousseau, Dewey and Freire

and the work presented in the thesis are both my own, and have been generated by me as the result of my own original research. I confirm that:

- this work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at this University;
- where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated;
- where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed;
- where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work;
- I have acknowledged all main sources of help;
- where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed myself;
- none of this work has been published before submission

Signed: …………………          …………………………

Date:…………………9th September 2019          …………………………

## Acknowledgements

This thesis represents in many ways the end of a journey that began with my decision, encouraged and cultivated by my wife Elena, to return to education and enrol at Birkbeck College for a degree 11 years ago.  Over that time the proportion of my time spent studying philosophy has incrementally increased and I now see this as my vocation, my passion, and my purpose.

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**Chapter 0**

**Introduction**

**§0.0  Motivation**

The aim of this research project is to identify a philosophically coherent conception of the Critical Citizen and explore whether such a conception provides a tenable educative model.  I approach this question with a particular focus on the tension between the individual and society that manifests in both the concept of the citizen itself and within citizenship education.

The concept of the citizen sits at the centre of our political and educational conversation.  It is a demand for rights and representation, but it is also a demanding ideal of embodied values and responsibilities.  It is appealed to by advocates of freedom and progress as frequently as it is appealed to by the advocates of order and tradition.  In the name of freedom and progress this can be seen clearly in the new claims to equal rights that have been made over the last few decades by diverse groups, many of which have suffered and continue to suffer significant discrimination and oppression.  In recent years the rights of women have returned to the public debate as the #MeToo movement has forced a re-evaluation of our embedded social attitudes and treatment of women as sexual objects, and as the recent publicity received over the continuing and significant gender pay gap in the United Kingdom.  We have also seen LGBT+ rights gain traction in recent years.  Where, only one generation earlier, consensual sex between two adult males was still illegal in the United Kingdom, a significant shift in public attitude and legislation has taken place,[1] it is now the case that through human rights and anti-

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[1] Homosexual acts were first decriminalised in England and Wales in *The Sexual Offences Act*, 1967.  It was not until the *Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act*, 1980, that this was extended to Scotland and *The Homosexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order*, 1982, before this was true of Northern Ireland also.  Since then a great number of small steps have taken place and, hopefully, will continue to take place both legislatively and in the minds of the public.  *The Sexual Offences Act*, 2003, replaced all sex-specific legislation with gender neutral language; *The Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act*, 2013, made same sex marriage legal, with certain restrictions; and *The Adoption and Children Act*, 2002, allowed for same sex couples to apply for adoption.  This is but a small number of the changes that have taken place in UK legislation over recent years.  For more on the history of the LGBT+ movement in the UK see, P. F. Purton, *Champions of Equality Trade Unions and LGBT Rights in Britain* (Baltimore, Maryland: Project Muse, 2019).  For an account of the continued struggle for decriminalisation throughout the commonwealth see, Corinne Lennox, *Human*

discrimination legislation people from traditionally oppressed groups are gaining a voice and representation.[2]

However, it would be naïve to think that rights claims are progressively expanding and that public attitudes are becoming progressively more accepting.  Racism, in a broad sense, continues institutionally and in the conscious and unconscious mind-sets of individuals.  It is embedded in our society, but we are often blind to it, expressing surprise and disgust when explicit expressions are voiced, yet unwilling to challenge our own implicit prejudice or the prejudices supported by the institutional structure of society.[3]  In addition to this, citizenship and citizenship education are clearly employed in the name of order and tradition also in a way that is distinct from that described above, where the values defended are often patriarchal and heteronormative.  Citizenship education and education more broadly conceived is employed by some as a way of maintaining the existing state of affairs or returning to an ideal past where gaining control over a populace acts as an aim of education.[4]  Practices such as the regular repetition of the

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*Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in the Commonwealth: Struggles for Decriminalisation and Change.* (Human Rights Consortium, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 2013).

[2]  Through *The Human Rights Act*, 1998, and *The Equality Act*, 2010, one may not be discriminated against on account of age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex, or sexual orientation.  I offer here a reasonably broad account of the rights of the citizen, I do not limit it to the narrower rights to vote, stand for office, and hold those in office accountable.  I understand it to include all those characteristics and qualities of a person that inform their ability to access full participation as a citizen.  This therefore includes those parts of ourselves which others may wish to legislate against.  The broader understanding is preferable because it incorporates the citizen as a forensic term alongside the citizen as a holder of rights and bearer of responsibilities.  I am thankful to Susanne Burri for drawing my attention to this ambiguity between liberal rights and citizen rights.

[3] A key example of this is the aftershock of the United Kingdom referendum on leaving the EU, which was effectively reduced to a mudslinging campaign of propaganda and accusations of racism.  Another is the recent surge in high profile cases of racism in professional football which is spoken of by many as if this is a return of racism rather than an emboldened expression of latent racism and an admirable reaction to it by BAME footballers.  See, Dominic Fifield, 'Raheem Sterling Accuses Media of "fuelling Racism" after Alleged Abuse', *Guardian Newspaper*, 12 September 2018 www.theguardian.com/football/2018/dec/09/raheem-sterling-newspapers-fuelling-racism-alleged-abuse-chelsea> [accessed 5 June 2019], for an article on black British footballer Raheem Sterling's astute observation and reaction to the insidious form that racism takes in media portrayals of footballers of different ethnicities.

[4] Tristan McCowen writes, 'It is as common for citizenship education to be justified on the basis of the maintenance of order and control in society, and of legitimization of current political institutions, as on the development of empowered political agents.' Tristan McCowan, *Rethinking Citizenship Education: A Curriculum for Participatory Democracy*, Continuum Studies in Educational Research (London; New York: Continuum, 2009), p. 4.  This is reflected in the recent report by the select committee on citizenship and civic engagement, 'The Ties that Bind'.  In which it is stated that, 'citizenship education, … should be the first great opportunity for instilling and developing our values, encouraging social cohesion, and creating active citizens has been neglected.' *The Ties That Bind:  Citizenship and Civic Engagement in the 21st Century* (Select Committee on Citizenship and Civic Engagement, April 2018), (p. 4).

Lord's Prayer, which I remember doing daily in my state primary school, or the legislated practice of the pledge of allegiance in the United States of America could be understood as attempts to inculcate specific values and character within the  populace in this way.

The complexity behind the citizen and the aims of citizenship education are evident in the developments in the political conception of citizenship and citizenship education in the United Kingdom in recent years.  Since the introduction of compulsory citizenship education in England and Wales in 2002 there has followed a confusing mix of policies and curricula.  Fundamental British Values (FBV), the Prevent Strategy, the introduction of the National Citizenship Service, and changes in the national curriculum have introduced a confusion of ideologies and a tension between the intentions of a socially conservative vision being developed at the political level and the professional standards of teachers whose focus is on the individual under their charge and not some ideological political vision.[5]  The tension between these two forces is but one instance of the tension between the individual and society that will be discussed in this thesis.

This thesis is motivated by a particular reading of the politico-educational project of Jean-Jacques Rousseau in which I introduce the terms *interactional* and *institutional* to describe the different responses to the tension between the individual and society contained within the pedagogical novel *Émile*, and the political treatise *The Social Contract*.[6]  The *interactional* structure of education is the pedagogy applied in the classroom environment, or more specifically that structure of the immediate learning environment with relation to the interaction between student, teacher, and the curriculum.  The *institutional* structure of education refers to the ways in which the institutions of society are managed, constructed, and organised in relation to the education of its members and how those institutions relate to the members of society. This reading of Rousseau is derived from Frederick Neuhouser who argues that *Émile* and *The Social Contract* offer a two-pronged approach to a single problem, the first prong focuses, 'on the restructuring of social and political institutions' and the second on, 'the

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[5] I shall return to the practice of citizenship education in the UK and the changes that have occurred since its inception in Chapter 8.

[6] Following convention all references to Rousseau will be from *The Collected Writings of Rousseau*, ed. by Roger D. Masters and Christopher Kelly, 13 volumes (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1990-2010); and *Œuvres Complètes*, ed. by Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 5 vols (Paris: Gallimard, 1959-1995).

education, or formation, of individual character.'[7]  Reading these two texts as providing two different but complementary answers to the tension between the individual and society results in a two-pronged approach which is grounded in philosophical theory and educational practice.

Rousseau's politico-educational project acts as a launch-pad into this new investigation with the same general aim.  I begin with Rousseau because, while there were others before him who developed political theses with an educative heart – such as Plato, Hobbes and Locke – Rousseau is unique in his application of a two-pronged approach and in the form of the citizen that develops out of his politico-educational project.  This project is neither an attempt to mould the citizen to the form of the state nor is it an attempt to mould the state to the form of the citizen but a continual investigation into what the citizen is by the citizen.  In my presentation of his thought, Rousseau argues that there must be both a just society and a just people for a stable cooperative association, but one cannot be reached by means of the other, they must be approached concurrently.  This – in my view crucial – insight is what sets Rousseau apart from those who came before him.  However, Rousseau does not stand alone as the theoretical foundation of my argument.  Two further significant figures take prominence as protagonists of this research project alongside Rousseau.  The politico-educational projects of John Dewey and Paulo Freire, I argue, can be read as sharing a narrative with that of Rousseau and complement his thought in interesting ways that can help us develop a suitable vision for the 21st Century.  Therefore, the politico-educational projects of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire, and their respective methodological approaches form the theoretical foundations of this thesis.

The historical analysis of the politico-educational projects of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire is used to challenge the interactional and the institutional assumptions of contemporary arguments that seek to define the citizen, and the theory and practice of contemporary citizenship education.  In conclusion I make two suggestions for the

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[7] Frederick Neuhouser, *Rousseau's Theodicy of Self-Love: Evil, Rationality, and the Drive for Recognition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 157.  Neuhouser presents his interpretation of Rousseau as a solution to the problems caused by the volatility of *amour-propre*, a particular type of self-love that is the root of our envy and vain-glory, and not the tension between the individual and society.  However, the claim that *Émile* and *The Social Contract* are two complementary responses to same problem is separable from the claim that *amour-propre* is the central theme in Rousseau's political theory.  My interpretation of Rousseau is the subject of Chapter 2.

successful development the Critical Citizen. This is done within a framework that resolves the tension between the individual and society at both the interactional and institutional levels. The first is the central principle for the resolution to the tension between the individual and society at the interactional level; the second is the central principle for the resolution to the tension at the institutional level. The two resolutions that I defend are tentative, but I believe necessary, if one seeks a resolution to the tension between the individual and society in the formation of persons. They are internally democratic schooling built around a dialogical environment and the federated disestablishment of education and state.[8] This is a philosophical investigation and I shall largely refrain from proposing concrete proposals for the resolution of this tension. My main goal is to offer a useful conceptual framework that can help guide and structure further research into a suitable recalibration of the citizen and citizenship education. A framework which is designed for the well-being of society without losing the individual to the prioritisation of economic forces or the preservation of existing social norms.

## §0.1  The Protagonists:  Rousseau

As noted above, the primary tension that this thesis is addressing is the tension between the individual and society as it manifests within the concept of the citizen. The tension arises in the citizen because it demands the subordination of the interests of the individual to the interests of society, often more specifically, the interests of the state. This concept of the citizen dates back to Ancient Greece and Rome. Aristotle in *The Politics* and the *Nichomachean Ethics* and Plato in *Crito* and *The Laws* describe the classical conception of the citizen.[9] Here it is argued that the perfect citizen is one where the virtues of a good citizen and a good person coincide; such good people know how to rule and how to be ruled. A good citizen upholds the interests of the state, holds the

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[8] This should be understood similarly to disestablishment in relation to church and state. However, I shall explain it in more detail over the course of the thesis, in particular in Chapter 8.

[9] Aristotle, *The Politics*, trans. by Thomas Alan Sinclair, Penguin Classics, Rev. ed. (Harmondsworth, England; New York, N.Y: Penguin Books, 1981); Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. by J. A. K. Thomson, Penguin Classics (London; New York: Penguin Books, 2004); Plato, *The Laws*, Penguin Classics (London: Penguin, 2004); Plato, 'Crito', in *Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy: From Thales to Aristotle*, ed. by S. Marc Cohen, Patricia Curd, and C. D. C. Reeve, 3rd ed. (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing, 2005), pp. 141–53.

values of the state, and expresses the virtues that strengthen the state. They are expected to cede their own private gain for the well-being of the community. This idea of the citizen as an active and engaged member of the community with both rights and duties developed further in the writings of Machiavelli and later in Rousseau's *Social Contract*.[10] In fact it is in Rousseau's *Social Contract* that the paradigmatic example of this model of the citizen is most clearly expressed. He writes, '[t]he Lacadaemonian Pedaretus runs for the council of three hundred. He is defeated. He goes home delighted that there were three hundred men worthier than he to be found in Sparta … . Behold the citizen.'[11] The person that places the interests of the state above their own is a citizen. With this conception of citizen in mind tension is easily perceived between it and the free individual because the desires and interests of the individual will not always coincide with the interests of the state, and by extension the citizen.

Therefore, Rousseau proves an ideal launch-pad into a discussion of this tension and the concept of the citizen. Rousseau's suitability is further supported by the fact that in the *Social Contract* and *Émile* there appear to be two distinct directions of thought. In one direction Rousseau develops a political and social theory the central point of which is the engaged and active citizen. This falls neatly into the republican conception of citizenship and shares themes with Plato, Machiavelli, and his own presentation of Sparta.[12] In the other direction Rousseau develops a theory of the free individual who

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[10] See, Niccolò Machiavelli, *Discourses on Livy*, trans. by Julia Conaway Bondanella and Peter Bondanella, Oxford World's Classics (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); and 'The Social Contract', *OC III*, 347-470; *CWR, Vol. 4*, pp. 127-224.

[11] 'Émile'*, OC IV*, 249; *CWR, Vol. 13*, p. 164. It is important to note that for Rousseau the individual spoken of is a man. The roles of men and women are distinct within his philosophy, and the political project that I am writing of is predominantly the domain of the man. As a result of this, in explicating Rousseau's philosophy I shall use androcentric language. I do this for two reasons; firstly, because it is a misrepresentation of Rousseau's political philosophy to write as if women are included as citizens or 'men', and to do otherwise is to hide Rousseau's intentional and systemic misogyny behind a false veil of gender neutrality; and secondly, there are serious questions regarding the coherence of Rousseau's political philosophy as a direct result of this misogyny and as such I do not wish to dampen my argument by not drawing attention to this aspect of his work. However, I shall as a matter of convention place raised apostrophes around each instance of androcentric language in order to highlight its presence and avoid participating in insidious patriarchal practices. See *Feminist Interpretations of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, ed. by Lynda Lange, Re-Reading the Canon (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), for a broad analysis of Rousseau from a feminist perspective.
It is also the case that Aristotle's citizen is only a man, but my treatment of his ideas is too brief to justify this treatment. For all other authors in this thesis that are guilty of androcentric language in a quotation that appears I shall break the neutrality of the masculine by inserting [*sic*] immediately afterwards.

[12] For more on the two different directions of thought in Rousseau's political theory see, Judith N. Shklar, *Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau's Social Theory*, Cambridge Studies in the History and Theory of

possesses the strength of character to overcome and perceive the coercive nature of society and its institutions.  I shall explore how Rousseau intended to create a balance between these competing ideals of the person.

Rousseau's political project suggests a reflective methodology which goes some way to explaining his radical aims in *Émile* and the *Social Contract*.  Therefore, I use two alternative methodologies to build upon his thought and develop a framework for thinking about citizenship education which, in turn, offer alternative answers to the tension identified in critical citizenship than that which Rousseau gives: American pragmatism and critical pedagogy.  There are interesting similarities between these approaches in that both have been used to develop theories of social reform, been developed into radical models of education, both concern themselves with the balance of, and conflict between, theory and practice, and both challenge classical philosophical dualisms and closed philosophical systems.  These similarities are reflected in the work of Rousseau but the methodologies of American pragmatism and of critical pedagogy have moved far beyond the vague sketch of reflective thought Rousseau offered in his political theory.  As such, American pragmatism and critical pedagogy offer two distinct avenues of enquiry that serve to strengthen the concept of the critical citizen and do so through a model of education.

## §0.2 The Protagonists:  Dewey

John Dewey is considered one of the three great early American pragmatists.  Pragmatism was originally developed by Charles Sanders Peirce, brought to the wider public attention through the work of his friend William James, and continued by, most notably, Dewey.  These three represent the principal early American pragmatists.[13]  When Peirce developed the pragmatic method in the 1870s it was done so as an alternative

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Politics (London; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985); John Charvet, *The Social Problem in the Philosophy of Rousseau.* (Cambridge University Press, 2009); Ernst Cassirer, *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1963); and Frederick Neuhouser (2010).

[13] This is widely accepted.  See *The Bloomsbury Companion to Pragmatism*, ed. by Sami Pihlström, Bloomsbury Companions (Bloomsbury Academic, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015); and *A Companion to Pragmatism*, ed. by John R. Shook and Joseph Margolis, Blackwell Companions to Philosophy, 32 (Malden, MA ; Oxford: Blackwell Pub, 2006).

methodology to the physical sciences, as a reaction to the Cartesian method where first principles were supposedly devised by reason alone and everything else was derived from these first principles.[14] Instead Peirce argued that we are should not start with Cartesian doubt but 'with all the prejudices which [we] actually have when we enter the study of philosophy'.[15] From this position the method we must employ in order to become clear about concepts and hypothesis is one of reflection on the results of practice. We are to clarify our hypothesis through practical application and allow the results of this enquiry to inform and modify the original hypothesis for future enquiry. Peirce shifted the focus away from the antecedent – or *a priori* knowledge, the idea that a universal truth is knowledge through reason, and reachable from simple premises through logical steps with each step linked together in an unbroken chain of knowledge – to the consequent. In other words, instead of focussing on that which can be known for certain and building our understanding on top of that knowledge, Peirce espoused a thoroughly empirical philosophy where doubt can only be transcended at the end of enquiry.[16] As such, we must subject our beliefs about the world to experiment by considering what conceivable effects the object of our belief has and considering whether these consequences are consistent with the previously held belief. Peirce wrote, 'consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object'.[17] The idea that consequents, rather than antecedents, fix meaning is the backbone of pragmatism as a methodological approach within philosophy, and is sometimes referred to as the pragmatic maxim.

Pragmatism, for Peirce, is a method of science and of logic. The proper scope for its application is limited to the field of science – of which philosophy is a part. There is no

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[14] Peirce developed, and coined the term, pragmatism at 'The Metaphysical Club', an informal philosophical club in Cambridge, Massachusetts in the early 1870s. His pragmatic ideas are developed in a number of essays, most notably; C. S. Peirce, 'Some Consequences of Four Incapacities', *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, 2.3 (1868), 140–57; Charles S. Peirce, 'The Fixation of Belief', in *The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings*, ed. by Nathan Houser and Christian J. W. Kloesel, 2 vols (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992a), 109–23; and Charles S. Peirce, 'How To Make Our Ideas Clear', in *The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 1 (1867-1893)*, ed. by Nathan Houser and Christian J. W. Kloesel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992b), pp. 124–41. However, Peirce does not use the word pragmatism in print until after William James.

[15] Charles S. Peirce (1992b), p. 140.

[16] *ibid*.

[17] *ibid*, p. 131.

place for pragmatism within the realm of social and political matters and it renders many of the disputes within metaphysics meaningless. While Peirce maintained that pragmatism could only be applied to those situations where an observable consequence was possible – thereby closing the door on philosophy as a discipline engaged with much metaphysics and social concerns – James argued that the consequences of belief are not limited to that which can be observed. For James, the pragmatic method could legitimately be applied to all felt consequences of a believer. This means that, in James' view, psychological consequences of a belief contribute to the meaning of that belief.[18]

Similar to James, Dewey developed his version of the pragmatic method by extending it beyond the physical sciences and applying it to the social and moral spheres also.[19] However, Dewey came much closer to Peirce's understanding of truth. According to Dewey, the truth is that which results from socially shared enquiry and that essences are constructed by the community of enquirers who share the ensuing beliefs.[20] Dewey emphasized this intersubjectivity of shared enquiry and thereby found a middle ground

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[18] The best example which illustrates the difference between Peirce and James is with their view of transubstantiation. According to Peirce, because there is no physical observable difference to the sacrament at any point, the disagreement between Protestants and Catholics is beyond the scope of scientific enquiry. He writes, 'to talk of something as having all the sensible characters of wine, yet being in reality blood, is senseless jargon.' (Charles S. Peirce, '1992b', p. 131.) Whereas, James argues, contrary to Peirce, that psychological differences, as well as physical differences, are observable if the experience of the object or event differs between individuals. This difference is meaningful and worthy of philosophical consideration. Therefore, according to James, pragmatism can be applied to more than the sciences and observable practical consequences that would occur regardless of the individual concerned – providing the method was followed correctly. According to James, pragmatism is instead a method that applies to individuals and to the psyche. William James, 'Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results', *University Chronical*, 1898, 187–210; and 'The Pragmatic Method', *The Writings of William James*, John J. McDermott (ed.), (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 347–8.

[19] Peirce objected to the extension of the pragmatic method beyond the physical sciences. Peirce argued that to do so overlooked an important distinction between scientific enquiry and practical enquiry of the everyday. The latter attempts to answer a particular human need which is contingent upon the existent society of the time of the enquiry, whereas the latter, in contrast, is driven by the desire to uncover unalterable truths that govern the world of which we are a part. In overlooking this distinction, Peirce believes that enquiry into the everyday is loaded with unanalysed bias and hence not truth-apt. Charles S. Peirce, 'Philosophy and the Conduct of Life', in *The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings Volume 2 (1893-1913)*, ed. by Nathan Houser and Christian J. W. Kloesel (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 1998), pp. 27–41. However, Dewey argues that a clean separation between the two is neither possible nor desirable. Our social bias affects all of our enquiries and therefore is an important consideration in enquiry. See, John Dewey, 'Experience and Philosophic Method', in *The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953, Volume 1: 1925*, ed. by Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008), pp. 10–41.

[20] It is Peirce's view that '[t]he opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real'. (Charles S. Peirce, '1992b', p. 139.) Peirce believes that the truths of the sciences are fixed and stable, and are arrived at when all possible proper enquiry has concluded. Dewey stopped short of this objectivism.

in-between the thorough-going objectivism of Peirce and the subjectivism of James. Deweyan pragmatism is thus an enquiry into a truth that is discoverable but not fixed. It is dependent upon its conditions and changes according to those conditions.[21] James Campbell argues for a similar positioning of Dewey within the American pragmatist canon. He writes that Dewey, 'attempted a combination of the critical and cooperative spirit of Peirce with a focus on the issues of general and direct human concern that interested James.'[22] Dewey's moving of moral discussion away from moral truths discovered through reason and toward a generally scientific approach to moral issues is a method that Dewey called 'instrumentalism'.

Pragmatism has been criticised because in working within the bounds of current scientific truth it grants too much authority to the status quo and ultimately fails to lead to the social reform that it promises. A leading critic of pragmatism was Max Horkheimer who developed critical theory, which is his own response to the dominance of the Cartesian model of enquiry. Horkheimer was the head of the Frankfurt school which has become synonymous with critical theory and it is this theoretical backdrop that led to the development of critical pedagogy, the second methodological approach that will provide the main focus of this thesis.

## §0.3 The Protagonists: Freire

Freire is often cited as a key figure in the development of critical pedagogy.[23] The critical pedagogy movement can be roughly understood as a model of critical theory through education. Henry Giroux in, 'Critical Theory and Educational Practice', told the

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[21] See, Jim W. Garrison, 'Realism, Deweyan Pragmatism, and Educational Research', *Educational Researcher*, 23.1 (1994), 5–14 (p.7), and R. W. Sleeper, *The Necessity of Pragmatism: John Dewey's Conception of Philosophy* (Urbana; Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001), p. 3.

[22] James Campbell, 'A History of Pragmatism', in *The Bloomsbury Companion to Pragmatism*, ed. by Sami Pihlström, Bloomsbury Companions (Bloomsbury Academic, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015), pp. 64–80 (p. 72).

[23] Henry Giroux, 'Critical Theory and Educational Practice', in *The Critical Pedagogy Reader*, ed. by Antonia Darder, Rodolfo D. Torres, and Marta Baltodano, (New York, Routledge, 2017), pp. 31-55; Moacir Gadotti, *Reading Paulo Freire: His Life and Work*, SUNY Series, Teacher Empowerment and School Reform (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994); Jones Irwin, *Paulo Freire's Philosophy of Education: Origins, Developments, Impacts and Legacies* (London: Continuum, 2012); and Ira Shor, 'Education Is Politics: Paulo Freire's Critical Pedagogy', in *Paulo Freire: A Critical Encounter*, ed. by Peter McLaren and Peter Leonard (London; New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 25–35.

story of the methodology and source of critical pedagogy through its theoretical forebear, critical theory.[24] Giroux shows how the work of critical theorists and the Frankfurt school and critical theorists, provided the insight and foundation 'for a theory of radical pedagogy'.[25] Horkheimer used the term 'critical theory' as an alternative to what he characterised as 'traditional theory', a method of enquiry that he attributed to Descartes.[26] Echoing some of the concerns expressed by Peirce, Horkheimer rejects *a priori* knowledge. Horkheimer's insight was that in defining itself in this manner theory fails to take account of social and cultural influence upon thought and therefore, in not recognising the place of science within a larger social framework, cannot escape its limited scope. In light of this, the central tension identified by the Frankfurt School is that which exists between theory and praxis, where praxis is understood, 'to designate a kind of self-creating action, which differed from the externally motivated behaviour produced by forces outside man's [*sic*] control,' and the difficulty in establishing the balance between the two.[27]

Paulo Freire can be read as following on from the project of critical theory and combining it with education to develop a model of critical pedagogy.[28] He developed the theory and practice on which his pedagogy rests, 'out of a complicated symbiosis of Christian and Marxist thought', and while teaching illiterate peasant farmers in Brazil and Chile.[29] In addition to this Christian and Marxist foundation, Freire's philosophy is deeply embedded with ideas from existentialism and what is often referred to as continental philosophy.[30] Linked to this, Freire was also deeply influenced by Erich Fromm. Freire

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[24] Giroux (2017).

[25] *ibid*, p.31.

[26] Max Horkheimer, 'Traditional and Critical Theory', in *Critical Theory: Selected Essays* (New York: Continuum Pub. Corp, 2002), pp. 188–243 (p. 188).

[27] Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950* (Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1996), p. 4.

[28] Although it is important to note that Freire did not use these terms to describe his project himself.

[29] Irwin (2012), p. 8. Peter Roberts argues similarly in attributing Hegel and Marx as the source of Freire's dialectical approach toward understanding the world. Peter Roberts, 'Knowledge, Dialogue, and Humanisation: The Moral Philosophy of Paulo Freire', *The Journal of Educational Thought (JET) / Revue de La Pensée Éducative*, 1998, 95–117 (p. 96). Freire is also linked as a result of this Christian Marxist influence to the liberation theology movement of Latin America that was being developed at around the same time. See, John L. Elias, *Paulo Freire: Pedagogue of Liberation* (Malabar, Fla: Krieger Pub. Co, 1994). For more on liberation theology, see, Gustavo Gutiérrez, *A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation* (Maryknoll, N.Y: Orbis Books, 1988).

[30] Irwin (2012) points out that Freire's books, in particular *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, are littered with references to Jean-Paul Sartre, Franz Fanon, and others of the continental philosophy tradition. However,

adopts Fromm's concept of the 'fear of freedom,' which is a key inspiration in Freire's psychological analysis of humans caught in oppressive relationships between each other and with the world.[31]  Fromm was a member of the Frankfurt school and an existential theorist.

Henry Giroux traces the roots of critical pedagogy back to critical theory and the Frankfurt School.[32]  Giroux places particular importance on the work of Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse.[33]  He argues that while their views contain significant differences,

> … [they] converge on the existing repressiveness underlying positivist rationality and on the need for the development of a collective critical consciousness and sensibility that would embrace a discourse of opposition and non-identity as a precondition of freedom.[34]

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continental philosophy is a peculiar example of terminology, often gaining meaning in comparison with its supposed opposite, analytic philosophy.  Although attempts have been made to define continental philosophy in essentialist terms (David E. Cooper, 'The Presidential Address: Analytical and Continental Philosophy', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 94.1 (1994), 1–18 (pp. 4–7)) it is better understood within a historical context.  A distinction between analytic and continental philosophies grew out of the second world war, and can be attributed to the rejection of British idealism by Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore, (see Peter Hylton, *Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992))  This distinction appears to be have cemented quickly, as can be seen in A. J. Ayer's and Gilbert Ryle's attacks upon members of the phenomenological movement, (A. J. Ayer, 'Some Aspects of Existentialism', in *The Rationalist Annual*, ed. by Charles Albert Watts (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009), pp. 5–13; Gilbert Ryle, 'Phenomenology vs. The Concept of Mind', in *Critical Essays: Collected Papers, Volume 1* (London; New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 179–96, provide good examples of this.)  To be sure, the term continental philosophy is a broad term and often includes phenomenologists and existentialists such as Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre; alongside critical theorists such as the members of the Frankfurt School, without providing a clear indication of what brings these fields together.  For more on this distinction and how at times it is no more than seeming see Andreas Vrahimis, *Encounters Between Analytic and Continental Philosophy*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

[31] Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, trans. by Myra Bergman Ramos (London, England: Penguin Books, 2017).  For more on Fromm's psychology and the fear of freedom see, Erich Fromm, *The Heart of Man: Its Genius for Good and Evil* (Riverdale, NY: American Mental Health Foundation Books, 2010); and Erich Fromm, *The Fear of Freedom* (London: Routledge, 2010).

[32] Giroux (2017).  For more on critical theory and its proponents Martin Jay writes an authoritative biography, Jay (1996).  See also, *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*, ed. by Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt (New York: Continuum, 1982), which contains a collection of essays about the ideas of those in the Frankfurt School.

[33] Key works by these individuals that inform Giroux's arguments are, Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics* (London: Routledge, 2010); Max Horkheimer, *Critical Theory: Selected Essays* (New York: Continuum Pub. Corp, 2002); and Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (London: Routledge, 1999).

[34] Giroux (2017), p. 44.

Therefore, the struggle for freedom necessarily contains within it a critique of the current order of things.  Furthermore, this criticism leads to an analysis of, 'the nature of domination that contains invaluable insights for a theory of education.'[35]  In particular Erich Fromm provides a key link between Freire and critical theory because it is Fromm who influenced Horkheimer in the 1930s and who aimed to draw together Freudian and Marxist views.[36]  Freire, due to Fromm's impact on his understanding of the psychology of the individual and society, also draws these two threads together.  It is because of the centrality of this tension within his philosophy, and his focus on social reform and education that Freire stands out as particularly relevant to this research project.

It seems then that critical pedagogy and pragmatism both can provide a model for a research project that aims to develop a consistent account of the Critical Citizen by treading the delicate balance between theory and practice. However, critical pedagogy adopts a negative stance to normative frameworks, such as the concept of the citizen, understanding them to be ideological.  Certain truths, such as the values and virtues associated with the concept are seen to be presupposed, and as such discussion outside of these assumed premises is silenced.  The pragmatist tradition, arguably, is more sympathetic of the current state of affairs because it intentionally works within the accepted societal truths in order to challenge them and advance truth.  This cannot be said of Paulo Freire.  It was Freire's goal to emancipate both the oppressed and the oppressors by providing the opportunity for the oppressed to become educated through a method of critical pedagogy.  In order for emancipation to occur the oppressed must learn to emancipate themselves.  It could be said therefore that Freire sought to undermine the stability of the state and not cultivate good participants of the state.  So, Freire's critical pedagogy may prove a stronger route for realising the free individual, whereas Dewey's pragmatism may prove a stronger route for the formation of the citizen.

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[35] Giroux (2017), p. 44.

[36] Erich Fromm, *The Crisis of Psychoanalysis: Essay on Freud, Marx, and Social Psychology* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1991); Max Horkheimer, 'Materialism and Metaphysics', in *Critical Theory: Selected Essays* (New York: Continuum Pub. Corp, 2002), pp. 10–46.

**§0.4 Structure**

This thesis is structured in two broad and interconnected parts.  In Part One, I identify the tension between the individual and society within the concept of the citizen and address that tension through an analysis of the three key protagonists – Rousseau, Dewey and Freire – and the larger debate on the concept of the citizen.  The thesis is an enquiry into the tension between the individual and society, manifesting in a problem of authority, which is to be solved by a particular progressive model of education.  However, this framing of the project requires further development because it misses a central component of the thesis.  It is also a theory of the citizen.  As will become clear, in particular within my analysis of Rousseau and of Dewey, the individual and society are both in tension with—and dependent upon—one another.  One way which this is the case is in the form of the individual, which may be defined with reference to the society of which they are a part or with reference to the interests of the individual.  Following Rousseau, the citizen in its most extreme case is a person who lives wholly for the well-being of society.[37]  In contrast, the free individual in its most extreme case exists wholly according to their own private interests.  However, these aims—the free individual and the person who lives for their community—are not rejected by Rousseau.  Instead it is argued that they can be consonant with one another.  As with Rousseau's work, that is the aim of this thesis also.

Through this analysis I draw attention to the shortcomings in Rousseau, Dewey and Freire, and of existing models of the citizen.  I then employ an interpretation of the politico-educational projects of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire to provide a theoretical foundation of a citizen which answers these deficiencies by offering a methodological response to the tension between the individual and society.  What results is a largely negative definition of the citizen as a fluid and revisable concept.  The second part of the thesis embraces educational and political theory and is focussed upon devising a model of education which has the citizen, as conceptualised in the first part of the thesis, as its end-in-view.  In this way, the structure corresponds to the two primary questions which this thesis explores.

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[37] 'Émile', OC IV, 249; *CWR, Vol. 13*, p. 164.  See page 6 above.

The first part of the thesis comprises five Chapters. In Chapter 1 I begin with a brief historical analysis of the concept of the citizen which will then lead into a discussion of the contemporary debate which seeks to define the citizen. The analysis of the citizen will do two things, it will highlight the contributions and influence of the politico-educational projects of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire within the tradition of this debate. Additionally, the analysis of the citizen shall highlight the tension between the individual and society which lies at the heart of any conception of the citizen.

Chapters 2, 3 and 4 shall present a genealogical analysis of the tension between the individual and society through the politico-educational projects of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire. First, I shall present a description of how the tension between the individual and society manifests within Rousseau's project, the resolution that he offers to this tension, and the limitations of that resolution offered. Then, building upon that interpretation of Rousseau, I shall follow the same pattern with Dewey, and then with Freire.

In Chapter 5, I shall draw the threads of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire together. I do this in two ways. Firstly, I shall justify the connection that I draw between the projects and the thought of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire. Secondly, I shall highlight how the strengths of each mitigate the weaknesses of the others. I shall show how the methodology employed by each thinker is intimately linked to educational practice and that Rousseau, Dewey and Freire each prove instrumental in the development of the concept of the citizen that I seek to defend. I shall conclude with a vision of the citizen that operates as the end-in-view of the thesis and the subject of the educational theory of Part Two. This citizen is the result of the critique offered in Chapter 1 and the theories of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. I shall refer to the product of my analysis as the Critical Citizen.

However, there is a continued tension in the Critical Citizen which without resolution negates the dissolution of the tension between the individual and society in the form of the Critical Citizen. This is because the Critical Citizen is an individual at one moment of time and abstracted from the bias and corruption of their unique interaction and experience of the external world. In isolation the Critical Citizen is a beautiful creation, but the ideal exists only in the imagination of its creator, it serves no purpose beyond offering a guide for a greater enquiry. Therefore, it must be asked how the Critical Citizen comes to be, in spite of the nurturing power of lived experience and the

contrary interests of existing power relations. How does one escape these constraints and step outside of themselves into the domain of the Critical Citizen, and how does each and every other person achieve the same? The dominant answer for any model of the citizen identified as ideal through enquiry is education. Therefore, following on from the identification of the Critical Citizen as the end-in-view of Part One, Part Two of the thesis comprises the educational project to realise, or at the very least approach, that end-in-view. What we learn from the projects of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire is that the Critical Citizen is both realised and identified through democratic education. However, the tension between the individual and society that the Critical Citizen is designed to overcome has not been fully answered. In fact, the tension shifts to a different level of enquiry because persisting through the method of education, the means for its realisation, is the problem of authority. The problem of authority manifests on two levels for there is the institution of education supported by the perceived public interests of those who support and direct the institution, this refers to the institutional structure of education. There is also the more direct authority of the educators and their perception of the interests of the individuals under their charge, this is the interactional structure of education. It is the tension between the individual and society raised anew, it is therefore incumbent to investigate how this tension can be overcome.

In Chapter 6, I shall begin Part Two of the thesis in which I seek the model of education suitable for the development of the Critical Citizen. I begin this exploration with a brief analysis of the roots of citizenship education which are found in antiquity. In doing so a mirror is held up to the analysis of the classical citizen in Chapter 1. It is shown that the tension between the individual and society in the education of the citizenship is uncovered in the same place as the tension within the concept of the citizen itself. I then argue that the tension in citizenship education is a manifestation of the problem of authority and go on to draw out the problem of authority in detail, seeking to identify how it is understood and resolved in political philosophy. I shall then transpose that conversation into the educational context and identify how the problem of authority manifests in the classroom environment and in the relationship between the student and teacher.

In Chapter 7 I return to the works of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire. First, I identify how the problem of authority manifests within the politico-educational project of

Rousseau and his resolution to that problem.  Then, mirroring the example set in Chapter 2, I do the same for Dewey and Freire respectively.

Following on from the analysis of the problem of authority within Rousseau, Dewey and Freire, Chapter 8 presents a critique of contemporary solutions to it in theories of democratic education.  I begin this chapter with an exposition of citizenship education in the United Kingdom after the publication of 'Education for Citizenship and the Teaching of Democracy in Schools', commonly referred to as the Crick Report, in 1998.[38]  In which I trace a shift in the practice of citizenship education which is reflected by a shift in the government's ideological commitments to democratic education.  I use this exposition as an anchor which tethers the theoretical analysis in the following sections within which I lay out my defence of the two major contributions that I offer.

Firstly, I address the issues that arise from competing forms of the citizen that operate as the aim of education through an analysis of democratic education.  I conclude that the issues that arise from prescriptive models of the citizen cannot be resolved and that schools should be structured along internally democratic lines to provide the environment for the development of persons, morally and intellectually, that are defined by those people who seek to embody the principles lived by.

Secondly, I address the challenges to institutional authority over education by liberals, deschoolers and libertarians.[39]  Here I conclude that the best way to mitigate the coercive impact of external authority over people's education is through a federalism which protects the voice of the community, the family, and the professionals within schools.  Furthermore, through principles of nonrepression and nondiscrimination protects the freedom of those within school through state legislation.  In addition to this federalism I argue that it is crucial for the development of the Critical Citizen that education be financed publicly but free of political influence and therefore defend a model of disestablishment, what I call a federated disestablishment.  It is crucial that both internally democratic schools and federated disestablishment are pursued in concert for they stand or fall together.  Lastly, I argue that further research, both theoretical and empirical is warranted in investigating the worth of these two suggestions.

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[38] *Education for Citizenship and the Teaching of Democracy in Schools* (Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, 1998).

[39] These terms are reasonably vague as they stand, but I shall reserve analysis of them for the contents of Chapter 8.

# Part I

## The End-in-View

**Chapter 1**

**The Concept of the Citizen**

**§1.0  Summary**

I shall begin with a brief analysis of the concept of the citizen.  This chapter will provide a historical context of how the citizen is understood which will lead into a critique of three alternate models of the citizen which have sought to provide an answer to the competing demands of rights and responsibilities.  In the first two sections of the chapter I shall consider the two prevailing conceptions of the citizen as a part of the classical debate, the republican and the liberal citizen.  Then I shall narrow in on the key difference between the republican and the liberal citizen and conclude that neither, on their own, are able to provide a coherent account of the citizen.  Where the republican citizen emphasises the importance of the responsibilities of the citizen the liberal citizen focusses on the rights of the citizen.  However, it is argued that in prioritising responsibilities the demands upon the citizen are too great and, more worrying, the freedom of the citizen is called into question.  It is further argued that prioritising rights, while securing freedom, does not adequately secure attachment to the state and worries persist about the stability and progression of a state which does not create obligations upon its citizenry.  The tension between the rights and responsibilities of the citizen shall highlight the tension between the individual and society which lies at the heart of any conception of the citizen.

In the next section I shall offer a brief description and analysis of three alternative models of the citizen: the participatory democratic; communitarian; and cosmopolitan conceptions of the citizen.  I shall then offer an explanation as to why none of these models, on their own, is sufficient as an aim for a coherent conception of the citizen.

While a more in depth look at the conceptions of the citizen contained within Rousseau, Dewey and Freire take place in the next chapter it is important to put the conceptions of the citizen discussed here into the context of the philosophies of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire.  As such I shall then seek to highlight the influence and overlap that they have had in the understanding of what the participatory democratic,

the communitarian, and the cosmopolitan citizens are.  I shall conclude this chapter by drawing attention to the tension between the individual and society as it manifests throughout these three conceptions of the citizen, as well as the liberal and republican conceptions of the citizen.  This will lead into an analysis of the manifestation of the tension between the individual and society within the politico-educational projects of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire in the following three chapters.

## §1.1  The Classical Citizen Debate

The concept of the citizen dates back to antiquity from which one can trace two different understandings of that concept which have been dominant within literature on the citizen.  There is the citizen as the bearer of responsibilities, and there is the citizen as the bearer of rights.[40]  The former is the citizen of republican virtue which is traced back to the ancient Greeks and ancient Romans.  Aristotle develops an account of the citizen in his *Politics* and in the *Nichomachean Ethics* which represent the root of this conception of the citizen.[41]  Aristotle describes the citizen as one who is distinguished by others through their, 'participation in giving judgment and in holding office.'[42]  A similar understanding of

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[40] There is also the question of who qualifies as a legal citizen.  Historically the conditions of citizenship status were very limiting.  One would need to be a man of a certain status and wealth in order to bear the title.  However, let us not be fooled into thinking that contemporary society has overcome morally questionable limiting of rights.  In the UK for example, one is not a citizen when one is a child, but the minimum age of criminal responsibility is 10 years old and children from this age can be tried as adults; from the age of 14 one can possess a firearms certificate; from the age of 16 one can be married, have consensual sex, buy lottery tickets, leave school and join the army; from 18 one is a legal adult and gains full-citizenship rights with only a couple of exceptions; to adopt a child one must 21 and to receive the National Living Wage as a minimum return for one's labour a person must be 25.  Furthermore, one's mental health may limit their citizenship rights; one does not possess full-citizenship rights if imprisoned or on parole; as a foreign national with only residential status; as a refugee or immigrant; or a member of the armed forces.  Each of these limitations are worthy of serious debate, morally questionable, and often arbitrary.  However, for the most part, these limitations and this debate lie outside of the scope of this thesis.  For more on the legal discussion of rights see Geoffrey Robertson, *Freedom, the Individual and the Law*, 7th ed (London: Penguin, 1993); *UK and European Human Rights: A Strained Relationship?*, ed. by Katja S. Ziegler, Elizabeth Wicks, and Loveday Hodson (S.l.: Hart Publishing, 2018). and Brice Dickson, *Human Rights and the United Kingdom Supreme Court* (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2013).

[41] Aristotle introduces the word *homonoia* (Ὁμόνοια) usually translated as 'concord' to describe the particular type of friendship that exists between city-states.  Heater writes of *homonoia*, 'It carried the dual meaning of peace between city-states and social/political harmony within them', Derek Benjamin Heater, *What Is Citizenship?* (Malden, Mass: Polity Press, 1999), p. 55, which extends the role and attitude of citizenship beyond the strict interaction between individual and state.

[42] Aristotle (1981), *Pol.* III.1, 1275a22.

the citizen is apparent in Plato's *Crito*, in which Socrates, living his final days before execution, is presented as the model citizen. This dialogue draws out the tension between justice and the law and argues that this tension is only seeming.[43] This model of citizenship is revisited and revised in the early-modern era. The character and qualities of the citizen of Aristotle and Plato form the foundations of the republican citizen. A key source of the political theory of republicanism and the citizens which comprise the Republic is Rousseau, and in particular his *Social Contract*. Michael Walzer writes, 'it is Rousseau (and, a little later, Kant) who gives citizenship its modern philosophical grounding'.[44] Rousseau – like Machiavelli, Cicero, and Aristotle before him – attributed to the citizen the values of militarism and patriotism. The republican citizen is a person with an active stake in government, guided by the principles of the public good, and possessing an unquestioning devotion to their Republic that they will defend with their life.[45]

The republican conception of citizenship has seen a return in popularity in the second half of the twentieth century. In *The Human Condition*, Hannah Arendt challenges us to learn from the civilisations of the past. Ancient Greece provides the backdrop for challenging political assumptions taken for granted in the twentieth century.[46] Derek Heater comments, 'Hannah Arendt, was convinced of the value of active citizenship as construed by the classical writers.'[47]

Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit have also been hugely influential in reinvigorating the civic republican tradition. Skinner responds to Rawlsian liberalism by turning back to Renaissance political thought, in particular drawing upon Machiavelli's *Discourses on*

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[43] For an analysis of the paradoxes and positions within the *Crito* see Michael J. Rosano, 'Citizenship and Socrates in Plato's "Crito"', *The Review of Politics*, 62.3 (2000), 451–77.

[44] Michael Walzer, 'Citizenship', in *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*, ed. by Terence Ball, James Farr, and Russell L. Hanson, Ideas in Context (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 211–19 (p. 212).

[45] That Rousseau defends this version of the citizen is disputed in this thesis. However, it is not in question that Rousseau was influential on others who do hold this view.

[46] Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). Arendt offers an alternative understanding of the liberal and republican conceptions of the citizen. She argues that they should not be understood as conceptions that focus on the duties and rights of citizens, but as conceptions that focus on positive (participatory, creative) and negative (non-interference) freedoms, the latter being preferable, see Arendt (1998); and Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (Faber and Faber, 2016). In the following sections I too shall challenge the distinction between the liberal and republican conceptions of the citizen.

[47] Heater (1999), p. 69.

*Livy*.[48]  From this starting place Skinner argues that the maximisation of liberty and the common good are compatible.  He writes, 'if we wish to maximize our liberty, we must devote ourselves wholeheartedly to a life of public service, placing the ideal of the common good above all considerations of individual advantage.'[49]  The thought is that a free state, if guided by 'the general will of the whole body politic', is therefore an expression of the freedom of each individual member of that body politic.[50]

In a different, but still strongly republican vein, Pettit argues that freedom should be understood in terms of non-domination rather than the liberal non-interference.  He writes, 'someone dominates or subjugates another, to the extent that (1) they have the capacity to interfere (2) with impunity and at will (3) in certain choices that the other is in a position to make.'[51]  Therefore, the state must not arbitrarily interfere in the lives of individuals because it would unjustly limit their freedom.  What constitutes arbitrary interference is a matter of debate, but the paradigm example of the dominated individual is a slave.  It is true that with a benevolent master a slave could achieve seeming freedom and fulfil the conditions of freedom in the negative sense, however the slave's master retains a power of arbitrary interference that may be employed at any time.  Therefore, a slave – no matter who their master is – can never be free.[52]  Skinner and Pettit argue that an appropriately democratic state can possess non-arbitrary power which is by definition not a constraint upon a person's freedom and in this way argue that the republican citizen and individual freedom are compatible.

However, the republican conception of the citizen outlined above does not go unchallenged.  A society of virtuous and engaged citizens is often seen as too demanding and unnecessary.  Thomas Hobbes, a forerunner of classical liberalism, famously thought little of a person's ability to be virtuous without the threat of force.  The nature of the human animal, according to Hobbes, is one of a continual desire or appetite for power which puts people in direct conflict with one another.  He writes,

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[48] Quentin Skinner, 'On Justice, the Common Good, and Priority of Liberty', in *Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community*, ed. by Chantal Mouffe, Phronesis (London; New York: Verso, 1992), pp. 211–24 (p. 216); and Machiavelli (2008).

[49] Skinner (1992), p. 217.

[50] *ibid*.

[51] Philip Pettit, 'Freedom as Antipower', *Ethics*, 106.3 (1996), 576–604 (p. 578).

[52] *ibid*, p. 577.

I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse

desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death.  And the cause

of this, is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than

he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a

moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to

live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more.'[53]

From this view of the nature of the human animal Hobbes concludes that a stable society is found only through obedience to an all-powerful Sovereign.  As such, the *Leviathan* develops a form of governance that will succeed in spite of the shortcomings of the human animal.  Similarly, Bernard Mandeville argued that the state could be stable and prosper even if the members of society were motivated solely by self-interest.[54] Furthermore, it is unclear whether the republican conception of freedom is sufficient in resolving the tension between the responsibilities demanded of the citizen and the freedom that they enjoy.  For example, Judith Suissa has argued persuasively that it is impossible to escape the arbitrariness that republican theorists take issue with and therefore, the republican conception of freedom is in fact incompatible with the state.[55] It is on the back of objections such as these that the liberal citizen begins to take shape.

The liberal citizen, much like the republican citizen above, can be traced back to ancient Rome.  Walzer, in his analysis of the history of the citizen, comments that as the Roman empire grew the meaning of the citizen changed.  No longer did it mean that, as a citizen, one participated directly in the running of the state, because the state was too large and complex.  Instead to hold the title of citizen guaranteed a person a certain set of rights and protection by the state.[56]  The liberal tradition was continued by the philosophical and political theories of Benjamin Constant, Alexis de Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill, and Adam Smith, and while the term 'liberal' remains contested by defenders

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[53] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Penguin Classics (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1988), p. 161.

[54] Bernard de Mandeville, *The Fable of the Bees*, Penguin Classics, Reprinted (London: Penguin Books, 1989).

[55] Judith Suissa, 'Education and Non-Domination: Reflections from the Radical Tradition', *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, 38.4 (2019), 359–75.

[56] Walzer (1989), p. 211.

and detractors alike there are core features which these theorists share.[57] The obvious feature is that the free choice of the individual is primary. Liberalism provides the foundations for the second definition of the citizen according to which a person possesses fundamental rights, such as freedom, and these rights are protected by the state.[58]

T. H. Marshall's influential essay 'Citizenship and Social Class' is illustrative of the liberal conception of the citizen.[59] According to Marshall, a person's citizenship rights are a combination of their civil, political, and social rights.[60] For the people of society to enjoy these rights fully requires an advanced and progressive welfare state. According to Marshall, it is the advance of social policy—such as access to education, health, and minimum standard of living—that leads to an equalising of status among the populace. Marshall writes,

> in the twentieth century citizenship and the capitalist class system have been at war. … Social rights in their modern form imply an invasion of contract by status, the subordination of market price to social justice, the replacement of the free bargain by the declaration of rights.[61]

This is characteristic of liberal citizenship because, in equalising status among people it is more probable that they will feel like full members of society and act as such. It is clear from this that Marshall emphasises the role of rights in his conception of

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[57] Liberalism is an amorphous and complex term. For more on liberalism and the debate of its meaning and context see, *Political Liberalism: Variations on a Theme*, ed. by Shaun P. Young (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004); *Liberalism and the Moral Life*, ed. by Nancy L. Rosenblum (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1991); Judith N. Shklar, 'Liberalism of Fear', in *Political Liberalism: Variations on a Theme*, ed. by Shaun P. Young (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), pp. 149–66; and Duncan Bell, 'What Is Liberalism?', *Political Theory*, 42.6 (2014), 682–715.

[58] See, Ronald Terchek, *Republican Paradoxes and Liberal Anxieties: Retrieving Neglected Fragments of Political Theory* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), for more an historical analysis of the liberal and republican traditions, and their links to the contemporary political debate.

[59] T. H. Marshall, 'Citizenship and Social Class', in *Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays* (London; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1950), pp. 1–85. Heater refers to this essay as, 'the most famous single work to have been composed on liberal citizenship', Heater (1999), p. 12. Kymlicka and Norman similarly recognise the importance of this work. They write, 'The most influential exposition of this postwar conception of citizen-as-rights is T. H. Marshall's "Citizenship and Social Class,"', Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, 'Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory', *Ethics*, 104.2 (1994), 352–81 (p. 354).

[60] Marshall (1950), pp. 10–11.

[61] *ibid*, p. 68.

citizenship and argues that in securing rights people will take ownership of their citizenship.  The liberal conception of the citizen changes the focus away from the public sphere and the virtues that promote the public good, to the private sphere and the rights of the individual to live without interference by the state within that sphere.  Walzer writes of the liberal citizen, '[f]or them, the political community is only a necessary framework, a set of external arrangements, not a common life.'[62]

The tradition of the liberal citizen continues to find its champions in the likes of the political philosophy of John Rawls who defines citizenship as the possession of equal rights that are protected by the state.[63]  Leif Wenar writes of the Rawlsian citizen that, '[c]itizens are free and equal in that each is an equally valid source of claims on social institutions regardless of her religious affiliation, philosophical commitments, and personal preference.'[64]  This view is supported by Rawls' famous two principles of justice, the first of which guarantees citizens equal rights and freedoms and the second principle which requires that all citizens have equal opportunities to assume positions of power and that any inequalities in holdings do not create additional constraints on the rights and freedoms of the worst off.[65]

Chantel Mouffe comments that Rawls, 'affirms that once citizens see themselves as free and equal persons, they should recognise that to pursue their own different conceptions of the good, they need the same primary goods'.[66]  This is why Rawls believes that people in the original position and behind the veil of ignorance will agree to his two principles of justice.  This is a view of citizenship that perceives persons as pursuing their own self-interests, self-interests which are constrained only by the two principles of justice which are rationally agreed upon by everyone, also in virtue of self-interest.[67]

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[62] Walzer (1989), pp. 215–16.

[63] John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, Rev. ed (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 82–83.

[64] Leif Wenar, 'Why Rawls Is Not a Cosmopolitan Egalitarian', in *Rawls's Law of Peoples A Realistic Utopia?*, ed. by Rex Martin and David A Reidy (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 2008), pp. 95–113 (p. 96).

[65] Rawls (1999), p. 53.

[66] Chantal Mouffe, 'Democratic Citizenship and the Political Community', in *Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community*, ed. by Chantal Mouffe, Phronesis (London; New York: Verso, 1992), pp. 225–39 (p. 226).

[67] Rawls (1999), pp. 118–23.

Mouffe criticises the liberal citizen for reducing 'citizenship to a mere legal status, setting out the rights that the individual holds against the state.'[68] It, in effect, disassociates the people from others within their community because social cooperation occurs only because, and when, it is in the interests of the individual.  It is instrumentally justified.  Therefore, '[i]deas of public-mindedness, civic activity and political participation in a community of equals are alien to most liberal thinkers.'[69]  They are alien because, while a liberal may desire or value public-mindedness, civic activity and political participation in some way, the values are disconnected from the liberal underpinning of the citizen.

A further concern which arises with the liberal conception of the citizen is that the set of rights that constitute citizenship and the legal framework which defines the scope of the citizen differs from country to country and changes over time.[70]  What constitutes the set of rights and privileges that sustains an equilibrium between the people and the authorities of the state at any one time and place shifts.  As such, the passive enjoyment of rights requires active participation in order to secure those rights, and those rights and privileges must be periodically modified to maintain peaceful relations between these two forces.  Walzer identifies two ways in which the shift occurs, 'the number and range of people in the "commonality" grows by invasion and incorporation', and 'the number and range of liberties or entitlements also grows'.[71]  But of course the shifts need not be representative of growth, rights often are additionally constrained over time also.[72] Therefore, the defender of the liberal citizen must incorporate responsibilities into their conception otherwise the risk of society stagnating and dissolving over time will remain a legitimate concern.

The conceptions of the republican citizen of active responsibilities in the public sphere and the liberal citizen of passive rights in the private sphere are not dichotomous.

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[68] Mouffe (1992), p. 227.

[69] *ibid*.

[70] For example, in the UK human rights were not codified until the Human Rights Act 1998; until 2003 a 16-year-old could pose naked in a national newspaper; and same-sex marriage was not permitted until 2014. These three examples are legislated by the following statutes, *Human Rights Act*, 1998; *Sexual Offences Act*, 2003; and *Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act*, 2013.

[71] Walzer (1989), p. 217.

[72] This is evidenced for example by an increase in stop and search powers and the re-introduction of indefinite detention without trial in the UK's terrorism legislation, of which, at the time of writing, there have been thirteen separate acts passed to date since 2000.

This is something acknowledged by the defenders of both the republican and the liberal citizen. The republican citizen, while primarily focussed in the responsibilities felt, must also recognise the importance of rights within this conception. Whether these rights extend beyond the central commitment to a right of non-domination depends upon the model of republicanism. However, some argue that republican freedom is best understood as a type of negative freedom, or freedom from interference, because a person's freedom can be measured by the likelihood of constraints to their action. Therefore, a person is less free if the probability of suffering constraints to their actions is greater than if they were not subject to arbitrary power.[73] If republican freedom is understood in this way freedom is protected through the guarantee of passively enjoyed rights. If this is the case it is unclear how the republican citizen differs markedly from the liberal citizen.[74]

Similarly, this problem manifests within the liberal conception of the citizen. Proponents of the liberal citizen do not turn their backs on responsibilities wholesale but argue for the primacy of rights in defining the citizen. John Locke, for example is a defender of the rights of the individual and limiting the power of the state to protect those rights.[75] Along with these rights come the counterbalancing force of obligation – obligation to the state and to each other. John Rawls argues that a principle of natural duty would be chosen in the original position and is a necessary component of a stable cooperative association.[76] Marshall too echoes this view. He writes,

> If citizenship is invoked in the defence of rights, the corresponding duties
> of citizenship cannot be ignored. These do not require a man [*sic*] to
> sacrifice his [*sic*] individual liberty or to submit without question to every
> demand made by government. But they do require that his [*sic*] acts

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[73] See, Ian Carter, *A Measure of Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Matthew H. Kramer, *The Quality of Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

[74] Both Walzer (1989) and Bruce Ackerman, in 'Neo-Federalism?', in *Constitutionalism and Democracy*, ed. by Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, Studies in Rationality and Social Change, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 153–94, argue that the liberal and republican conceptions of the citizen can be understood as complementary.

[75] See John Locke, *Second Treatise of Government* (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing, 2011); John Locke, *Some Thoughts Concerning Education: And, Of the Conduct of the Understanding* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1996).

[76] Rawls (1999), pp. 293–301.

should be inspired by a lively sense of responsibility towards the welfare
of the community.[77]

Therefore, conceptions of the liberal citizen, much like conceptions of the
republican citizen, if they perceive themselves as a distinct conception of the citizen, must
show how they retain that distinct identity.  Furthermore, it must be shown, by the liberal
and republican theorist alike, how the rights and responsibilities of the citizen are
compatible.  However, it seems unlikely that the classical debate is adequately equipped
to resolve this tension for which an effective balance is necessary for a well-functioning
cooperative association.  Kymlicka and Norman identify an increase in interest in
citizenship for exactly this reason.[78]  They write,

the health and stability of a modern democracy depends, not only on the
justice of its "basic structure" but also on the qualities and attitudes of
its citizens... [without these qualities and attitudes] democracies become
difficult to govern, even unstable.[79]

Marshall thought that active participation would occur as a direct result of a
person's citizenship rights, but it is not clear that this is the case. If active participation
does not occur as a result of granting the conditions in which a person can assume
responsibilities, and it is necessary for the stable functioning of a cooperative society that
a citizen has both rights and responsibilities then it must be established how these
responsibilities are cultivated.  As such, a new focus has been sought to motivate and
explain a citizenship that is constituted by both rights and responsibilities.

The classic debate addressed the tension between rights and the responsibilities of
the individual as dictated by the state.  This tension is a manifestation of the tension
between the individual and society because the rights represent the interests of the

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[77] Marshall (1950), p. 70.

[78] Penny Enslin and Patricia White also write of this uptick of interest in citizenship and citizenship
education, in 'Democratic Citizenship', in *The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Education*, ed. by Nigel
Blake, Blackwell Philosophy Guides (Oxford, UK; Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), pp. 110–26 (p.
110).

[79] Kymlicka and Norman (1994), pp. 352–53.

individual and the responsibilities represent the interests of others. The answers provided for this tension within the classical debate of the citizen are unsatisfactory. For while the liberal citizen can be seen as too passive and self-interested, the ideal of the republican citizen can be seen as too demanding and self-sacrificing. Furthermore, the classic debate fails to provide an adequate response to the tension because the classical notion of the citizen is a man, and the distinction between private and public often appealed to as spheres that delineate the forces of rights and responsibilities are at least partly defined by, and unconsciously support, existing gender norms.[80]

There have been several attempts to re-evaluate the citizen in light of concerns such as these. The following sections shall analyse the most prominent of these re-evaluations. In the process I shall draw attention to the influence and the overlap of these theories of the citizen with the politico-educational projects of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire because it is through these figures that the model of the citizen defended in this thesis is found. In doing so a clearer presentation of the citizen being argued for will become apparent.

## §1.2 Three Alternative Models of the Citizen

The republican and the liberal conceptions of the citizen represent only a narrow offering of the debate on the citizen. The definition and foundation of the citizen is a broad debate that both feeds off of the traditional conceptions found within the debate between the republican and the liberal theorist and cuts across these traditional dividing lines. As such, the citizen represents a normative concept that differs significantly from theory to theory. In addition to re-interpretations of the liberal and republican citizen, contemporary debates include a variety of other positions. These are most notably: participatory democratic theory; civil society theory or communitarianism; and

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[80] See, Madeleine Arnot, '"Gendered Citizenry": New Feminist Perspectives on Education and Citizenship', *British Educational Research Journal*, 23.3 (1997), 275–95; Ruth Lister, *Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives*, 2. ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Susan Moller Okin, 'Women, Equality, and Citizenship', *Queen's Quarterly*, 99.1 (1992), 56–71; and *Beyond Equality and Difference: Citizenship, Feminist Politics, and Female Subjectivity*, ed. by Gisela Bock and Susan James (London: Routledge, 1992), for a feminist perspective on citizenship and the citizen.

cosmopolitan theory. In this section I shall introduce these three alternative models of the citizen which cut across the traditional republican and liberal conceptions.[81]

These three models of the citizen offer a broad understanding of how 'the citizen' is understood within the literature and serve to illustrate two important aspects of this thesis. The first is the influence and overlap between the contemporary debates on the citizen and the philosophies of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire, and the second aspect is the persistence of the tension between the individual and society within all conceptions of the citizen. Even though these five political approaches are often set up in opposition to one or more of the others, for the most part, they are not distinct and the principles of each have occasion to overlap and bleed into another.

The first alternative model of the citizen that I consider is the participatory democratic citizen. Participatory democratic theory argues that cultivating greater participation within society at a young age results in greater participation within society throughout one's life. This is because the members of society learn and develop the skills of active participation in society by actively participating in society.[82] Michael E. Morrell writes, '[a]ccording to participatory democratic theory, citizens should be given greater opportunities to participate in making the decisions that govern their lives; if this were to happen, citizens would be transformed in positive ways'.[83] However this is just one claim of the participatory democratic theorist. Pateman argues that, in addition to the claim that individuals learn to participate by participating, that 'participatory democratic theory is an argument about democratisation'.[84] That is, the participatory democratic theorist identifies a number of ways in which society will be democratic and engage the individuals of society in politically active ways. Pateman defends participation as a value that is guaranteed by right. She writes,

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[81] Civil society theory is a form of communitarianism. In this thesis I shall be using the terms interchangeably. Furthermore, this list is not meant to be exhaustive but is a broad representation of the citizenship debate. For a more thorough analysis of the different conceptions of the citizen within philosophy see, Derek Benjamin Heater, *Citizenship: The Civic Ideal in World History, Politics and Education* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004a).

[82] While this sounds at first blush like an education model for the republican citizen and less like a distinct model or concept of the citizen, participatory democratic theory is often defended by self-styled liberals as well, such as John Dewey and Amy Gutmann. This is discussed in more detail below.

[83] Michael E. Morrell, 'Citizen's Evaluations of Participatory Democratic Procedures: Normative Theory Meets Empirical Science', *Political Research Quarterly*, 52.2 (1999), 293–322 (p. 294).

[84] Carole Pateman, 'Participatory Democracy Revisited', *Perspectives on Politics*, 10.01 (2012), 7–19 (p. 10).

the conception of citizenship embodied in participatory democratic theory is that citizens are not at all like consumers. Citizens have the right to public provision, the right to participate in decision-making about their collective like and to live within authority structures that make such participation possible.[85]

Pateman, inspired by the works of Rousseau and Mill, argues alongside them that greater participation will lead to greater acceptance of the dictates of society. But further to this, Pateman argues that participatory democracy has a positive impact on the education of those who participate and their integration into society. Pateman claims that evidence suggests, 'we do learn to participate by participating and that feelings of political efficacy are more likely to be developed in a participatory environment.'[86] Morrell also takes up the mantle of participatory democracy. He writes, 'participation, in order to increase citizens' positive perceptions of the decision-making process, must occur fairly often, involve several issues, and be structured so that citizens feel safe to offer their political opinions'.[87]

Participatory democratic theory should be understood as distinct from deliberative democracy. For while there is some overlap, participation and deliberation are two different values which can be in conflict with one another.[88] It is common for deliberative democratic theorists to incorporate participation as a value, and some argue that

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[85] Pateman (2012), p. 15.

[86] Carole Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 105.

[87] Morrell (1999), p. 294.

[88] The tension between deliberation and participation as values is discussed by, Dennis F. Thompson, 'Deliberative Democratic Theory and Empirical Political Science', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 11.1 (2008), 497–520; Bruce A. Ackerman and James S. Fishkin, *Deliberation Day* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 2004); and Joshua Cohen and Archon Fung, 'Radical Democracy', *Swiss Journal of Political Science*, 10.4 (2004), 23–34. Diane Carole Mutz, in her study, *Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative versus Participatory Democracy* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), argues that deliberation undermines participation. Her research suggests that deliberation improves understanding between people of different viewpoints and, as a result, quells the tension between them because their differences seem less urgent and their opponents less like enemies. For these reasons, through effective deliberation people become less likely to participate actively in politics.

deliberative democracy actually subsumes participatory democracy.[89] Thompson writes, 'rather than transcending participatory theory, many deliberative democrats see themselves as extending it. To the standard list of political activities in which citizens participate—voting, organising, protesting—they add deliberating.'[90] Pateman expresses a similar sentiment when she writes, 'in so far as deliberative democrats take an interest in examples of participatory democracy, they typically treat them as an example of deliberative democracy.'[91] However, this is to sell participatory democratic theory short. Participatory democratic theory argues for the democratisation of society and structural changes in the construct of society in order to facilitate greater democracy. In Pateman's words the participatory society 'needs to be created.'[92]

The second alternative model of the citizen that I introduce is the Communitarian Citizen. Communitarians offer another method for re-evaluating the citizen. They respond to concerns with liberal political theory arguing that the universalism germane within it is incoherent.[93] Instead, according to the communitarian, political theory must focus on the principles found in the traditions and practices of particular societies. This is because the moral standards of cooperative association differ from context to context.[94]

The communitarian theorist is committed to the view that we owe additional duties to our local and national communities. Communitarianism places emphasis on a concept

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[89] Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright, *Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance*, The Real Utopias Project, 4 (London: Verso, 2011); and Robert E. Goodin, *Innovating Democracy: Democratic Theory and Practice after the Deliberative Turn* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), argue that deliberative democracy subsumes participatory democracy.

[90] Thompson (2008), p. 512.

[91] Pateman (2012), p. 8.

[92] *ibid*, p. 10.

[93] For a detailed analysis of communitarian thought and its debate with liberalism see, Amitai Etzioni, *The Spirit of Community: The Reinvention of American Society*, 1st Touchstone ed (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994); Michael Walzer, 'The Civil Society Argument', in *Group Rights: Perspectives Since 1900*, ed. by Julia Stapleton, Key Issues, no. 3 (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1995); Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, *Liberals and Communitarians*, 2nd ed (Oxford; Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell, 1996); and *Debates in Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology*, ed. by Derek Matravers and Jonathan E. Pike (London; New York: Routledge, in association with the Open University, 2003).

[94] These arguments are found in Charles Taylor, 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man', in *Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 15–57; Alasdair C. MacIntyre, *Against the Self-Images of the Age: Essays on Ideology and Philosophy* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978); and Alasdair C. MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (London: Duckworth, 1988), pp. 1-11. Despite the fact that neither Taylor nor MacIntyre refer to themselves as communitarians the arguments referred to have been labelled so by their opponents and the next generation of communitarian theorists. See Daniel Bell, 'Communitarianism', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2016 www.plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/communitarianism.

of the self that is, at least in part, defined or constituted by various attachments particular to the individual, such as familial ties and religious tradition.  These attachments, being held so close to the individual, cannot be abstracted from the individual and as such, the political sphere must extend beyond concerns for conditions of autonomous action and consider additionally the social attachments which contribute to an individual sense of self and identity.[95]  The values of citizenship, according to the communitarian, are learned in the particular attachments to which one belongs.  It is within these groups that we learn, 'values of civility and self-restraint' and 'the virtues of mutual obligation.'[96]  One learns civic virtues within the groups of which one is a part.

The third alternative model of the citizen is the cosmopolitan citizen.  The cosmopolitan theorist is committed to the view that each person is of equal moral worth and there is no justification for partial moral principles which prioritise or elevate one group above another.  It is for this reason that the cosmopolitan citizen is often presented in opposition to the communitarian citizen.  However, like the communitarian and the participatory democratic, the cosmopolitan cuts across the traditional debate between the liberal and the republican.  As such, cosmopolitan theorists can be attached to different philosophical traditions.[97]

The roots of cosmopolitanism can be traced back to antiquity.  Diogenes the Cynic and Stoicism both express cosmopolitan views.  Although Diogenes the Cynic only professed cosmopolitanism in the negative sense, i.e. one does not owe special duties to the state of which one resides, Stoics such as Cicero and Seneca, did defend some form of moderate cosmopolitanism.[98]  These roots have developed into at least three different

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[95] Charles Taylor in, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989), provides a detailed account of our perception of modern identity and how it has been formed over time and out of the ideas on human identity that have come before.
[96] Kymlicka and Norman (1994), p. 363.
[97] Peter Singer in, *One World Now: The Ethics of Globalization* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), and Peter K. Unger in, *Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), defend a conception of cosmopolitanism on utilitarian grounds.  Onora O'Neill in, *Bounds of Justice* (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), and John Rawls in, *The Law of Peoples: With 'The Idea of Public Reason Revisited'* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003), defend a form of cosmopolitanism within the liberal Kantian tradition.  Whereas, James Bohman in, 'Cosmopolitan Republicanism: Citizenship, Freedom and Global Political Authority', *The Monist*, 84.1 (2001), 3–21; and 'Republican Cosmopolitanism*', *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 12.3 (2004), 336–52, defends a republican conception of cosmopolitanism.
[98] For more on historical conceptions of cosmopolitanism see Robert Drew Hicks, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, The Loeb Classical Library (London: Heinemann, 2000), Vol. 2; Eric Brown, 'Hellenistic

branches of cosmopolitanism, but these branches, while interrelated, can come apart. There are political cosmopolitans, moral cosmopolitans, and economic cosmopolitans. What is most relevant in the discussion of the cosmopolitan citizen is moral cosmopolitanism and as such it is that which I shall focus upon.[99]

Moral cosmopolitanism can be understood as a commitment to universal moral principles which apply to all people equally. Influential ethical theorists like Kant and Bentham develop ethical systems of deontology and consequentialism respectively, which are just this.[100] Martha Nussbaum develops a contemporary account of cosmopolitanism. Nussbaum identifies the underlying moral principle of cosmopolitanism when she writes, 'Whatever else we are bound by and pursue, we should recognise, at whatever personal or social cost, that each human being is human and counts as the moral equal of every other.'[101]

Influenced by the cosmopolitanism of Stoicism Nussbaum provides a descriptive account of moral practice. From Stoic thought Nussbaum reimagines the concentric circles of moral attachment. She writes,

> The first one encircles the self, the next takes in the immediate family,
> then, in order, neighbours or local groups, fellow city-dwellers, and

Cosmopolitanism', in *A Companion to Ancient Philosophy*, ed. by Mary Louise Gill and Pierre Pellegrin (Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2012), pp. 549–58; and *The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy*, ed. by Robert Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé, 23 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).

[99] Economic cosmopolitanism is the defence of free markets and attributable to Adam Smith. See Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations: Books I-III*, Penguin Classics, Reprinted (London; New York: Penguin Books, 1999); and *The Wealth of Nations: Books IV-V*, Penguin Classics (London; New York: Penguin Books, 1999). I understand the political cosmopolitan as one who is committed to some form of world organising body. These bodies can be loosely federated or, in some cases, a world state is defended. Kant's political philosophy is illustrative of political cosmopolitanism. See, Immanuel Kant, 'Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch'; and Immanuel Kant, 'Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose', in *Kant: Political Writings*, ed. by Hans Siegbert Reiss, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, 2nd, ed edn (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 93–130 & pp. 41–53. Of course, moral cosmopolitanism, especially in the context that I discuss it, is not distinct from the political more broadly conceived. However, I wish to discuss something that is distinct from arguments of political cosmopolitanism narrowly understood as defined in this footnote

[100] See, Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, ed. by Mary J. Gregor and Jens Timmermann, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, Revised edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); and Jeremy Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (Mineola, N.Y: Dover Publications, 2007).

[101] Martha Craven Nussbaum, 'Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism', in *For Love of Country? Debating the Limits of Patriotism*, ed. by Joshua Cohen (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002), pp. 2–20 (p. 133).

fellow countrymen—and we can easily add to this list groupings based on ethnic, linguistic, historical, professional, gender, or sexual identities. Outside all these circles is the largest one, humanity as a whole.[102]

However, these circles are descriptive, and they need not be understood as objective or fixed. The circles provide an illustrative function in that they highlight a plausible ordering of moral partialism. A different order with different categories does not affect the cosmopolitan argument. This is because after recognising that people possess a weighted morality based upon concentric circles the cosmopolitan then argues that the aim is to draw the circles together. Nussbaum achieves this end through a defence of cosmopolitan education which is designed to put people into conversation with the world.[103]

The participatory democratic, the communitarian and the cosmopolitan citizen all suffer shortcomings that open them up to objection. In this section I shall raise the most concerning objections that can be raised against these conceptions of the citizen with the aim of building a compatibilist model of the citizen which incorporates elements of all three.

The participatory democratic citizen is problematic for similar reasons to the republican citizen. According to Thompson, 'the most common empirical challenge to participatory theory' is that it is unrealistic, 'because most citizens are not political animals.'[104] On this view, the participatory citizen is simply too demanding as an aim because most people do not want to participate in politics. However, Thompson argues that this objection misses the point because theory is designed to challenge political reality, not accept it as given.[105] He writes, 'Participatory theory deplores the lack of participation in any current political system, just as deliberative theory condemns the lack of deliberation.'[106] A better objection, according to Thompson seeks to show conflict

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[102] Nussbaum (2002), p. 9.
[103] Nussbaum supports cosmopolitan education with four arguments. 1) Through cosmopolitan education, we learn more about ourselves; 2) '*We make headway solving problems that require international cooperation*'; 3) *We recognise moral obligations to the rest of the world that are real and that otherwise would go unrecognised*'; 4) '*We make a consistent and coherent argument based on distinctions we are prepared to defend.*' Nussbaum (2002), p. 12-14.
[104] Thompson (2008), p. 512.
[105] *ibid*, p. 499 & p. 512.
[106] *ibid*, p. 512.

between core values.  Participation alone cannot build the attachments necessary for a functioning society of responsible citizens therefore there must be other values, such as deliberation, which are central to this vision of the citizen, and if this is so then it must be explored that the set of values are coherent.  Adrian Oldfield addresses this concern and writes, '[p]olitical participation enlarges the minds of individuals, familiarises them with interests which lie beyond the immediacy of personal circumstance and environment, and encourages them to acknowledge that public concerns are the proper ones to which they should pay attention.'[107]  However, this is a 'starting point' because without some appeal to individual interests it is likely that a significant portion of a populace would be resistant to developing the desired habits.[108]  Participation may well be a necessary component of citizenship but it does not appear to be sufficient for citizenship.[109]

Communitarianism suffers similar shortcomings to the participatory democratic citizen.  Communitarianism is unsatisfactory because the values learnt and the scope of these values can be both limited and limiting.  Identification with a group within civil society may put one at odds with those outside of the group when interests do not align.  Furthermore, the practices within those groups may run contrary to the values firmly held outside of the group.  Associational networks may prove too insulated from outside influence, and too insular to impact externally to the group.  Even if the group is able to influence the larger society it is not clear that we would want them to.  A similar situation arises as with participatory democratic theory where the primary value is asked to do too much.  One's existing set of beliefs and norms which are defined by the temporal, geographical, and cultural factors with which one associates are a necessary component of the citizen and citizenship but they are not sufficient.  Kymlicka and Norman make this point when they write, 'civil society theorists define citizenship in terms of the virtues of the private sphere.  But while these virtues may sometimes be necessary for good citizenship, they are not sufficient, and may sometimes be counterproductive.'[110]

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[107] Adrian Oldfield, 'Citizenship: An Unnatural Practice?', *The Political Quarterly*, 61.2 (1990), 177–87 (p. 184).  This concern with participatory democratic theory is also addressed by Geoff Andrews in, 'Universal Principles', in *Citizenship*, ed. by Geoff Andrews (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1991), pp. 212–18; and Lawrence M. Mead in, *Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of Citizenship* (New York: Free Press, 1986).

[108] Oldfield (1990), p. 184.

[109] Kymlicka and Norman (1994), p. 361.

[110] *ibid*, p. 365.

Therefore, the values and beliefs acquired in one's communities, that is familial, local, national and global communities represent the starting place for enquiry.  In other words, they are merely descriptive and remain descriptive until subject to reflective thought outside of those inhibiting conditions.  These beliefs and values do not possess normative power and are not desirable as ends in and of themselves.

What emerges from this critique of the participatory democratic and the communitarian citizen is that neither of them offer holistic conceptualisations of the citizen but instead stress an aspect of the citizen that they feel is overlooked.  Participatory democratic theorists challenge the overly passive enjoyment of rights, whereas the communitarian challenges the atomistic individualism of some models of liberalism.

The cosmopolitan citizen is subject to a different set of criticisms, which mainly focus around what qualifies as a citizen.  One objection is that it is not possible to be a citizen of the world in the same way as a person is a citizen of a nation-state because there is too little to motivate the necessary moral connection to the world.  Walzer writes, 'I am not a citizen of the world… I am not even aware that there is a world such that one could be a citizen of it.'[111]  This objection to cosmopolitanism argues that, in the case of the nation-state the people of that nation-state share a history, culture, values, and respect for the rule of law of that nation-state, while this is not the case for the world.  There is too little to motivate the necessary empathy to ground a claim of citizenship.  This is a problematic claim, it is not clear that the nation-state satisfies the conditions set but, it seems that it has a greater chance of satisfying them than the cosmopolitan.  Walzer objects to cosmopolitanism on these grounds.  He writes, 'I have commitments beyond the borders of this or any other country, to fellow Jews, say, or to social democrats around the world, or to people in trouble in faraway countries, but these are not citizen-like commitments.'[112]

Another related objection to the cosmopolitan citizen is that it is not possible to be a citizen of the world because there is no global body which grants a person's rights and duties, and which protects those rights and duties through the rule of law.  Furthermore,

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[111] Michael Walzer, 'Spheres of Affection', in *For Love of Country? Debating the Limits of Patriotism*, ed. by Joshua Cohen (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002), pp. 125–27 (p. 125).
[112] *ibid*, p. 126.

to be a citizen one must possess rights of participation and representation with respect to law and policies practiced in their name as citizens. There is no elected or representative body for the citizen of the world. There are bodies, organisations and international laws which the cosmopolitan citizen can appeal to, and build upon, in order to show that this argument is not wholly true. Furthermore, the situation where there is little international institutional structure and legislation need not remain the case forever. Of course, some cosmopolitans argue that there should be such bodies but without them, as Gertrude Himmelfarb points out,

> the first requirement of international cooperation, … essential for economic development, environmental protection, and "quality-of-life issues," is the existence of states capable of undertaking and enforcing international agreements. "International" has "national" as its necessary and primary ingredient.[113]

However, this does not provide a response to the moral concern, that a person feels empathy and attachment to those geographically proximal and who they can immediately relate to. Therefore, there is an obstacle of proximity bias that the cosmopolitan citizen theorist must respond to, especially since a manifestation of the proximal bias potentially perpetuates the liberal democratic western citizen as the ideal model for the world citizen.[114] In other words, when communities morally and proximally distant to our own are encompassed under the banner of the cosmopolitan ethic there is a distinct risk of imposing values upon them.

In this section I have introduced potentially problematic concerns with each of the three alternative models of the citizen discussed. While the concerns raised have not shown any one of these models to be wholly unfit, they have shown that not one of them, on their own, is adequate as a model of the citizen. Instead, the three concepts usefully draw out attention to salient issues while remaining, in abstraction, incomplete. In the following section I shall take a step away from the shortcomings of these three

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[113] Gertrude Himmelfarb, 'The Illusions of Cosmopolitanism', in *For Love of Country?*, ed. by Joshua Cohen (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002), pp. 72–77 (p. 76).

[114] *ibid*, p.75.

models of the citizen in order to highlight the influence and overlap that the philosophies of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire have with them. This serves to highlight the importance of the work of these figures in a discussion of the concept of the citizen but also paves the way for a more detailed analysis of their politico-educational projects in the subsequent chapter which shapes the model of the Critical Citizen that I defend.

## §1.3  Rousseau, Dewey and Freire and the Three Alternative Models

In the participatory democratic citizen Rousseau is a primary classical source.[115] Rousseau's political vision places the citizen at the centre of the political process. Every member of the citizenry is a part of the Sovereign body of Rousseau's Republic. The role of this Sovereign body is to act as the legislative power through the expression of the General Will. Rousseau writes, 'Only those who are forming an association have the right to regulate the conditions of the society'.[116] The General Will is the result of a citizen's properly directed reasoning and desire. Although Rousseau appears to say otherwise, it is not the case that the General Will is an amalgamation of each individual's particular interests.[117] Cassirer writes,

> From a formal point of view, it is true, Rousseau has a good deal of difficulty in delimiting, clearly and firmly, the *volenté générale* [General Will] against the *volenté de tous* [Will of All], and in the *Contrat social* we can find not a few passages that would seem to indicate that the content of the General Will could be determined purely quantitatively, by some simple counting of individual votes. No doubt, there are flaws of exposition, but these flaws do not touch the core of Rousseau's fundamental thought.[118]

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[115] See, Pateman (2000), pp. 22–27; and Terrence E. Cook and Patrick M. Morgan, *Participatory Democracy* (San Francisco: Canfield Press, 1971), pp. 6–11 & pp. 115-120.
[116] 'Social Contract', *OC III*, 380; *CWR, Vol. 4*, p. 154.
[117] 'Social Contract', *OC III*, 371; *CWR, Vol. 4*, p. 147.
[118] Cassirer (1963), p. 63.

The General Will must be more than merely what remains after particular interests have been discounted. It is the expression of that which is best for the whole group.[119] The participation of the citizen in the Republic as Sovereign is an essential feature of Rousseau's political thought. Furthermore, the educative aspect of participatory democratic theory is represented in Rousseau also. Rousseau argues that the citizens of the Republic will learn, through their participation as Sovereign, to express the General Will effectively and without error. But this will not happen straight away, nor will it happen unless the citizens participate in society as Sovereign.[120]

Dewey's theory of democracy is also a model of participatory democracy. Joel Westheimer and Joseph Kahne write that Dewey, 'emphasized participation in collective endeavours. To support the efficacy of these collective efforts, he also emphasized commitments to communication, experimentation, and scientifically informed dialogues.'[121] A main feature of Dewey's political project is an attempt to refine and maximise democracy within society as a tool for social change and enfranchisement of the individual. Democracy, when used as a term by Dewey, is more than merely the limited view of democracy as a form of government. Democracy, for Dewey, 'is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience'.[122] It is, therefore, rule by the people, not solely through elected representatives or the mere act of voting, but, rule by the people through participation in a community of enquirers. Jim Garrison writes, that Dewey's conception of democracy, 'was less about voting than about equal participation by all in the conversation of humankind. Initiation into this conversation is the purpose of education, and it is the purpose of educational research to provide tools that aid this task.'[123] In understanding democracy as a process to be participated in by all,

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[119] The General Will is a complex and engaging subject of its own and not one that I shall go into detail here. For the purposes of this thesis I shall assume that the General Will does not produce any complications to the main arguments that I wish to make. For more detail about the General Will see Joshua Cohen, *Rousseau: A Free Community of Equals* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Patrick Riley, 'Rousseau's General Will', in *The Cambridge Companion to Rousseau*, ed. by Patrick Riley (Cambridge New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 124–53; and N. J. H. Dent, *A Rousseau Dictionary*, The Blackwell Philosopher Dictionaries (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Reference, 1992).
[120] 'The Social Contract', *OC III*, 438; *CWR Vol. 4*, pp. 198-199.
[121] Joel Westheimer and Joseph Kahne, 'What Kind of Citizen? The Politics of Educating for Democracy', *American Educational Research Journal*, 41.2 (2004), 237–69, (p. 241).
[122] John Dewey, 'Democracy and Education', in *The Middle Works of John Dewey, 1899-1924, Volume 9: 1916*, ed. by Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008), pp. 1–370 (p. 93).
[123] Jim W. Garrison, 'Realism, Deweyan Pragmatism, and Educational Research', *Educational Researcher*, 23.1 (1994), 5–14 (p. 13).

Dewey's political project immediately expands beyond that of political science and demands engagement with broad and complex philosophical and pedagogical problems. What Dewey provides instead of a fixed model of the ideal state is the method by which the structure and terms of association of the state meet the needs and desires of the citizenry. The method is Dewey's instrumentalism. Dewey writes,

> …popular government is educative as other modes of political regulation are not. It forces a recognition that there are common interests, even though recognition of *what* they are is confused; and the need it enforces of discussion and publicity brings about some clarification of what they are.[124]

Communication in this way serves to support societal growth. This has an educative effect for the individual too. Sandra B. Rosenthal writes, '[t]he educative effect of democratic participation, in Dewey's view, goes beyond skills and knowledge to involve moral development, and thus, personal transformation.'[125] Dewey's theory of schooling and education links together what goes on in our homes and schools with society. For Dewey a democratic person must possess the skills and desire to participate in society, and it was the responsibility of society to cultivate those qualities. This view can be seen in Dewey's writings very early and it persists throughout his career. Dewey argued that the school, as a part of the community, must be involved in the community. Furthermore, it was Dewey's contention that the students of the school develop the skills and knowledge necessary by direct practice and observation. Therefore, greater interaction between school and society is encouraged. Within Deweyan scholarship Dewey is widely thought of as a participatory democratic theorist.[126]

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[124] John Dewey, 'The Public and Its Problems', in *The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953, Volume 2: 1925-1927*, ed. by Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), pp. 235–372 (p. 364).

[125] Sandra B. Rosenthal, *Speculative Pragmatism* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1986), p. 191.

[126] Dewey as a participatory democratic theorist is a position widely held. In particular see Robert Brett Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010). A clear expression of this view is found in John Dewey, 'The School and Society', in *The Middle Works of John Dewey, 1899-1924, Volume 1: 1899-1901*, ed. by Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1976), pp. 1–109.

On the other hand, Freire is not an influence on participatory democratic theory, nor is he referenced as practicing participatory democratic theory. This is most likely because of the revolutionary aspect of his politico-educational theory which seeks to destroy the existent societal structure, which he sees as oppressive, and not work within it under the name of democracy. However, it is worth noting the revolutionary practice developed by Freire called for a great engagement with and participation in one's immediate community. Furthermore, and more in the spirit of the participatory democratic citizen, in the post-revolutionary period Freire's practice was strikingly similar to that of Dewey's. The Citizen School programme that Freire implemented while Municipal Secretary of Education in São Paulo has distinctive elements of participatory democratic theory. The Citizen School aimed to be democratic and participatory in its structure with an aim of dissolving the barriers between school and society.[127]

The influence of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire extends beyond the scope of the participatory democratic citizen. The communitarian citizen emphasises, not participation in a democracy and the democratisation of society, but an active engagement with the values and wellbeing of the local community. Yet still, the voices of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire can be heard clearly.

In the case of Rousseau, the community plays an integral part within his small-scale republics. Arthur Ripstein comments, 'Anyone who reads Rousseau's *The Social Contract* is struck by the extent to which he supposes the political community to be constitutive of its citizens.'[128] In Rousseau's small-scale republics the citizens hold strong attachments to one another through a cultivation of national and patriotic sentiment.[129] It is through

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[127] I shall return to Freire's citizen school in Chapter 7

[128] Arthur Ripstein, 'Universal and General Wills: Hegel and Rousseau', *Political Theory*, 22.3 (1994), 444–67 (p. 444).

[129] Nationalist and patriotic sentiment is expressed most explicitly in Rousseau's practical treatises, 'Considerations on the Government of Poland and on Its Planned Reformation', in *OC III*, 953-1041; *CWR Vol. 11*, pp. 167-240; and 'Plan for a Constitution for Corsica', in *OC III*, 901-50*; CWR Vol. 11,* pp. 123–66. In these texts Rousseau encourages the development of national sentiment as a means of developing strength and stability when threatened by powerful countries. For this reason Mads Qvortrup in, *The Political Philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Impossibility of Reason* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), attributes Rousseau with being the progenitor of nationalism. He writes, 'Previously unrecognised by scholars of nationalism, Rousseau was, in fact, the founder of the modern doctrine of nationalism', p. xi. For analysis of Rousseau's patriotic and nationalist sentiment see, Frederick M. Barnard, 'Patriotism and Citizenship in Rousseau: A Dual Theory of Public Willing?', *The Review of Politics*, 46.2 (1984), 244–65; and Terrence E. Cook, 'Rousseau: Education and Politics', *The Journal of Politics*, 37.1 (1975), 108–28.

participation within these small republics that the citizens learn the values that they share.  These characteristics of Rousseau's theory ring true in the ears of the communitarian.

Dewey also has strong links to communitarian thought.  While Dewey refers to himself as a liberal theorist he, much like the communitarian, rejects the universalism often present within it.[130]  Dominique Parodi writes of Dewey's rejection of universalism,

> [t]he great error of philosophy since classical antiquity has been, according to John Dewey, to put the static and the changeless above the moving and the changing; to conceive knowledge as an ensemble of absolute truths and certainties, morality as obedience to principles or to ends also absolute; and to strive to construct reality in all its aspects out of fixed and ready-made elements.[131]

What is more, much like the communitarian, Dewey argues that our starting place for enquiry must be from our current set of beliefs and norms.  This is a fundamental criterion of Dewey's pragmatism because enquiry begins with direct experience. Barbara Thayer-Bacon writes,

> [a]s a pragmatist, Dewey shows us that thinking begins with a situation of experience, then a problem develops within this situation (felt need), that triggers the person to seek a solution (hypothesis) by gathering information and making observations (reasoning/solutions), and testing out the ideas by application (testing hypothesis/ideas).  His model for

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[130] Dewey refers to himself as a liberal in, 'Individualism, Old and New', in *The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953, Volume 5: 1929-1930*, ed. by Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008), pp. 41–144.  For more on Dewey's rejection of universalism and his theory of truth see, Garrison (1994), pp. 7–11; and John Dewey, 'Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality', in *The Middle Works of John Dewey, 1899-1924, Volume 3: 1903-1906*, ed. by Darnell Rucker and Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008), pp. 3–39.  See also, Lowell Nissen, 'Dewey's Theory of Truth', *The Personalist*, 46.2 (1965), 203–10.

[131] Dominique Parodi, 'Knowledge and Action in Dewey's Philosophy', in *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, ed. by Paul Arthur Schilpp and Lewis Edwin Hahn, The Library of Living Philosophers, Volume 1, 3d ed (La Salle, Ill: Open Court, 1989), pp. 229–42, (pp. 230-231).

reflective thinking is like the scientific method, and it has greatly

influenced more recent debates concerning *critical thinking*.[132]

According to Dewey, the individual is a product of their social environment. Dewey

expresses, in *Democracy and Education*, his view that all those who participate in a

relational activity have a social environment. He argues that an individual cannot act in a

vacuum, and as such all actions are performed within a social environment. It is because

a person cannot be abstracted from society that Dewey assumes the communitarian

viewpoint that political theory begins with the values and experiences that we learn from

our immediate environment.

In a similar fashion to Dewey, Freire's politico-educational project is sensitive to the

communitarian viewpoint. Freire makes it explicit that the theory that he developed for

the illiterate peasant farmers of Brazil and expressed in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*

should not be incorporated wholesale outside of this time and context. To do so would

be dogmatic and insensitive to the particular conditions of the environment in question.

Dogmatism, according to Freire, is for the sectarian. Doubt and revision through

reflection are the tools for the radical. He writes, 'I will be satisfied if among the readers

of this work there are those sufficiently critical to correct mistakes and

misunderstandings, to deepen affirmations and to point out aspects I have not

perceived.'[133] Jones Irwin stresses the importance of the existential and political

situations from which Freire's thought and writings developed. Irwin writes that,

'symbiosis between life and philosophy is everywhere manifest in Freire's texts'.[134]

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[132] Barbara Thayer-Bacon, 'Education', in *The Bloomsbury Companion to Pragmatism*, ed. by Sami Pihlström (London New Delhi New York Sydney: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2015), pp. 188–202 (pp. 198–99).

[133] Freire (2017), p. 13.

[134] Irwin (2012), p. 1. Those situations that Irwin identifies as of particular significance are the military coup in Brazil in 1964 that led to Freire's exile, and the movements of rebellion in May 1968, an event still in progress at the publication of *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. In addition to these seismic events, Freire's reflections show the impact of the everyday on his thought. Freire reflects upon an interaction with a fishing community while addressing them on corporal punishment where he was rebuked by a member of that community for his lack of understanding of them. Freire came to refer to 'class knowledge' as a form of privileged knowledge and in recognition of his arrogance at that time. See, Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of Hope: Reliving Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, ed. by Ana Maria Araújo Freire (New York: Continuum, 1994), pp. 25–27. Another example of this reflection is that later in his career he takes ownership of his unintended but implicit sexism. Originally, and in earlier editions of *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* Freire uses the masculine gender without discrimination throughout which, as a result, has come under much scrutiny by feminist writers, most notably by bell hooks, *Teaching To Transgress: Education As the Practice of*

Freire's philosophy is fundamentally one of life and politics, one that is subject to change and reflection as a result of the experiences endured and experiences enjoyed. As such, it would be folly to import Freire wholesale without consideration of the environment where it emerged and how that differs from any other. Therefore, an essential aspect of Freire's philosophy and any Freirean inspired alternative is the environment in which it is applied. It must take into consideration the values and customs of this environment as its starting point and not some overly prescriptive end.

Freire's communitarian thought also manifests in his practical method for the realisation of his politico-educational project. The practice of Freire's pedagogy is defined largely by the construct and practice of the revolutionary educator. These revolutionary leaders are sensitive to the particular circumstances and context of the students and aim to illicit the learning stimuli from the community of the students, 'with an attitude of *understanding* towards what they see.'[135] In doing so, the revolutionary leaders impose stimuli upon the students but cultivate that stimuli from the students. They are, therefore, sympathetic to the nuances and particularities of each community and the

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*Freedom* (New York: Routledge, 1994). In the most recent edition from Penguin books much of the androcentric language has been edited out, although it does still appear at times. This is important to flag because Freire took ownership of his sexism and in his reflections upon *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, *Pedagogy of Hope: Reliving Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, (pp. 65–68), he sought to correct his mistake and recast his thought as one not limited to the Marxist inspired class struggle but one that extends to the struggles experienced by all oppressed groups, such as race and gender. In this way Freire is different to Rousseau who was intentionally addressing men exclusively, and different too, from Dewey who, despite possessing an attitude and philosophy of inclusion, consistently wrote with exclusive language. While androcentric language is commonplace throughout Dewey's writings, he does not practice intentional exclusion of women like Rousseau. While Rousseau intentionally developed his theory of education (for Émile at least) and conception of citizenship specifically for men, Dewey's practice of androcentric language was not intended to exclude women. In fact, Addams, Seigfried, Lagemann, and Fischer in *Feminist Interpretations of John Dewey*, ed. by Charlene Haddock Seigfried, Re-Reading the Canon (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 'look back to Dewey's original engagement with feminist activists and theorists in an effort to establish that feminism was already deeply rooted in pragmatism from the beginning.' (p.2) For more on the link between Dewey and feminism see, Marjorie C. Miller, 'Response to Eugenie Gatens-Robinson, Marcia K. Moen, Felicia Kruse', *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, 27.4 (1991), 465–74; and Mary Leach, '(Re)searching Dewey for Feminist Imaginaries: Linguistic Continuity, Discourse and Gossip', in *The New Scholarship on Dewey*, ed. by Jim W. Garrison (Dordrecht ; Boston: Kluwer Academic, 1995), pp. 123–38.

[135] Freire (2017), p. 83. Freire explains this process in detail in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (pp. 83-96). There are four stages in the process of liberation through education; investigation, codification, decodification, and re-presentation. I shall not go into details of these four stages here because the aim is to express the sentiment and intent of the role and construct of Freire's revolutionary leaders and not the details of how that manifests within the particular context of the time and place that Freire developed the practice for, namely Brazilian and Chilean literacy of the 1960s.

stimuli are presented to the students, not as answers to be remembered and adhered to 'but as problems to be solved.'[136]

Revolutionary leaders who enter into a community must use the existing beliefs and norms of that community as its starting point. They do so for two reasons. Firstly, even if the revolutionary leaders know right from wrong and freedom from unfreedom – which of course, according to Freirean theory, they cannot because they are not absolute concepts – it will not bring people to freedom in telling them how they are unfree. Secondly, it is too much to assume that the privileged knowledge that it is attached to any one particular community does not persist for good reason. Therefore, the existing beliefs and norms of society must provide the starting point of enquiry.[137]

With regard to the cosmopolitan citizen, Rousseau and Freire have a more strained connection. Rousseau is committed to the egalitarian principle of cosmopolitanism and this equality is sometimes interpreted as a radical equality because of his attacks on property and disproportionate wealth. In the *Social Contract* Rousseau writes, '...with regard to wealth, no citizen should be so opulent that he can buy another, and none so poor that he is constrained to sell himself.'[138] Therefore, it is not uncommon to read Rousseau as defending something akin to the cosmopolitan ethic because we have moral responsibilities to all people equally. Judith Shklar writes,

> Equality was not a quasilegal fiction for him, and inequality not
> something that others suffered. When he announced to his shocked
> readers that all our vices had their origin in inequality, he meant to take
> a wholly new view of the moral world: the way it looks from the very
> bottom of society.[139]

This equality, however, is only theoretical. Maurice Cranston writes, 'Rousseau has the reputation of being a radical egalitarian. I shall suggest that a more careful reading of his work shows him to have been hardly more egalitarian than Plato.'[140] In practice the

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[136] Freire (2017), p. 96.
[137] *ibid*, pp. 83–88.
[138] 'The Social Contract', *OC III*, 391–92; *CWR Vol. 4*, p. 162.
[139] Judith N. Shklar, 'Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Equality', *Daedalus*, 107.3 (1978), 13–25 (p. 13).
[140] Maurice Cranston, 'Rousseau on Equality', *Social Philosophy and Policy*, 2.01 (1984), 115-24, (p.115).

equality of Rousseau's politico-educational project is mitigated by a number of factors. This is because Rousseau elevates the citizen within the ideal form of cooperative association – the small Republic – which creates a stratified hierarchical social structure that places some above others, most notably men above women. Furthermore, Rousseau defends sentiments of nationalism and patriotism within the ideal small Republic, and the treatment of the foreigner as other. These sentiments are defended in the interests of the strength and stability of the Republic. Therefore, Rousseau can be seen as defending a weak cosmopolitanism or even a partialist morality depending on the weight accorded these two contrasting aspects of his theory. Furthermore, Rousseau has expressed explicitly anti-cosmopolitan sentiments. In Book I of *Émile* he writes,

> The essential thing is to be good to the people with whom one lives…
> Distrust those cosmopolitans who go to great length in their books to
> discover duties they do not deign to fulfil around them. A philosopher
> loves the Tartars so as to be spared having to love his neighbours.[141]

However, it would be wrong to credit Rousseau with a normative defence of patriotism. It is the view of Rousseau that 'men' as they are cannot love indiscriminately. Rousseau's partialism is qualified a little earlier on the same page of the quote above when he writes, 'Every patriot is harsh to foreigners. They are only men. They are nothing in his eyes. This is a drawback, inevitable but not compelling.'[142] Therefore, despite his commitment to a radical equality it is a stretch to call Rousseau a cosmopolitan.

Freire shares this thin attachment to cosmopolitanism with Rousseau. Freirean ethics claims that the vocation of the human animal is humanisation. This is the case for each and every person, both oppressed and oppressor alike. It is a declaration of equality as a condition of freedom. Furthermore, the actions of the revolutionary leaders, who enter into a community, often as outsiders, in order to facilitate the conscientisation of that community could be seen as practitioners of a universal cosmopolitan ethic.

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[141] 'Émile', *OC IV*, 248; *CWR Vol. 13*, p. 163.
[142] 'Émile', *OC IV*, 248; *CWR Vol. 13*, p. 163. For more on the tension between Rousseau's cosmopolitan and anti-cosmopolitan expressions see, Helena Rosenblatt, 'Rousseau, the Anticosmopolitan?', *Daedalus*, 137.3 (2008), 59–67.

However, there is a focus on the local community spoken of above that elevates the privileged knowledge of a community to the foundations of enquiry. This casts doubt on Freire's politico-educational project being incorporated into the cosmopolitan canon. By contrast, Dewey has definite cosmopolitan themes deeply embedded within his political theory.

A model of moral cosmopolitanism can be clearly identified in Dewey's mature philosophy.[143] It is a model of moral cosmopolitanism because it informs the scope of his ethical enquiry. As David T. Hansen notes, 'the provenance of his thought had no national or otherwise predetermined boundaries, and … the meanings in his thought were not preshaped by wherever his desk and typewriter happened to be.'[144] Leonard J. Waks also notes a cosmopolitan strain in Dewey's thought. He writes, '[w]hile Dewey does not often use the terms cosmopolitan and cosmopolitanism, the notions play an essential role in his mature viewpoint.'[145]

According to Hansen, Dewey's cosmopolitanism is present in the enquiry that takes place by individuals of and with the world. It is found in Dewey's understanding of the human animal as fluid and revisable. Hansen writes that, '[i]n his view, a person is not a finished, complete, or fixed entity, however much the person's habits may run in a steady rhythm or well-worn grove. Rather a person, in principle, is in fact in continuous formation through the crucible of what he or she participates in and the manner or style in which he or she participates.'[146] This is a cosmopolitan position because it does not assume a Cartesian foundation of knowledge but a commitment to,

> learning from all the contacts of life which becomes, in effect, a way of
> dwelling in the space between, a way of inhabiting not the world nor the
> local in some kind of "pure" form but rather their interaction within the
> person's or community's experience.[147]

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[143] Leonard J. Waks, 'Inquiry, Agency, and Art: John Dewey's Contribution to Pragmatic Cosmopolitanism', *Education and Culture*, 25.2 (2009), 115–25; and David T. Hansen, 'Dewey and Cosmopolitanism', *Education and Culture*, 25.2 (2009), 126–40, offer an exploration of political cosmopolitanism in Dewey's philosophical thought.

[144] Hansen (2009), p. 126.

[145] Waks (2009), p. 117.

[146] Hansen (2009), p. 128.

[147] *ibid*, p. 129.

Dewey's cosmopolitanism is informed by his pragmatic method which determines a foundation of enquiry and growth. Similarly, Waks explores the connection between pragmatism and cosmopolitanism in Dewey's thought and argues that Dewey, in virtue of this connection, escaped a problematic characteristic of many forms of cosmopolitanism, namely the gap between theory and practice. Waks writes that,

> [t]he question arising for Dewey is whether any factors in the nation-state order can be used to transcend it to create a wider and freer, more cosmopolitan world order. He addressed that question from the educational side in *Democracy and Education* and from a social and political standpoint in *The Public and its Problems*.[148]

According to Waks, what is particular about Dewey's cosmopolitanism is the role that art plays within it. Waks argues that it is almost universal among political theorists that political communication is equated with speech and writing. By contrast, it is Dewey's view that all communication is like art because communication requires both the listener and the speaker to, in the words of Waks, 'expand their imagination and encompass the other'.[149] In doing so both the listener and the speaker broaden their understanding. Art, according to Waks, 'is never merely subjective self-expression. Artists respond to objective conditions in situations they share with others. They express what many feel but cannot say.'[150] These expressions arise from disrupted situations within the social environment. From this, according to Waks, nascent publics can form around these disruptions. He writes, '[h]ere inquiry leads at early stages to the projecting of aesthetic experiences as means for the end in view of public formation.'[151] The nascent publics can develop into groups of social action. A feedback loop occurs with art because it is an expression of a situation which is then discussed and debated which will feed into further artistic expression. It is through art that cosmopolitan communities can be

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[148] Waks (2009), p.117.
[149] *ibid*, p. 120.
[150] *ibid*, p. 121.
[151] *ibid*.

created because it is through art that, 'bonds can be formed across differences and eventuate in fruitful deliberation and cooperative social action.'[152]

According to Dewey, art is more universal than speech because artistic expression captures what is distinctive about the artists' culture. It operates as a means for entering into an empathic relation with other cultures and view of the world. However, as Waks notes, '[w]e can grasp the art of other peoples, … , only by taking the spirit of that art into our own attitude.'[153] Therefore, in Waks view, art offers a particularly effective way of accessing the cosmopolitan attitude and perceiving the importance of cosmopolitanism in Dewey's thought. Art offers a way to perceive the other through our own eyes and dissolve the barriers between these different worldviews.

In this chapter I have provided a philosophical analysis of the citizen which has drawn out the tension between the individual and society contained within the concept. I have also illustrated how the politico-educational projects of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire connect to the various conceptions of the citizen under discussion. In the following chapter I shall identify a tension between the individual and society that persists throughout the concept of the citizen as it is discussed here, whether by the liberal, republican, participatory democrat, communitarian or cosmopolitan. I shall do so through an analysis of the politico-educational projects of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire. I shall identify how the tension manifests within their respective projects and address how Rousseau, Dewey and Freire seek to resolve this tension. The purpose of this is to build upon the analysis of the citizen so far and lead into a commitment to a model of the citizen which shall form the end-in-view of the thesis.

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[152] Waks (2009), p. 122.
[153] *ibid*.

**Chapter 2**

**The Tension in Rousseau**

**§2.0  Summary**

In the following three chapters I shall introduce the three major thinkers that provide the theoretical foundation of this thesis in more detail.  I shall analyse the tension between the individual and society within their politico-educational projects.  In doing so I shall make clear how this tension manifests with their conceptions of the citizen.  I shall also analyse their respective resolutions to the tension, highlighting the limitations of said resolution.  This will lead into Chapter 5 where a model of the Critical Citizen is developed which draws on elements of each of these three politico-educational projects reinforcing their strengths and mitigating their weaknesses.

Beginning with Rousseau I shall explore the tension between the individual and society within his two key political texts that sought a resolution to that tension, *Émile* and the *Social Contract*.  Addressing each text separately will highlight how this tension manifests so starkly within Rousseau's politico-educational project.  I shall then draw these two texts together in order to offer Rousseau's holistic resolution to this tension as I understand it.  I shall conclude this analysis of Rousseau by drawing attention to the limitations of Rousseau's resolution and arguing that the methodology germane within his project encourages us to look beyond the philosophy of Rousseau for answers.

Two texts written by Rousseau and published in the same year, *Émile* and the *Social Contract* appear, at first sight, to propose two completely different approaches to the tension between the individual and society.  Peter Gay makes this tension between the texts clear.  He points out that Rousseau has been variously identified as an individualist and as a collectivist.  According to Gay, the individualism is read from a focus on the *Second Discourse*, his autobiographical works such as *The Reveries of the Solitary Walker* and *Confessions*, and sometimes *Émile*.  Whereas, the collectivism is read from works including the *Social Contract*, the *Geneva Manuscript*, *Considerations on the Government*

*of Poland and on its Planned Reformation*, and *Plan for a Constitution for Corsica*.[154]  Gay writes,

> [t]hese two irreconcilable interpretations of Rousseau's thought have been supplemented by two other views: it has been argued that his doctrines are confused and rent by internal contradictions, or that they shifted from one extreme to the other as they were developed and elaborated.[155]

In *Émile* we follow the story of a child educated to be free from the influences of the state, and in the *Social Contract* Rousseau presents a political treatise where the individual sacrifices their independence to be a member of the collective and live in the interests of the whole.  A key part of this seeming disconnect is found in their differing accounts of freedom.  I shall examine the manifestations of the tension between the individual and society first in *Émile*, and then in the *Social Contract*.  As such, these expositions will present the project of each work but with a distinct focus upon the conceptions of freedom offered.

## §2.1 The Interactional Response of *Émile*

*Émile* is the primary source of what I refer to as the interactional solution to the tension between the individual and society.  I employ the term interactional in opposition to institutional.  It refers to the direct interactions between persons in their immediate environment.  In other words, it is the formative effects felt through our relationships with others.  *Émile* is a pedagogical novel that tells of the raising of a child—the eponymous Émile—under the direction of Jean-Jacques, his tutor and guardian.  The aim of the education that Émile receives at the hands of Jean-Jacques is a path to freedom.  The model of freedom developed by this pedagogy is different from the natural freedom

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described in the *Second Discourse*, and—as we shall see later in this chapter—it is different from the freedom developed in the *Social Contract* also.[156] The freedom of *Émile* is a virtue based model of freedom. Where the *Second Discourse* tells the story of the degeneration of the human animal and describes the freedom of 'natural man' in the state of nature, *Émile* begins in corrupted society and develops a freedom to withstand the coercive force of it.[157]

The need for a form of freedom that extends beyond the freedom to do as one pleases and cultivates psychological freedom also, arises from Rousseau's analysis of the human animal in cooperative society. In other words, the project of *Émile* follows on from that of the *Second Discourse*. According to Rousseau, the human animal is a destructive force, it 'disfigures everything' in order to bend nature to its will.[158] However, it is not necessary for the human animal to be in conflict with the world in such a way. Rousseau writes, 'Everything we do not have at birth and which we need when we are grown is given us by education.'[159] It is education that provides us with strength, aid, and

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[156] Natural freedom is a form of negative freedom, meaning that natural freedom is the freedom from imposition. Rousseau describes this freedom in the *Social Contract* as being, 'limited only by the force of the individual'. 'The Social Contract', *OC III*, 365; *CWR, Vol. 4*, pp. 141–42. David James clarifies the freedom of the state of nature. He defines it as, 'a form of freedom that consists in encountering no obstacles when it comes to acting on the basis of one's desires except the limits of one's own physical and mental powers.' David James, in *Rousseau and German Idealism.* (Cambridge University Press, 2016), (p. 22).

[157] Rousseau has been accused of defending a return to nature. While this view has been largely discredited it was commonly held and still finds occasional expressions. Jimack appears to defend the view that Rousseau was reimagining natural freedom for the individual when he writes, 'There can be no denying that Rousseau's declared aim in *Émile* was to form a natural man to live in society; but it is equally difficult to ignore the ambivalence of this aim. This conflict between Rousseau's love of nature and his enthusiasm for society, between his intense individualism and his ideal of selfless devotion to the state, is not, of course, confined to Émile. In one form or another, it recurs throughout both his life and his works.' Peter Jimack, *Rousseau: Emile*, Critical Guides to French Texts, 28 (London: Grant & Cutler, 1983), p. 27. It is clear that Todorov also believes that the 'man' that Rousseau puts in opposition to the citizen in *Émile* is 'natural man', and that Todorov equates this 'natural man' to the 'natural man' of the *Second Discourse*. Todorov (2001), p. 12. Furthermore, Todorov appears to equate 'social man' and 'natural man' in his interpretation. This comes out when he writes, 'The ways of the citizen and the individual do not coincide, … The opposition is not, as we see, between ancients and moderns, … but rather … between two divergent tendencies, illustrated by Sparta and Athens in ancient times or by Geneva and Paris in modern times.' *Tzvetan Todorov, Frail Happiness: An Essay on Rousseau, trans. by John T. Scott and Robert D. Zaretsky (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), pp. 13–14.* This cannot be the case because Athens and Paris are the homes of the corrupted 'social man'. There is no freedom to be had by those that inhabit them.

[158] 'Émile', *OC IV*, 245; *CWR Vol. 13*, p. 161.

[159] 'Émile', *OC IV*, 247; *CWR Vol. 13*, p. 162.

judgement.  The story of education in *Émile* is set out to provide us with the answer of how to achieve these qualities and as a result, the freedom particular to *Émile*.

The form of education that Émile receives is what Rousseau calls 'negative education'.  This is an education led by the 'internal development of our faculties', which is what Rousseau calls education by nature.[160]  What Rousseau means by nature in this instance is that which is opposed to artifice, it is one's original disposition therefore it should be understood as nature in an explanatory or descriptive sense, and not a normative sense.[161]  A person's nature is negatively defined as that which exists before one is '[c]onstrained by our habits' and 'corrupted by our opinions'.[162]  This is a psychology that Rousseau more positively defined in the analysis of the *Second Discourse* where human nature was identified as consisting of four qualities; *amour de soi*, *pitié*, self-perfection, and free will.[163]

The education of Émile mirrors the development of the 'natural man' of the *Second Discourse* from the savage beast, to the golden age of rudimentary cooperative association.  From the point of the golden age the genealogies of *Émile* and the *Second Discourse* come apart because *Émile* offers a resolution to the degeneration of the human animal perceived in 'civil man'.  Where the *Second Discourse* tells the story of what has

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[160] 'Émile', *OC IV*, 247; *CWR Vol. 3*, p. 162.

[161] Throughout his political corpus Jimack sees Rousseau using the word 'natural' in two different ways; 'sometimes in the historical sense, as in the second *Discours*; sometimes in the psychological sense in which he defines it at the beginning of *Émile*… and sometimes (most of the time perhaps) in a rather vague way which could be taken in either sense.' Jimack (1983), pp. 18–19. R. S. Peters also observes the different uses of the word 'nature' by Rousseau.  He writes, '[s]ometimes it obviously means "innate".  At other times it is used as a contrast to what is artificial or contrived.  In other contexts it seems to single out what is spontaneous or authentic as opposed to what is premeditated or feigned.  There is also the suggestion, on occasion, of less sophisticated and civilised–understandable enough in the aftermath of various explorers and their superficial reports of more 'natural' ways of living.' R. S. Peters, *Essays on Educators* (London; Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1981), p. 16.

[162] 'Émile', *OC IV*, 248; *CWR Vol. 13*, p. 163.

[163] 'Second Discourse', *OC III*, 141-142; *CWR, Vol. 3*, pp. 25-26.  Furthermore, I shall, contrary to convention, not translate the French *pitié* into the English 'pity'.  This is because I believe that the word is used by Rousseau to mean something more similar to the English 'empathy'.  Further to this, the French word *pitié* does not carry the negative connotations of 'pity' that it seems to possess in the English language.  Evidence of this is found easily, in *Emile* Rousseau writes of *pitié*, 'who does not pity the unhappy man whom he sees suffering?... Imagination puts us in the place of the miserable man… Pity is sweet because, in putting ourselves in the place of the one who suffers, we nevertheless feel the pleasure of not suffering as he does.' *OC IV*, 503–4; *CWR Vol. 13*, p. 373.  In 'Essay on the Origin of Languages', he writes, 'How do we let ourselves be moved to pity?  By transporting ourselves outside of ourselves; by identifying ourselves with the suffering being.  We suffer only as much as we judge he suffers; it is not in ourselves, it is in him that we suffer.… He who imagines nothing feels only himself; he is alone in the midst of mankind.' *OC V*, 395; *CWR Vol. 7*, p. 306.

happened, in *Émile* we are told a story of what *could* happen if the people of society are educated appropriately.  Therefore, while Rousseau begins with an explanatory sense of nature and aims to describe a person's original disposition, this point of departure between *Émile* and the *Second Discourse* introduces a different sense of nature with normative undertones.

In *Émile* Rousseau writes of three types of education. These are the educations by 'men', things and nature. If a person is to be raised in accordance with education by 'men' or things then, so Rousseau argues, they are to be raised for others because they are to be moulded according to pre-established reason. However, a person, to be educated well, must receive all three educations in concert with one another even though we possess no control over nature, and only limited control over things.  Therefore, one's education by 'men' and things should be directed to conform with education by nature.  When one's education is guided by nature, and external forces—such as other people and the objects of the external world—are directed in accordance with nature one is educating for the individual rather than for others.  However, these different forces of education must sometimes conflict.  This inevitability leads to a choice which is the source of conflict between *Émile* and the *Social Contract*.  Rousseau writes,

> But what is to be done when they are opposed?  When, instead of raising a man for himself, one wants to raise him for others?  Then their harmony is impossible.  Forced to combat nature or the social institutions, one must choose between making a man and a citizen, for one cannot make both at the same time.[164]

This is a key passage in *Émile* and in interpretation of Rousseau's answer to the social problem because while Émile is raised to be a 'man', the choice made in the *Social Contract* is clearly to raise for others.  This is the citizen.  How can Rousseau provide two divergent answers to the same question?  Judith Shklar argues that Rousseau in this passage is illustrating the futility of our endeavour to overcome the tension between the individual and society, that there are two paths before us and either one will lead us to

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[164] 'Émile', *OC IV*, 248; *CWR Vol. 13*, p. 163.

harmony and freedom but we, as flawed and corrupted humans, are destined pursue a confusion of both paths.[165] However, Shklar does not acknowledge the importance of the last few words of the passage, '… at the same time', and as a result condemns the human animal to a denatured existence when Rousseau offers a way out.

Alternatively, Todorov identifies a third 'man' in his reading of this passage within the larger context of Rousseau's political theory. According to Todorov, there is the citizen, the solitary individual, and the moral and universal individual. He writes, '[t]he first is the aim of the political writings in particular, … The second path is the one that his autobiographical writings present in detail, … The third is set out principally in Émile.'[166] The two versions of the individual that Todorov identifies, 'are both opposed to that of the citizen.'[167] However, it is a mistake to separate out the autobiographical from the political in the way that Todorov does. All versions of 'man' developed by Rousseau are to some extent autobiographical but Todorov has his analysis the wrong way around. In his view there is a, 'continuity between Rousseau's doctrinal works and his personal writings' and that we can import Rousseau's ideal – himself – portrayed in those works into his earlier doctrines.[168] Arguing against this position, t is rather, in my view Rousseau's identification of his self as the model of 'man' that provides the obligation to critique that very model and continue Rousseau's project from generation to generation. Todorov accentuates Rousseau's autobiographical self-righteousness and as a result he misplaces the third incarnation of the human animal as found in *Émile*. There are three manifestations in Rousseau: the citizen; the free individual; and the 'man-citizen', which operates as the end product of his political project.

I share Neuhouser's view that according to Rousseau, a person cannot be educated to be a 'man' and a 'citizen' concurrently but is instead educated to be both consecutively. Neuhouser writes, 'that what Rousseau denies is only the possibility of simultaneously forming children into both men and citizens'.[169] I shall aim to defend this interpretation in the following section of the chapter. First though, I shall continue to explore the two answers that Rousseau offers in *Émile* and the *Social Contract*.

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[165] Shklar (1985).
[166] Todorov (2001), p. 18.
[167] *ibid*.
[168] *ibid*, p.49.
[169] Neuhouser (2010), p. 172.

The 'man' that is chosen for Émile to become is representative of individual freedom.  This is seen clearly enough from the passages above.  Émile is to be raised for himself and to be free from the coercion of external forces.  The freedom developed is a virtue account of freedom.  The virtues that Rousseau identifies for Émile are; a good judge of character, strong, hardy, humble, an appreciation of the value of knowledge and the authority of one's masters, and a clear understanding of one's proper rank amongst 'men'–one of equality.[170]  These virtues are learnt through negative education and the guidance of the tutor–Jean-Jacques.  A child educated through the means of negative education is a child that has been educated at their own pace and through their own experiences.  This freedom from coercion however, is curtailed by Émile's tutor.  In order to guarantee that Émile has the right kind of experiences, at the right time, and with the right consequences the child is subject to the most extensive coercion and control at the hands of the tutor.  Furthermore, it is important to Rousseau that the child does not perceive the coercion and that the coercion is of the right type.  This strong paternalism appears at odds with the freedom that Émile is bred to embody.[171]

This is not the only problem created by the tutor.  Jean-Jacques, in order to adequately perform his duties as governor, must fulfil strict criteria.[172]  Rousseau's

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[170] Rousseau describes the character of Émile often but there are two parts of the story which best reflect the character which is intended to be built.  The clearest passages are found at 'Émile', *OC IV*, 418–25; *CWR Vol. 13*, pp. 302–7, and 'Émile', *OC IV*, 669–71; *CWR Vol. 13*, pp. 509–11. More specifically, at the end of Book II Rousseau describes Émile as he reaches the age of reason, where he is 'bubbling, lively, animated, without gnawing cares, without long and painful foresight, whole in his present being, and enjoying a fullness in life which seems to want to extend itself beyond him.'  'Émile', *OC IV*, 419; *CWR Vol. 13*, p. 302. In Book IV Rousseau describes Émile's essential character.  He writes, 'Émile possesses a tender and sensitive soul, but he values nothing according to the price set by opinion; thus, although he likes to please others, he will care little about being esteemed by them.  From this it follows that he will be more affectionate than polite, that he will never put on airs or make a display, and that he will be more touched by a caress than by a thousand praises.  For the same reason he will neglect neither his manners nor his bearing.  He may even take some care with his dress, not in order to appear to be a man of taste but to make his looks more agreeable.  He will not resort to the gilded frame, and his clothing will never be stained by the mark of riches.'  'Émile', *OC IV*, 669; *CWR Vol. 13*, pp. 509–10.

[171] I shall return to this concern.  I shall explain both why Rousseau employs the device of the tutor, and I shall explain why it is a component of Rousseau's political thought that is in most need for revision later in this chapter.  Furthermore, the problem of paternalism or elitism of which Jean-Jacques is an extreme example, will arise again and again throughout this thesis.  The authority and role of the educator proves to be problematic throughout progressive thought and Dewey and Freire will struggle with this also.  These themes are central in the discussion of authority later in the thesis.

[172] There are three conditions which must be met by a good governor.  Firstly, they must not be, 'a man for sale'.  The child should be educated by their father.  Rousseau writes, 'to make a man one must be either a father or more than a man oneself.' 'Émile', *OC IV*, 263; *CWR Vol. 13*, p. 176. Secondly, the governor must be well-raised themselves.  This of course raises a problem of infinite regress, for who then educated the

argument is that the governor must have the skills and constitution necessary for the task of raising a child from birth to adulthood, this includes, 'the age, health, kinds of knowledge, and all the talent suitable for working at education'.[173]  The demands of the governor are so great that they do not just rule out Rousseau himself from performing the role but all people.  Therefore, the tutor — Jean-Jacques — must be understood as a fiction, not least because he must himself be a product of the educational process that is championed for him in order to have the authority to educate Émile.  If the tutor is not a fiction, and a character matching the criteria set for Jean-Jacques possible, then Rousseau's pedagogical method is not necessary because the end is achievable without appeal to it – proof of which is found in the existence of the tutor.  Instead of suffering this conclusion Rousseau assumes this 'marvel found' and continues with the project in the hope that, 'in considering what he ought to do that we shall see what he ought to be.'[174]  This theme of convenient fiction is something that I shall return to when considering the argument of institutional justice as found in the *Social Contract*.

Similar to the particularity with which Jean-Jacques is created, so too is Émile.  Not every child is suitable because of the corrupt conditions of the human animal.  Firstly, Émile is to be adopted before birth.  Two things follow from this; one is that, 'genius and character' are not considerations in selecting a child because they cannot be known prior to birth; and the second is, that Émile is effectively an orphan.[175]  The parents are to have no authority over Émile and no hand in raising Émile.  Rousseau writes, '[h]e ought to honour his parents, but he ought to obey only me.  That is my first or, rather, my sole condition.'[176]  The other qualities of the pupil are to possess 'a common mind' and come from a 'temperate country'.[177]  Furthermore, Émile is to be chosen from rich stock rather

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educator; and who educated the educator's educator; and so on.  Or, alternatively it raises a foundationalist problem, in that an explanation must be given of the first educator and how they were so without being educated similarly.  Thirdly, the governor must be young.  As close in age to Émile as possible, 'I would want him to be a child himself if it were possible'.  'Émile', *OC IV*, 265; *CWR Vol. 13*, p. 176.  Of course this is not possible, especially when taken into consideration with the other conditions of a good governor.  It is one thing to posit an educator that has been subject to the education that Émile is to receive, but it is another entirely to suppose additionally that this person is almost the same age as Émile.

[173] 'Émile', *OC IV*, 264; *CWR Vol. 13*, p. 177.
[174] 'Émile', *OC IV*, 263; *CWR Vol. 13*, p. 176.
[175] 'Émile', *OC IV*, 266; *CWR Vol. 13*, p. 179.
[176] 'Émile', *OC IV*, 267;  *CWR Vol. 13*, p. 179.
[177] 'Émile', *OC IV*, 266; *CWR Vol. 13*, p. 178.

than poor; will be the product of 'a normal birth', and not be a sickly or weak child.  No, Émile will be a 'robust and healthy pupil'.[178]

Émile's freedom is achieved by providing conducive parameters in which natural education can have its positive effect.  By the time Émile approaches the age of reason Rousseau writes of him,

> He will not stupidly question others about everything he sees, but will examine it himself and will tire himself out to discover what he wants to learn before asking.  If he gets in unforeseen difficulties, he will be less disturbed than another; if there is risk, he will be less frightened.[179]

Through the negative education that he receives, Émile develops into a man that is able to assume the roles and responsibilities of husband, father, and citizen and withstand the corrupting influences of society.  He is able to achieve this because of the virtues inculcated in him by his tutor Jean-Jacques, inculcated through unwavering and total control.  However, it is unclear in which way Émile is free.  While he is free from the corrupting influence of society he is still subject to the will of his tutor.[180]  In many ways

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[178] 'Émile', *OC IV*, 272; *CWR Vol. 13*, p. 183. It is not always clear how these considerations complement the design of Rousseau's educational programme.  Sometimes it appears to be a manifestation of prejudice as with his claim that Émile be from temperate climes. Rousseau writes, 'Neither the Negroes nor the Laplanders have the sense of the Europeans.' 'Émile', *OC IV*, 266–67; *CWR Vol. 13*, p. 179.  But at other times it seems that Rousseau's considerations are designed to forestall objections arising from the nature of the child.  By declaring certain qualities and predispositions Rousseau is controlling the scope of his enquiry. However, it is important to note the prejudice that is packaged into this selection process.  Émile's education is an education for rich, able-bodied, neurotypical, European males.

[179] 'Émile', *OC IV*, 422; *CWR Vol. 13*, p. 305.

[180] At the end of the book Jean-Jacques tells Émile that his job is done and the he is not needed any longer. But far from being ready for the world Émile is unable to let go.  R. S. Peters calls Émile's inability to let go of the tutor's authority over him, 'one of the greatest paradoxes in the most influential of all works in the progressive tradition.'  Peters (1981), p. 31.  This is all the more surprising since at the end of the story Émile is married with a child on the way but still the autonomy needed to break from the tutor's control is lacking.  This is painted in even stronger light when one realises that in the unfinished sequel, *Émile and Sophie*, the relationship breaks down after the death of their daughter and Sophie's infidelity. N. J. H. Dent writes of this, 'There is little of significance in [*Émile and Sophie*] except perhaps that they reveal that even in Rousseau's own estimation the chances of human happiness, or preserving oneself from the corruptions of city life, are very small indeed even when people have been brought up and guided with the utmost of care.'  N. J. H. Dent, *Rousseau*, Routledge Philosophers (London; New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 121.  This is important to note because it will link in with my claim that *Émile* and the *Social Contract* are two sides of one argument which stand or fall together.

this is unsatisfying, but it is only one part of the argument from Rousseau. We must now consider the story as told in the *Social Contract*.

## §2.2 The Institutional Response of *The Social Contract*

In contrast to the interactional response to the tension between the individual and society as found largely within the pages of *Émile* is the institutional response largely found in the *Social Contract*. I employ the term institutional to refer to the relationship between the individuals of a cooperative association and the institutions which frame that association. In other words, the *Social Contract* is a response to the tension between the individual and society through the identification and establishment of just institutions. The individual of the *Social Contract* is the citizen and it is the citizen who shall comprise and inhabit those institutions.

Rousseau's aim is to establish a, 'legitimate and reliable rule of administration' developed for people in their corrupted form.[181] The concern is that the collective strength found in the formation of society by social contract will undermine the individual's freedom and strength. The social contract therefore must be constructed so as to,

> [f]ind a form of association that defends and protects the person and goods of each associate with all the common force, and by means of which each one, uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before.[182]

The answer to this problem for Rousseau appears to be the total alienation of the individual to society. However, the form of freedom in civil society is different to the freedom of the state of nature. As stated above, the natural freedom of the state of nature is one limited only by physical impediment. This cannot remain once a person has entered into association with others because the society that Rousseau aims to establish is cooperative and therefore run in the interests of each member.

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[181] 'Social Contract', *OC III*, 351; *CWR, Vol. 4*, p. 131.
[182] 'Social Contract', *OC III*, 360; *CWR, Vol. 4*, p. 138.

The society that Rousseau describes is a demanding one because the individual cedes the authority of the individual in order to join in union with others. This union is a society of equals because each individual gains their share of the rights alienated by the other members of the union and therefore gains as much as they lose. Rousseau expresses the terms of this social contract in the following way, '*Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will; and in a body we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.*'[183] As such, a person is both citizen and subject; a participant in the sovereign body and subject to the rules of that body.

The collection of individuals that comprise society is the Sovereign. An expression of sovereignty is an expression of the General Will, which was discussed above.[184] Therefore, the individuals of this society are sovereign as citizen and member of the collective, but wholly under the dominion of the Sovereign in their role as subject.[185] In designing society so that each person is psychologically invested and directly involved Rousseau is mitigating the corruption of those institutions that constitute a democratic society. Rousseau also forestalls any member of society from suffering arbitrary dominion because each is a member of the Sovereign body and while subject to its demands is also the source of those demands. According to Rousseau's argument, everyone is therefore equal because each member is subject to and author of the General Will to the same degree and in the same manner.

It is worth noting here the limitations of this equality. Not everyone in society is a citizen and therefore not everyone in society is a member of the Sovereign body, which means not everyone is equal. Women are the most prominent non-citizen in society. Women are not taught to be free in the way that men are. A woman is a wife; a woman is an object of affection; a woman is not a man's equal. However, while women are not man's equal in society they are integral to the balance of man's character and to the balance of society.[186]

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[183] 'Social Contract', *OC III*, 361; *CWR, Vol. 4*, p. 139.
[184] 'Social Contract', *OC III*, 368; *CWR, Vol. 4*, p. 145. See, pages 41-42 above.
[185] The use of the capital in Sovereign is used to distinguish between the adjective and the noun, which is treated as a proper noun.
[186] For more on this co-dependent and asymmetrical relationship see Penny A. Weiss, 'Sex, Freedom & Equality in Rousseau's "Émile"', *Polity*, 22.4 (1990), 603–25; and Jane Roland Martin, 'Sophie and Émile: A

In entering into union with others one has sacrificed their natural freedom to the Sovereign retaining only that which is not useful to society.  A citizen still has natural freedom in the actions performed beyond the interests of the collective but the freedom they possess as a member of that body has changed form.  In fact, there are several forms of freedom at play in the *Social Contract*.  N. J. H. Dent identifies three freedoms in the movement from the 'natural man' of the state of nature to the 'civil man' of the Republic.  There is, circumstantial freedom, which is the freedom from duties and responsibilities towards one's environment, coupled with access to the means for desired action.  Secondly, there is discretionary freedom, which comes in two parts.  The first, 'comprises the power to regulate the dictation of present impulse or desire, in view of some believed future good or harm which present action on desire would affect.'[187]  The second part of discretionary freedom is an expression of the individual in accordance with those desires without imposition.  Dent writes, 'the individual who enjoys maximal discretionary freedom decides all matters according to his [*sic*] own lights (on his [*sic*] own preferred basis), following his [*sic*] own modes of appraisal, reaching his [*sic*] own decision upon which he acts unchecked and unquestioned.'[188]  Finally, there is principled freedom, which is the freedom of the citizen and an extension of discretionary freedom.  The move from maximal discretionary freedom to principled freedom is the move from natural freedom to the freedom of association described above.  It requires one to sacrifice one type of freedom for another because one cannot be a citizen if one is only answerable to oneself.

Alternatively, David James identifies democratic freedom, which 'consists in the collective power of the members of a political community to determine the laws to which they are all subject'; civil freedom, which 'consists in protection against arbitrary, unjust interference on the part of others'; and moral freedom, which consists in the restraint of one's appetites and actions, 'in accordance with universally valid rules that prescribe their duties to them, thus enabling them to consult their reason before following their

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Case Study of Sex Bias in the History of Educational Thought', *Harvard Educational Review*, 51.3 (1981), 357–72.
[187] N. J. H. Dent, *Rousseau: An Introduction to His Psychological, Social, and Political Theory* (Oxford, UK; New York, USA: B. Blackwell, 1989), p. 195.
[188] Dent (1989), pp. 195–96.

inclinations.'[189] Once each of these freedoms has generated in the citizen then genuine freedom has been attained and the individual has achieved 'self-mastery'.[190] There is much overlap between the views of Dent and James but both offer something different also. However, for the purposes of this thesis it is enough to show that the freedom that governs the citizen is defined and constructed by the state, and that this is not the case for the pre-social individual. The interpretations of both Dent and James accomplish this.

The aim of this analysis of freedom is to show that the person of the state of nature has retained the quantity of freedom that they possessed in exchanging one type of freedom for another more suited for civil association. This is how Rousseau answers the question of the *Social Contract*. The motivation for making this move was formed by self-interest. In Dent's terms, it was the desire to increase one's circumstantial freedom due to the expectation of greater security of self and possession that led the human animal to form into cooperative groups. The move for greater circumstantial freedom necessitates a loss of discretionary freedom because the individual can no longer act solely in one's own interest. However, the move to principled freedom does not occur until the individual is motivated by an enlightened will. Dent distinguishes between an individual's 'actual will' and their 'enlightened will'.[191] A person who is governed by their actual will is one who, 'forms the idea of his own best interest' and seeks to achieve this state of affairs for their own welfare.[192] Whereas, an enlightened will is one which is derived from an individual's 'proper good' which is a manifestation of their genuine best interests, as opposed to that which is believed to be in their best interests by the individual.[193] This is how the individual is able to express the General Will because the good that they pursue is not one formed of their own notions of right but formed as a result of properly directed reason. Dent writes,

> "Principled" freedom is the unfettered scope to utilize one's power of
> choice and action to the pursuit of objectives, courses of conduct, that

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[189] James (2016), pp. 21-22.
[190] *ibid*, p. 22.
[191] Dent (1989), p. 197.
[192] *ibid*, p. 198.
[193] *ibid*.

have the endorsement of right reason, as that is judged not just by

oneself alone but by whatever person or agency is the custodial

interpreter and arbitrator of what the requirements of "right reason"

actually amount to.[194]


The freedom of the citizen as understood in the *Social Contract* is defined and

constructed by the state.  It is demanding.  It is demanding because it is asking a lot of

each individual to seek the best for society rather than what they perceive to be in their

own best interests, and it is demanding because it relies on the individuals of society to

understand and agree that what is best for society is that which is best for them.

Therefore, an account must be given as to how a person, as Sovereign, is to achieve this

demanding form of freedom.

While it is true, as noted above, that the Sovereign body is the legislative power of

the Republic this theoretical structure is meaningless without a citizenry that are capable

of forming and maintaining just institutions, because the people often do not know what

they want or what is good for it.[195]  Rousseau writes of this phenomenon, 'By itself, the

people always want the good, but by itself it does not always discern it.  The general will

is always right, but the judgement that guides it is not always enlightened.'[196]  If the

individuals that comprise society are unable to make this transition from one form of

freedom to another, then the tension between the individual and society remains.  To

resolve the tension individuals, 'must be obligated to make their wills conform to their

reason.'[197]  If this is done then the public will be able to recognise what it desires, and the

social body will exist in 'the complete cooperation of its parts', but, in order for this to

occur, both the public and the individuals which comprise it need guidance.[198]

The problem of the inadequately free public is answered with a new fiction–the

Lawgiver.  The function and necessity of the Lawgiver mirrors the function and the

necessity of the tutor in *Émile*.  The job of the Lawgiver is to discover the rules best suited

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[194] Dent (1989), pp. 198-99.
[195] 'Social Contract', *OC III*, 380; *CWR, Vol. 4*, p. 154.
[196] 'Social Contract', *OC III*, 380; *CWR, Vol. 4*, p. 154.
[197] 'Social Contract', *OC III*, 380; *CWR, Vol. 4*, p. 154.
[198] 'Social Contract', *OC III*, 380; *CWR, Vol. 4*, p. 154.

to govern society and in order to achieve this one would need near magical powers. Mark Blackell, describes the Lawgiver as, 'A legislator with an extra-social, quasi-metaphysical source of authority'.[199]  It is not simply that one would need 'superior intelligence', but one would need faculties so acute that the Lawgiver would see, in Rousseau's words,

> all men's passions yet experienced none of them; who had no relationship at all to our nature yet knew it thoroughly; whose happiness was independent of us, yet who was nevertheless will to attend to ours; finally one who, preparing for himself a future glory with the passage of time, could work in one century and enjoy the reward in another.  *Gods would be needed to give men laws.*[200]

It is the task of the Lawgiver to mould the nature of the human animal into a new form, from independent and solitary being into, 'a part of a larger whole from which this individual receives, in a sense, his life and his being.'[201]  The Lawgiver discerns the laws that the people are to live by, but its office is strictly in framing the laws.  It is not a member of the executive or the Sovereign—and by extension has no legislative right—and has no command over the people of society.  In a similar sentiment to that which we find in *Émile* after the necessary invention of Jean-Jacques the tutor, Rousseau concludes, '[t]hus one finds combined in the work of legislation two things that seem incompatible: an undertaking beyond human force and, to execute it, an authority that amounts to nothing.'[202]

There is an additional complication in this story however, which is also present in *Émile*.  There is a great demand of the public where, 'the effect would have to become the cause; the social spirit, which should be the result of the institution, would have to

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[199] Mark Blackall, 'Rousseau, Constant, and the Political Institutionalization of Ambivalence', in *Rousseau and Desire*, ed. by Mark Blackell, John Duncan, and Simon Kow (Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2009), pp. 117–37 (p. 119).
[200] 'Social Contract', *OC III*, 381; *CWR, Vol. 4*, p. 154, emphasis added
[201] 'Social Contract', *OC III*, 381; *CWR, Vol. 4*, p. 155.
[202] 'Social Contract', *OC III*, 383; *CWR, Vol. 4*, p. 156.

preside over the founding of the institution itself.'[203]  In other words, because the people

that form the Republic are not themselves beings capable of framing laws or consistently

perceiving the interests of the whole, Rousseau introduces the authority of God.  This is

done to ensure that the mandates of the General Will are followed by the people who

would otherwise not be ready to do so through their own will alone.[204]  The Lawgiver

then uses the authority of God to compel the people of society to obey, 'without violence

and persuade without convincing.'[205]  The coercion and manipulation of the people in the

*Social Contract* is strikingly similar to the coercion and manipulation of Émile at the hands

of the tutor.  The conclusion that Rousseau reaches though moves silently past this

insidious control and declares confidently the freedom achieved through this societal

structure.

The freedom in a cooperative society, structured in the manner defended by

Rousseau, is of a greater quality than that of the state of nature, and so, while there may

no more freedom in terms of quantity, the citizenry of a republic retain as much freedom

as held before its formation.  This freedom however, is incomplete.  Where the *Second*

*Discourse* tells the story of the degeneration of 'man', *Émile* and the *Social Contract*

reverse the story.  In the *Social Contract* Rousseau takes people 'as they are' in their

corrupted form seeking to generate cooperative society, and in *Émile*, similarly, Rousseau

begins in corrupted society but attempts to side-step its effects.  The focus of *Émile* is on

the creation of the free individual within this domain, thereby differing from the *Second*

*Discourse* because the latter does not need to address the coercive power of society in its

postulation of the individual prior to the advent of that society.  However, *Émile* differs

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[203] 'Social Contract', *OC III*, 383; *CWR, Vol. 4*, p. 156.

[204] Religion plays a significant role in the story of *Émile* also.  It is the Savoyard Vicar who teaches the tutor. This profession of faith effectively plays the same role in the story of *Émile* as religion does in the *Social Contract*.  The message appears to be in both stories that without a strong religious foundation the human animal would lack the moral maturity to act in its own best interests and therefore must be led to the truth by some external force.  In this case, God.  For a thorough analysis of the role of religion within Rousseau's political project see Mark Sydney Cladis, *Public Vision, Private Lives: Rousseau, Religion, and 21st-Century Democracy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).  For an alternative interpretation on the role of religion in Rousseau see, Patrick Riordan, 'Neither Theocracy Nor Civil Religion Can Serve the Common Good', *Tambara: A Journal on the Humanities and Social Sciences*, 32.1 (2015), 85–106.  In which Riordan argues that, 'Far from concluding that politics can successfully instrumentalize religion for its purposes, as is usually thought to be his view, Rousseau came to the conclusion that the kind of religion which might be made useful for politics would not succeed because it would be severely deficient, precisely as religion.' (p.89)

[205] 'Social Contract', *OC III*, 383; *CWR, Vol. 4*, p. 156.  I shall return to this definition of authority offered here by Rousseau later in the thesis as a solution to the problem of authority is sought.

too from the *Social Contract* because while a corrupt cooperative society persists, the freedom pursued is independent of it.

Rousseau in *Émile* has developed an individual at odds with the society that he developed in the *Social Contract*; two political treatises published in the same year and written concurrently yet offering two different accounts of freedom and of the person. In the following section I shall argue that these two theses are in fact compatible and coherent, but that the practical model which results is inherently flawed. Following this the search for a suitable model of the citizen shall be extended beyond Rousseau.

## §2.3 Rousseau's Resolution

It is my contention that the two narratives of *Émile* and the *Social Contract* can be reconciled. This is not a unique thesis. What is particular to my interpretation of Rousseau's political project is that I focus on its educative elements to show this coherence.[206] I claim that these two texts provide two mutually dependent answers to the tension between the individual and society, one interactional and one institutional. Therefore, *Émile* and the *Social Contract* can be read as a coherent and consistent political project.

The solutions provided in *Émile* and the *Social Contract* are useful narratives of the changes that we have undergone and what we aim to achieve. Shklar argues that they are representative of two fictions that persist throughout Rousseau's political thought. *Émile* is representative of the 'golden age', and the *Social Contract* is representative of Sparta.[207] While Shklar argues that these two fictions highlight the frail and strictly theoretical possibility of resolution, I contend that the role of these fictions is to serve as models that we can employ in our continual education and re-education. Rousseau, therefore, provides the tools for a reflective theory of political philosophy that can most accurately be described as a theory of *paideia*.

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[206] The following authors have all argued that Rousseau's political project should be read as a unified whole, and each provide an explanation of the seeming conflict between the differing resolutions offered to the problem presented in the *Second Discourse,* but the degree with which Rousseau achieves this aim is a matter of dispute. Cassirer (1963); Charvet (2009); Dent (1989); Neuhouser (2010); Judith N. Shklar (1985); Leo Strauss, 'On the Intention of Rousseau', *Social Research*, 14.4 (1947), 455–87; and Todorov (2001). I shall continue to draw on each of these texts to support my interpretation below.
[207] Shklar 1985, pp. 1-32.

The interpretation that I offer fits within the scope of what Rafeeq Hasan calls the 'Social Autonomy' interpretation of Rousseau.[208]  According to Hasan, there are three key claims made by the social autonomy interpretation of Rousseau.  Roughly these three key claims are: that there is a coherence between the free individual and the citizen; that the General Will is a complex principle which protects the freedom and equality of the participants of the state; and that *amour-propre*, is more than simply the source of our corruption, pride and envy, it is also the passion that, 'lies at the origin of the concept of equal moral and political worth'.[209]  Unlike Hasan, I accept all three of these claims.[210]  I shall argue that claims one and two follow from the pedagogies practiced by the tutor of *Émile* and the Lawgiver of the *Social Contract* respectively, and that claim three is the consequence of their dual practice.  In other words, through the dual programme of the interactional model of education practiced in *Émile* and the institutional model of education practiced in the *Social Contract* the inflammation of *amour-propre* is minimised, people recognise the connection between their private interests and the interests of the community, and people develop the skills necessary to perceive injustice and challenge it.

Hasan attributes the social autonomy interpretation of Rousseau to John Rawls, Joshua Cohen, and Frederick Neuhouser.  To a greater or lesser degree, all three offer Kantian readings of Rousseau.  Rawls explicitly reads Rousseau through the eyes of Kant and states that, 'Kant is the best interpreter of Rousseau.'[211]  Similarly, Cohen's enquiry is shaped by Kant, Cassirer, and Rawls' categorisation of Rousseau's works.[212]  Whereas, while Neuhouser offers a Kantian reading of Rousseau it is understood in the context of Rousseau as the father of German Idealism, rather than a direct Kantian reading.[213]  I pick

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[208] Rafeeq Hasan, 'Rousseau on the Ground of Obligation: Reconsidering the Social Autonomy Interpretation', *European Journal of Political Theory*, 17.2 (2018), 233–43 (p. 234).
[209] Hasan (2018), p. 234.
[210] Hasan accepts the first two claims and challenges the third because the social autonomy model of interpretation is overly Kantian.  Hasan (2018), pp. 7-8.  I respond to this concern later in this section.
[211] John Rawls, *Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy*, ed. by Samuel Richard Freeman (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 200.  The Rousseau of Rawls comes from, Immanuel Kant, 'Conjectural Beginning of Human History', in *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*, ed. by Pauline Kleingeld, Rethinking the Western Tradition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), pp. 24–36.
[212] Cohen (2010), p. 7.
[213] Frederick Neuhouser, *Rousseau's Critique of Inequality: Reconstructing the Second Discourse* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 14.

out Neuhouser in particular to focus upon because I develop upon his idea of Rousseau having developed a two-pronged response to the problem outlined in the *Second Discourse* which can be characterised as a spelling out of the tension between the individual and society. Something that John Charvet in his analysis of Rousseau referred to as the social problem.[214]

According to Neuhouser, the *Second Discourse*, the *Social Contract*, and *Émile* can be read as compatible and complementary texts. Neuhouser places central importance on the concept of *amour-propre* within Rousseau's political thought. He writes, 'more than any other aspect of his thought the theory of *amour-propre* is the foundation of which [Rousseau's] social, political, and moral philosophy rests.'[215] *Amour-propre* is relational self-love, it is how we see ourselves in the eyes of another. It becomes inflamed easily in seeing ourselves not as equals or believing that we are superior to another. As stated above, it is often interpreted as a negative phenomenon and something to be controlled but Neuhouser resists this and argues that *amour-propre* is in fact neutral. Instead *amour-propre* is to be cultivated and properly directed. It cannot be eliminated and it is a misunderstanding of the concept to argue that it should be. According to Neuhouser, while it is true that *amour-propre* is, 'the principle source of the many evils that plague human beings', it does not necessarily lead us to those evils.[216] Neuhouser continues, 'it is possible for *amour-propre* to assume good forms that not only enrich and elevate human existence but also have the capacity to remedy the very ills the inflamed desire for recognition produces.'[217]

Neuhouser reads *Émile* and the *Social Contract* as two texts dedicated to cultivating a positive manifestation of *amour-propre* and averting the dangers of its inflammation. He therefore understands Rousseau as having suggested a 'two-pronged approach' to this aim.[218] The former largely focussed upon the task of the formation of the individual character, and the latter primarily engaged with the challenge of developing just institutions. It is necessary to do both because neither one nor the other is sufficient to

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[214] Charvet (2009).
[215] Neuhouser (2010), p. 1.
[216] *ibid*, p. 15.
[217] *ibid*.
[218] *ibid*, p. 154.

successfully avert the dangers of *amour-propre* on their own.  Therefore, Rousseau's project must be taken as a complete whole.

However, there are two ways in which the centrality of *amour-propre* thesis that defines Neuhouser's interpretation of Rousseau is insufficient.  Firstly, the *Social Contract* makes no mention of *amour-propre*; and secondly, Neuhouser places too much focus on *amour-propre* at the expense of the other psychological forces at play within Rousseau's political theory.  These two objections were raised by Robin Douglass.  Douglass argues that Neuhouser is mistaken in placing so much weight on the *Social Contract* in answering the problems generated by *amour-propre*.  He writes,

> it is worth stressing that none of the passages Neuhouser cites from the
> *Social Contract* … even implicitly suggest that the reason why these
> forms of equality are important is because they are sources of
> recognition, or satisfy a desire for equal standing relative to others.[219]

Neuhouser is aware that nowhere in the *Social Contract* is *amour-propre* discussed explicitly but believes that it is clear that it does so.  Addressing this concern Neuhouser writes, '[n]evertheless, once one has traced the problem of *amour-propre* through *Emile* and the *Second Discourse*, it is not difficult to see that significant aspects of that problem are also addressed by the social and political measures endorsed in the *Social Contract*.'[220]  According to Neuhouser the *Social Contract* contains important responses to the inflammation of *amour-propre*.  One way in which it does is by countering the type of inequalities that Rousseau would seek to eliminate, or at least curtail – these are social inequalities supported by the structure of civil society.  The second way that the *Social Contract* counteracts the inflammation of *amour-propre* is through the development of an institutional structure which promotes an equality of social recognition.[221]

Douglass argues that even if the *Social Contract* is seen as answering some of the problems with *amour-propre* raised in the *Second Discourse*, that it does not address the

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[219] Robin Douglass, 'What's Wrong with Inequality? Some Rousseauian Perspectives', *European Journal of Political Theory*, 14.3 (2015), 368–77 (p. 372).
[220] Neuhouser (2010), pp. 161–62.
[221] *ibid*, p. 162.

non-political social institutions role in cultivating a positive expression of *amour-propre*. In other words, 'it satisfies only the respect component of social recognition, and not the esteem component.'[222]  Neuhouser's answer to this is to appeal to Hegel.  However, Douglass resists this move.  He writes, '[o]ne reason why reading Rousseau … on *amour-propre* is so valuable, and at the same time so disquieting, is because he presented the problems it generates as being so pervasive as to preclude any political remedies, at least in modern, market-based economies.'[223]  Douglass argues that the solution Rousseau offers to the problems created by *amour-propre* in the *Social Contract* appeal to the power of public education to direct an individual to associate their own well-being with the well-being of the polity.  Douglass writes,

> [r]ather than setting individuals against one another, as is so often the case in modern societies, Rousseau seems to have thought that the *amour-propre* of virtuous citizens could be satisfied by pursuing the glory of their polity; a goal that would be highly esteemed by virtuous citizens.[224]

In addition to the concern that Rousseau does not mention *amour-propre* at all in the *Social Contract* is the worry that in placing such great importance on *amour-propre*, as Neuhouser does, there is a risk of undermining the importance of the faculty of reason, *pitié* and *amour de soi* in Rousseau's psychology. Douglass writes,

> [w]e might overemphasise the importance of *amour-propre* if we focus exclusively upon it and do not attend to the other psychological dimensions of Rousseau's critique of inequality; in particular, the extent to which inequality stifles pity and prevents humans from identifying with one another.[225]

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[222] Douglass (2015), p. 373.
[223] *ibid*.
[224] *ibid*.
[225] *ibid*, p. 374.

Douglass argues that the role of *pitié*, which is conceptually prior to *amour-propre*, in resolving the tension between the individual and society should not be undermined. An ability to feel the suffering of others as our own is what leads us to becoming moral beings and without it those privileged by chance and luck will be unlikely to associate with the well-being of those worse off than themselves.[226] Rousseau writes of *pitié*, that it 'tempers the ardour he has for his own well-being by an innate repugnance to see his fellow suffer' and that it, 'contributes to the mutual preservation of the entire species.'[227]

Douglass' arguments highlight the limitations of placing such central importance on *amour-propre* in Rousseau's political project. In particular the concern that the *Social Contract* does not discuss it explicitly at any point is difficult to swallow, especially when one considers that *Émile* and the *Social Contract* were both published in 1762 and written, to some degree, concurrently. Ultimately, Neuhouser offers too narrow a reading in his focus on *amour-propre*. However, there is no need to abandon claim three of the social autonomy interpretation of Rousseau. *Amour-propre* is more than simply the source of our corruption, pride and envy and it is key in Rousseau's concept of equal moral and political worth. It is a neutral passion which is integral in the development of the human animal into the 'man-citizen'. *Amour-propre* retains this importance, but it does so within the context of the whole psychological animal. It is mutually co-dependent with the development of *pitié*, the General Will, and the other virtues of Émile. Therefore, it is necessary to take account of the whole psychological animal when exploring Rousseau's positive political argument as found in *Émile* and the *Social Contract*.

Above I have raised concerns with the stated aim of Rousseau's political project as understood by Neuhouser, namely to provide an answer to the inflammation of *amour-propre*. A third concern that I have with Neuhouser is with respect to how he interprets the scope and purpose of the two-prongs that are to address this inflammation. Neuhouser argues that the two broad categories that represent each prong are 'the restructuring of social and political institutions and those that concern the education, or formation, of individual character.'[228] According to Neuhouser, the first is largely

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[226] Douglass (2015), p. 375.
[227] 'Second Discourse', *OC III*, 154; *CWR Vol. 3*, pp. 36-37.
[228] Neuhouser (2010), p. 157.

contained within the *Social Contract* and the second within the pages of *Émile*. The difference between the two prongs is found in the distinction between domestic and public education. '[P]ublic education is "common" … and seeks to produce "citizens"'.'[229] Whereas, domestic education is individual 'and seeks to produce "men"'.[230]

Neuhouser argues that public and domestic education ,'differ along two dimensions'.[231] That is that they differ in their goal or end, where the former aims to produce citizens and the latter 'men', and they differ in the social space in which they take place. In the case of *Émile* this means that education takes place in a relatively private space, 'free from the watch and influence of society at large.'[232] Whereas, the public education of the *Social Contract* takes place through the interaction with just institutions and structure of society.

However, it is not clearly the case that the two-prongs should be understood in these terms, where one prong deals with domestic education and the other public education. In fact, both *Émile* and the *Social Contract* deal with both types of education as Neuhouser defines them. The education of *Émile* is primarily domestic but it is so out of necessity. Émile is removed from the corrupting and coercive force of civil society and the tutor introduces Émile to this other world as and when he deems it appropriate for Émile's development. It is not asocial nor is it apolitical. It is an education that has as its goal a set of virtues which are politically and socially informed. Émile embodies these virtues. He is, as a result, the personification of equality.[233]

Similarly, while the education of the *Social Contract* is primarily public it is a mistake to overlook the domestic nature of the relationship between the Lawgiver and the Sovereign. There is a clear corollary between that and the relationship between the tutor and Émile. As discussed above, the Lawgiver guides the Sovereign to the General Will through the prescriptions of religion because the Sovereign, at first at least, will not reliably identify the General Will on account of its being composed of individuals still corrupted by civil society.

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[229] Neuhouser (2010), p. 159.
[230] *ibid.*
[231] *ibid.*
[232] *ibid*, p. 160.
[233] A description of Émile's character was given on page 59 and in footnote 170.

For these reasons I claim that Rousseau should be read as providing a resolution to the tension between the individual and society through a two-pronged politico-educational project, one interactional and the other institutional. I call this claim the centrality of education thesis and I support it by drawing attention to two rarely commented upon aspects of Rousseau's theory. The first aspect is that Rousseau intentionally uses fictional devices and Rousseau uses these necessary fictions as theoretical tools for the development of his arguments in both *Émile* and the *Social Contract*; the prime examples being the tutor in the former and the Lawgiver in the latter. This device serves two purposes; it shows where the theory could go if such things existed and it serves to highlight that the perceived end of the political project cannot be reached in one generation.

The second aspect of Rousseau's theory which supports the centrality of education thesis overlaps with the first. It is the case that Rousseau is aware of his fallibility and builds that capacity for error into his political project. He is aware of the role that he plays within his philosophical project and perceives himself as a member of a corrupt society, he is an example of 'social man'. One example of this is when Rousseau writes in the *Second Discourse*, '[e]verything that comes from Nature will be true; there will be nothing false except what I have involuntarily put in of my own.'[234] This is a contentious claim because he is often arrogant and can be read as displaying false modesty. Leo Strauss offers an interesting analysis of this aspect of Rousseau's personality.[235] Strauss accommodates for the contradiction that he perceives in the *First Discourse*, by arguing that Rousseau assumes two characters in the text. That of the 'simple soul' or 'common man' and the voice of the scholar–'Just as the *Discours* may be said to have two different authors, it may be said to be addressed to two different audiences.'[236] Both these voices find expression throughout Rousseau's corpus and it is no doubt that Rousseau thought highly of himself, and that he thought most everyone was more corrupt than himself. However, he was simply too astute, and clearly aware of the connotations of his own

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[234] 'Second Discourse', *OC III*, 133; *CWR Vol. 3*, p. 19. Another is in the 'Letter by J. J. Rousseau to M. Philopolis', a reply to a critic of the *Second Discourse*, in which Rousseau writes, 'I feel too strongly in my own particular case how little I can forego living with men as corrupt as myself, and the wise man himself, if there is one, would not now seek happiness deep in the wilderness.' *OC III*, p. 235; *CWR Vol. 3*, p. 131.

[235] Strauss (1947).

[236] *ibid*, p.463.

philosophical assumptions, for it to be justified in dismissing his pronouncements of fallibility.

Together, Rousseau's fallibility and the literary fictions represent the stepping off point from the political project as stated within Rousseau's texts and into the application of that project through the methodology that these fictions present. What I mean by this is that the stability of thought that these creations offer, and the doubt sewn into Rousseau's thesis ensure that the conclusion is not available. Therefore, we are left with a choice of our own. Either Rousseau's philosophical project is a non-starter or an explanation of the non-existence of the central figures of the tutor and Lawgiver within that project is offered.

Taking the latter position, I offer education as the resolution. The role of education is explicit within the pages of *Émile* but it is a mistake to overlook the importance of education within the *Social Contract*.[237] The force of the General Will is educative. The people that join in union do not remain as they were in the state of nature, nor do they remain corrupt. If the changes that occur to these people are to be positive and lead toward freedom and equality, then the structure and institutions of their union must direct them so. Therefore, the Lawgiver plays a similar role as the tutor. They are both preventative of the development of inflamed *amour-propre* and responsible for the development of those virtues that sustain and flourish, thereby resolving the tension between the individual and society. In short, the Lawgiver is educative. This education takes place over the course of a person's life and from generation to generation until the Lawgiver and the tutor are no longer needed. For this reason, as mentioned above, I call Rousseau's political project an expression of *paideia*. This interpretation of Rousseau is strongly influenced by Neuhouser and his categorisation of Rousseau's political project as a two-pronged approach to achieve properly directed *amour-propre*. However, it strengthens the two-pronged thesis by going beyond Neuhouser in acknowledging the development of the whole psychological animal as the aim of both the interactional and the institutional aspects of Rousseau's politico-educational project and thus, drawing out the 'centrality of education thesis' that I defend.

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[237] Both Todorov and Charvet see the role of education in the *Social Contract*. Charvet believes that the solution offered in the *Social Contract* is done so through public education, as opposed to the domestic education developed in *Émile*. Charvet (2009), p. 26. This thought is shared by Todorov who perceives the necessity of public or civic education for the stability of the Republic, Todorov (2001), p. 26.

However, the limitations of Rousseau's political project are clear. Firstly, there is only a thin, almost impossible, chance of resolution. Both strands, the interactional and institutional, must be developed in concert and over generations for the coercive force of society to be held in check and for individuals to flourish. It is clear that Rousseau does not think it likely at all. In fact, as mentioned above, Shklar, believes that the chance of redemption in Rousseau is so slim that it is treated as impossible in practice, existing only as a theoretical possibility.[238]

Furthermore, there is no implementable practical model for resolution. The practical aspects of these works are the most insidious and unrealistic aspects of either project. This is seen most clearly in the implausible and exaggerated characters of the books; Émile, Sophie, Jean-Jacques, the Lawgiver, and the Savoyard Vicar. *The Social Contract* and *Émile* should be understood as strictly theoretical works. That the *Social Contract* is a theoretical work is evidenced by the changes made in the compositions of *On the Government of Poland* and *Constitutional Project for Corsica*.[239] These texts were designed by Rousseau for a specific people at a specific time and while they represent different manifestations of the same political project they differ markedly from one another and both from the *Social Contract*.

Lastly, a reflective methodology, though present in Rousseau, is only hinted at in the *Second Discourse* and is undermined by his misogyny. It is important to remember that Émile's education is the education of a man. The education of women is separate and distinct. In Rousseau's eyes a woman is to be educated as a wife and companion of a man, not as a citizen and not as a free individual themselves.[240] The reflective methodology is further undermined by his insidious teaching habits. In order to control

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[238] Shklar (1985), p. 30.

[239] Rousseau, 'Considerations on the Government of Poland and on Its Planned Reformation', in *OC III*, 953-1041; *CWR Vol. 11*, pp. 167-240; and 'Plan for a Constitution for Corsica', in *OC III*, 901-50; *CWR Vol. 11,* pp, 123-66. See footnote 424 for references.

[240] While it is a matter of dispute whether Rousseau believed the differences between a man and a woman were natural or social it is not a matter of any controversy within Rousseau scholarship that the differences perceived were to be maintained and supported within both the public and private spheres–thereby disenfranchising women both in society and at home. The qualities that Rousseau associates exclusively to a particular gender are used to justify this asymmetry and is therefore a huge failure of Rousseau's reflections upon natural character, and of his reflective method. For more on this see, Lange (2002); Penny A. Weiss, 'Sex, Freedom & Equality in Rousseau's "Emile"', *Polity*, 22.4 (1990), 603–25; and Jane Roland Martin, 'Sophie and Emile: A Case Study of Sex Bias in the History of Educational Thought', *Harvard Educational Review*, 51.3 (1981), 357–72.

the environment of Émile Rousseau advocates many tricks and deceits, not least getting him lost in the forest, forcing him to sleep in a room with a broken window, and encouraging his embarrassment by a travelling magician.[241]

Neuhouser fails to distance his interpretation of Rousseau from these limitations. He sidesteps the issue of insidious control, choosing to assume that the tutor's actions can be separated from the theory and chooses to bracket off any questions that may arise from Rousseau's misogyny.  Instead, choosing to work on the assumption that the 'salvageable philosophical core' that he identifies is not undermined by it.[242]  This cannot be the case.  Rousseau envisages different social roles for women and men and provides the two genders with distinct educations that are designed to complement one another. Émile's education is not complete until he has formed a monogamous and heterosexual union with Sophie.  According to Rousseau, 'the union of the sexes each contributes equally to the common aim, but not in the same way.'[243]  And the role played in that union is defined by the characteristics of one's gender.  The woman ought to be 'passive and weak' in opposition to the strong and active nature of man, who women are 'made specially to please'.[244]  As such, to treat Émile's education as sufficient for both genders is to ignore vital parts of the education of the individual and the citizen because that which Sophie brings in order to complete the education of Émile is not taken into account.  In analysing Rousseau's conception of the nature of man and woman, and the roles that they play in both the state and the home, Rebecca Kukla identifies an incoherence of social association.[245]  According to Kukla, the problem of joining forces with others and yet retaining the freedom possessed within the state of nature, 'ought to have led Rousseau to recast the terms of the problem of *civic* association, and to have seen this problem as inextricably bound up with the face of patriarchy.'[246]

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[241] These events are described in 'Émile', *OC IV*, 447-451; *CWR Vol. 13*, pp. 326-329, *OC IV*, 333-335; *CWR Vol. 13*, pp.234-234, and *OC IV*, 437-441; *CWR Vol. 13*, pp.318-321, respectively.
[242] Neuhouser (2010), p. 25.
[243] 'Émile', *OC IV*, 693; *CWR Vol. 13*, p. 532.
[244] 'Émile', *OC IV*, 693; *CWR Vol. 13*, p. 532.
[245] Rebecca Kukla, 'The Coupling of Human Souls: Rousseau and the Problem of Gender Relations', in *Feminist Interpretations of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, ed. by Lynda Lange, Re-Reading the Canon (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), pp. 346–82.
[246] *ibid*, p. 348.

It is possible to overcome Rousseau's misogyny and insidious teaching practices by refocussing his political project in two interconnected ways. Firstly, by drawing out the centrality of education and secondly by developing the reflective methodology intimated throughout Rousseau's project. These two points are interconnected because of the nature of education that Rousseau promotes. It is through continual learning–over the course of one's life and over generations of life–that corruption is overcome. This claim is supported by the genealogical fictions that persists within *Émile*, a theme common in Rousseau's writings.[247] Rousseau is not naïve to this point and recognises the task asked of the tutor as too great even for himself. The problem here is that if Rousseau were to be read as providing an immediately implementable pedagogical theory then it would collapse because the tools prescribed, i.e. the tutor and guardian Jean-Jacques, are not available.

Therefore, the project of properly directed *amour-propre* is one part of the educational project which is central to Rousseau's theory, but so is the socio-political project of the *Social Contract*. It is not something that can be achieved without learning from and reflecting upon the mistakes of the past and applying this learning to our conduct as individuals and construct of our institutions. Rousseau is committed to a generational project where parent teaches child as best as they are able, and the power of the educational theory that Rousseau develops exists in its recognition of this limitation. There may have been no person available to Rousseau to act as tutor or Lawgiver, and there may be no person that fulfils the criteria now, but if the project is followed then there is a chance that there will one day be. It becomes a genealogical solution to a problem that Rousseau elucidated through the genealogical model of the *Second Discourse*.

However, this reflective methodology is poorly developed within Rousseau's political project. As such, it is important to move on from Rousseau and explore methodologies that are more fully developed and refined. In doing so, the methodologies

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[247] Examples of Rousseauian genealogical fictions include the variety of forms of 'man' in the *Second Discourse*; the stages of psychological development undergone by Émile which mirror those forms of 'man'; then there is the psychological development of 'man' in the *Social Contract* from the state of nature to expresser of the General Will; finally, there is the importance of *Telemachus*, a text by François Fénelon, in the education of Émile into adulthood, in which the hero's tutor is revealed to be the god of wisdom. See Patrick Riley, 'Rousseau, Fénelon, and the Quarrel of the Ancients', in *The Cambridge Companion to Rousseau*, ed. by Patrick Riley (Cambridge New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 78–93.

explored shall provide new tools that can further Rousseau's political project or show that project to be ultimately unsuccessful.  Either way, the project to provide a theoretical and practical foundation for the development of the citizen that is equipped to cope with the necessary coercion of cooperative society will be explored.

## Chapter 3

## The Tension in Dewey

### §3.0  Summary

In this chapter I shall move onto an analysis of Dewey's politico-educational project in which I argue that the tension between the individual and society manifests in two different ways, through what I term the tension from environment and the tension of overlapping interests.  The first tension of the individual and society that I identify within Dewey's philosophy is between the individual and their environment – where environment is understood as, 'those conditions that promote or hinder, stimulate or inhibit, the *characteristic* activities of a living being.'[248]  This tension manifests as a result of Dewey's conception of freedom and his view of culture.  This I refer to as, the tension from environment.  Secondly, there is a tension between the interests or desires of the individual and the interests of both the state and the groups to which each individual belongs.  Dewey explores this second tension within *The Public and its Problems*.  This second tension I refer to as, the tension of overlapping interests.

There are several accounts of the tension that occurs between the individual and society within Dewey's political philosophy, however, they focus primarily on either the first or the second manifestation of that tension that I have identified.  Whilst I have found no other analysis of Dewey's philosophy that treats these tensions as two parts of the same problem, I believe that it is clearly the same problem viewed from two different perspectives.[249]  Below, it is my aim to explicate these two tensions as I find them within

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[248] Dewey, 'MW9', p. 15.

[249] The first tension is discussed by, Sang Hyun Kim, 'The Problem of Authority: What Can Korean Education Learn From Dewey?', *Education and Culture*, 29.1 (2013), 64–83; Elizabeth Flower, 'A Naturalistic Psychology, Individual, and Social', in *John Dewey: Critical Assessments, Volume 1*, ed. by J. E. Tiles, Routledge Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers (London; New York: Routledge, 1992); Cherilyn Keall, 'The Paradox of Freedom: John Dewey on Human Nature, Culture, and Education', *Education and Culture*, 29.2 (2013), 53–70; and Marsha Chevalier, 'Paradoxes of Social Control: Children's Perspectives and Actions', *Journal of Research in Childhood Education*, 13.1 (1998), 48–55.  Whereas the second tension is discussed by, Gordon. W. Allport, 'Individual and Social Psychology', in *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, ed. by Paul Arthur Schilpp and Lewis Edwin Hahn, The Library of Living Philosophers, Volume 1, 3d ed (La Salle, Ill: Open Court, 1989), pp. 263–90; Sandra B. Rosenthal, 'The Individual, the Community, and the Reconstruction of Values', in *Philosophy and the Reconstruction of Values: Pragmatic Essays After Dewey*, ed. by John J. Stuhr (SUNY Press, 1993), pp. 59–77; Alfonso J. Damico, *Individuality and Community: The*

Dewey's later writings.  Then I shall explore Dewey's resolution to the tensions and the limitations of these resolutions.

## §3.1  The Tension from Environment

The first manifestation of the tension between the individual and society considers the tension from the perspective of one's environment.  This tension persists throughout all forms of association, and cultural and familial practices.  It is a question of what constitutes legitimate social control.  Dewey believes that too much and the individual will be dictated to and not learn for themselves, but not enough and individuals will not flourish within society.  It is in *Democracy and Education*, that Dewey most clearly expresses his view that all those who participate in a relational activity have a social environment.  He argues that an individual cannot be abstracted from society, that it is not possible to experience the view from nowhere.[250]  Therefore, all actions are performed within a social environment. The environment of which an individual is a part has the potential to be, depending on its expression, a source of educative growth, but equally it can arrest the growth of the individual.  Elizabeth Flower expresses this in her analysis of Dewey's naturalistic psychology.  She writes,

> … conditions modify both plan and planner throughout the execution of
> an action.  There is a transaction between two subsystems, the agent
> and the environment.  The agent cannot be cut from the environment,
> for the requirements which the environment makes are not outside the
> agent, and the agent's abilities and resources must count as a part of

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*Social and Political Thought of John Dewey* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1978); and George Raymond Geiger, 'Social and Political Philosophy', in *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, ed. by Paul Arthur Schilpp and Lewis Edwin Hahn, The Library of Living Philosophers, Volume 1, 3d ed (La Salle, Ill: Open Court, 1989), pp. 335–68.

[250] Dewey writes, 'Because *an* individual can be dissociated from this, that and the other grouping…. there grows up in the mind an image of a residual individual who is not a member of any association at all.  From this premise, and from this only, there develops the unreal question of how individuals come to be united in societies and groups: *the* individual and *the* social are now opposed to each other, and there is the problem of "reconciling" them.  Meanwhile, the genuine problem is that of adjusting groups and individual to one another.' Dewey, 'MW9', p. 355.

the conditions in reference to which plans are made and action emerges.[251]

Dewey's task, as he sees it, is to develop a process of communication that balances the coercive nature of a person's environment with that person's freedom.  Thereby creating the most conducive environment for the realisation of growth and flourishing of both.

This tension between a person's environment and their freedom manifests on a large scale in virtue of living in association with others.  Dewey presents the assumption that, 'no one would deny that the ordinary good citizen is as a matter of fact subject to a great deal of social control…', however, according to Dewey this control is not always prohibitive of freedom, for he continues, '…and that a considerable part of this control is not felt to involve restriction of personal freedom.'[252]  Dewey contends that if one were to deny this claim they would be committed to a negative conception of freedom and the intractability of the tension between the individual and their environment.  However, freedom, according to Dewey, is more than merely the absence of physical impediment.  Dewey writes, '[t]he commonest mistake made about freedom is, I think, to identify it with freedom of movement, or with the external and physical side of activity.'[253]  If this was not the case, and to be free one need only be able to do as one pleased, then the presence of social control becomes an inescapable impediment to one exercising their freedom.[254]

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[251] Flower (1992), p. 32.

[252] John Dewey, 'Experience and Education', in *The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953. Vol. 13: 1938-1939*, ed. by Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991), pp. 1–62 (p. 32).  I am grateful to Joshua Forstenzer for pushing me to clarify that, if by this Dewey means that, most citizens do not feel a restriction to their personal freedom even in the face of significant social control, then those citizen's may still be subject to constraints on their freedom.  However, I think it is clear from the context that Dewey means, an observer of these citizens does not feel that there are constraints upon the citizens' freedom as a result of the social control that they are subject to.  Therefore, the middle claim does follow from the subsequent claim.

[253] Dewey, 'LW13', p. 39.

[254] The belief that freedom is the freedom to do as one pleases is the foundational commitment of negative conceptions of liberty.  The difference between negative and positive conceptions of liberty, and their impact upon Dewey's resolution to the tension between the individual and society is a subject that is returned to in the following section, see footnotes 295 & 312 for references.

For Dewey, to be free one must also possess, 'freedom of thought, desire, and purpose'.[255]  In attributing these additional qualities to the conception of freedom we must admit to a degree of social control in our association with others.  In light of this argument, Cherilyn Keall states that Dewey is presenting a positive conception of freedom.[256]  Keall argues that Dewey's understanding of human nature offers a third way between the view that it is fixed and unchanging and that human nature can and does change.  Keall's argument offers insight into the tension between the individual and their environment because, while there are qualities of human nature that are fixed it is more accurate to say that one is a product of their environment, of their culture, their time, their familial practices.[257]  This identity is built through the development of habit, and exists within a culture that is resistant to change.  This formulation raises questions of freedom and demands an explanation of change that does occur.

Human freedom, on Keall's account of Dewey, is both supported by and undermined by one's environment—or culture—because it has a twofold character.  In the first, one's environment 'tends toward fixity', in that the force of habit and expectation mean that a person is likely to act in accordance with what has come before.[258]  However, while Dewey argues that the past is controlling it competes with one's free will rather replaces it as a cause of action, as such Dewey must not be confused with having presented a determinist position.  Keall describes Dewey's view as, 'human culture does not stand over against human nature… [but] issues from human nature'.[259]  Therefore, basic human needs are able to manifest change within culture but these instances will remain imperfect and sporadic unless cultivated through education.

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[255] Dewey, 'LW13', p. 39.

[256] Keall (2013), p. 59.

[257] Although those qualities of human nature that do not change appear to be quite limited.  Keall references Dewey's essay, John Dewey, 'Does Human Nature Change?', in *The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953, Volume 13: 1938-1939*, ed. by Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008), pp. 286–93 (p. 286), to illustrate that innate needs such as food, drink, and movement are conditions of human nature that cannot change, Keall (2013), p. 54.

[258] Keall (2013), p. 57.

[259] *ibid*.  Determinism is the view that the past and the laws of nature fix the future and one cannot do otherwise.  Schopenhauer provides a classic example of determinism in Arthur Schopenhauer, *Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will*, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

Marsha Chevalier analyses the tension from environment in Dewey's thought also and describes the force of culture upon the individual as 'external control'.[260] The freedom of the individual is preserved by democratic participation which results in 'internal control'. This latter force being, 'internally negotiated and mutually constructed'.[261]

The tension from environment is therefore no more than seeming according to Dewey because our actions are not determined they are merely coerced, and freedom to change persists throughout the most coercive of environments. However, this freedom is arrested within that environment and it is only through education that this inhibitive force is counteracted. Despite, this categorisation of the tension the problem does bleed into that of the second tension between the individual and society that I have identified, the tension of overlapping interests. This is because an environmental force can be 'natural' in that it arises from a cultural or habitual practice unseen, unthought, or unquestioned but this can still be insidious. This force can still be damaging to growth because of either intentional or unintentional acts of persons contained within that environment.[262] So while Dewey can appeal to democratic participation as the resolution to this tension it is clear that this needs to be spelled out in more detail.

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[260] Chevalier (1998), p. 49.

[261] *ibid*. Another, analysis of social control within Dewey is presented by J. O. C. Phillips, 'John Dewey and Social Control Reconsidered', *History of Education*, 12.1 (1983), 25–37. The focus here is on the Later Works, in particular *Experience and Education*, whereas Phillips only considers social control from the perspective of Dewey's work pre-1920. He emphasises Dewey's early psychology and personal history to combat the view that Dewey's educational theory aspires to maintain the status quo by shifting the focus rather than refuting the argument. For that which Phillips is responding to see, Clarence J. Karier, 'Liberal Ideology and the Quest for Orderly Change', in *Roots of Crisis: American Education in the Twentieth Century*, by Clarence J. Karier, Paul C. Violas, and Joel H. Spring, Rand McNally Education Series (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1972), pp. 84–107.

[262] I am referring here to implicit bias surrounding such things as gender, class, sexuality, roles within society, etc,. Perceptions can be maintained because the current order is desired or because it is thought of as natural due to its level of embeddedness within society. For more on implicit bias see 'Project Implicit' and papers such as, Jesse Graham, 'Mapping the Moral Maps: From Alternate Taxonomies to Competing Predictions', *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 17.3 (2013), 237–41; Yoav Bar-Anan, Jan De Houwer, and Brian A. Nosek, 'Evaluative Conditioning and Conscious Knowledge of Contingencies: A Correlational Investigation with Large Samples', *The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 63.12 (2010), 2313–35; Jennifer A. Joy-Gaba and Brian A. Nosek, 'The Surprisingly Limited Malleability of Implicit Racial Evaluations', *Social Psychology*, 41.3 (2010), 137–46; Matthew B. Kugler, Joel Cooper, and Brian A. Nosek, 'Group-Based Dominance and Opposition to Equality Correspond to Different Psychological Motives', *Social Justice Research*, 23.2–3 (2010), 117–55. From the philosophical perspective Roland Barthes, *Mythologies* (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 2006), draws attention to many different categories of human life and interaction that externally mould individuals.

## §3.2 The Tension of Overlapping Interests

As mentioned above, the tension from environment is not the only manifestation of tension between the individual and society. The second manifestation of the tension is more narrowly conceived than the first. It arises as a result of the complex and embedded democratic vision that is both contextually immediate and representative of Dewey's end-in-view. In this section I shall explicate the tension of overlapping interests which arises within Dewey's politico-educational project.

This tension is related to and overlapping with the tension from environment and arises from Dewey's acknowledgement that each individual is a member of more than simply the state.[263] They are members of many groups all of which have specific interests and desires. This consideration results in the addition of a further conflict into the traditional debate. Dewey must consider the tension that exists not merely between the individual and society. There exists the individual, society as a whole, and a multitude of groups all of which operate with independent interests and desires thereby creating a third level of tension that needs to be resolved. This tension is drawn out most clearly in *The Public and its Problems*.[264]

Above I argued that Dewey's political project is an expression and application of a method to cultivate an environment where both society and the individual could achieve educative growth, and a desire to achieve that growth. One important consideration as a part of this project is the tension in interests between the individual and society. Further to this tension however are the publics to which individuals belong. In *The Public and its Problems* Dewey argues that the individual, the society of which they are a part, and the publics of which they are a member must be understood as necessary constituents of each other. This is because, as noted above, as much as the individual is a product of their environment – as are the groups to which they associate – society is a collection of individuals and, much like each individual, it cannot be abstracted from them. According

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[263] I do not mean to imply that one's environment and the state are equivalent. One's environment extends beyond the reach of the state to include the influence of cultural and familial practice, and the unique experiences felt by any one person. Whereas, the state, while possessing the power to influence many aspects of a person's environment is itself only a part of that environment, subject to its affects in a very similar fashion to any individual.

[264] Dewey, 'LW2', pp. 235-372.

to Dewey, the mistake made by classical liberalism is in defining society and the individual in opposition to one another and in isolation of one another.[265]  Dewey, on the other hand, seeks to explain how these three necessary components of communal life are interrelated, and how they ought to be directed so that each complements the other and experiences educative growth.

These three components of society deserve to be clarified if their tension is to be clearly seen.  A public is generated after an act, or set of acts, produce consequences that affect people outside of those directly involved with the act, and the occurrence of those indirect consequences being perceived as something that needs to be mitigated or promoted.  It consists of a group of individuals that share some common ground and act in the interest of this commonality.  Allport writes that a public,

> is nothing but the by-product of social activity between individuals.  So long as A and B have direct private transactions no public is involved.  But let the consequences of their transactions extend beyond their own lives, affecting the lives and welfare of others, and a public, based on common interest springs into being.[266]

However, not all social groups can be classified as publics because some will necessarily run counter to the interests of others and the state.  The example that Dewey offers is a band of robbers.[267]  Even if the individuals of this group act consistently with the interests of the group in mind they cannot make those interests consonant with the interests of other groups or the society as a whole.  'The robber band cannot interact flexibly with other groups; it can act only through isolating itself.'[268]  Therefore, the

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[265] The application of the term 'Liberalism' is diffuse and varied.  Dewey identified as a liberal philosopher, see Dewey, 'LW5'; John Dewey, 'Liberalism and Social Action', in *The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953, Volume 11: 1935-1937*, ed. by Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008), pp. 1–66.  Dewey aims his criticism at what he refers to as 'classical liberals' such as John Locke and his most famous expression of the position in *Second Treatise on Government* (Penguin, 2011).  See Michael J. Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*, 2nd ed (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998) for a clear expression of Liberalism and more on the internal debates of Liberalism.
[266] Allport (1989), p. 285.
[267] Dewey, 'LW2', p. 328.
[268] *ibid*.

groups of which an individual is a member must be positively reinforced through participation.[269]

What distinguishes the state and the public is that while both are organised by officials, only the state must possess a, 'temporal and geographical location.'[270] According to Dewey, the boundaries of a public will be difficult to draw. A public must not be so large that it cannot incorporate face-to-face relationships; but not so small and intimate where the state would be 'an impertinence.'[271] The state is a more formal term that can overlap with both the social and the public but must be understood separately. The state therefore, is the organised form of a public with institutions established for the regulation of the consequences that give rise to a public. Dewey writes,

> the perception of consequences which are projected in important ways beyond the persons and associations directly concerned in them is the source of a public; and that its organisation into a state is effected by establishing special agencies to care for and regulate these consequences.[272]

This distinction, between a 'public' and a 'state' becomes clearer when one understands Dewey's distinction between 'private' and 'public' which is the key to Dewey's account of the state. A private person is opposed to a public official. The former has no input into, nor benefit from, the public; and the latter care for those who suffer observed consequences from actions and determine whether those actions are in need of inhibiting or promoting. Axel Honneth identifies this as a proceduralist differentiation between 'private' and 'public'.[273] The line that Dewey draws between private and public

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[269] The example that Dewey uses to illustrate this point is reasonably uncontroversial. A band of robbers necessarily work against the interests of others. However, this can be easily challenged with Robin Hood examples of thievery. Furthermore, and more worrying than counter-examples, is that it seems like this point could be used to exclude anyone who substantially challenged social or political norms. In the interests of expediency, I shall pass silently by this concern and assume that there are uncontroversial examples of those that work against the interests of the group and that those that do so are not examples of publics.

[270] Dewey, 'LW2', p. 260.

[271] *ibid*, p. 261.

[272] *ibid*, p. 260.

[273] Axel Honneth, 'Democracy as Reflexive Cooperation: John Dewey and the Theory of Democracy Today', *Political Theory*, 26.6 (1998), 763–83 (p. 763).

is informed by 'the extent and scope of the consequences of acts which are so important as to need control, whether by inhibition or by promotion.'[274]  The structure that Dewey has offered is on two levels.  The many publics are all a part of the state, they are connected and overlapping and each is responsible for transactions that cause consequences felt by other individuals and other publics.  The tension here, and in what way publics overlap, can be illustrated clearly in the language of identity.  A person who identifies as a member of more than one oppressed or minority group, such as a black woman, may consider both of these elements of their person as essential to their identity.  However, the interests of and the approach practiced to satisfy those interests will not always align.  This is evidenced by the criticism received by what is broadly referred to 'second-wave' feminism for forwarding an agenda that applied disproportionately to white middle-class women.[275]  Therefore, in this instance the perceived and promoted interests of women as a group do not align coherently with the interests of the working class or people of minority ethnic groups, they merely overlap.  It is for this reason that I call this tension, the tension of overlapping interests.

It is the role of the state and the officials of the state to regulate these consequences to guarantee a standard of participation and interest for all people in further community and state action.  Dewey writes, '[t]he public consists of all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically cared for.'[276]

However, it is a mistake to perceive Dewey as having developed two separate pairs of concepts; private and public, and individual and social.  Dewey argues that these concepts are not wholly distinct.  An act can be both private and social, similarly an act can be both public and not-social. Dewey writes,

> [m]any private acts are social; their consequences contribute to the
> welfare of the community or affect its status and prospects.  In the
> broad sense any transaction deliberately carried on between two or

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[274] Dewey, 'LW2', p. 245.
[275] See, Cathryn Bailey, 'Making Waves and Drawing Lines: The Politics of Defining the Vicissitudes of Feminism', *Hypatia*, 12.3 (1997), 17–28.
[276] Dewey, 'LW2', pp. 245–46.

more persons is social in quality.  It is a form of associated behaviour and

its consequences may influence further associations.[277]

This non-equivalence between the divisions private/public and individual/social that

Dewey argues for is designed to show the mistake in perceiving the interests of the

community to be subsumed by acts of the state.  If the interests of the community can be

shown to come apart from the acts of the state, then, according to Dewey, the distinction

between private and public shall discern the involvement of community in the

interactions of the individual.

The third force is the individual, which is a unity where associations develop into a

unique but societally embedded person. The individual is to be understood neither, as

something which is isolatable and definable independent of society nor, as a member of

an aggregate that forms society.  According to Rosenthal, 'the individual represents the

instigation of creative adjustments within a community, adjustments which creatively

change both poles which operate within the adjustment process.'[278]  Not happy to define

an individual as something separate Dewey instead perceives the individual as, '[a]

*distinctive* way of behaving in conjunction and *connection* with other distinctive ways of

acting, not a self-enclosed way of acting, independent of everything else'.[279]  Therefore,

the individual possesses both the coercion of their society and environment but also their

unique perspective and ability to change the world.

We can see in this brief analysis – of the state, the many publics, and the individuals

– the beginnings of Dewey's resolution to the tensions identified.  It is clear that no

consensus between these groups which would dissolve the tension can be reached, nor

should one be sought even if it could be achieved.  This is a point William R. Caspary

recognises in identifying the importance of the continuation of conflict for the realisation

of Dewey's political project.  He argues that the aim is not in overcoming conflict, for

conflict is a necessary component of societal growth.[280]  Conflict, in some form, persists at

all levels, even within the individual.  Caspary writes, 'it is through working out conflicts

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[277] Dewey, 'LW2', p. 244.
[278] Rosenthal, (1993), p. 62.
[279] Dewey, 'LW2', pp. 352–53.
[280] William R. Caspary, *Dewey on Democracy* (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 9.

with one another that citizens contribute to each other's learning and development.'[281] But this 'working out' as Alfonso J. Damico points out is in the emphasis of 'common interests' and not in the elimination of difference.[282]  However, society operates on multiple levels with competing interests at each level, even within each group and individual.  Allport expresses this tension when he writes,

> [e]ach of us is a member of many unrelated, and sometimes even antagonistic groups.  For us to elect an official who represents *all* of our diversified interests is impossible.  We do not even *understand* the vast industrial and economic enterprises with which we are related in we know not how many ways, and for that reason do not know even in what direction our interests lie.[283]

As a consequence of these concerns there is created risk of, what Dewey refers to as, the 'eclipse of the public'.[284]  This is the problem as Dewey understands it.  In the next section I shall look at Dewey's resolution to the two tensions identified in more detail and the limitations to that resolution.

## §3.3 Dewey's Resolution

Dewey's resolution to both tensions is sensitive to the differences between individuals, yet it refrains from elevating the individual to a level unconstrained by social obligation.  Neither does Dewey suggest that the answer is the elevation of the state above the particular interests of the individual.  As Caspary writes, '[i]t is the creative interaction and tension between individual and society' that leads to the full development of persons and society.[285]  This view is developed in Dewey's *Ethics*, in particular the revised edition, in which he writes,

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[281] Caspary (2000), p. 9.
[282] Damico (1978), pp. 5–6.
[283] Allport (1989), p. 286.
[284] Dewey, 'LW2', p. 304.
[285] Caspary (2000), p. 13.

[o]nly when individuals have initiative, independence of judgement, flexibility, fullness of experience, can they act so as to enrich the lives of others and only in this way can a truly common welfare be built up. The other side of this statement, and of moral criterion, is that individuals are free to develop, to contribute and to share, only as social conditions break down walls of privilege and of monopolistic possession.[286]

With respect to the first tension identified, that of the tension from environment, Dewey must establish a balance between freedom and social control. As an example of uncontroversial social control Dewey draws an analogy with the rules of a game. The participants of a game submit to the rules of the game and do not feel that there is an 'external imposition' in doing so.[287] If there were no rules there would be no game and if there were different rules it would be a different game. From this, Dewey concludes that, 'control of individual actions is effected by the whole situation in which individuals are involved, in which they share and of which they are co-operative or interacting parts.'[288] What the example shows is an instance of legitimate control that Dewey believes does not impose upon one's freedom.

In the case of games, co-operatives, and all other equivalent cases, according to Dewey, 'it is not the will or desire of any one person which establishes order but the moving spirit of the whole group. The control is social, but individuals are parts of a community, not outside of it.'[289] The necessity of social control is important in shaping the organisation and practice of schools. The task is not the elimination of social control but avoiding authoritarian tendencies. For example, the social control that occurs within a school does so in its organisation and practice. Chevalier engages with the game example and argues that Dewey, 'implies that educators should create academic experiences that, like games, have their own inherent rules, thus alleviating the need for external control.'[290] This is in contrast to an authoritarian school which exhibits social

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[286] John Dewey, 'Ethics', in *The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953, Volume 7: 1932*, ed. by Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989), pp. 1–462 (p. 348).
[287] Dewey, 'LW13', p. 32.
[288] *ibid*, p. 33.
[289] *ibid*, p. 33.
[290] Chevalier (1998), p. 49.

control as external impositions upon the children, this is an example of inhibitive social control that arrests the growth of individuals within the environment.

The alternative, according to Dewey, is a school operating consistently with his game analogy. The social control of an institution such as this, 'resides in the very nature of the work done as a social enterprise in which all individuals have an opportunity to contribute and to which all feel a responsibility.'[291] However, Dewey recognises that the social control within a school is difficult to balance. In order for each individual to be able to flourish they must be recognised as possessing a distinctive character and set of needs. This creates a great demand upon the teacher. It is for the teacher to have more than subject-knowledge but to have knowledge of each individual and how to cater for their needs. It is to allow for student participation but remain led by the more mature and informed adult.[292] It is to seek non-coercive resolution to conflict and yet retain the power to exclude pupils who can no longer be helped or whose disruptions are so great that no-one else can learn. The permitted degree of social control within the school is vague and rather subjective – only a perceptive and skilled teacher, or a community of skilled teachers will be able to tread this difficult path. Dewey argues that while the arbitrary authority of the teacher has ceased within progressive education the authority of experience and knowledge remains. Therefore, the teacher retains their position as the leader of the class to direct experience.

Social control is balanced by freedom, and freedom must be managed in the same manner as its opposite. An expression of freedom is one which results from intelligent choice, from a person who considers consequences as consequences. Dewey claims, in *Human Nature and Conduct*, 'to foresee future objective alternatives and to be able by deliberation to choose one of them and thereby weigh its chances in the struggle for future existence, measures our freedom'.[293] Dewey expressed this central aspect of

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[291] Dewey, 'LW13', p. 34.

[292] This point of Dewey's is in response to a more radical incarnation of progressive education explored by figures such as Homer Lane, A.S. Neill, and to a lesser extent R.D. Laing and the anti-psychiatry movement. These figures, amongst others, challenged adult and professional authority and perceived its presence as a barrier to learning. See, Homer Lane, *Talks to Parents and Teachers* (S.l.: Bonobo Press, 2011); Alexander Sutherland Neill, *Summerhill*, Pelican Books (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Eng: Penguin Books, 1968); R. D Laing, *The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness* (London: Penguin, 2010). I shall discuss this branch of progressive education in more detail in Chapter 6 in my discussion of authority.

[293] John Dewey, 'Human Nature and Conduct', in *The Middle Works of John Dewey, 1899-1924, Volume 14: 1922*, ed. by Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008), pp. 1–227 (p. 210).

freedom similarly, in *Experience and Education*, when he writes, '[t]he only freedom that is of enduring importance is freedom of intelligence, that is to say, freedom of observation and of judgement exercised in behalf of purposes that are intrinsically worthwhile.'[294] Dewey is developing a social and positive account of freedom. There is no freedom unless in association with others, and in possession of the power to exercise that freedom.[295] In *The Public and Its Problems*, published five years later than *Human Nature and Conduct*, Dewey writes, '[l]iberty is that secure release and fulfilment of personal potentialities which take place only in rich and manifold association with others: the power to be an individualised self making a distinctive contribution and enjoying in its own way the fruits of association.'[296]

The flourishing of this freedom that Dewey identifies begins with, '[n]atural impulses and desires' but requires, 'some reconstruction, some remaking, of impulses and desires in the form in which they first show themselves', in order to achieve intellectual growth.[297] There is a risk here of collapsing into an indefensible account of paternalist authority, but Dewey is not appealing to an externally imposed control. In order to resolve the tension between the individual and social control this inhibition of natural impulses and desires is guided by, 'an individual's own reflection and judgement.'[298] This is what Chevalier refers to as 'internal control.'[299]

Therefore, social control is legitimate when it leads to educative growth and a flourishing of freedom for the individual as a part of the community – whether that community be the school, larger society, or some other group to which the individual belongs. What this means is that an environment with a balance of social control and

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[294] Dewey, 'LW13', p. 39.

[295] Darnell Rucker addresses Deweyan political freedom and clarifies the position that I have set out above. Freedom, for Dewey, is more than merely the absence of impediment and it is not found in any internal phenomenological content but exists, 'as a special kind of interaction between an organism and its environment in which experience becomes the basis for the conscious modification of further experience in accordance with emerging goals.' Darnell Rucker, 'Dewey's Ethics: Part Two', in *Guide to the Works of John Dewey.*, ed. by Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1970), pp. 112–30 (p. 118). As mentioned above, Cherilyn Keall provides a similar account of Dewey's positive conception of freedom and argues that his commitment to such, 'implies that, for Dewey, education is crucial for human fulfilment.' Keall (2013), p. 60.

[296] Dewey, 'LW2', p. 329.

[297] Dewey, 'LW13', p. 41.

[298] *ibid*, p. 41.

[299] Chevalier (1998), p. 49.

freedom is the most suitable for the growth of both society and the individual.  An individual is an active participant in the formation of purposes 'which direct his [*sic*] activities in the learning process.'[300]  Guidance by the teacher, or other official, should be directed so that their intervention be, 'an aid to freedom, not a restriction upon it.'[301]  To balance against the risk of too much freedom or too much imposition Dewey suggests that one must,

> be intelligently aware of the capacities, needs, and past experience of
> those under instruction, and, secondly, to allow the suggestion made to
> develop into a plan and project by means of the further suggestions
> contributed and organised into a whole by the members of the group.
> The plan, in other words, is a co-operative enterprise, not a dictation…
> The development occurs through reciprocal give-and-take, the teacher
> taking but not being afraid also to give.[302]

This does not mean that authority has been abolished.  Authority does sometimes have to intervene but it should be used seldom in a well-regulated environment.  Furthermore, the intervention of authority is only legitimate when it is a manifestation of the interests of the group and not personal will.

The second tension of the individual and society, that of the tension of overlapping interests, is resolved in a similar fashion.  It is worth quoting Dewey at length to understand the relationships between individual, group, and state, and how Dewey envisages them interacting;[303]

> [i]n a search for the conditions under which the inchoate public now
> extant may function democratically, we may proceed from a statement of

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[300] Dewey, 'LW13', p. 43.

[301] *ibid*, p. 46.

[302] *ibid*, pp. 46–47.  In this excerpt Dewey is speaking specifically of teachers however it is true also of any public official.  This is because the role of an official in a public or state is the same as the role of the teacher in that they are to observe consequences that follow transactions and use their knowledge and authority to regulate the effect of those consequences upon third parties.

[303] Dewey uses the word groups in the following passage to mean the same thing as publics.  Therefore, the groups to which one belong are synonymous with Deweyan 'publics'.

the nature of the democratic idea in its generic social sense. From the standpoint of the individual, it consists in having a responsible share according to capacity in forming and directing the activities of the groups to which one belongs and in participating according to need in the values which the groups sustain. From the standpoint of the groups, it demands liberation of the potentialities of members of a group in harmony with the interests and good which are common. Since every individual is a member of many groups, this specification cannot be fulfilled except when different groups interact flexibly and fully in connection with other groups.[304]

Dewey's solution to the tension between the individual, the state, and the many publics is that the interests and desires of this trifecta, while in tension, are not incompatible with each other providing that they exercise the positive freedom that Dewey defends and, further to this, that society protects this conception of freedom through the regulation of the consequences of transactions occurring throughout society. As such, the conflict of individual and society for Dewey is in part only apparent.

Allport, in his analysis of Dewey's *Public and its Problems*, perceives an, 'inherent contradiction' in Dewey's resolution between the 'advocacy of the community of *whole* individuals' and the desire 'to harmonise the *segmental* types of public based upon common but highly specialised interests'.[305] However, Allport misrepresents Dewey's resolution because the intention is not to erase tension between the overlapping sets but to employ that conflict of interests in engaged dialogue. As Rosenthal argues, the tension between and within each component of society is necessary because it is that tension that fuels further dialogue and growth.[306]

The conflict that remains is a necessary part of cooperative association. The resolution of this conflict is found in Dewey's conception of freedom and the role of democracy within society. Rosenthal argues that,

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[304] Dewey, 'LW2', pp. 327–28.
[305] Allport (1989), pp. 286–7.
[306] In fact Rosenthal argues persuasively that the root of the tension is in the self and if that were to be absent then there would be no motivation to question and learn, Rosenthal (1993), p. 61.

the creativity of the individual and the constraints of group conformity

are not two conflicting alternatives, but rather two mutually dependent,

interrelated poles in a dynamic temporal process which manifests itself

as two poles within the self, two poles within the community, and two

poles in the experience of value.[307]

Therefore, the resolution to the tension between the individual and society is found in dynamic engagement with society. In democratic participation the tension between the individual and society is not dissolved but harnessed as the necessary friction that motivates individuals, publics, and the state into dialogue. That dialogue then contributes to educative growth, highlights that which is held in common, and provides the means for further dialogue.[308]

However, there are several problems that persist in Dewey's resolution of the tension between individual and society. I shall highlight three concerns: the weight placed on the game analogy to justify social control, the insidious control of an individual's desire by their social environment, and the problem of maintaining a consistent understanding of the distinction between private and public.

Dewey appeals to the rules and participation of individuals in a game to show an example of legitimate social control. Although Dewey admits that he is asking a lot of his simple analogy he believes that it is successful in illustrating, 'the general principle of social control of individuals without the violation of freedom.'[309] However, this example is not as comprehensive as Dewey would like it to be. It is meant to apply to both the school environment and into the larger societal context but, arguably, it fails to do either. In the example of a game given, the participants are presumably all motivated to play, invested in the outcome, participating voluntarily, and have actively consented to the

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[307] Rosenthal (1993), p. 59.

[308] This interpretation of Dewey's project is consistent with that offered by Rosenthal (1993); Damico (1978); and Keall (2013). An alternative view is offered by Daniel M. Savage, *John Dewey's Liberalism: Individual, Community, and Self-Development* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2002). Savage argues that Dewey offers a way of dissolving the dichotomised debate between liberals and communitarians. However, in his argument Savage does not adequately address the concern of coercion by one's environment. Furthermore, Savage is incorrect in ascribing to Dewey the view of defending liberal principles through his method, and by presenting the good of the individual as a final point and end-in-itself. Savage overlooks the sensitivity of the relationship between means and ends in Dewey's mature philosophy. Savage (2002), p. 122.

[309] Dewey, 'LW13', p. 33.

rules of the game. This may provide an ideal conception of society and the school, but it is a naïve one. There is a definite risk of the game breaking down entirely unless all participants satisfy all of these considerations. This cannot be the case within the broader context. Furthermore, the individual freedom of those persons who do not share these qualities of voluntary participation will, as a result of their difference, suffer from external imposition because they are being forcibly governed to comply. Children do not choose to attend school unless their desire coincides with legislative or familial command, and certain adult persons, similarly, fail to meet Dewey's criteria for the same reason. They do not choose but are commanded to participate or are beholden to society.[310] Dewey's example can be made stronger in considering co-operative activities or games rather than the competitive example given, however this does not answer the concerns of voluntary participation and is therefore still problematic.

A second concern with Dewey's resolution to the tension between the individual and society arises within the delicate balance between social control and freedom. In particular, Dewey's reference to the inhibition of one's impulses and the necessary 'reconstruction' of desire. Dewey is right in specifying that this inhibition originates, not from external source, but 'through an individual's own reflection and judgement.'[311] However, this position remains vulnerable to insidious control while the environment of the individual remains externally imposed. If the environment in which an individual persists possesses a stable character then an imposition will result that may, under Dewey's system, be construed as illegitimate. Whether the environment be school or society at large there will be external imposition upon an individual's reflection and judgement. Therefore, there is a risk that expression of desire, even after reflection, will not be authentic depending upon how embedded a practice is within that

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[310] The problems raised here mirror many of the problems discussed in democratic theory regarding the legitimacy of the state. Many reasons have been given to establish the authority of the state and obligate the participation of its members within the state. Such as consent (Locke 2011); the principle of fair play (A. John Simmons, 'The Principle of Fair Play', *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 8.4 (1979), 307–37); and the moral duty to obey the law (John Horton, 'Elaborating the Associative Theory', chapter 7 of his *Political Obligation*, Issues in Political Theory, 2nd ed (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). While I shall not engage with any of these debates, the point that I make here is simply that for Dewey to gloss over these problems with a limited analogy is a weakness to his argument.
[311] Dewey, 'LW13', p. 41.

environment.[312] The result could therefore be the domination and continuation of the status quo, and growth being inhibited in turn. Dewey recognises this difficulty because it is a reiteration of the question of legitimate social control, however, it is unclear whether his appeals for reflective balance resolve the concern.

The third concern with Dewey's resolution to the tension between the individual and society is whether Dewey has a coherent understanding of the distinction between private and public. Dewey describes a society in which the members of a public form a democratic community of enquirers where each member, as a part of that community, is morally, emotionally, intellectually, and consciously sustained.[313] Further to this, 'a good citizen finds his conduct as a member of a political group enriching and enriched by his participation in family life, industry, scientific and artistic associations.'[314] What Dewey envisages is a mutual and interactive partnership between all groups of individuals cooperating through communication. Within this environment conflict is, though not dissolved, overcome, 'since the pulls and responses of different groups reinforce one another and their values accord.'[315]

The slippage between private and public becomes apparent in Dewey's conception of the social. When Dewey refers to the social he is referring to that which has social worth. It is a positively charged term and as such both private and public acts can be social if they impact upon society with positive consequence. A defining feature of a private act, for Dewey, is that the consequences are confined to those directly involved but in explaining how an act can be both private and social this understanding is confused. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how private and public acts differ if private

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[312] The concept of authenticity or authentic action is a wide field of debate. It is of particular concern for those who, like Dewey, advocate a positive conception of freedom because free acts by individuals become veiled behind an individual's psyche and the conditions of society. This is often used as an objection to positive freedom (Isaiah Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', in *Four Essays on Liberty* (Oxford, 1958)). One way of phrasing the question of authentic action is, what constitutes a constraint upon freedom? If one answers this narrowly then many forms of social control do not infringe upon an individual's freedom. For such a view see F. A. von Hayek, *The Constitution of Liberty* (London: Routledge, 2010). However, if one argues that constraints upon freedom are broader, then that which constitutes illegitimate social control can extend to all forces that impair equality. This view, or similar, is expressed by, G. A. Cohen, *Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Amartya Sen, *Inequality Reexamined* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); and Philippe Van Parijs, *Real Freedom For All: What (If Anything) Can Justify Capitalism?*, Oxford Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon, 2003).

[313] Dewey, 'LW2', p. 330.

[314] *ibid*, p. 328.

[315] *ibid*, p. 328.

acts can affect third parties. It seems that they collapse into one another. This problem is mitigated in understanding the social as positively valenced. In that way one can understand a private act as having indirect consequences which has a positive social impact such as business decisions by private companies which have positive economic impact. Therefore, public acts have potentially harmful consequences for third parties which is what demands the regulation. Despite the fact that, for Dewey, where the line is drawn between the public and private realms is not fixed it seems that he is guilty of presupposing the worth of the social before showing it to be so through investigation.

This curious understanding of social as positively valenced is stated explicitly when Dewey argues that the public, 'cannot be identified with the socially useful' in a continuation of his point.[316] This is clarified with instances of public acts that are clearly harmful – such as war or ill-advised policy. The concern that I raise is that too much has already been assumed – such as economic justifications of private gain – without any indication as to why private acts that have positive consequences need not be regulated in the same way as public acts when those positive consequences may come at a cost. The claim that those acts are private in which the consequences felt outside of immediate actors are wholly positive is surely naïve because even if there are acts that elicit such consequences their understanding as wholly positive will be informed by all those preconceptions about society that Dewey was careful to avoid in searching for the state through the pragmatic method.

Dewey's distinction between private and public is called into question by his own understanding of the social, and his wider pragmatic methodology because the concept of a private act appears to dissolve. In a society in which the individual cannot be abstracted to be understood because of their mutual co-dependence can an act be said to have *no* consequences outside of those who performed it? If the answer is yes then Dewey is opening himself up to same objection that he uses against classical liberalism, namely that an individual can act (and be understood) independent of society.[317]

In the next section I shall consider the tension between the individual and society as it manifests in the politico-educational project of Freire. This will lead into Chapter 5

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[316] Dewey, 'LW2', p. 245.

[317] The problem of distinguishing between the public and the private spheres is not limited to Dewey. Rousseau too, identifies the scope of the state to be limited to the public sphere (Rousseau, *The Social Contract*). The distinction has its roots in Aristotle, (Aristotle (1981)).

which aims to draw the threads of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire together and serves as the theoretical foundations for the model of the citizen defended.

# Chapter 4

# The Tension in Freire

## §4.0 Summary

I shall now address the tension between individual and society within the politico-educational project of Freire. Freire's politico-educational project is one of two overlapping and mutually dependent halves. It is an example of the praxis that Freire supports in both word and action. There is the theoretical half which provides an account of an identified tension in society and the model of education needed to overcome that tension. Then there is the practical half of Freire's project which provides an account of how he applied that theory in the particular circumstances where these ideas were developed. It is important to note that Freire is not offering a universal programme. Therefore it is integral to remain attentive to the practical challenges and reflect and revise the critical pedagogy appropriately.[318] As Freire writes, 'in the struggle this pedagogy will be made and remade.'[319] This encourages us to understand Freire's politico-educational project as providing a feedback loop between his theory and practice.

In this chapter, I shall firstly, explore how the tension manifests through a description of his analysis of oppression within society. Then, I shall offer an account of Freire's resolution to the tension identified in two subsequent sections, within which I shall explain how Freire seeks to resolve this tension through pedagogical theory, in particular his problem-posing education, and identify and detail the role of the revolutionary teacher in this process with an eye to problematizing this figure. I shall conclude the chapter by drawing attention to the limitations of Freire's responses to the tension between the individual and society.

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[318] One oft-repeated complaint of some self-styled Freirean educators is that they interpret Freire as a method and pay little or no attention to the political and social underpinnings that were present in its formulation. For more of this 'fetish of method' see Stanley Aronowitz, 'Paulo Freire's Radical Democratic Humanism', in *Paulo Freire: A Critical Encounter*, ed. by Peter McLaren and Peter Leonard (London; New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 8–24 (pp. 8–12).

[319] Freire (2017), p. 22.

## §4.1 The Tension in Freire

In this section I identify how the tension between the individual and society manifests within the politico-educational project of Freire. For Freire, this tension persists in society both through internal psychological constraints and external institutional constraints. I shall first briefly explicate the psychological foundations of the tension between the individual and society. Then, secondly, I shall explain how Freire perceives this tension as being maintained through the institutions of society, most notably education.

The tension between society and the individual is central to Freire's politico-educational project, it is the problem that his project is designed to address. So central is the tension between the individual and society that in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, which represents Freire's clearest and most complete statement of his politico-educational project, the process of humanisation acts as the goal of the project. Humanisation is a technical term of Freire's which means to become 'more fully human' and, according to Freire, operates as the vocation of the human animal.[320] To become more fully human one is becoming less oppressed and in being oppressed one is dehumanised.

The reason that this is a response to the tension between the individual and society is because of the source of people's oppression. Freire speaks of the human animal's dehumanisation as a 'historical reality.'[321] It is something that we have suffered and continue to suffer as a result of living in a society structurally supported by oppression. The inverse, humanisation, is 'constantly negated,' through injustice, exploitation, oppression, and violence.[322] Societies, through these practices, according to Freire, make humans less human. He describes the humanity of the human animal as stolen by this

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[320] Freire (2017), p. 18. Freire's use of humanisation as the ontological aim of the human animal is telling. It links him to the liberation theology movement which employed Marxist theory to argue that society is oppressive and corrupting in its current form. For some theologians this was a controversial position for a Christian theology because it moved original sin out of the individual and into the society of which they are a part. This constitutes an interesting link between Freire and Rousseau because much of the ire that Rousseau received from the church and from religious groups was because of this perceived move in his own theology. Therefore, terminologically humanisation operates within Freirean theory in the same way as 'alienation' does within Marxism. I shall explore the theoretical foundations of Freire's politico-educational project in more detail in Chapter 5.

[321] Freire (2017), p. 17.

[322] *ibid*, pp. 17-18.

process of dehumanisation, but absent even in those that have stolen the humanity of others.

According to Freire, to live in a society where the freedom of some of its members is constrained by others through structural and cultural practices makes all members less human. For as long as society is structured in such a way where there exists two largely distinguishable groups of people – those with material wealth and those with not, those with power over others and those subject to the power of others, those with cultural dominance and those on the margins of society – we shall live in a society of oppressors and oppressed. In a society of oppressors and oppressed all people are dehumanised by various practices.

Dehumanising practices take away a person's conscious awareness of their dehumanisation and agency. The dehumanisation of the human animal is deepened and embedded through the psychological consequences of a society of oppressors and oppressed. People are dehumanised by themselves and the other members of society through their participation in it. They tacitly consent to their own oppression and this too makes them less human. Wayne Au, an advocate of Freirean pedagogy writes, 'to treat humans as objects, thereby lessening their abilities to act to transform their world, is to dehumanize them … , a state of being which engenders a state of oppression'.[323]

Freire perceives a society of corrupted individuals, corrupted by the power and desire of society, enslaved by fear and consent. Freire writes, 'the oppressed, having internalised the image of the oppressor and adopted his [*sic*] guidelines, are fearful of freedom.'[324] A consequence of this is the fear of freedom.[325] Irwin writes, '[t]his notion of a fear of freedom… is developed by Freire specifically in relation to the oppressed and their fear of overcoming the position of being oppressed.'[326] This manifests in two ways, either the fear of freedom provides a motivation to remain oppressed or, in another, but equally damaging way, the fear of freedom may relate to one's desire to assume the role of the oppressor. Both of these manifestations arise from the image of the oppressor as

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[323] Wayne Au, 'Epistemology of the Oppressed: The Dialectics of Paulo Freire's Theory of Knowledge', *Journal of Critical Education Policy Studies*, 5.2 (2007), 175–96 (p. 180).
[324] Freire (2017), p. 21.
[325] *ibid*, p. 21.
[326] Irwin (2012), p. 35.

an authority in virtue of being an oppressor which is projected upon them by the oppressed.

However, the fear of freedom is not limited to the oppressed.  It is also found in the oppressing class.  The oppressors too are not free. The oppressors too have been dehumanised by the practice of oppression, although they suffer this fear of freedom in a different–and much less challenging–manner, it remains the case that they too are afraid; they 'are afraid of losing their "freedom" to oppress.'[327]  From their position of power and privilege the oppressor has little motivation to perceive their participation in the oppression of others, nor to see their own 'dehumanisation' which grants them this privilege.  It is for this reason that the oppressed themselves must assume responsibility to free themselves, and in doing so their oppressors as well.

Therefore, the fear of freedom contributes to the maintaining of the status quo by lending it psychological support through the cultivation of a desire to become an oppressor and the belief that the distinction between the 'haves' and 'have-nots' is morally and politically justifiable.  People are inhibited by the fear of freedom and the fear of the risks of struggle against their oppression.[328]  As such, even when a person discovers their own state of oppression this does not lead on its own to an overcoming.  A person must also discover their yearning to be free within themselves and in addition to this they must, 'perceive that this yearning can be transformed into reality only when the same yearning is aroused in their comrades.'[329]  This describes the process of *conscientização* in the human animal.  Once an individual has come to this awareness critical consciousness is achieved.

However, one should not understand critical consciousness as an end in the development of the person, nor as a discrete stage in the development of a person's consciousness which is how it is often understood due to different types of consciousness in Freire's early works.[330]  Freire initially offers three stages of consciousness – magical,

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[327] Freire (2017), p. 20ftn.

[328] There is a great similarity between this argument offered by Freire and that of Simone de Beauvoir in relation to the oppression of women and their complicity in that oppression.  See, Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex* (London Vintage, 2007).

[329] Freire (2017), p. 21.

[330] See, Paulo Freire, 'Education as the Practice of Freedom', in *Education for Critical Consciousness*, Continuum Impacts (London ; New York: Continuum, 2005a), pp. 3–78; and Paulo Freire, 'Extension or

naïve, and critical.[331]  What follows from this according to William Smith and Peter L.

Berger is a cognitive and ontological hierarchy where each individual must move through

each discrete phase to reach critical consciousness.[332]  However, as Peter Roberts notes

magical and naïve consciousness are largely confined to his early works and should be

understood as a response to a particular set of concrete circumstances which those books

were addressing.[333]  Instead critical consciousness should be understood as quite

separate to magical and naïve consciousness but with clear overlaps between them.

Roberts notes, 'Freire finds in naïve consciousness both aspects of the former magical

stage and the seeds of potential resistance to oppression'.[334]  The three different

consciousnesses attempt to capture general patterns and do not represent strict progress

of consciousness.  Furthermore, it is important to remember that a person has not come

to the end of their journey upon reaching critical consciousness because they do not

participate absolutely or exclusively in this mode of consciousness.  Roberts writes that

*conscientização* is an 'ever-evolving process' in continual interaction with a changing

world.[335]

　　　The realisation that one's own freedom can only come to be when the desire to be

free of oppression is present in others, shows that individual freedom and societal

freedom are intimately related, a person cannot realise their freedom without their

community doing so as well.  It is the fear of freedom that supports a society of

oppression and exploitation, people that suffer the fear of freedom, 'prefer the security

of conformity with their state of unfreedom to the creative communion produced by

freedom and even the very pursuit of freedom.'[336]  Even when a person seeks their

liberation an inner conflict persists.  People may yearn for freedom to satisfy their desire

for authentic living, but they fear it.  The dominant understanding of authenticity,

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Communication', in *Education for Critical Consciousness*, Continuum Impacts (London ; New York:
Continuum, 2005b), pp. 85–146.
[331] In Freire's early work he hypothesises different levels of consciousness, the last phase of which is critical
consciousness, or what Freire, in his early works calls '*transitive-critical consciousness*'.  Paulo Freire
(2005a), pp. 3–78.
[332] William Arthur Smith, *The Meaning of Conscientização: The Goal of Paulo Freire's Pedagogy* (Amherst,
Mass.: Center for International Education, University of Massachusetts, 1976); and Peter L. Berger,
*Pyramids of Sacrifice: Political Ethics and Social Change* (New York (N.Y.): Anchor Books, 1976).
[333] Roberts (1996), p. 186.
[334] *ibid*, p. 185.
[335] *ibid*, p. 187.
[336] Freire (2017), p. 22.

according to Marina Oshana, follows from the work of Johann Herder. 'According to this ideal,' Oshana writes, 'a person lives authentically when she is true to herself, and she is true to herself when she develops her life on the basis of what is of value to her.'[337] Therefore, a person is authentic, or is acting authentically, when they pursue their own humanisation and the humanisation of others. However, the fear of freedom is a constraint upon that pursuit because the oppressor has been internalised. Any attempt to mitigate or dissolve the fear of freedom must take into account, 'this tragic dilemma of the oppressed'.[338] Any theory that proclaims freedom as an aim must address the reality of psychological chains.

However, who the oppressed are is not always clear. *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* is placed within the context of class struggle. It passes silently by the oppression particular to other groups. Therefore, in Freire's early works at least, the oppressed are loosely speaking the class most subjugated by the existing power relations of society. In defence of Freire, this is a naïve reading because while he does speak in terms of them and us, of the oppressors and the oppressed, and while this dichotomisation conceals the more nuanced definition of the oppressed and oppressors alike, it is still clear that the terms must be understood more broadly. We are all oppressed, and we are all oppressors. In what way this is the case varies in context and degree between all persons.

The tension between the individual and society which occurs within an oppressive society and is maintained by the fear of freedom of the members of that society is clearly seen in Freire's attack on the dehumanisation of society through traditional models of education. Freire argues that dehumanisation, and by extension the tension between the individual and society, is encouraged and cemented through traditional education. Freire describes the student-teacher relationship in traditional education as of being narrative in character and writes, '[t]he relationship involves a narrating Subject (the teacher) and patient, listening objects (the students). The contents, whether values or empirical

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[337] Marina Oshana, 'Autonomy and the Question of Authenticity', *Social Theory and Practice*, 33.3 (2007), 411–29, (p. 411). For more on the concept of authenticity and its role in a theory of freedom see footnote 300 and Charlotte Elizabeth Knowles, 'Becoming Oneself : A Heideggerean Analysis of Complicity' (unpublished phd, Birkbeck, University of London, 2016).

[338] Freire (2017), p. 22.

dimension of reality, tend in the process of being narrated to become lifeless and petrified.'[339]

Traditional education, according to Freire, presents information as if truth has been found and is fixed. There is but one answer and there is one way to get there. The task of the teacher is to fill the students with pre-existing and established knowledge. The content of this knowledge is 'detached from reality, disconnected from the totality that engendered them and could give them significance. Words are emptied of their concreteness and become a hollow, alienated, and alienating verbosity.'[340] Knowledge becomes soporific rather than empowering. Freire writes, in a damning indictment of the practice of training students,

> [t]he student records, memorises, and repeats… . Narration (with the teacher as narrator) leads the students to memorise mechanically the narrated content. Worse yet, it turns them into "containers," into "receptacles" to be "filled" by the teacher. The more completely he fills the receptacles, the better a teacher he is. The more meekly the receptacles permit themselves to be filled, the better students they are.[341]

Freire calls this the banking method of education, where the teacher deposits information into the minds of students who receive the information without question. Their task being to memorise and repeat. This method encourages no independent thinking. In fact, it stifles, through its lack, 'creativity, transformation, and knowledge'.[342] For Freire, this divorces the student from enquiry and praxis and, 'apart from enquiry, apart from the praxis, individuals cannot be truly human.'[343] Therefore, traditional education is a part of the process of dehumanisation.

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[339] Freire (2017), p. 44.
[340] *ibid*.
[341] *ibid*, pp. 44-45.
[342] *ibid*, p. 45.
[343] *ibid*.

In addition to being oppressive the banking method of education is also insidious because it hides its intention to turn people into automatons capable of only repeating and never of creating.  It hides behind a veil of false generosity to provide knowledge to all people but achieves nothing more than, 'the very negation of their ontological vocation to be more fully human.'[344]

The banking method of education presents a version of the human animal who is a possessor of a consciousness rather than a conscious being.  In understanding a person in such a way provides the educator with an empty and passive mind that is open to the deposits of knowledge—knowledge which are representations of reality.  Freire accuses the banking method of making no distinction between 'being accessible to consciousness and entering consciousness.'[345]  In this way the individual is in tension with the world because they are not a participant with the world of which they are a part, but 'merely *in* the world' and can be understood as separate and distinct.[346]

In response to his damning analysis of contemporary societal tendencies Freire develops a model of education which is designed to break down the existing oppressive power relations and lead to the humanisation of the oppressed and oppressors alike. Freire argues that in providing people with the right tools, which are literacy and critical reflection, those that sit at the bottom of an embedded social hierarchy will develop both the ability to see their own oppression and the motivation to overcome it.  They will both see and act against the forces that keep them in their weakened state.  In the following section I shall introduce the model of education which, Freire argues, shall deliver this aim, problem-posing education.

## §4.2 Resolution through Problem-Posing

Freire attempts to resolve the tension between the individual and society through his model of radical pedagogy.  However, I shall first put problem-posing education into

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[344] Freire (2017), p. 47.

[345] *ibid*, p. 49.

[346] *ibid*, p. 48.  In my analysis of Freire I use the words 'world' and 'society' interchangeably.  This is because Freire's use of the word 'world' applies to that which is impacted by the thought and action of the individuals in question.  However, this should be understood as distinct from Dewey's 'social environment' and Rousseau's 'Republic' because it is intended to be broader than a person's immediate environment in that what constitutes that world is broadened through the continual application of Freire's problem-posing education.  This will become clear when I lay out Freire's positive argument below.

context by highlighting its aims.  Therefore, I shall briefly explain how the constraints on freedom within society and Freire's theory of knowledge lead into the foundations of this pedagogical theory.  I shall then provide a brief analysis of Freire's problem-posing education.

As discussed in the previous section, the tension between the individual and the world within Freire's politico-educational project rests in the conflict created by oppression and the dehumanisation of the human animal.  Therefore, while the existence of oppression and oppressed people is a historical fact it is not a necessary condition of life for the human animal.  Freire argues that the tension can be overcome.

A key claim that Freire makes is that the current order of things is maintained by both the oppressed and the oppressors, and neither are fully human as a result.  As such, the pedagogical aim is to humanise both groups.  However, from their position of privilege and power the oppressors are not able to seek liberation.  The oppressed will struggle against those who made them less human – but if they are to become more fully human and struggle in a meaningful way then they must not seek to make the oppressors oppressed.  It is the responsibility of the oppressed to restore humanity to both themselves and their oppressors.[347]  Freire writes,

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[347] The word 'restore' is worth taking note of here because of its obvious Christian connotations. Carlos Alberto Torres links the language of restoration with Hegelian consciousness.  He writes, '[t]here will then be only one pedagogy, that of the oppressed, restorer of the humanity of both the oppressor and the oppressed. This double restoration, in the same liberating act, indicates the presence of the Hegelian supposition by which consciousness, in itself, is wanting of the consciousness of itself and for itself, while the latter only recognizes itself as such through the former, which in its relationship with nature gives it the possibility of being proprietor (of the good that the consciousness in itself toils over) and owner (of the slave, in itself, that toils in nature).' Carlos Alberto Torres, *First Freire: Early Writings in Social Justice Education* (New York: Teachers College Press, Teachers College Columbia University, 2014), p. 40.  However, Freire was a committed Catholic and his works were influenced by many catholic scholars.  Elias argues that this Catholicism was instrumental in Freire and that the use of religious language is littered throughout *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*.  Language such as, vocation, faith, trust, humility, hope, guilt, conversion, and original sin is found within the text, Elias (1994), p. 39.  The question of whether this Catholicism is an essential feature of Freire's political and educational project is an open one.  It is clear that Elias thinks that it is, however independently of Freire, Carl Rogers develops a person-centred approach to education with significant overlaps, Carl R. Rogers, 'The Foundations of the Person-Centered Approach', *Dialectics and Humanism*, 8.1 (1981), 5–16; Carl R. Rogers, 'Significant Learning: In Therapy and in Education', *Educational Leadership*, 16.4 (1959), 232–42.  Maureen O'Hara argues that there is much similarity between Roger's person-centred pedagogy and Freire's religious theory is not a barrier to that similarity.  Maureen O'Hara, 'Person-Centered Approach as Conscientização: The Works of Carl Rogers and Paulo Freire', *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, 29.1 (1989), 11–35.

[t]his, then, is the great humanistic and historical task of the oppressed:

to liberate themselves and their oppressors as well.  The oppressors,

who oppress, exploit, and rape by virtue of their power, cannot find in

this power the strength to liberate either the oppressed or themselves.

Only power that springs from the weakness of the oppressed will be

sufficiently strong to free both.[348]

It is important to understand how central it is to Freire's thought that the oppressed free themselves.  It is no liberation at all if egalitarian change is enforced upon people.[349] Freedom is not a forensic term; its legal proclamation is not an example of its practice. People will remain unfree and dehumanised until they perceive their own oppression and remove those chains themselves.  Freedom, for Freire, is defined by its negative relationship to oppression.  To be free is to be free from oppression.  This is made clear when he writes that, 'humanisation… is affirmed by the yearning of the oppressed for freedom and justice,' and '[f]reedom would require [the oppressed] to eject this image [of the oppressor] and replace it with autonomy and responsibility.'[350]  The oppressed yearn for freedom to satisfy their desire for authentic living but they fear it.  The oppressor has been internalised.  Freedom, according to Freire, is that which results from a humanising education, but it is more than merely the removal of that which constrains. To be liberated through education is to be, 'no longer oppressor no longer oppressed, but human in the process of achieving freedom.'[351]  With this in mind Freire explores how to provide the oppressed with the tools so that they can discover their own freedom.  One

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[348] Freire (2017) p. 18.

[349] Quoting from Torres, Freire writes, '[c]onscientisation is never a kind of aspirin which we give or prescribe to the oppressed people. That is as if for example, I could sell twenty pills for the oppressed and twenty-five for the oppressors.  The pills of conscientisation and then they get better tomorrow. No, no, it is not a medicine.  It is an exercise of understanding much more rigorously how society works.  This is the task of knowing, education as a process of knowing'. Torres (2014), p. 42.  This sentiment, that as a condition of freedom a person must be responsible for its realisation avoids the complication, associated with paternalism and positive conceptions of liberty, that there is a risk of abuse by authority.  The politician and socialist Eugene Debs responded to this concern similarly when he said, '[t]oo long have the workers of the world waited for some Moses to lead them out of bondage. I would not lead you out if I could; for if you could be led out, you could be led back again. I would have you make up your minds there is nothing that you cannot do for yourselves.' ('Industrial Unionism' speech <https://www.marxists.org/archive/debs/ works/1905/industrial.-htm>, delivered, Grand Central Palace, New York, Sunday, December 10, 1905)

[350] Freire (2017), pp. 17-18; and p. 21

[351] ibid, p. 23.

great obstacle to the oppressed successfully achieving freedom–and an explanation as to why change cannot come from the top-down, and must be bottom-up–is the persistence of the fear of freedom.[352]

Freire argues that as people begin to perceive their oppression and become more conscious they view themselves as separate from the world that limits them. Freire writes,

> [a]s they separate themselves from the world, which they objectify, as they separate themselves from their own activity, as they locate the seat of their decisions in themselves and in their relations with the world and others, people overcome the situations which limit them: the "limit-situations."[353]

A limit-situation is precisely this, an obstacle to be overcome. Freire references Alvaro Vieira Pinto to clarify this concept. It is not to be understood in the negative, as an obstacle that prevents but as one that presents, in that it represents the, 'boundaries where all possibilities begin'.[354] This is the definition of a limit-situation. Once these situations are perceived as limiting they, 'stand out in relief from the background'.[355] The actions performed in response to this 'challenge' are 'limit-acts'. A limit-act is one which is, 'directed at negating and overcoming, rather than passively accepting, the "given."'[356] Limit-acts are instances of praxis, 'the praxis which, as the reflection and action which truly transform reality, is the source of knowledge and creation.'[357] Once a limit-situation has been overcome through one's limit-acts the world becomes transformed, the world as-it-is being challenged by one's critical perception. In Freire's words, '[a]s reality is

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[352] As mentioned above, the fear of freedom is a concept first developed by Erich Fromm who had significant influence upon Freire's understanding of psychology. Fromm (2010). Elias notes that 'Freire knew Fromm personally and derived a number of key analyses from him.' Elias (1994), p. 36. This would include, in addition to the conception of the fear of freedom, his introduction to early Marx, existentialism and phenomenology. Elias (1994), pp. 37–43.

[353] Freire (2017), p. 72.

[354] Alvaro Vieiro Pinto, *Consciência E Realidade Nacional* (Rio de Janeiro, 1960), Vol. II, p. 284. Quoted from, Freire (2017), p. 72.

[355] Freire (2017), pp. 73–74.

[356] *ibid*, p. 72.

[357] *ibid*, p. 73.

transformed and these situations are superseded, new ones will appear, which in turn will evoke new limit-acts.'[358] Therefore, emancipatory education represents a process that is building upon itself.

Freire's ontology feeds directly into his epistemology. The incompleteness of the world is accompanied by the incompleteness of the individual and of knowledge. This is important in understanding the relationship between the individual and society because the knowledge possessed and our understanding of what knowledge is contributes to the tension perceived. Roberts argues that Freire reverses the Platonic understanding of knowledge. Instead of the recollection of the unchanging form through independent reflection and the application of reason to discover knowledge, Freire places knowledge in the material world. Roberts writes,

> [t]he origins of knowledge lie not in some form of celestial divination but in the day to day transforming moments of human activity. As Freire sees it, knowledge is not recollected through philosophical thought but *created* through reflective action in a social world.[359]

Knowledge and human beings, in their incomplete state, are always in a state of becoming. What this means is that the human ideal that Freire espouses is a process and not an end goal to be achieved. This process of becoming is Freire's humanisation. However, Freire's epistemology does not dissolve into relativism. There may be no static, unchanging truths to be discovered but there are morally preferable ways of life, and that preference is the process of humanisation.[360] In this way Freire shows that the tension between the individual and the world has, as its source, human action and inaction. The tension is thereby transferred into a new domain, between the broadly defined groups of the oppressed and the oppressors where the oppressors represent and defend, through

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[358] Freire (2017), p.73.

[359] Roberts (1998), p. 101.

[360] This is a bold claim but is not an uncommon view. This position is defended by Roberts, 'Knowledge, Dialogue, and Humanisation: The Moral Philosophy of Paulo Freire'; R. D. Glass, 'On Paulo Freire's Philosophy of Praxis and the Foundations of Liberation Education', *Educational Researcher*, 30.2 (2001), 15–25. Furthermore, Au writes, 'Freire's epistemology frames knowledge as always changing, always developing, as humans seek out causality and critically analyse that same causality in order to improve their epistemological grasp of something'. Au (2007), p.181. However, this view of Freire's philosophy, and the consistency of it shall be challenged in the following section.

personal interest and the structure of society, the existing structure of society. Therefore, where there is a tension between the interests of the oppressors and the oppressed there is a tension between the individual and society.

The solution to this tension is to be found in the negation of people as oppressors and oppressed.  The tension may be a historical fact but it is not an ontological necessity, and if people participate in an education that reveals their oppression to them, and provides them with the tools to challenge that oppression, then the people may overcome that oppression in developing their *conscientização*.  I shall analyse this resolution to the tension in detail in the following section as well as the limitations that threaten the validity of such an approach.

The method by which Freire engages the oppressed in their own liberation is through his model of education.  According to Freire it is through education, and not violent insurrection, that the oppressed will successfully overcome their position and achieve freedom.[361]  He writes, '[t]he only effective instrument is a humanising pedagogy.'[362] This humanising pedagogy Freire calls problem-posing education.

Problem-posing education, as a humanist and liberating praxis, posits as fundamental that the people subjected to domination must fight for their emancipation. To that end, it enables teachers and students to become Subjects of the educational process by overcoming authoritarianism and an alienating intellectualism; it also enables people to overcome their false perception of reality. The world—no longer something to be described with deceptive words—becomes the object of that transforming action by men and women which results in their humanization.

Problem-posing education does not and cannot serve the interests of the oppressor. No oppressive order could permit the oppressed to begin to question their situation and as 'Why?'  While only a revolutionary society can carry out this education in systematic terms, the revolutionary leaders need not take full power before they can employ the method. In the revolutionary process, the leaders cannot utilize the banking method as an interim measure, justified on grounds of expediency, with the intention of

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[361] However, Freire is no pacifist.  Violence is justified by Freire when dialogue is no longer an option and when motivated by love.  Freire (2017), pp. 102; 112.  The role of violence within Freire's politico-educational project is something that I shall return to when considering the coherence of his overall argument in the final section of this chapter.

[362] Freire (2017), p. 42.

*later* behaving in a genuinely revolutionary fashion. They must be revolutionary—that is to say, dialogical—from the outset.

Au describes problem-posing education as a process for students and teachers to engage in through, 'asking critical questions of the world in which they live, asking questions of the material realities both experience on a day-to-day basis, and critically reflecting on what actions they may take to change those material conditions.'[363] Problem-posing understands knowledge, not as a set of facts or values to be remembered but as a consequence of communal enquiry; and it understands human consciousness as being with the world and not something that can be separated from the world. Knowledge, Freire writes, 'emerges only through invention and re-invention, through the restless, impatient, continuing, hopeful enquiry human beings pursue in the world, with the world, and with each other.'[364] It emerges through the enquiry of peers with each other, the results of which are understood as fluid and revisable. It is through this dialogue that human consciousness is developed because it cultivates an environment of reflection of a person's particular reality. Au writes, 'Freire sees dialogue as part of the history of the development of human consciousness'.[365] The process of becoming conscious in a meaningful way is what Freire calls *conscientização*.[366] As noted above, *conscientização* is a mode of consciousness which is not a fixed end but a continual process of becoming. Torres writes that this consciousness, 'obtains a structural perception of problems resulting from its (committed) critical insertion in the process of transformation (social change).'[367] The main characteristic of this mode of consciousness

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[363] Wayne Au, 'Fighting With the Text: Contextualising and Recontextualising Freire's Critical Pedagogy', in *The Routledge International Handbook of Critical Education*, ed. by Michael W. Apple, Routledge International Handbook Series (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009), p. 222.

[364] Freire (2017), p. 45.

[365] Au (2009), p. 222.

[366] Freire's first use of the term in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, is in the preface on page 9. However, Myra Bergman Ramos adds an instructive translator's footnote, she writes, '[t]he term conscientização refers to learning to perceive social, political, and economic contradictions, and to take action against oppressive elements of reality.' Freire (2017), p. 9.

[367] Torres, (2014) p. 35. I shall return to the concept of *conscientização* in the following section because the development and expression of *conscientização* is central to Freire's conception of the individual and the individual's relation to the world.

is dialogue and without this consciousness, 'it is impossible to be able to act upon reality.'[368]

An integral aspect of creating a dialogical environment suitable for the creation of knowledge is in subverting the role of the teacher in order to overcome the contradiction between student and teacher. According to Freire, the concept of the teacher as the source of knowledge should be supplanted by the 'teacher-student', and the understanding of students as containers to be filled should be replaced by the concept of 'students-teachers'.[369] The teacher-student is the revolutionary educator who must participate in the process with the students, 'to engage in critical thinking and the quest for mutual harmonisation.'[370] In this role the revolutionary educator is a partner in education with the students.

One cannot think of themselves as a student or a teacher but must genuinely overcome the false dichotomy and understand themselves to be students-teachers or teacher-student. Freire writes,

> [i]n problem-posing education, people develop their power to perceive
> critically *the way they exist* in the world *with which* and *in which* they
> find themselves; they come to see the world not as a static reality, but as
> a reality in process, in transformation.[371]

This will be informed by how people see themselves in the world which is why one must overcome the contradiction before dialogical learning can take place and authentic thought obtained. 'Hence, the teacher-student and the students-teachers reflect simultaneously on themselves and the world without dichotomising this reflection from action, and thus establish an authentic form of thought and action.'[372]

It is through dialogue that the students both learn and teach. It is through dialogue that the teacher both learns and teaches. Freire writes, '[p]roblem-posing education

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[368] Paulo Freire, *Sobre La Acción Cultural* (Santiago de Chile, Chile: Instituto de Capacitación e Investigación en Reforma Agraria, 1972), p. 40. quoted from, Torres (2014), p. 35.
[369] Freire (2017), p. 53.
[370] *ibid*, p. 48.
[371] *ibid*, p. 56.
[372] *ibid*.

affirms men and women as beings in the process of *becoming*—as unfinished, uncomplicated beings in and with a likewise unfinished reality.'[373] Freire states that we are aware of this unfinished status, and this state motivates the learner to continue their enquiry and understand education as an ongoing activity. Problems are discussed, debated and challenged, and from these initial presented stimuli new problems arise that are, themselves, discussed, debated and challenged. There is not an end to education. It is, instead, a process. In Freire's words, '[e]ducation is thus constantly remade in the praxis. In order to *be*, it must *become*. Its "duration" is found in the interplay of the opposites *permanence* and *change*.'[374]

Freire argues that in reflecting upon oneself and in reflecting upon the world the scope of that which is perceived increases. Things previously understood only as background phenomena begin to be brought out into explicit observations. Freire writes,

> [t]hat which had existed objectively but has not been perceived in its deeper implications… begins to "stand out," assuming the character of a problem and therefore of challenge. Thus, men and women begin to single out elements from their "background awareness" and to reflect upon them. These elements are now objects of their consideration, and, as such, objects of their action and cognition.[375]

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[373] Freire (2017), p. 57.

[374] *ibid*. Freire here moves away from his Hegelianism in that Freire does not identify the end of the dialectic as Absolute Knowledge. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. by A. V. Miller, Oxford Paperbacks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). Problem-posing education re-presents knowledge back to students as a new problem. Torres writes, 'Freire—speaking from another historical situation and with qualitatively different material—rejects the Hegelian ideological structure while keeping part of its dialectical method and establishes the critical path of a consciousness that becomes critical through the re-existentiation of his or her world.' Torres (2014), p. 41. This movement away from Hegel is reflected in the philosophy of Dewey also. Although it is important to note that Hegelian scholarship is itself divided on how to interpret absolute knowledge within Hegel. For more on Dewey's relationship with Hegelian thought, and the competing interpretations of that thought see James A. Good, *A Search for Unity in Diversity: The 'Permanent Hegelian Deposit' in the Philosophy of John Dewey* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006); John R. Shook, *Dewey's Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality*, The Vanderbilt Library of American Philosophy, 1st ed (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2000); and Terry Pinkard, 'Was Pragmatism the Successor to Idealism?', in *New Pragmatists*, ed. by C. J. Misak (Oxford, UK; New York, USA: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 142–68.

[375] Freire (2017), p. 56.

It is by starting in this situation, where the individuals that constitute the world reflect upon the world of which they are a part, that those individuals are able to remake the world. As Freire notes, 'the movement must begin with the human-world relationship.'[376] This process of transformation does not end in the remaking of the world because that new understanding must then go under the same reflective process and be remade in turn. It is this process that is humanisation and it is through participation in this process that people and society are able to become less oppressed and less oppressive.[377] This relationship between the individual and the world is one of conflict. It is the world that oppresses through the actions of people, and it is the individual oppressed who has the power to change the world. In the following section I will clarify this relationship.

## §4.3 Resolution through the Revolutionary Educator

One key way in which Freire aims to dissolve the tension between the individual and society is through the practice of the teacher. As detailed above, the traditional role of the teacher acts as a tool of continued oppression by 'filling' students with fixed and unquestioned knowledge, thereby perpetuating the existing state of affairs. According to Freire, the answer is not to replace knowledge that perpetuates oppressive society with the knowledge that perpetuates free society because the imposition of knowledge is itself an example of oppression. Therefore, Freire reinvents the role of the teacher. This section shall introduce the practice of this revolutionary educator and how they

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[376] Freire (2017), p. 58.

[377] This interpretation of the text is contrary to that presented by Elias. Elias seems to suggest because of the language he uses that Freire has some end goal and that this end goal is the completion of the human animal. Elias writes, 'Individuals become truly human by their participation in life in society.' Elias (1994), p. 49. Furthermore, Elias' use of the word 'utopian' in describing Freire's philosophy implies that perfect future which is realisable imminently. This is particularly evident when Elias employs the familiar Catholic criticism of liberation theology that Freire has not taken adequate consideration of original sin. Elias writes, '[i]t appears that Freire's radical person, who develops through the process of conscientisation, will be able to act rationally and in a non-oppressive manner. Freire writes as if the oppressed, once liberated, will be different persons. He seems to assume that they will use their freedom wisely, that they will not be exploitative. Experience tells a different tale. The oppressed once freed from oppression at times become the oppressors of others.' Elias (1994), p. 56. I believe that this is a naïve criticism of Freire for many reasons, but not least because the process of conscientisation is not one that is ever completed and continues over generations. The human animal is not perfectible and nor should we aim for such because it is our unfinished status that moves us toward further challenge and growth. I shall return to this analysis in the following section.

incorporate problem-posing education into the field both in the direct interaction with students and in the broader institutional roles that Freire held throughout his career.

To be a revolutionary teacher one must fulfil two criteria. Firstly, one must be genuinely committed to the revolutionary cause; and secondly, one must participate in the subversion of the role of the teacher by not assuming authority in virtue of their status as a teacher but to earn that authority through communication.[378] With respect to the former this means that the revolutionary educator must trust the oppressed to discover their oppression and seek to overcome it; that they do not engage in propaganda; that they do not attempt to give the oppressed the gift of freedom. There is no short-cut to a person's humanisation. Freire writes,

> [t]he correct method for a revolutionary leadership to employ in the task of liberation… lies in dialogue. The conviction of the oppressed that they must fight for their liberation is not a gift bestowed by the revolutionary leadership, but the result of their own *conscientização*.[379]

This person, if coming from the oppressor class, must submit to a 'profound rebirth'.[380] There is a distinct risk that a person who was once oppressor may bring with them attitudes and assumptions exclusive to that class. Furthermore, they may, despite their genuine desire to bring about social justice, seek to do so on behalf of the oppressed rather than together with them. Freire writes that, '[a] real humanist can be identified more by his trust in the people, which engages him in their struggle, than by a thousand actions in their favour without that trust.'[381] Therefore, a person who converts from a member of the oppressor class must be one with the oppressed and they cannot be so as long as they hold on to the identity of their privilege. In Freire's words, '[t]hose who

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[378] Freire (2017), pp. 83–84.

[379] *ibid*, p. 41.

[380] Freire describes the need for a 'profound rebirth' of a person to take the role of revolutionary leader and teacher in the revolution, and at another time refers to it as an 'easter experience'. Freire (2017), p. 35; Paulo Freire, 'Education, Liberation, and the Church', *Religious Education*, 79.4 (1984), 524–45 (p. 525). Jim Walker points out that this concept is theoretically underpinned by Freire's 'existentialist-Christian orientation'. Jim Walker, 'The End of Dialogue: Paulo Freire on Politics and Education', in *Literacy and Revolution: The Pedagogy of Paulo Freire*, ed. by Robert Mackie (New York: Continuum, 1981), pp. 120–50 (p. 136).

[381] Freire (2017), p. 34.

undergo it must take on a new form of existence; they can no longer remain as they were.'[382]

It is Freire's view that through communication new roles are formed. The traditional senses of 'teacher' as one who teaches and 'student' as one who is taught are replaced. 'The teacher is no longer merely the-one-who-teaches, but one who is himself taught in dialogue with the students, who in turn while being taught also teach.'[383] Those persons that fulfil the considerations above are dialogical teachers and revolutionary leaders. Their task is to assist the oppressed, through communication, to see their oppression which will lead to the oppressed acting against their oppression.

As mentioned above, it is necessary that the revolutionary leaders recognise the privileged knowledge that is acquired in virtue of being a member of a particular group or culture, a knowledge that is acquired through lived experience. Therefore, it is their responsibility to facilitate the cultivation of learning stimuli from the community of the students, 'with an attitude of *understanding* towards what they see.'[384] The revolutionary leader must remain sensitive to the particularities of each community and ensure that all learning stimuli originate from that community before being re-presented to them, not as answers to be remembered and adhered to 'but as problems to be solved.'[385] The unending process of humanisation is cemented by the problems being discussed and solved together by the group, not with the end in mind of finding the answer but in finding answers that are then themselves problematised and are returned to the dialogical environment as new problems. In other words, the answers become means to further dialogue.

The model of education is designed to be emancipatory and enfranchising because it aims for the people to become, 'masters of their thinking by discussing the thinking and views of the world explicitly or implicitly manifest in their own suggestions and those of their comrades.'[386] Freire placed significant weight on the idea that for an education to be emancipatory it must do more than bring freedom. A pedagogy of the oppressed must be such that the oppressed themselves are direct participants in its practice and design.

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[382] Freire (2017), p. 35.
[383] *ibid*, p. 53.
[384] *ibid*, p. 83.
[385] *ibid*, p. 96.
[386] *ibid*, p. 97.

Freire's resolution to the contradiction between the individual and the world is to empower the individual through a dialogical educational model.  It is through the word that we transform the world.

Throughout his life Freire assumed a number of institutional positions and sought to implement significant social change from his position within the governmental apparatus.  Through considering these institutional positions the resolution to the tension between the individual and society that Freire sought is illustrated at both the interactional level, through his practice as educator and the development of the revolutionary educator, and at the institutional level, through an engagement within the state apparatus and educational institutions.  It is important to highlight these institutional endeavours so that one can interpret Freire's pedagogical theory in different institutional settings.

In Brazil, Freire earned a directorship of the Department of Education and Culture in the Brazilian state of Pernambuco in 1946.  Later, Freire became Director of the Department of Cultural Extension of Recife University in 1961.  It was in these two positions that Freire developed his approach to teaching and focus on literacy.  For his work in adult literacy Freire was effectively exiled from Brazil after the coup d'état of 1964.  Freire settled in Chile, via Bolivia. In Chile Freire worked for INDAP (Institute of Agriculture and Livestock Development); the Ministry of Education; and CORA (Corporation for Land Reform).  Furthermore, he was a UNESCO consultant who, 'advised… the Instituto de Capacitación e Investogación en Reforma Agraria (ICIRA) [Institute for Training and Research on Land Reform], a mixed agency of the UN and the Chilean government.'[387]  He was invited to join INODEP (Ecumenical Institute for the Development of Peoples) in 1969 and was then elected its president in 1970.  He then joined the World Council of Churches (WCC) in 1970.  It was as a member of the WCC that Freire visited countries in Asia and Africa.  Most significant of these were his trips to Guinea-Bissau.[388]

Freire was invited, as a member of the Institute for Cultural Action and the Department of Education of the World Council of Churches, by the revolutionary

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[387] Balduino Andreola, 'Chile', in *Paulo Freire Encyclopedia*, ed. by Danilo Romeu Streck (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), p. pp.47-48 (p. 47).
[388] Many commentaries and analyses of Freire make space to provide biographical information.  However, I have found Gadotti (1994); and Irwin (2012), most illuminating.

government of the recently independent Guinea-Bissau, through the Commission on Education, to 'visit in order to discuss the bases [sic] of our collaboration in the field of literacy education for adults.'[389]  In Geneva Freire and his colleagues outlined their proposed work plan for Guinea-Bissau, this plan was then fleshed out in detail with the people coordinating the re-education effort in Guinea-Bissau.  Freire perceived the time in Guinea-Bissau as being divided into three over-lapping and interconnected phases.  He writes,

> [t]he first two, which I sought to characterise as times of seeking to see and hear, question and discuss, were actually analytical in nature.  The third phase—synthesis—grew mechanically from them.  In fact, this latter activity was taking place all the time even in the midst of analysis, from which it can never really be separated.[390]

The desire of the new revolutionary government of Guinea-Bissau, under the leadership of Luís Cabral, was to remove all aspects inherited and imposed by their colonial oppressors.  This represents a massive societal overhaul which will affect all branches of government and structure of society.  Furthermore, it will affect interactional relations also.  This overhaul was not limited to content, nor was it limited to method of teaching students, but also encompassed an overhaul of the teaching of teachers.[391]  Additionally, as will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7, on his return to Brazil from exile Freire became Municipal Secretary of Education in São Paulo.  In was in this role that Freire established the *escola cididã* or Citizen School.

Through his various institutional roles in Brazil and across the world Freire sought a practical implementation of his ideas.  What is evident in this analysis of the more practical implementation of Freire's pedagogical ideas at the interactional level by the revolutionary leader, and at the institutional level by Freire in official roles is that both as a practitioner and as an official Freire engaged in the process of humanisation.  It was Freire's life-pursuit to address and mitigate the tension between the individual and

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[389] Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy in Process: The Letters of Guinea-Bissau* (London: Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative, 1978), p. 7.

[390] *ibid*, pp. 37–38.

[391] *ibid*, p. 46.

society through education.  In the following section I shall address three limitations that I identify with Freire's resolution.

## §4.4  The Limitations of Freire's Approach

In this section I shall introduce two concerns that I have with Freire's resolution to the tension between the individual and society.  Firstly, there is a concern with respect to the inconsistency of the application of Freire's conception of means and ends when considering the legitimacy of violence.  Secondly, is the concern that a conflict of interests between the state and the education of the people under its dominion is unsatisfactorily answered by Freire.  This will lead into Chapter 5 which takes the analysis of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire offered in the previous chapters and draws out their similarities and differences.  This analysis will then lead into an account of the model of the citizen defended in this thesis which will draw on the influences from all three figures, seeking to harness their respective strengths while mitigating their respective weaknesses.

The first concern with Freire's resolution to the tension is found in his attitude toward violence.  In his description of humanisation Freire argues that it is 'thwarted by injustice, exploitation, oppression, and the violence of the oppressors'.[392]  It is worth noting that this sentence can be read in two different ways.[393]  Is it that humanisation is thwarted by the actions of the oppressors in all four of these categories?  Or, is it that only the violence of the oppressors thwarts humanization but all instances of injustice, exploitation and oppression do so, thereby making space for the humanizing violence of the oppressed?  I would argue that the function of the definite article that precedes the word violence indicates the latter, but if that is the case then it must be asked: What is distinct about violence that separates it from injustice, exploitation and oppression?

Freire's conception of violence should be understood not just an active and intentional harming through physical force.  In *Letters to Cristina* Freire recounts his experience with hunger that resulted from poverty.  He writes,

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[392] Freire (2017), p. 18.

[393] This appears to be the case in Portuguese also because it is unclear whether the subject that is the oppressor attaches to the whole list in the last item in the list.  In Portuguese it is written, 'Vocação negada na injustiça, na exploração, na opressão, na violência dos opressores.' Paulo Freire, *Pedagogia do Oprimido* (Rio De Janeiro, Brazil: Paz e Terra, 1974), p. 30.

> [a] hunger that, if it was not softened as ours was, would take over our bodies, molding them into angular shapes. Legs, arms, and fingers become skinny. Eye sockets become deeper, making the eyes almost disappear. Many of our classmates experienced this hunger and today it continues to afflict millions of Brazilians who die of its violence every year.[394]

This extended sense of violence is apparent in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* also.  At one point Freire writes,

> [a]ny situation in which "A" objectively exploits "B" or hinders his and her pursuit of self-affirmation as a responsible person is one of oppression. Such a situation in itself constitutes violence, even when sweetened by false generosity, because it interferes with the individual's ontological and historical vocation to be more fully human. With the establishment of a relationship of oppression, violence has *already* begun.[395]

The very presence of exploitation and interference in the process of humanisation constitutes violence.  At another point Freire writes that, '[a]ny situation in which some individuals prevent others from engaging in the process of inquiry is one of violence. The means used are not important; to alienate human beings from their own decision-making is to change them into objects.'[396]  Lastly, in reference to cultural invasion, Freire writes that, '[w]hether urbane or harsh, cultural invasion is thus always an act of violence against the persons of the invaded culture, who lose their originality or face the threat of losing it.'[397]  Therefore, it is clear that violence, for Freire, is not merely an act of physical force but any act that imposes upon an individual's process of humanisation.  If this is the

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[394] Paulo Freire, *Letters to Cristina: Reflections on My Life and Work* (New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 15.
[395] Freire (2017), p. 29.
[396] *ibid*, p. 58.
[397] *ibid*, p. 125.

case then violence, by its very nature, is constituted by acts of exploitation and oppression.

Yet it cannot be the case that violence is *ipso facto* dehumanising because while Freire recognizes the risk of the radical, in response to the pressures of their oppression, employing reactionary tactics in order to fulfil the revolution and warns against it, he continues to advocate violence in opposition to oppression. In a key passage on the role of violence Freire writes as follows:

> [y]et it is—paradoxical though it may seem—precisely in the response of the oppressed to the violence of their oppressors that a gesture of love may be found. Consciously or unconsciously, the act of rebellion by the oppressed (an act which is always, or nearly always, as violent as the initial violence of the oppressors) can initiate love. Whereas the violence of the oppressors prevents the oppressed from being fully human, the response of the latter to this violence is grounded in the desire to pursue the right to be human. As the oppressors dehumanize others and violate their rights, they themselves also become dehumanized. As the oppressed, fighting to be human, take away the oppressors power to dominate and suppress, they restore to the oppressors the humanity they had lost in the exercise of oppression.[398]

The question is, why is this not paradoxical? Why would it be the case that an act of violence that is initiated by the oppressed with the intention of the humanisation of all not one that is necessarily exploitative and oppressive? It is the intention behind it? This cannot be the case because there will be many in the oppressor class or role of the oppressor who genuinely believe that they are acting in the best interests of all. Even though these actions are of false generosity, it is eminently possible that in their own oppression and subject themselves to dehumanization, they believe themselves to be acting in true generosity and through acts of love.

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[398] Freire (2017), p. 30.

Is it then because the oppressed are reacting to their oppressive conditions and therefore not initiating violence themselves?  This cannot be the case either because this would make them reactionaries and guilty of what Freire calls sectarianism.  For Freire, sectarianism is radicalisms' natural counterpart in Freirean terminology:

> Sectarianism, fed by fanaticism, is always castrating. Radicalization, nourished by a critical spirit, is always creative. Sectarianism mythicizes and thereby alienates; radicalization criticizes and thereby liberates. Radicalization involves increased commitment to the position one has chosen, and thus ever greater engagement in the effort to transform concrete, objective reality. Conversely, sectarianism, because it is mythicizing and irrational, turns reality into a false (and therefore unchangeable) "reality."'[399]

Violence is justified by Freire when dialogue is no longer an option and when motivated by love.[400]  In virtue of the violence perpetrated by the oppressors over generations the revolution is often performed in the same language.  Freire writes, '[c]onsciously or unconsciously, the act of rebellion by the oppressed (an act which is always, or nearly always, as violent as the initial violence of the oppressors) can initiate love.'[401]

Robert Mackie defends Freire's justification of violence.  He writes,

> [i]t is to Freire's credit that he does not opt for a pacifist resolution of the oppressor-oppressed contradiction.  In a situation of class struggle dialogue is impossible between antagonists.  This is because dialogue can only occur in a context of love, humility, faith, and critical consciousness—qualities that are absent in the oppressor and stunted in the oppressed.[402]

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[399] Freire (2017), p. 11.
[400] Freire justifies the use of violence in Freire (2017), pp. 102; and 112.
[401] Freire (2017), p. 30.
[402] Robert Mackie, 'Contributions to the Thought of Paulo Freire', in *Literacy and Revolution: The Pedagogy of Paulo Freire*, ed. by Robert Mackie (New York: Continuum, 1981), pp. 93–119, (p. 113).

However, despite Mackie's defence the employment of violence in his method is troubling for Freire in two ways. First, genuine acts of love are indistinguishable from perceived acts of love which are in fact acts of false generosity. Second, the employment of violence as a means for the realisation of *conscientização* is contrary to the spirit of humanisation in Freire's work and shows a lack of consistency in his application of his conception of the relationship between means and ends.

The first problem is illustrated clearly when one considers the actions of the revolutionary leaders. According to Freire, 'revolutionaries themselves become reactionary by falling into sectarianism in the process of responding to the sectarianism of the Right.'[403] Therefore, they would be betraying their own humanisation by acting in the same manner as the oppressors, by internalising the oppressor. It would no longer be an act of love but an act to take the oppressors place and make them oppressed.

Therefore, the only thing that distinguishes the violence of the oppressed from the violence of the oppressors is that it is motivated by a genuine act of love rather than a perceived one. However, there is no way for a person, oppressed and oppressor alike, to identify which acts of violence are acts of love and which are not. They are indistinguishable.

Nell Noddings, in *Women and Evil,* identifies this troubling aspect of Freire's conception of 'acts of love'.[404] Those acts which are performed by the oppressed to pursue the humanisation of all people when they are genuinely motivated for that end are acts of love. This is in contrast with false generosity which are acts that appear egalitarian but in fact sustain the current power norms. An act of love is one of 'true generosity' and one that undermines the structure of oppression, it is a revolutionary act.[405]

Noddings asks, '[w]hat in the history or in the experience of the oppressed leads us to suppose that they will be loving? Or is liberation an act of love simply by virtue of its result?'[406] Here Noddings is eluding to the fact that Freire is employing the end of

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[403] Freire (2017), p. 11.
[404] Nel Noddings, *Women and Evil* (Los Angeles, California; London: University of California Press, 1991).
[405] Freire (2017), p. 19 & 24.
[406] Noddings (1991), p. 161.

freedom to justify the means of violence. Despite the fact that, as has been shown above, Freire's pedagogy is a commitment to the interconnectedness of means and ends.

Furthermore, Freire perceives the duplicitous nature of the existing societal structure in condemning the violence of those that act against their power while simultaneously permitting violence to maintain order. He writes as follows:

> The dominant elites consider the remedy to be more domination and repression, carried out in the name of freedom, order, and social peace (that is, the peace of the elites). Thus they can condemn—logically, from their point of view—"the violence of a strike by workers and [can] call upon the state in the same breath to use violence in putting down the strike."[407]

However, the violence of the oppressed and the violence of the oppressors being indistinguishable is not, in itself, a refutation of Freire's political project or his justification of violence. It could still be the case that there are genuine acts of love which employ violence as the means for the realisation of the humanisation of the oppressed and oppressors alike. What is more problematic for Freire is that in this instance the means justify the ends and betray a fundamental feature of his resolution to the tension between the individual and society.

As has been shown above, problem-posing education is the pedagogical method by which people are humanised through developing their conscious awareness. A central tenant of problem-posing education is that the people free themselves, that being led to freedom is no freedom at all. If this is the case of the oppressed it must be the case for all people because the oppressors too are oppressed and dehumanised and cannot develop *conscientização* through external imposition. As a result, the existing oppressors will not be able to undo their dehumanisation and will, through the revolution, become the new oppressed. Therefore, I interpret within Freire's politico-educational project a commitment to the interconnectedness of means and ends. A person must be subject to the means of realising humanisation and conscious awareness in order to enjoy those

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[407] Freire (2017), p. 51. Quote taken from Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (New York: Sribners, 1960), p. 130.

ends.  Put another way, a person cannot develop *conscientização* without problem-posing education.

This presents a problem for Freire in two relationships.  There are those, 'acts of love' performed by the oppressed which affect the lives of the oppressors, and there are those, 'acts of love' performed by the revolutionary educators which affect the lives of other oppressed persons.  Acts of love performed by the oppressed will inform the state of affairs that result and if those acts are violent ones it is unclear how the revolution escapes the oppressive state of affairs that preceded it.  Freire writes as follows:

> Once a situation of violence and oppression has been established, it engenders an entire way of life and behaviour for those caught up in it— oppressors and oppressed alike. Both are submerged in this situation, and both bear the marks of oppression. Analysis of existential situations of oppression reveals that their inception lay in an act of violence— initiated by those with power. This violence, as a process, is perpetuated from generation to generation of oppressors, who become its heirs and are shaped in its climate.[408]

In this passage Freire argues that violence breeds violence, that violence means pursue violent ends.  If this is true of the oppressors now will it not also be the case for any society established through a violent act?  If a revolution is instigated by a violent reaction to the violent perpetrated by the oppressor then in what way and at what point is violence as a tool for change dismissed?  At what point and in what way does the new regime differ from the old is its truths are enforced through the necessity of violence? How does Freire's political theory guard against the risk of new oppressors and new oppressed as a consequence of revolution rather than a dissolution of the dichotomous relationship?

With regard to the acts of love performed by the revolutionary leaders, these are designed to be acts that lead to liberation and they are acts of teaching.  Furthermore, these acts of love must take all people into consideration.  However, acts done

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[408] Freire (2017), p. 32.

supposedly in the name of love can be uncompromising and vicious. Noddings reminds us of the treatment of "witches" by the Christian church in the name of love and the treatment of people by, 'ordinary parents and teachers' that wish to control the lives of others through 'acts of love'.[409] This is a real problem for Freire because without greater clarification of what constitutes an act of love morally questionable acts may be performed under its banner, but if a greater clarification is offered then the dialogical process is undermined.

The second problem that I identify in Freire's resolution to the tension between the individual and society is a conflict of interest between the state and the education of the people under its dominion. Where the first concern relates to the tension between the individual and society at the interactional level, existing as it does in the relationships between the individuals in an oppressed situation and in the process of revolution, the second concern with Freire's resolution relates to the tension at the institutional level. The question that Freire poses is, if a pedagogy of the oppressed requires political power for implementation and the aims of a pedagogy of the oppressed are contrary to the aims of existing political power, then how is it possible to practice a pedagogy of the oppressed?[410]

The state are representatives of existing power relations and existing power relations support oppression. I find this uncontroversial. What constitutes oppression and who is oppressed is obviously an open question but that there is pervasive oppression supported by existing power norms is uncontroversial. Therefore, freedom of the individual and the interests of the state are in conflict. Freire recognises this and writes, '[t]he oppressor knows full well that ... intervention would not be in his [*sic*] interest. What *is* to his [*sic*] interest is for the people to continue in a state of submersion, impotent in the face of oppressive reality.'[411] The state is unable to support a programme of freedom because they are both representatives of and subject to the consequences of a 'fear of freedom'.

As expressed in detail above, Freire argues that the burden of the fight for freedom is solely that of the revolutionary leaders with the oppressed. It cannot be performed by

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[409] Noddings (1991), p. 165.
[410] Freire (2017), p. 28.
[411] *ibid*, p. 26.

the dominant elites because it would mean, 'that they have relinquished power to dominate and joined the cause of the oppressed, or had lost that power through miscalculation.'[412]  Therefore, before the revolution there can be no state sponsored problem-posing education of true generosity.  The education that occurs before the revolution which is humanizing is only conducted with the people by the revolutionary leaders.

It is only after the revolution has taken hold and the oppressors dissolved that revolutionary education can extend beyond these limited boundaries.  This is complicated by the fact that there is no singular moment of revolution.  Freire writes, '[i]n a dynamic, rather than static, view of revolution, there is no absolute "before" or "after," with the taking of power as the dividing line.'[413]  Therefore, the power and influence of oppressor interests will continue and inhibit the development of an emancipatory education.  While it may be in the authentic interests of the state it is not in the perceived interests of the oppressor society to undermine the authority that they have over the oppressed.  Freire's pedagogy insufficiently accounts for the conflict of interests between power and freedom.

There is a third concern with Freire's resolution, that a tension persists in the authority of the revolutionary leaders which raises concerns of a paternalist ethic.  This raises issues relating not only to the tension between the individual and society but in the relation to authority and claims of authority.  For this reason I shall discuss this concern in Chapter 7 where I look at the manifestation of authority in the politico-educational projects of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire in more detail.  These three overlapping concerns regarding the role of authority within Freire's politico-educational project serve to highlight problems in both the practical application and the theoretical underpinnings of his theory.[414]  In spite of this Freire's project has proven to be instrumentally successful

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[412] Freire (2017), p. 99.

[413] *ibid*, p. 110.

[414] Freire has also been accused of colonial elitism, *Rethinking Freire: Globalization and the Environmental Crisis*, ed. by C. A. Bowers and Frédérique Apffel-Marglin, Sociocultural, Political, and Historical Studies in Education (Mahwah, N.J: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2005); Gustavo Esteva, Dana L. Stuchal, and Madhu Suri Prakesh, 'From a Pedagogy for Liberation to Liberation From Pedagogy', in *Rethinking Freire: Globalization and the Environmental Crisis*, ed. by C. A. Bowers and Frédérique Apffel-Marglin, Sociocultural, Political, and Historical Studies in Education (Mahwah, N.J: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2005).  It is argued that the, 'emancipatory vision is based on the same assumptions that underlie the planetary citizenship envisioned by the neoliberals promoting the Western model of global development.' Bowers and Apffel-Marglin

and theoretically influential.[415]  In fact, Freire is treated with such esteem and his work considered of such great worth that Glass writes, 'It seem that often a blind eye is turned toward […] theoretical difficulties, and instead an adoring gaze treats Freire more as an icon and myth that as a radical philosopher subject to the limits of history and a necessarily situated perspective.'[416]  However, the concerns that I have raised in the final section of this chapter draw out troubling aspects of his theory.  With reference to the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Dewey in the next chapter, I shall draw out the similarities and differences in their respective resolutions to the tension between the individual and society and draw them together into a single coherent account of the citizen.  I contend that these three thinkers together can provide the foundations for a practical and theoretical approach to critical citizenship where the concerns raised for each are answered by the strengths of the others.

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(2005), p.ix. One way that this argument is made is with an eye on the centrality of critical reflection in Freire's pedagogy.  Critical pedagogy is identified by Bowers et. al. as a clear and damaging example of an imposed Western ideal that appears to exist without question.  While an integral form of knowledge, according to Bowers et. al., it is one of many legitimate forms of knowledge and on its own is capable of creating the opposite of its stated aim.  The consequence of the exclusive focus on critical reflection is that the knowledge that can arise through the privilege of experience is destroyed and the people that hold that knowledge disempowered.  Alternatively, Bowers argues that answers by communities must come from within that local culture.  Additionally, it has also been argued that Freire fails to overcome his early liberalism as expressed in Freire (2005a); and Paulo Freire, *Cultural Action for Freedom*, Harvard Educational Review, No. 1 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Educational Review, 2000), and as such is guilty of promoting an individualist theory because the theory is centred around the individual developing their own consciousness, C. A. Bowers, 'Issues in Focus: Linguistic Roots of Cultural Invasion in Paulo Freire's Pedagogy', *Teachers College Record*, 84.4 (1983), 935–53; C. A. Bowers, 'The Problem of Individualism and Community in Neo-Marxist Educational Thought', *Teachers College Record*, 85.3 (1984), 365–90.  Peter L. Berger echoes this complaint when he writes, 'it is hard to imagine a more 'elitist' program (and, for that matter, a more 'paternalistic' one) than one based on the assumption that a certain group of people is dehumanised to the point of animality, is unable to perceive this condition or rescue itself from it, and requires the (presumably selfless) assistance of others for both the perception and the rescue operation. Berger (1976), p. 116.  This results from the conflict of authority highlighted above.  However, these arguments are not as strong as those that I focus upon because their complaint is dependent upon a view of Freire's conception of consciousness that I do not share.

[415] With respect to practical success Freire's project has been attributed with countless examples but, his early career working with the illiterate people of Brazil and Chile provides a clear example, where it is said that Freire taught people to read and write in 45 days, Gadotti (1994), p. 15.  Freire's theoretical influence is also significant.  Freire's heirs, such as Maocir Gadotti, Ira Shor, Carlos Torres, Henry Giroux, bell hooks, Peter McClaren, and Antonia Dardar continue to write on and develop the pedagogical ideas of Friere.  See, *The Critical Pedagogy Reader*, ed. by Antonia Darder, Rodolfo D. Torres, and Marta Baltodano, 3rd edition (New York: Routledge, 2017).

[416] Glass (2001), p.16.

**Chapter 5**

**The Critical Citizen**

**§5.0  Summary**

In the previous chapter I have shown how the tension between the individual and society manifests within the philosophies of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire.  This tension represents the primary tension in the concept of the citizen.  In addition to this, I have illustrated the respective resolutions to this tension by Rousseau, Dewey and Freire, but, most importantly, I have highlighted the limitations to these resolutions.  As such, it has been shown that each of these resolutions were unsatisfactory on their own, but for different reasons.

In the case of Rousseau this is because of the dependence upon the insidious and hidden control of his figures of authority, in particular the tutor and the Lawgiver.  In the case of Dewey, the use of the analogy of the game, the potential employment of coercive control over an individual, and the problem of maintaining a consistent understanding of the distinction between private and public acts indicated a problematic relationship with the existing state of affairs and the ability to affect change within that state of affairs.  In the case of Freire, the justification of violence betrayed an inconsistency in his methodological approach with respect to the relationship between means and ends, and, related to this, the relationship between the state and the individuals under its dominion remains strained in spite of Freire's revolutionary pedagogy.

The aim of this chapter is to identify a form of the citizen which draws on the strengths of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire and places that citizen within the context of the debate of the citizen discussed in Chapter 1.  Therefore, in this chapter I shall build on the relationship between the philosophies of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire.  This will take account of both the direct influence between them, and those similarities and differences between them which arise more organically, or from the overlap in their respective projects.

To do this I shall justify the connection that I draw between them by drawing out similarities in their respective politico-educational projects.  Then I shall show how they

each go some way in remedying the shortcomings of the other two through modifications in the methodology applied and their differing engagement in the practice of education. Finally, I shall draw the threads together from the analysis of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire, along with the analysis of the citizen in Chapter 1 in order to define the model of the citizen that will operate as the end-in-view for the educative project that follows. This citizen will prove to be descriptively communitarian, normatively cosmopolitan, an active participant in one's society, and a possessor of both rights and responsibilities.

## §5.1 Defending the use of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire

In this section I shall defend the decision to read Rousseau, Dewey and Freire so closely together. This is not an easy task. It is important to note that there is not a great deal of literature which ties these three figures together despite some obvious similarities in their work, however, I interpret a narrative in their thought which builds from one to the next.[417] This is not an obvious or explicit narrative where Dewey responds to Rousseau, and Freire responds to Dewey. They were not contemporaries, nor were they a part of the same philosophical tradition. However, Dewey was familiar with Rousseau's work and offered a critique of some of the ideas of *Émile* in *Democracy and Education*,

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[417] One rare example of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire in conversation with each other is found in English and Stengel's paper on fear in learning, Andrea English and Barbara Stengel, 'Exploring Fear: Rousseau, Dewey and Freire on Fear and Learning', *Educational Theory*, 60.5 (2010), 521–42. Grace Roosevelt, 'Reconsidering Dewey in a Culture of Consumerism: A Rousseauean Critique', *Philosophy of Education Archive*, 2011, 283–91; Patrick Riley and Jennifer Welchman, 'Rousseau, Dewey, and Democracy', in *A Companion to the Philosophy of Education*, ed. by Randall Curren (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2003), pp. 94–112; and Jon Fennell, 'Dewey on Rousseau: Natural Development as the Aim of Education', *The Journal of Educational Thought (JET) / Revue de La Pensée Éducative*, 13.2 (1979), 109–20, are good examples of placing Rousseau and Dewey in conversation with each other. John E Petrovic and Kellie Rolstad in, 'Educating for Autonomy: Reading Rousseau and Freire toward a Philosophy of Unschooling', *Policy Futures in Education*, 15.7–8 (2017), 817–33, offer an account of unschooling which radicalises Rousseau through Freire, and Asoke Bhattacharya, *Paulo Freire: Rousseau of the Twentieth Century* (Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2011), also reads Freire from a Rousseauian perspective. Lastly, Michael O'Sullivan, 'Challenging Neoliberal Anti-Intellectualism, Consumerism, and Utilitarianism: Achieving Deweyian and Freirean Visions of Critically Engaged Citizens', in *Educating for Democratic Consciousness: Counter-Hegemonic Possibilities*, ed. by Ali A. Abdi and Paul R. Carr, Critical Studies in Democracy and Political Literacy (New York: Peter Lang, 2013), pp. 167–86; Darcísio Natal Muraro, 'Relações Entre a Filosofia e a Educação de John Dewey e de Paulo Freire', *Educação & Realidade*, 38.3 (2013), 813–29 [*Portuguese*]; and Timothy Hedeen, 'Dialogue and Democracy, Community and Capacity: Lessons for Conflict Resolution Education from Montessori, Dewey, and Freire', *Conflict Resolution Quarterly*, 23.2 (2005), 185–202; offer rare opportunities to read Dewey and Freire in conversation with each other.

and there is evidence that Freire was also familiar with Dewey's work.[418] I emphasise this relationship and read Rousseau, Dewey and Freire as engaged in an inter-generational project in freedom through education which aims to resolve the tension between the individual and society. In reading them in this way I argue that Dewey builds upon the foundations provided by Rousseau and answers a number of the limitations present within his politico-educational project. Similarly, I argue that Freire builds this project further and can be read as offering answers to a number of the limitations present in the politico-educational project of Dewey, even though he does not do so explicitly. In virtue of these responses, for the most part, not being explicit, reading Rousseau, Dewey and Freire in this way adds a further benefit in that these responses may operate in both directions. As such, Freire is not the culmination or end of this project but a member in a mutual project where one can learn from the other.

This being said, I identify three key similarities of theory between Rousseau, Dewey and Freire which support reading them in this unconventional way. There is the similarity of their overriding project, the similarity in their connection to the progressive education movement, and the similarity which arises from direct engagement with each other.

Arguably the most important similarity between Rousseau, Dewey and Freire, and the factor that links them together more concretely than any other is the similarity of their overriding projects. For each of them their model of education and their political project are mutually co-dependent. They each offer a model of education that is central to a political project – a political project which is democratic, radical, and built upon a view of the interdependence of theory and practice. In addition to this, Rousseau, Dewey and Freire all share, as a part of their politico-educational projects, an unwavering faith in democracy, a democracy that extends beyond the act of voting and representative government. Furthermore, in each case the strength of the democracy that is envisaged is created through the education of the people. Although sometimes overlooked, because of a particular author's focus on one aspect of their thought, it is incontrovertibly true that Rousseau, Dewey and Freire construct political theories that contained education at their heart.[419] Connected to this point is the fact that each of them, as the

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[418] I shall address this below.
[419] Stanley Aronowitz observes that many educators read Freire as a method of teaching. According to Aronowitz, Freire's method is misapplied if not understood in connection with the theoretical

aim of their project, seek to construct a philosophy which develops individuals into active and engaged citizens without sacrificing their own private interests, or at the expense of freedom. The general similarities warrant further investigation into reading Rousseau, Dewey and Freire in conversation with one another.

A second important similarity between Rousseau, Dewey and Freire is that all three are frequently associated with the progressive education movement. Progressivism is a broad term and defined variously. However, Darling and Nordenbo highlight five themes which 'echo throughout its history.'[420] These are: a criticism of traditional education; a challenge to understandings of the nature of knowledge; the view that children possess a natural desire to learn; a commitment to the value of democracy in schools because of children's right to determine their own learning; and a commitment to the development of the whole person.[421] Progressivism, understood in this way, is the approach to education that Rousseau, Dewey and Freire each share.

Rousseau is a key figure in progressive education. Darling and Nordenbo write, 'the first of the classics in the history of progressivism [was] Rousseau. … and perhaps the first writer to advance the idea of what we now sometimes call a child-centred approach to education.'[422] Rousseau located learning in a child's interaction with the world rather than in their instruction by the teacher. Progressivism is intimately linked to this child-centred approach.[423] Dewey too, holds a prominent position within the progressive education tradition and his influence is felt throughout the Western world. In the United Kingdom Dewey's philosophy was instrumental in the formation of the Plowden Report

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underpinnings of his theory, Aronowitz (1993), pp. 8–11. Dewey also is subject to significant misunderstandings of his work which has been generated by those who would read aspects of his work in isolation. R. W. Sleeper in, Sleeper (2001), writes of a letter by Dewey to Sidney Hook late in his life. Hook writes that in this letter, "Dewey complains that his metaphysics has been misconstrued because of his critics' failure to see how its subject-matter relates to the technical distinction made in logic between 'generic and universal propositions.' He complains that his work on ethics has been misunderstood owing to their failure to see how his emphasis on method furnishes a unifying factor. He complains that his critics generally remain 'oblivious that according to my view all judgement is '"practical"' and what they take as practical can be understood only as one species of the whole genus.'" (pp. 16-17) As such, I claim that Dewey's theory of education cannot be understood separate from his political project of the democratisation of society. This is most apparent in *Democracy and Education*, Dewey, 'MW9', pp. 1-370.
[420] John Darling and Erik Nordenbo, 'Progressivism', in *The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Education*, ed. by Nigel Blake and others (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), pp. 288–308 (p. 295).
[421] *ibid*, pp. 295–308.
[422] *ibid*, p. 289.
[423] For more information on progressivism and child-centred education see, John Darling, *Child-Centred Education and Its Critics* (London: P. Chapman Pub, 1994); and Darling and Nordenbo (2003).

published in 1967.[424]  Freire, while more commonly referred to as a member of the critical pedagogy movement, is often cited as a progressive educator also.[425]  Even though his theory exists within a different approach the overlaps are clear enough that the connection is often made between progressive education and critical pedagogy.[426]  As mentioned in the introduction, there are others who have engaged in a similar project to that which I attribute to Rousseau, Dewey and Freire, however it is this second condition which sets them apart.  Rousseau, Dewey and Freire seek to develop a child-centred or progressive model of education that seeks to overcome the tension between the individual and society through social justice in a way that it would be difficult to attribute to any other.

The third important similarity between Rousseau, Dewey and Freire is that there was a level of response in Dewey and subsequently by Freire.  Dewey was more than merely familiar with Rousseau, and the model of philosophy and education that he developed should be read as, at least in part, a response to Rousseau's conception of education as found in *Émile*.  In *Democracy and Education* Dewey interprets Rousseau as defending conceptions of the individual and society which identify them as separate constructs, and as defending nature as a singular aim of education.[427]  Dewey objects to the idea of the primacy of education by nature but agrees with Rousseau in how it is categorised in *Émile*.  Dewey applauds the identification of three types of education—things, men, and nature—and the claim that education is best when those three educations are aligned.  In fact, Dewey writes, '[i]t would be impossible to say better what is said in the first sentences.'[428]  Despite this intimate connection in the foundations of their politico-educational projects and Dewey's clear misrepresentation of Rousseau's methodological foundations there is little literature that puts Rousseau and Dewey into conversation with each other.[429]

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[424] Darling and Nordenbo (2003), p. 292.
[425] See and English and Stengel (2010).
[426] See, Douglas Kellner, 'Toward a Critical Theory of Education', *Democracy & Nature*, 9.1 (2003), 51–64.
[427] Dewey, 'MW9'.
[428] Dewey, 'MW9', p. 132.
[429] I gave a brief summary of some of the limited works which read Rousseau and Dewey together in footnote 417.

Similarly, the connection between Dewey and Freire has been largely overlooked, although it has been noted on occasion. Stanley Aronowitz notes clear resemblances between Dewey and Freire.[430] He draws attention to Freire's rejection of 'banking' education where students are treated as passive receptacles to be filled with knowledge; his insistence that people be actively engaged in their education through praxis; and of the breaking down of barriers between a person and the world in which they subsist. Lastly Aronowitz notes that, 'Freire assails education that focusses on individual mobility chances while eschewing collective self-transformation.'[431] These characteristics of Freire's method draw straight comparisons with the progressive education of Dewey. However, Aronowitz does not note any direct influence on Freire by Dewey. In addition to this Peter McLaren and Tomaz Tadua da Silva note that Freire's emphasis on individual and collective intentionality or agency as a precondition for knowing, follows, 'in the tradition of Hegel, Marx, and Dewey'.[432]

However, these comparisons are only in passing. Darcísio Natal Muraro, on the other hand, has sought to highlight the connection between Dewey and Freire in a recent paper on the relationship between their philosophy and education.[433] Muraro notes that Freire was both directly and indirectly aware of Dewey's pedagogical theory through the works of Anîsio Teixeira, who was a translator of the works of Dewey into Portuguese and Lourenço Filho who was a commentator on the works of Dewey in Portuguese.[434] Muraro also draws attention to those few people who have noted this connection between Dewey and Freire.[435] Moacir Gadotti adds a concreteness to the comparisons between Dewey and Freire also, in his claim that Freire thought of himself as a disciple of Teixeira

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[430] Aronowitz (1993).

[431] *ibid*, p. 9.

[432] Peter McLaren and Tomaz Tadua da Silva, 'Decentering Pedagogy: Critical Literacy, Resistance and the Politics of Memory', in *Paulo Freire: A Critical Encounter*, ed. by Peter McLaren and Peter Leonard (London; New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 47–89 (p. 54).

[433] Muraro (2013).

[434] *ibid*, p. 814.

[435] McLaren and da Silva (1993); Afonso Censo Scocuglia, 'A Progressão do Pensamento Político-Pedagógico de Paulo Freire', in *Paulo Freire e a agenda da educação latino-americana no século XXI*, ed. by Carlos Alberto Torres and Adriana Puiggrós, Coleção Grupos de Trabalho de CLACSO (Buenos Aires: Conselho Latino-Americano de Ciências Sociais: Agência Sueca de Desenvolvimento Internacional, 2001), pp. 323–48 [*Portuguese*]; and Celso de Rui Beisiegel, *Política e educação popular: a teoria e a prática de Paulo Freire no Brasil* (Brasília, DF: Liber Livro, 2008) [*Portuguese*]. Additionally, Aronowitz (1993), notes Dewey's influence on Freire's early work.

and by noting that Freire makes reference to Dewey and *Democracy and Education* in his thesis *'de História e Filosofia da Educação'*, published in Brazil in 1936.  Gadotti writes,

> 'O que a pedagogia de Paulo Freire aproveita do pensamento de John Dewey é a idéia de "aprender fazendo", o trabalho cooperativo, a relação entre teoria e prática, o método de iniciar o trabalho educativo pela fala (linguagem) dos alunos.  Mas, para Paulo Freire, as finalidades da educação são outres: sob uma ótica libertadora, a educação deve ligar-se à mudança estrutural da sociedade opressiva, embora ela não alcance esse objetivo imediatamente e, muito menos, sozinha.'[436]

Therefore, these similarities in project and overlap in theory are more than simply chance.  Dewey had some impact on the writings of Freire and further investigation is warranted.  These three reasons, together, provide enough evidence to justify reading Rousseau, Dewey and Freire together.  In the next section I shall then employ Rousseau, Dewey and Freire in conversation with each other to explore the model of the citizen that their politico-educational projects can justify.

## §5.2  Rousseau, Dewey and Freire in Conversation

In addition to the similarities between Rousseau, Dewey and Freire that I have addressed above, there are three key overlapping qualities within their respective politico-educational projects that serve both to highlight the differences between them, but also how their theories remain conceptually tied together.  It is in considering these three key themes that a stronger argument can be made that transcends any one of

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[436] 'What Paulo Freire takes from John Dewey in his pedagogy is the idea of "learning by doing", of cooperative work, of the relationship between theory and practice, and using students' speech (language) as the starting point for educational work. However, Freire believes that the final aims of education are more than this: Freire takes the liberating perspective that education must be linked to the structural change of an oppressive society – an objective which cannot be achieved immediately, let alone, by society on its own.'  Moacir Gadotti, 'A voz do biógrafo brasileiro: A prática à altura do sonho', in *Paulo Freire: uma biobibliografia*, ed. by Moacir Gadotti and Ana Maria Araújo Freire (São Paulo: [Brasília, Brazil]: Cortez Editora: Instituto Paulo Freire; UNESCO, 1996), pp. 69–116 (p. 92) [*Portuguese*].  I am thankful to Sydony Johnson for translating this passage for me.

Rousseau, Dewey and Freire and forms the foundation for the citizen of this thesis. The key themes that I focus upon are: the relationship between theory and practice; the relationship between means and ends; and the relationship of the individual with the world. I shall address each in turn.

The first overlapping feature of the politico-educational projects of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire is the relationship between theory and practice. While Rousseau recognised an important connection between theory and practice, he sought no resolution to the tension between them in his philosophy. Rousseau actively avoided practice. Darling writes, '[f]or practical educators, one of Rousseau's limitations is that he had so little patience with the idea of schools that he had no interest in how to practice the art of school teaching.'[437] Rousseau avoided more than the practice of school teaching however. In the discovery of Émile's tutor and guardian in the opening pages of *Émile* Rousseau declares himself unqualified to take the position himself. He writes,

> [n]ot in the condition to fulfil the most useful task, I will dare at least to attempt the easier one; following the example of so many others, I shall put my hand not to the work but to the pen; and instead of doing what is necessary, I shall endeavour to say it.[438]

Therefore, it seems that Rousseau's avoidance of practice is linked to his perception of his own fallibility which I highlighted in Chapter 2. The disconnect between theory and practice in Rousseau becomes starker still when one considers the difference between his theoretical political treaties, the *Social Contract* and *Émile*, and those written for a particular people at a particular time, *Poland* and *Corsica*. The differences between them show both that Rousseau perceived the important connection between theory and practice, and that he did not perceive it clearly enough.[439]

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[437] Darling and Nordenbo (2003), p. 291.

[438] 'Émile', *OC IV*, 264; *CWR Vol. 13*, p. 176.

[439] It is important to remember that *Considerations on the Government of Poland and on its Planned Reformation* was written as a commissioned piece by an influential political opposition in Poland at the time and therefore Rousseau shapes his recommendations based on his impression of the natural character of the Polish person and the existing institutional structure. As such, there is a much greater focus on building feelings of patriotism and militarism in the minds of the populace because of the perceived threat from Poland's neighbours. There is also, the more restrained appeal for the gradual emancipation of people in

In contrast, Dewey and Freire both built their methodologies around the connection between theory and practice. As noted in the introduction, Dewey's philosophy came from the American pragmatist tradition. As a pragmatist, Dewey was committed to developing knowledge through communal enquiry which started from our current understanding of the world and not from *a priori* propositions.

The commitment to the intimate connection between theory and practice is clear in Freire's politico-educational project also. In *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* Freire writes,

> [a]s we attempt to analyse dialogue as a human phenomenon, we discover something which is the essence of dialogue itself: *the word*. But the word is more than just an instrument which makes dialogue possible; accordingly, we must seek its constitutive elements. Within the word we find two dimensions, reflection and action, in such radical interaction that if one is sacrificed—even in part—the other immediately suffers. There is no true word that is not as the same time a praxis. Thus, to speak a true word is to transform the world.[440]

As noted in the introduction, the roots of Freire's critical pedagogy can be traced back to critical theory. Critical theory, just like some instances of pragmatism, aims to build knowledge from within social environments rather than divorced from it.[441] There

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the face of the political monopoly of the nobility than in the *Social Contract*. See, Tomasz Szkudlarek, 'On Nations And Children: Rousseau, Poland And European Identity', *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, 24.1 (2005), 19–38. Similarly, *Constitutional Project for Corsica* places much greater focus on the building of a national identity and unity. For a description and defence of the practical philosophy contained within these two treaties see, Ethan Putterman, 'Realism and Reform in Rousseau's Constitutional Projects for Poland and Corsica', *Political Studies*, 49.3 (2001), 481–94. Furthermore, it is pertinent to note the dramatic difference between the education of Émile and of Sophie to the treatment and education of Rousseau's own children. Timothy O'Hagan notes, 'the fact that the author of *Émile*, the most revolutionary treatise on child-raising of its time, should have consigned his five children from Thérèse [Levasseur] to the Foundlings Home, made him the butt of ceaseless ridicule, a caricatural figure of hypocrisy, embodying the failure to unite theory and practice.' Timothy O'Hagan, *Rousseau*, (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 2.

[440] Freire (2017), p. 60.

[441] There is a recent attempt to illustrate and build upon the similarities between American pragmatism and critical theory. In particular Jürgen Habermas, Richard Bernstein, and Axel Honneth have been building a conversation between various proponents of these two philosophical approaches. See, Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1* (London: Heinemann Educational, 1984); Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 2* (Boston: Beacon, 2005); Richard J. Bernstein, *The Pragmatic Turn* (Cambridge: Polity, 2010); and Axel Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, trans. by Joel Anderson, Reprinted (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2005).

is an important similarity between this approach and that of the pragmatists in that both understand the intimate relationship between theory and action. Further to this, Freire, like Dewey, did not hide in theory himself—as Rousseau did. Freire was active in social reform and political projects of his day. As Ana Maria Araujo Freire and Donaldo Macedo note, '[g]oing beyond academia and institutional life, Paulo Freire also engaged in the movements for popular education of the early sixties.'[442] Furthermore, Freire was instrumental in the foundation of the National Literacy Programme, 'which, through the Paulo Freire method, intended to make literate, while politicising them, five million adults.'[443] And, once Freire returned to Brazil from exile he became Municipal Secretary of Education in São Paulo responsible for 662 schools with 720 000 students from early years to 13-14 years of age, in addition to leading adult education and literacy training.[444] This biographical information is important because it draws parallels with Dewey. Both Freire and Dewey developed politicised models of educations that aimed to strengthen democracy.

Freire's aim is to develop a pedagogical theory and practice that can lead to the overcoming of the deeply ingrained oppressor oppressed relationship and, in turn, to the emancipation of all people. From these roots Freire develops a model of political education that is designed to emancipate the people and revolutionise the world.

The second point of overlap requires the brief introduction of new conceptual content in order to clarify and continue to build the model of the citizen that results from considering Rousseau, Dewey and Freire in the context of contemporary accounts of the citizen. There is a theoretical link, between the means of the realisation of the citizen and the ends of what form that citizen is to take, that extends beyond a mere conditional relationship in each of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire. In Rousseau this is the least developed. There are certain passages in Rousseau which suggests a commitment to the interconnectedness of means and ends but these are fatally undermined by his approach to education at both the interactional and institutional levels through the practice of the

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[442] Paulo Freire, *The Paulo Freire Reader*, ed. by Ana Maria Araújo Freire and Donaldo P. Macedo (New York: Continuum, 1998a).

[443] Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of Freedom: Ethics, Democracy, and Civic Courage* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998b).

[444] Daniel Schugurensky, 'Citizen School', in *Paulo Freire Encyclopedia*, ed. by Danilo Romeu Streck (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), pp. 51–53 (p. 51).

Tutor and the Lawgiver.  I have argued above that one of the primary limitations of Rousseau's theory is that the tutor and the Lawgiver are guilty of unjustifiable constraints upon the freedom of Émile and the citizens of the Republic, and that the control they practice over the lives of these people is insidious.  The projects of Dewey and Freire address this concern through the application of methodologies that perceive the interconnectedness of means and ends.  Dewey's pragmatism offers a more robust methodology than that which is found in Rousseau.

The process of Dewey's pragmatism is structured upon a delicate understanding of the relationship between means and ends, which is a discussion about the method by which we justify our desired end state of affairs and the process by which we reach that state of affairs.[445]  Waks, in particular, recognises the importance of means and ends within Dewey's work.  He writes, 'John Dewey's celebrated analysis of means-ends as a "continuum" runs through his mature work like a skeletal frame upon which various limbs – valuation, art, technique, science, and democracy – are hinged.'[446]  Means and ends also play an important role in Deweyan ethics.  Damico writes, '[m]en's [*sic*] efforts to resolve moral problems are aided greatly by knowledge of the interconnectedness among social forces and by careful consideration of the relationship between means and ends.'[447]  According to Dewey, one must understand ends, not as final and complete, but as means to further ends.  Much like how effects are built upon within the realm of the sciences to create new knowledge and confirm hypotheses.  To view ends conventionally – as beyond action – is a mistake.  In doing so, in having a fixed end to which we should direct action, our morality becomes bound almost entirely to this end-in-itself and divorces action from the means employed to achieve said aim.  Dewey writes in *Human Nature and Conduct* that, '[t]he entire popular notion of 'ideal' is infected with this

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[445] The centrality of Dewey's conception of means and ends within his political theory is discussed in Leonard J Waks, 'The Means-Ends Continuum and the Reconciliation of Science and Art in the Later Works of John Dewey', *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, 35.3 (1999), 595–611.  The role that means and ends play in Dewey's mature philosophy is also discussed in Alexander Livingston, 'Between Means and Ends: Reconstructing Coercion in Dewey's Democratic Theory', *American Political Science Review*, 111.03 (2017), 522–34; Aldo Visalberghi, 'Remarks on Dewey's Conception of Ends and Means', *The Journal of Philosophy*, 50.25 (1953), 737–53; and Todd M. Lekan, 'Ideals, Practical Reason, and Pessimism: Dewey's Reconstruction of Means and Ends', *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*, 34.1 (1998), 113–47.
[446] Waks (1999), p. 595.
[447] Damico (1978), p. 26.

conception of some fixed end beyond activity at which we should aim.'[448]  An end, understood as a fixed end beyond action is what Dewey calls an end-in-itself.

Dewey calls an aim an 'end-in-view'.  An end-in-view is to be distinguished from an end-in-itself.  We should understand ends-in-view as foreseen consequences which are formulated to provide meaning and to direct further action.  They are not, according to Dewey, ends of action.  'In being ends of *deliberation* they are redirecting pivots *in* action.'[449]  A person formulates an aim by first formulating a wish, 'an emotional reaction against the present state of things and a hope for something different.'[450]  However, this wish exists only in the context of the present state of affairs, 'it is a romantic embellishment of the present… .  Its natural home is not in the future but in the dim past or in some distant and supposedly better part of the present world.'[451]  Only when this wish is calculated through the means for its realisation does it become an aim.

Ends-in-view are therefore intimately connected with the means, and the means too are subject to Deweyan analysis.  According to Dewey, one must understand means, not as self-justifying or as justified beyond doubt, but within the context of the consequences that they produce.  As such, means are subject to revision and while many may be relatively stable, nothing is fixed and static.  The means employed, therefore, must be justified by the end-in-view and re-evaluated as that end-in-view shifts over time.  The relationship between the means and the ends is not fully explained by this unilateral position.  If means and ends are to be understood as truly interconnected then the ends-in-view must be justified by the means employed also.  Therefore, the question of the relationship between means and ends is central to any consistent understanding of Dewey's politico-educational project, and once highlighted is perceivable throughout Dewey's philosophical thought.

Karuna Mantena argues that while Dewey believed that means and ends were deeply interdependent, 'the only way means could be justified was by reference to the end toward which they aim.'[452]  According to Mantena, this was central to Dewey's

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[448] Dewey, 'MW14', p. 154.
[449] *ibid*, p. 156.
[450] *ibid*, p. 161.
[451] *ibid*, p. 161.
[452] Karuna Mantena, 'Gandhi and the Means-Ends Question in Politics', *Occasional Papers of the School of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study*, 46 (2012), 1–25, (p. 13).

pragmatic method in which ends-in-view are adjusted 'in light of objective consequential effects.'[453] The consequence of this view though, according to Mantena, was that Dewey's theory of means-ends was, in some sense, committed to an 'overly objective instrumentalism'.[454] It disassociated the particular agent from the particular act so that as long as the morally relevant act was performed it did not matter who performed that action. By distancing the actor and the acted upon from the act itself Dewey's theory of means-ends thereby misses the subjective relevance. Accordingly, Mantena writes that,

> from the standpoint of enlightened instrumentalism, if the act is taken to
> be correct in that it is properly directed toward achieving its end, there is
> little worry about the ways in which the actor is affected (changed or
> compromised) by the act itself.[455]

However, Mantena dismisses Dewey's conceptualisation of means and ends too quickly and limits her interpretation by only referencing one essay: 'Means and Ends: Their Interdependence'.[456] Mantena does not draw upon any work in which Dewey formulated a positive analysis of means and ends, only this short essay which is a response to Leon Trotsky's, 'Their Morals and Ours'.

Dewey avoids sacrificing agent subjectivity by drawing a distinction between primary and secondary dimensions of experience. This distinction, according to Waks, is at the centre of Dewey's conception of means and ends. Primary experiences are those direct interactions with the world that lead to the formation of beliefs. Waks puts it thus: 'For Dewey, life activities undergirded by adequate habit and intelligence-in-action constitute primary experience.'[457] This is contrasted with secondary dimension of experience which occurs when the beliefs acquired through primary experience are frustrated. It is 'characterized by reflective delay'.[458] A reanalysis occurs though a sharper

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[453] Mantena (2012), p. 13.
[454] *ibid*.
[455] *ibid*, pp. 13-14.
[456] John Dewey, 'Means and Ends: Their Interdependence', in *The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953. Vol. 13: 1938-1939*, ed. by Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991), pp. 349–55.
[457] Waks (1999), p. 598.
[458] Waks (1999), p. 598.

and more attentive focus on the relative causal relations.  In Waks' words, 'Enquiry leads to re-cognition'.[459]

Enquiry, for Dewey is the same as it was for Peirce, and it should be understood as a reconstructive process following the frustration of a previously held belief that leads to a new belief.  As such it is clear that an end-in-view exists as an object of the secondary dimension of experience.  Ends-in-view, according to Waks' understanding, 'are framed in and are intelligble only within unsettled situations.'[460]  The primary dimension of experience is restored once an end-in-view and the means to achieve it have been selected and then acted out.  Therefore the end result must be understood as the 'qualitative whole of primary experience, and not as a *part* broken off to guide the taking of means.'[461]  An end is both the means taken that led to it coming to be and the experience itself.  It is what Waks calls a 'cumulative gestalt'.[462]  This is in contrast to an end-in-view that is merely a calculation or predicted outcome from within secondary experience.

In unpacking the distinction between an end-in-itself and an end-in-view in this way Waks is able to show, not just that the two concepts are distinct, but that they are incomparable. One cannot compare an end-in-view, which are the objects of desire, and end results.  They do not differ in degree or amount, 'they are located in the different dimensions of experience, secondary vs. primary, and therefore 'the object thought of and the result never agree.'[463]

To try and understand an ending in primary experience as comparable with that devised in secondary experience is therefore a category mistake because no matter how many variables are considered and analysed when devising an end-in-view, that idea that exists only in secondary experience can never adequately characterise the result from the means taken.  Waks writes,

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[459] *ibid*.

[460] *ibid*, p. 599.

[461] *ibid*, p. 600.

[462] *ibid*.

[463] Dewey, 'MW14', pp. 172-3, Dewey's emphasis.  Quoted from, Waks (1999), p. 599.

that situation remains fluid and indefinite unless and until, in its qualitative totality, it calls for more focused and discriminating attention. That would entail an *additional* shift to the secondary dimension of experience at the close of the primary phase.[464]

However, in that shift one shows that the end is not a termini of action because it represents a new beginning and it is the new situation and not the end selected earlier to guide action that 'determines the focus of evaluation at that point.'[465]  With this clarification as to the meaning of Dewey's relationship between means and ends it is clear to see the mistake that Mantena has made in her interpretation.  The agent is not divorced from the means taken, nor the end-in-view because these things can only be understood as a part of the conflict of the individual as a part of their secondary experience.  In fact the means and the ends understood this way are defined by the agent and cannot be understood seperately from the agent.  Mantena makes a category mistake in attributing to Dewey a belief in an end that is beyond action and therefore separate from the actor.

Freire's politico-educational project has much in common with Dewey's here, although it is less clearly expressed.  Freire's description of education suggests both the view that there is an end to education and the view that the end of education is fluid.[466] The tension between the individual and society is resolved in Freire's thought through the constant re-problematising of the world.  There are no fixed conclusions but further problems to be addressed.  However, the suggestion that the 'unfinished character' of a person is a motivating force in seeking education by Freire, implies that there may be a finished character that is aimed at.[467]  Freire's understanding of the interconnectedness of means and ends is further undermined by his justification of violence.  As discussed above, violence is a tool of oppression, but Freire permits the use of violence in the revolution when dialogue has proven impossible.[468]

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[464] Waks (1999), p. 601.

[465] *ibid*, pp. 601-602.

[466] As noted in Chapter 4, Elias argues that Freire does perceive an end-in-itself.  See, footnote 377.

[467] Freire (2017), p. 57.

[468] See, Freire (2017), p. 102 and p. 112.  The problem of inconsistency in Freire's application of means and ends is discussed in Chapter 4.

The third point of overlap between Rousseau, Dewey and Freire to note is with regards to the relationship between the individual and society. This has been highlighted in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 through a discussion of the manifestation of the tension between the individual and society in their respective politico-educational projects. In the case of Rousseau, the tension between the individual and society is laid bare in the *First* and *Second Discourse* in which Rousseau argues passionately that the society of 'social man' is inherently corrupted and corrupting. In the works of Dewey, the tension between the individual and society manifests in both the relationship between the interests of the individual and the necessary manifestation of social control, and institutionally in the competing interests between different groups of individuals. Whereas in Freire, the tension between the individual and society forms the foundation of Freire's political endeavour. It is asserted as a matter of fact and the purpose of education is 'humanisation', which is the process of becoming free from the oppressive force of existing societal norms through challenging those norms.[469] In *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* he provides a theoretical and practical methodology for overcoming the corrupting and coercive state of affairs that persists.

In reading Rousseau, Dewey and Freire together I am able to pick up the threads of these three projects and plait them together into a stronger response to the tension. The key aspect of Rousseau's politico-educational project and his response to the tension between the individual and society is that he recognised the impact of a person's domestic education on their freedom; on the construct of society's institutions on that freedom; and the observation that one does not lead to the other, but that both must be addressed together. Therefore, Rousseau lays the foundation for a resolution to the tension by developing a politico-educational response at both the interactional and institutional levels.

Dewey continues with this project and argues in favour of breaking down the barriers between the school and the world, that the school should be treated as a microcosm of the world, and that the people subject to this education should define the world and not the world define them. Central to these arguments is Dewey's conception

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[469] Freire (2017), p. 17.

of the interrelatedness of means and ends which provided the foundation for his pragmatic method to build, develop and recalibrate as learning unfolds.

In doing so, Dewey provided a methodological answer to the limitations of Rousseau's politico-educational response, such as addressing the persistent problem of an authoritative relationship between teacher and student; employing a reflective methodology explicitly and consistently; and providing further analysis into the tension between the individual and the citizen. Building upon pragmatic foundations Dewey was able to develop a form of progressive education that proved implementable, democratic, and a tool for social change.

The difference between Dewey and Rousseau is largely attributable to their differing attitudes regarding the influence of society upon the individual. Dewey embraces this influence while recognising its destructive potential, while Rousseau designs a societal structure and model of education that aims to create the potential for the constructive and positive influence of society because of its otherwise necessarily destructive impact.

Freire continues this project further by perceiving this as a revolutionary process. Unlike Dewey, Freire does not remain optimistic about the levels of social control within people's social environment. However, unlike Rousseau, Freire does not succumb to pessimism with regards to our chances of overcoming that social control. Freire moves beyond the work of Rousseau in the belief that the possibility to overcome the coercion of an oppressive world is very real, and not simply a theoretical possibility. Further to this, Freire differs from both Rousseau and Freire in adding a truly global perspective to the tension between the individual and society. Freire's 'world' is distinct from Rousseau's 'Republic' and Dewey's 'publics'. Rousseau's society is only the immediate local area, the small Republic with limited suffrage. There is no consideration by Rousseau of how this Republic affects those outside of its bounds of governance or even the non-citizens within those boundaries. As discussed above, Dewey's publics are groups to which individuals associate, feel they belong, and actively pursue the interests of.[470] There are a multitude of publics and any one individual will likely be a member of many, with overlapping interests and internal tensions. What is key is that these publics

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[470] See, Chapter 3 for an analysis of Dewey's publics.

need not apply to any particular geographical area. In contrast to these conceptions of the groups to which individuals belong, when Freire speaks of the world he is speaking with a global tongue and it is not simply how the world is perceived that is transformed through problem-posing education but what the world is.

Through his endeavours into educational practice at both the interactional and institutional levels, Freire provided surer foundations for educational practice than Rousseau and Dewey were able to offer while maintaining a commitment to that practice being informed by the community and the individuals who are learning. However, Freire's response to the tension between the individual and society does not adequately resolve the problem of authority that is germane within it. The problem of authority is something that persists within the politico-educational projects of all three protagonists and is something that shall be returned to in later chapters. Despite this, it is clear that Rousseau, Dewey and Freire each engaged directly with the tension between the individual and society and did so with an eye to education as the source of resolution.

The benefits of reading the politico-educational projects of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire so closely together are exciting in virtue of the significant overlaps that I have outlined above. Furthermore, because this thesis aims to reflect the general framework that the politico-educational projects of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire share and contribute to the potentially ongoing narrative that I identify, then a great deal can be learned from doing so. In the next section I intend to justify the theoretical worth of this by detailing the model of the citizen that can be gleaned from such a reading.

## §5.3 The Critical Citizen

In this section I shall present the model of the citizen that I defend as the end-in-view of this thesis as well as the subject of the model of education developed in Part Two. This citizen is the culmination of the first three chapters of this thesis. In Chapter 1, the traditional debate between the liberal and republican conceptions of the citizen was presented which framed the debate as one which sought a resolution to the tension between the individual and society. Then, three further approaches to the citizen were introduced which spoke through and in-between the lines of the liberal and republican dichotomy; the participatory democrat, the communitarian and the cosmopolitan. An

analysis of these approaches sought to show their connections to and divisions from the politico-educational projects of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire. This then led into Chapters 2, 3 and 4, an analysis of the tension between the individual and society within the politico-educational projects of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire respectively. Therefore, Rousseau, Dewey and Freire are sown into the fabric of the analysis of the citizen. An intertwining of ideas then takes place which leads to the following statement.

As we have seen above, the construct of a citizen is many and varied but alongside the question of whether the citizen ought to be understood through a liberal or republican lens, or whether the citizen should be defined according to participatory democratic, communitarian, or cosmopolitan theory, there remains the question of what is a good citizen. In order to fully understand the model of the citizen as I define it it is important to introduce a new typology. According to Westheimer and Kahne, there are three kinds of good citizen. The personally responsible citizen; the participatory citizen; and the social justice-oriented citizen.[471] The personally responsible citizen is one who embodies values such as honesty, integrity and responsibility.[472] They are a person who is actively engaged and responsible toward themselves and their community. They are the type of person to pick up litter, give blood, recycle and volunteer.[473] The participatory citizen is one, 'who actively participate[s] in the civic affairs and the social life of the community at the local, state, or national level.'[474] They possess the skills and virtues necessary to organise and develop collective endeavours. Westheimer and Kahne write, 'the personally responsible citizen would contribute cans of food for the homeless, the participatory citizen might organise the food drive.'[475] As mentioned in Chapter 1 above, because of his focus on participation and democracy as a way of life, Dewey is often associated as a defender of the participatory democrat. However, it is to sell Dewey short

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[471] Joel Westheimer, *What Kind of Citizen? Educating Our Children for the Common Good* (New York: Teachers College Press, 2015), p. 38.

[472] A defence of the personally responsible citizen, and the cultivation of virtues such as these through education, is found in Thomas Lickona, *Educating for Character: How Our Schools Can Teach Respect and Responsibility* (Princeton, N.J.: Bantam Publishers, 1992); and Edward A. Wynne, 'The Great Tradition in Education: Transmitting Moral Values', *Educational Leadership*, 43.4 (1986), 4–9.

[473] Westheimer and Kahne (2004), p. 241.

[474] *ibid*.

[475] *ibid*, p. 242. See Benjamin R. Barber, *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), for a defence of the participatory citizen.

if one does not recognise that his political theory extends far beyond the constraints of the participatory citizen.

The justice-oriented citizen is one who possesses the skills to, 'analyse and understand the interplay of social, economic, and political forces.'[476] This conception is not itself limited to a particular political outlook but open to a variety of ideological positions. The justice-oriented citizen possesses a critical and questioning attitude that seeks a relief to existent injustices. These three manifestations of the citizen are not conceived as mutually exclusive and a conception of the citizen may easily borrow qualities from more than one of the types outlined. However, what Westheimer and Kahne have done is identify three primary conceptions of the good citizen as an aim of education.

The conception of the citizen that follows from the analysis of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire and is defended in this thesis primarily falls into this last category. The interpretation of the politico-educational projects of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire each place the focus on an individual who possesses the motivation and ability to challenge perceived injustices and seek resolution. Rousseau's pedagogy, in both the *Social Contract* and *Émile*, seeks to develop a person who is able to perceive and act in accordance with the General Will. The General Will is an expression of that which is just. Dewey's pedagogy seeks to discover knowledge through communal enquiry. This enquiry is radical because it rejects the notion of an end to that enquiry and as such challenges accepted societal truths. Freire's pedagogy aims to cultivate recognition of one's own oppression within society and the motivation to remake the world through a direct challenge to the societal norms which maintain that oppression. They are each prime examples of the aim to develop the justice-oriented citizen. What qualifies them as "good" is not a set of values handed down to them, and their participation in society is not limited to established systems and pre-existent community structures. The citizen of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire is one who defines justice in their search for it.

The shared feature of the justice-oriented citizen of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire assists in framing the citizen in conversation with the typology, spelt out in detail in Chapter 1, between the different types of citizen. Elements of communitarian and

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[476] Westheimer and Kahne (2004), p. 242.

cosmopolitan thought were identified within the politico-educational projects of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire. However, with the justice-oriented citizen in mind, this conflation of ideas can be shown to be compatible and coherent. The theories of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire are consistent with communitarianism because they acknowledge the inescapable influence that one's community plays in the formation of one's beliefs and values; Rousseau encourages the moral attachment to one's own community through patriotism; and Dewey and Freire argue in favour of beginning enquiry from one's local environment. However, while the communitarian argues for this as a part of their normative framework, Rousseau, Dewey and Freire do so instrumentally. Rousseau differs from Dewey and Freire somewhat here because, in *Émile* Rousseau argues that one's environment should be controlled to avoid the influence of one's local community, and Rousseau differs from Dewey and Freire in that he does not encourage enquiry but the development of reason. Therefore, Rousseau, in *Émile* is the least communitarian. However, in the *Social Contract*, Rousseau argues that the stability of the Republic is dependent upon strong emotional attachment to the Republic. For this reason, Rousseau believes it necessary to encourage patriotic sympathies.[477]

While the communitarian defends the normative value of one's traditions and culturally dependent beliefs, Dewey wishes to challenge those beliefs without resorting to an ideal theory which is divorced from the realities in which we live. This is a position shared by Freire who similarly starts enquiry from our current set of beliefs and norms in order to problematize them. In fact, Freire goes further than Dewey in that while Dewey holds the current state of affairs in a largely positive light, Freire, like Rousseau, perceives the current state of affairs as necessarily oppressive.[478] Paula Allman writes, 'Freire thinks dehumanisation is widespread. It is not just the poor who are alienated from decision-making and critical thinking but the vast majority of people living in the world regardless of their form of government.'[479]

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[477] See, Chapter 1, p. 44, footnote 129 and pp. 48-49.
[478] Freire describes oppression and 'dehumanisation' as historical facts that must be struggled against, Freire (2017), p.18.
[479] Paula Allman, 'Paulo Freire's Contributions to Radical Adult Education', *Studies in the Education of Adults*, 26.2 (1994), 144–61, (p.148).

It is in virtue of the communitarian elements of their politico-educational projects being instrumental that cosmopolitan views held alongside them do not result in an incoherent or inconsistent theory.  Rousseau, Dewey and Freire develop non-idealistic political theories and the aspects of their political thought which are communitarian are descriptive.  Rousseau, Dewey and Freire take the world as it is in order to change it.  A large consideration therefore is existing social attachments which cannot be ignored.  Instead they are employed as a part of the process toward freedom.  This is evidenced most clearly in Rousseau in the *Geneva Manuscript* when he writes, '[w]e conceive of the general society on the basis of our particular societies; the establishment of small Republics makes us think about the large one, and we do not really begin to become men until after we have been Citizens.'[480]  It is evident in Dewey with the employment of social control and training as the starting blocks of further enquiry.  Dewey writes,

> it is the office of the school environment to balance the various
> elements in the social environment and to see to it that each
> individual gets an opportunity to escape from the limitations of the
> social group in which he was born, and to come into contact with a
> broader environment.[481]

The very process of Freire's pedagogy confirms this, as the revolutionary educators re-present the world of the oppressed back to them as problems to be discussed.  The last stage of Freirean pedagogy is 're-presentation'.[482]  Freire writes,

> [w]ith all the didactic material prepared, to which should be added
> small introductory manuals, the team of educators is ready to re-
> present to the people their own thematics, in systematised and
> amplified form.  The thematics which have come from the people
> return to them—not as contents to be deposited, but as problems to
> be solved.[483]

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[480] 'Geneva Manuscript', *OC III*, 287; *CWR Vol. 4*, p. 81.
[481] Dewey, 'MW9', p. 25.
[482] See footnote 135 for a description of Freire's four stages of problem-posing education.
[483] Freire (2017), p. 96.

The politico-educational projects of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire employ elements of a communitarian framework which develop cosmopolitan consequences. In other words, the politico-educational projects of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire all start, not from some abstract and theoretical position, but from where we are, as products of our environment, warts and all. This is what I refer to as their descriptive communitarian framework. From this position and through an education which develops a critical and questioning mind, the world to which one is attached is problematized and challenged. This is the normative cosmopolitan project because through enquiry the barriers established without question are slowly erased and the spheres of association are brought closer together.

Building upon these foundations Rousseau, Dewey and Freire, together add key aspects of the model of the citizen defended here. Taken together we learn that the realisation or formation of the citizen is not something that ends at a certain point in one's life but a project that continues over the course of many generations as we learn and develop together. It is a concept of life-long learning and an inter-generational project that continues to develop with the flux of time and morality. In the most basic sense, from Rousseau we learn the importance of a dual project, one which engages at the interactional and institutional level, where society is developed for the citizen as the citizen develops for society; from Dewey we learn the importance of the interconnectedness of means and ends as the foundation of method; and from Freire we learn the value in problematizing and challenging existing ways of life through problem-posing education.

Therefore, the citizen of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire is descriptively communitarian, normatively cosmopolitan, an active participant in one's society, and a possessor of rights and of responsibilities. Additionally, the citizen of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire must be addressed in two ways, institutionally and interactionally; they must develop and exist within an environment which is sensitive to the interconnectedness of means and ends; and they must be subject to the lifelong pursuit of education through a problem-posing model.

The concept of the citizen defended and presented as the subject of civic education is one who holds the value of equal moral worth; is the product of an education which is

dialogical; and a member of a society which is constructed in accordance with these two principles and therefore educative in-itself. The citizen so conceived is an ongoing process without fixed end but the end-in-view of educative growth and humanisation. One can be a citizen in their own time and place but as a result of the educative process are a citizen *only* at that time and place. They will not meet the criteria of 'citizen' as the conditions of one's social environment change unless they too change. We, however, in the present context of Western values and hegemony, I feel reasonably confident in asserting, do not fulfil the criteria laid out above. We are, at best, partial citizens, oppressed and oppressors alike.

# Part II

# The Means of Realisation

**Chapter 6**

**Citizenship Education and the Problem of Authority**

**§6.0  Summary**

In the previous chapter a model of the Critical Citizen was advanced, one which follows from the analysis of the citizen and from the analysis of the tension between the individual and society in the politico-educational projects of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire. However, a defence of a particular model of the desirable citizen represents only half of the challenge.  There must also be a model of education which is consonant with this aim. In order to provide an answer to the tension between the individual and society it is necessary to also present a method for promoting the development of persons and society to reflect the qualities of the citizen identified.  This being said, the tension between the individual and society persists in citizenship education, not only in the concept of the citizen seen as an aim of education but in the practice of education itself. It is this tension as it manifests within educational practice that I shall turn my attention to in the second half of this thesis.  I will claim that the tension between the individual and society is a problem of authority.  I shall illustrate how the problem of authority manifests within the educational practice of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire, thereby showing a further level to the tension between the individual and society within their respective politico-educational projects.

This analysis leads me to identify three different aspects of the concept of authority which are under discussion; the definition of authority, the source of authority, and the ontology of authority.  With these three aspects of authority in mind a better understanding of the manifestation of the problem of authority in the politico-educational projects of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire can be given.  In the following section I shall introduce citizenship education in order to illustrate how the problem of authority is a manifestation of tension between the individual and society, and how this arises specifically in an educational environment.  I shall then explicate the concept of authority in more detail by drawing on prominent analyses in political philosophy.  This will lead me to transpose this discussion into the educational context and clarify how authority is

treated and understood in educational theory. I shall conclude the chapter by identifying the three aspects of authority as they have manifested in the preceding discussion.

## §6.1 History and Context of Citizenship Education

The claim that a person should receive an education which includes within it some model or focus upon citizenship is a widely held belief.[484] However, as Westheimer notes, 'when educators wrestle with the details of what will actually be taught about civic values, civic participation, peace and war, nationhood and citizenship, global communities and global economies, polite conversation gives way to heated exchanges.'[485] Furthermore, even if the content of citizenship education is resolved the question of how a person ought to be taught adds greater depths of disagreement. It should come as no surprise therefore, to discover that citizenship or civic education has existed for as long as the concept of the citizen itself.[486]

As noted in Chapter 1, the citizen of ancient Greece and of Rome differed in form. The history of citizenship education has been carefully traced by Derek Heater, who

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[484] Teaching citizenship in compulsory education is very common. Bernard Crick writes, 'England (still not Scotland, Wales, or Northern Ireland) was the last country in Europe (indeed in the USA and the old Commonwealth too) not to have Citizenship as a subject in a national curriculum.' Bernard Crick, 'Education for Citizenship: The Citizenship Order', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 55.3 (2002), 488–504 (p. 488). Helen Haste writes, 'Britain is the only "advanced" country that has not had (until recently) a school citizenship curriculum.' Helen Haste, 'Constructing the Citizen', *Political Psychology*, 25.3 (2004), 413–39 (p. 427).

[485] Westheimer (2015), p. 35.

[486] Civic education suggests a, learning about the machinations of democracy and government, whereas citizenship education seems to include this plus the broader conception of 'becoming a citizen'. However, this is by no means clear as the meaning of citizenship or civic education appears to shift with the political winds. While any one writer may draw a distinction between civic and citizenship education, within the literature the terms civic education and citizenship education are used interchangeably. Where some refer to civic education as the subject of their investigation, (*Civic Education across Countries: Twenty-Four National Case Studies from the IEA Civic Education Project*, ed. by Judith Torney-Purta, John Schwille, and Jo-Ann Amadeo (Delft: Eburon Publ, 1999); *Civic Education in the Asia-Pacific Region: Case Studies across Six Societies*, ed. by John J. Cogan, Paul Morris, and Murray Print, Reference Books in International Education (New York: RoutledgeFalmer, 2002); and Richard G. Niemi and Jane Junn, *Civic Education: What Makes Students Learn.* (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2005)) others refer to citizenship education or education for citizenship, (*Citizenship Education around the World: Local Contexts and Global Possibilities*, ed. by John E. Petrovic and Aaron M. Kuntz, Routledge Research in International and Comparative Education (New York: Routledge, 2014); Derek Benjamin Heater, *A History of Education for Citizenship* (London; New York: Routledge Falmer, 2004b); and Bernard Crick, 'The Presuppositions of Citizenship Education', *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 33.3 (1999), 337–52). As such, I shall treat the terms as synonymous.

writes, '[t]he essence of Greek citizenship was participation; the essence of Roman citizenship was the ownership of legal rights.'[487]  However, the Spartans, the Sophists, Plato and Aristotle all shared the view that education should cultivate *aretê* which can be understood loosely as 'excellence' or 'virtuous', and the virtues that are cultivated should lead the person to desire the good of the state above and beyond their own private interests.  For example the ancient Greeks believed that the well-being of society should be sought by its citizens, and it is through prioritising the interests of society that the stability of that society is assured.  Aristotle expresses this view clearly when he writes,

> … of all the safeguards that we hear spoken of as helping to maintain constitutional stability, the most important, but today universally neglected, is education for the way of living that belongs to the constitution in each case. It is useless to have the most beneficial laws, fully agreed upon by all who are members of the constitution, if they are not going to be trained and have their habits formed in the spirit of that constitution – in a democratic spirit, that is, if the laws are democratic, but oligarchically if they are oligarchic; for as one individual may be morally incapable, so may a whole state.[488]

The Roman citizen and citizenship education was heavily influenced by its Hellenic origins and as such, like the Greek education, trained its citizens to assume a certain role and set of qualities of virtues to promote and protect the state.  The ancient Greek and Roman models of citizenship education came apart as the Roman Republic grew leading to the meaning of the citizen to shift.  Over time the citizen came to be primarily a

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[487] Heater (2004b), p. 2.  However, David Burchell, 'Ancient Citizenship and Its Inheritors', in *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*, ed. by Engin F. Isin and Bryan S. Turner (London; Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE, 2002), pp. 89–104; Anthony Corbeill, 'Education in the Roman Republic: Creating Traditions', in *Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity*, ed. by Yun Lee Too (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2001), pp. 261–89; Josiah Ober, 'The Debate Over Civic Education in Classical Athens', in *Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity*, ed. by Yun Lee Too (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2001), pp. 175–209; Ryan Balot, 'Revisiting the Classical Ideal of Citizenship', in *The Oxford Handbook of Citizenship*, ed. by Ayelet Shachar and others, Oxford Handbooks (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 15–35; and J. G. A. Pocock, 'Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times', in *Theorizing Citizenship*, ed. by Ronald Beiner, SUNY Series in Political Theory (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), pp. 29–52, offer helpful analysis of education during classical times.
[488] Aristotle (1981), p. 331. (1310a12)

forensic term which protected the citizen through legally defined rights.  Therefore, civic education in the later Roman empire was focussed on the learning and interpretation of the law.  One aspect of Roman civic education we learn from Cicero, where he refers to a requirement that all children learn the Twelve Tables which codified the criminal, civil and public law of Rome and were centuries old by the time of Cicero.[489]  Therefore, the nature of the education considered necessary for citizenship differed.

A further difference between the citizenship education of ancient Greece and Rome that Heater identifies is that, 'Rome retained more firmly, though not entirely, the conviction that education was essentially a familial responsibility.'[490]  This is in contrast to Plato in particular who argued that education be administered by the state and that this education be compulsory.[491]  Anthony Corbeill notes that the lack of state supported education, 'accounts for the absence of public libraries until 38 BC, with the result that even men of learning such as Cicero needed to rely on friends and a cadre of personal copyists for texts'.[492]

The influence of the classical world on citizenship education extended over several centuries and in some ways continued to influence citizenship education into the twentieth century.[493]  Heater writes,

> [t]hrough the study of classical literature and Greek and Roman history, youths have learned about ideas concerning citizenship and the various styles in which the Spartans, Athenians and Romans practised that role. The ancient art of rhetoric, with its forensic and political potential, persisted in school curricula, and some educational theorists and politicians have argued that the ancient virtue of civic consciousness

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[489] Marcus Tullius Cicero, James E. G. Zetzel, and Marcus Tullius Cicero, 'On the Laws', in *On the Commonwealth: And, On the Laws*, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 105–75 (p. 111).
[490] Heater (2004b), p. 18.
[491] Plato (2004).  For an account of Roman education and its Hellenistic roots see, Anthony Corbeill (2001).
[492] Corbeill (2001), p. 262.
[493] Although David Burchell notes that what persisted was less the conception of the citizen held by the ancient Greeks and Romans but the interpretation of that citizen by writers of the enlightenment era. Burchell (2002).

should be restored by the broadest educational means for the benefit of modern states.[494]

In this introduction to the roots of citizenship education the foundation of both the republican and liberal conceptions of the citizen is evident. On the one hand there is the citizen as a participant and practitioner of governance, and on the other hand there is the citizen of protected legal rights. Furthermore, there is the question of the balance between the rights and responsibilities of the citizen, and there is the question of the scope of the state and whether it can interfere in the private lives of its citizens.

One further thing that this brief introduction illustrates, and central to the topic of this thesis, is that the tension between the individual and society persists in citizenship education. This is evident because the differences between Ancient Greek and Roman citizenship education highlighted here are, at root, manifestations of the tension between the interests of the individual and the interests of the society or the state of which the individual is a member. At one extreme stands the Spartan citizen, living entirely for the state and educated to endure suffering and to assume the virtues of valour and fortitude so that they willingly sacrifice all private desires for the greater good. Heater writes, '[t]he training of Spartan youths for citizenship was the most extraordinarily determined undertaking by a state in the entire history of citizenship education to shape its citizenry to its perceived needs.'[495] At the other end of the spectrum the citizen of the later Roman empire who, separated from the mother land, possessed the title of citizen but not the duties of governance.

It is from the Roman citizen as the possessor of rights that the classical liberal citizen of Constant, de Tocqueville, Mandeville, Locke, and Mill grew. What the classical liberal added was a limitation to the scope of government to the public realm, thereby protecting the private sphere from interference by the state.[496] This tension between the

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[494] Heater (2004b), p. 25.

[495] *ibid*, p. 4.

[496] Heater offers accounts of the liberal citizen throughout his works. See, Derek Benjamin Heater, *What Is Citizenship?* (Malden, Mass: Polity Press, 1999); Heater (2004a); and Heater (2004b). Additionally accounts of the liberal citizen have been offered by Peter H. Schuck, 'Liberal Citizenship', in *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*, ed. by Engin F. Isin and Bryan S. Turner (London; Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE, 2002), pp. 131–44; and Iseult Honohan, 'Liberal and Republican Conceptions of Citizenship', in *The Oxford Handbook of*

individual and society is the subject of discussion in the chapters above.  However, in education, the tension manifests again but in a different manner and is illustrated by Corbeill's comment that, 'education in Roman society—as perhaps in every society—serves not to democratise the population, but to replicate or re-produce the already existing social system.'[497]  Therefore, the interests of the state are not consonant with the interests of those who comprise the state which do not necessarily align with the existing social norms.

I shall argue that even in egalitarian minded and social justice-oriented models of education the tension between the individual and society persists in the concept of authority.  In order to make clear the connection between the tension and authority I shall present an overview of the concept of authority in the political and educational context.  I shall then, in the following chapter, illustrate how the problem of authority manifests in the educational projects of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire.  I contend that a problem of authority arises in the disconnect between the freedom of a student, the aims of education, and the role of the teacher as mediator between the student and the curriculum.

## §6.2  The Concept of Political Authority

In this section I shall offer an analysis of several popular conceptions of authority in order to highlight the tensions within that concept.  From the wealth of literature on the concept of authority I isolate Hannah Arendt, Carl J. Friedrich, and Max Weber.  These three accounts of authority stand out because they have all been influential in the field of education despite coming from different disciplines; Arendt the philosopher, Friedrich the political scientist, and Weber the sociologist.  These accounts of authority transcend the context in which they were originally written and continue to challenge how we understand authority today.  In contrast to these investigations into a defence of authority and its practice in society are those theorists that challenge authority, the most fervent of which come from anarchist theorists.  I shall, therefore, offer a brief exposition

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*Citizenship*, ed. by Ayelet Shachar and others, Oxford Handbooks (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 83–106.
[497] Corbeill (2001), p. 262.

of the anarchist challenge and explanation of how the classical anarchist answered that challenge.  This will lead into the next section which will transpose this debate into the educational context.

I shall begin this exposition of authority with Hannah Arendt's historical account of the origins and meaning of authority because it clearly illustrates two tensions that dominate discussions of authority in both political and educational settings: the tension between authority and reason, and the tension between authority and freedom.

Arendt traces the history of the concept of authority, 'which has been dominant in our history' and seeks to define it.[498]  She identifies the origins of authority within the ancient Greek philosophies of Plato and Aristotle and the foundations of Rome. Throughout this narrative Arendt distinguishes authority from the, often confused, concepts of power and violence, and persuasion and reason.  She does this to show that legitimate authority has been lost in failing to recognise these distinctions.  According to Arendt, authority has been lost due to an equivocation of violence and authority, which in turn, is a result of a tendency to relate everything to a functional context.  Therefore, authority becomes everything which makes people obey.  This obviously includes violence.  However, according to Arendt these two concepts are distinct.[499]  Arendt is responding to people like Charles W. Hendel who maintain that authority is consistent with and contains within it elements of power and force.  He writes,

> [p]ower is, … , an essential element of authority, and authority is a sustaining power for the whole community.  It asserts the claim of the community upon the lives and conduct of those who are party of it, and asserts it on occasion by applying it with force… .  Often, too, the civil laws need more power behind them than they actually have, and governments, may be weak; yet in none of these cases is authority necessarily lacking.[500]

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[498] Hannah Arendt, 'What Is Authority?', in *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought* (New York: Penguin Books, 1993a), pp. 91–141 (p. 93).
[499] *ibid*, p. 91.
[500] Charles W Hendel, 'An Exploration of the Nature of Authority', in *Authority*, ed. by Carl J. Friedrich, NOMOS, I (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 3–27 (p. 13).

Arendt defines authority as the, 'unquestioning recognition by those who are asked to obey; neither coercion nor persuasion is needed.'[501]  As will become clear below, Arendt defines authority in the same terms as Rousseau.[502]  Arendt argues that, when an authority issues a command of a subject they are giving a reason for following that command, namely, that it has been issued by a recognised authority.  This is not to be understood as an additional reason for following a command.  The command does not stack onto other reasons which supports the command.  This is because, for Arendt, authority does not require reasons.  Authority is distinct from persuasion and is identifiable as the following of a command without argument or force.

Furthermore, it is not the case that authority may strategically employ persuasion, or coercive force in order to reassert authority.  Arendt writes,

> authority precludes the use of external means of coercion; where force
> is used, authority itself has failed.  Authority, on the other hand, is
> incompatible with persuasion, which presupposes equality and works
> through a process of argumentation.  Where arguments are used,
> authority is left in abeyance.[503]

According to the definition of authority given by Arendt, a person who employs persuasion or force, whether they possessed authority or not, would be expressing a different quality in doing so.  For example, an expression of coercive force is one of violence not authority, and while a violent command is effective in accomplishing compliance, that compliance is not related to authority.  Arendt writes, 'Out of the barrel of a gun grows the most effective command, resulting in the most instant and perfect obedience. What never can grow out of it is power.'[504]  Violence and authority are distinct from one another, as is persuasion.

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[501] Hannah Arendt, *On Violence* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1970), p. 45.
[502] Arendt's definition of authority mirrors that of Rousseau's therefore I shall return to it in the following chapter.
[503] Arendt (1993a), p. 93.
[504] Arendt (1970), p. 53.

Carl J. Friedrich's conception of authority, like Arendt's, traces the origins of authority and perceives tradition at its foundation.  According to Friedrich, at its etymological root, authority is derived from *augere*, to augment.  He writes, '*Auctoritas* thus supplements a mere act of the will by adding reasons to it.'[505]  In Roman times authority was the result of deliberation by the elders of society, and an expression of authority acted as, according to Friedrich, 'more than advice, yet less than a command.'[506]

Friedrich shares Arendt's definition of authority and responds to the tension between reason and authority, a tension which he traces back to the Jacobins during the French revolution.[507]  Friedrich too rejects any definition of authority which equates it with power.  Jeremy F. Plant writes on the similarity between Arendt and Friedrich that, '[l]ike Friedrich, Arendt bases her thoughts on authority with reference to the difference between power and authority and the need to see it as related to communications'.[508]  However, unlike Arendt, Friedrich does not place authority in the person but in their ability to communicate.  Friedrich writes,

> when I speak of authority, I wish to say that the communications of a person possessing it exhibit a very particular kind of relationship to reason and reasoning.  Such communication, whether opinions or commands, are not demonstrated through rational discourse, but they possess the *potentiality of reasoned deliberation* – they are "worthy of acceptance."[509]

In accordance with this view, Friedrich claims that in any utterance of authority that there are reasons that support that utterance but these reasons are not expressed in the communication of the utterance, they exist in potentiality.  These reasons can, in theory,

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[505] Carl J. Friedrich, 'Authority, Reason, and Discretion', in *Authority*, ed. by Carl J. Friedrich, Nomos, I (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 28–48 (p. 30).
[506] *ibid*.
[507] *ibid*, pp. 28–29.
[508] Jeremy F. Plant, 'Carl J. Friedrich on Responsibility and Authority', *Public Administration Review*, 71.3 (2011), 471–82 (p. 477).
[509] Friedrich (1958), p. 35.

be called forth and made explicit because the authority of a person rests in their 'capacity to issue authoritative communications.'[510]  Furthermore, these communications hold weight only when they are, 'based upon reasoning that has meaning not only to X, but also to A, B, and C, in the sense of being related to knowledge which they all possess, or to opinions, beliefs, and values which they all share.'[511]  This distinction aims to avoid importing persuasion into a working definition of authority, and it aims to explain how neither the superordinate or subordinate in an authority relation suspends reason as they do their judgement.  Clarke E. Cochran, in his commentary on Friedrich's conception of authority, argues that Friedrich's conception of authority suggests a dependence upon tradition as well as through communication because, 'the shared values of a community suggests authority's connection with tradition, since tradition is an important carrier of value.  Thus, reasoning from tradition is a key method of authority.'[512]  Therefore, no reasons are given and no persuasion is employed in the issuing of a command or other expression of authority.  A speaker who expresses authority through their communication could give reasons, there are reasons that underpin their effective command.  However, these reasons remain unspoken.  This is what Friedrich means by the possession of the *potentiality of reasoned deliberation*.[513]  It is for this reason that Friedrich perceives authority as a property of a person's communication and not of the person themselves.

A person who possesses authority in their communication does so in part because of their shared values with the people who are subject to their authoritative communications.  However, this is not enough on its own to establish the source of a person's authority.  They also must possess the capacity for reasoned deliberation.  Without this capacity there can be no genuine authority.[514]

The difference between Arendt and Friedrich is in the role of reasons.  For Arendt the only reason necessary is because the command is issued by a recognised authority, but this is not sufficient according to Friedrich, according to whom it is necessary that there be reasons that support that command although they need not be spoken.  It is

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[510] Friedrich (1958), p. 36.

[511] *ibid*.

[512] Clarke E. Cochran, 'Authority and Community: The Contributions of Carl Friedrich, Yves R. Simon, and Michael Polanyi', *American Political Science Review*, 71.02 (1977), 546–58 (p. 549).

[513] Friedrich (1958), p. 37.

[514] *ibid*.

Arendt's view that with the breakdown of tradition and religion as the source of authority that authority itself has been all but lost. What is spoken of as authority is in fact power or coercion.[515] Whereas, Friedrich offers a positive argument based around his notion of reasoned elaboration. Plant identifies two differences in outlook between Arendt and Friedrich that leads to their different conclusion on the matter of authority. Firstly, Arendt does not build reason or scientific method into her model of authority which for Friedrich forms the foundation of, 'noncoercive authority relations between those with knowledge and those who appreciate the need to defer to those with greater knowledge and expertise.'[516] Secondly, Plant observes that Friedrich, from his background in professional administration, developed a much more practical model of authority, whereas Arendt's view has a touch of futility. In Plant's words, 'Friedrich never stressed the tragic element on human existence that is so evident in the work of Arendt.'[517]

Max Weber employs a similar understanding of authority to Arendt and Friedrich in his sociological theory. Weber identifies three different types of legitimate authority. These types represent the source of a person or institution's authority. There is legal-rational authority, which is found in the belief that commands and regulations expressed by the law and by those who embody the law are expressed by right. It is explained by a belief in the legitimacy and validity of the rule of law. In legal-rational authority the locus of authority is in a set of rules or principles formalised and codified. Therefore, legal-rational authority demands that one follow the dictates of the person who fills the role which bears authority granted by those principles. Peter M. Blau writes in his analysis of Weber's theory of authority, 'the assumption is that a body of legal rules has been deliberately established to further the rational pursuit of collective goals.'[518] Then there is traditional authority, which is supported by a person's belief, 'in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them'.[519] Traditional authority is that which is vested in a person or institution in virtue of a faith in

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[515] See, Arendt (1993a); and Hannah Arendt, 'Authority in the Twentieth Century', *The Review of Politics*, 18.4 (1956), 403–17.
[516] Plant (2011), p. 477.
[517] *ibid*, p. 478.
[518] Peter M. Blau, 'Critical Remarks on Weber's Theory of Authority', *American Political Science Review*, 57.02 (1963), 305–16 (p. 308).
[519] Weber (1978), p. 215.

the long-standing traditions that established and support those institutions and the people expressing authority from their position within that institution.[520]  Traditional authority transcends any one particular person or role, it is attached to the belief in the legitimacy of that authority expressed over time.  Blau encapsulates the notion of traditional authority in the statement, 'The King is dead – long live the King.'[521]  Lastly there is charismatic authority, which resides in a person due to their particular, 'sanctity, heroism or exemplary character', and this is referred to as charismatic authority.[522]  In this instance the person would hold authority whether they held a position of power established through an institution of not.  Blau notes that charismatic authority, 'usually acts as a revolutionary force'.[523]  According to Weber, all three of these sources of authority can be legitimate.

Hannah Arendt expresses a similar view to Weber in what constitutes the legitimate source of authority.  She writes that authority,

> can be vested in persons – there is such a thing as personal authority, as, for instance, in the relation between parent and child, between teacher and pupil – or it can be vested in offices, as, for instance, in the Roman senate (*auctoritas in senatu*) or in the hierarchical offices of the Church (a priest can grant valid absolution even though he is drunk).'[524]

Therefore, in Arendt's conception there is a particular focus on tradition as the source of authority.  It is the loss of our attachment to certain traditions that results in her view that authority has been lost, replaced by power, violence, and persuasion masquerading under its name.  However, there is, in the appeal to the authority held by offices, a commitment to the legitimacy of legal-rational authority also.

While the accounts of authority offered by Arendt, Friedrich and Weber differ in important respects they share many features, such as the belief in tradition as a justifiable source of authority and the view that authority is a property of a person or

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[520] Weber (1978), p. 215.
[521] Blau (1963), p. 308.
[522] Weber (1978), p. 215.
[523] Blau (1963), p. 308.
[524] Arendt (1970), p. 45.

office that is expressed unilaterally from superordinate to subordinate. However, the most important feature that they share is that they each offer a defence of authority and its place in society. There are, of course, those who challenge authority and the most fervent challengers are often attached to the anarchist tradition.

R. P. Wolff acts as the lightning rod of the anarchist critique of authority.[525] In his *In Defense of Anarchism* Wolff argues that autonomy and authority are diametrically opposed. He draws the sharpest separation possible between authority and autonomy and argues that they are incompatible. According to Wolff, '[a]uthority is the right to command, and correlatively, the right to be obeyed.'[526] Wolff defines autonomy in opposition to authority. He writes that autonomy is, 'a combination of freedom and responsibility; it is a submission to laws which one has made for oneself.'[527] As such, one is not subject to any person's will besides their own. Wolff goes on to argue that any instance of authority, if heeded, is an unjustifiable constraint on a person's freedom and therefore is incompatible with autonomy, and that, 'philosophical anarchism would seem to be the only reasonable political belief for an enlightened man [*sic*]'.[528]

In commenting on Wolff's framing of the tension between authority and autonomy David Miller writes,

> [a]ccording to Wolff it shows that the idea of a *de jure* or legitimate
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> authority is a contradiction in terms. There are no circumstances in

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[525] Joseph Raz writes in the introduction to his edited collection of essays on the justification of authority, that, '[n]o one has brought out the problematic aspect of authority better than Robert Paul Wolff in his *In Defense of Anarchism*.' *Authority*, ed. by Joseph Raz, (Oxford, U.K: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p.3.

[526] Robert Paul Wolff, *In Defense of Anarchism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), p. 4. The obligations created by the commands of authority are problematic. I do not employ Raz's definition of authority in this analysis and instead prefer that offered by Arendt above. This is because the language of rights and obligation is too strong and suggests that one is not free to do otherwise and therefore, through definition, freedom and authority are incompatible. It denies the possibility of freedom because to obey one does not give weight to one's own reasons, but to disobey – or even more troubling in instances of coinciding reasons – one's freedom is undermined because to do so is to flout a right that exists within the set of rights that protect one's autonomy. For more on the debate of obligations in the context of authority see, Joseph Raz, 'Promises and Obligations', in *Law, Morality, and Society: Essays in Honour of H. L. A. Hart*, ed. by P. M. S. Hacker and Joseph Raz (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), pp. 210–28; Stephen Darwall, 'Authority and Reasons: Exclusionary and Second-Personal', *Ethics*, 120.2 (2010), 257–78; Scott Hershovitz, 'The Role of Authority', *Philosophers' Imprint*, 11.7 (2011), 1–19; and Scott Hershovitz, 'The Authority of Law', in *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law* ed. by Andrei Marmor (London; New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 65–75.

[527] Wolff (1998), p. 14.

[528] *ibid*, p. 19.

which I should recognise an obligation to obey somebody simply
because he [*sic*] has commanded it, because in doing so I would be
breaching my primary obligation to be autonomous.[529]

However, this philosophical anarchism of Wolff's takes a hard line which most anarchists would not draw.  Authority persists in anarchist theory.  It is true that anarchists reject authority and phrase this rejection in strong terms.  The anarchist theorist and biographer George Woodcock notes that Sébastian Faure wrote, '[w]hoever denies authority and fights against it is an anarchist,'[530] and Peter H. Marshall quotes similarly anti-authoritarian statements by the anarchist theorists Mikhail Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin, Errico Malatesta, and Colin Ward.[531]  However, Marshall cautions against the simplicity of these statements.  He writes,

[a]uthority is more fundamental and exists prior to the foundation of the
State.  In addition, it might be misleading to define anarchy as an
absence of authority for strictly speaking it would appear that a society
without some form of authority is virtually inconceivable.'[532]

Similarly, Judith Suissa, in her analysis of authority in anarchist theory, argues that '[i]t is … not logically inconceivable that a political system calling itself a state could be compatible with anarchist principles.'[533]  This is because the objections to the state that the anarchist has are directed to a particular construct of that state and not the state in and of itself.  Therefore, Suissa argues that the objection to the state by the anarchist is instrumental rather than intrinsic.

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[529] David Miller, *Anarchism*, Modern Ideologies (London: J.M. Dent, 1984), pp. 26–27.

[530] George Woodcock, *Anarchism: A HIstory of Libertarian Ideas and Movements* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England; Ringwood, Victoria, Australia: Penguin Books, 1963), p. 7.

[531] Marshall writes, 'Bakunin, who called himself an "anti-authoritarian", advocated the "*absolute rejection of all authority*" while Kropotkin maintained that anarchism works "to destroy authority in all its aspects".' Malatesta also defined anarchy as "*society organised without authority*", meaning by authority "the power to *impose* one's will".  More recently, Colin Ward has called an anarchist society "a society which organises itself without authority".' Peter H. Marshall, *Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism* (London: Fontana Press, 1993), p. 42.

[532] Marshall (1993), p. 42.

[533] Judith Suissa, *Anarchism and Education: A Philosophical Perspective* (Oackland: PM Press, 2011), p. 56.

Furthermore, even if the anarchist was committed to the absolute rejection of the state it does not necessarily follow that the anarchist is committed to the absolute rejection of authority. Suissa references Richard T. De George, 'who argues that most anarchist theorists were well aware of the fact that some kind of authority is necessary for social organisation to function.'[534] De George reformulates the rejection of authority by the anarchist as the rejection of a top-down model of authority, where authority is imposed upon the individual from above. De George refers to this as authoritarianism. He writes, '[a]uthoritarianism starts at the top and directs those below for the benefit of those above.'[535] Legitimate authority for the anarchist, De George explains, is that which originates from the people themselves and is directed across society. He continues,

> [i]f authority is to be compatible with anarchism it must start from below, be constantly responsive to its source, and be used for the benefit of the people subject to it. The root problem is to provide organisation without authoritarianism.[536]

Examples of this according to De George are epistemic authority and authority of competence. In this way legitimate authority is expressed as a hypothetical imperative. For these reasons, it is clear that even the radical rejection of authority is often a qualified rejection.

It is unclear whether the anarchist theorist is successful in offering an account of authority which does not undermine their commitment to anarchism. However, what is clear is that whether authority is perceived as a threat to freedom, as in the case of the anarchist and those sympathetic with the anarchist suspicion of authority, or whether it is perceived as the root of stable government as is argued by Arendt, Friedrich and Weber it is recognised that there is a tension between authority and freedom, and a tension between authority and reason. The concept of authority that is being developed on both

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[534] Suissa (2011), p. 58.
[535] Richard T. De George, 'Anarchism and Authority', in *Anarchism*, ed. by J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, Nomos, XIX (New York: New York University Press, 1978), pp. 91–110 (p. 98).
[536] *ibid*.

sides of the equation is representative of a commitment to find a coherent expression of authority with freedom and reason.

According to Arendt, authority, in a meaningful sense, and not in its equivocation with power, persuasion, or violence, has disappeared.[537] The 'most significant symptom' of the disappearance of authority from the modern world is that it is now challenged in child-rearing and education, 'where authority in the widest sense has always been accepted as a natural necessity'.[538] Arendt, identifies progressive education as the source of the anti-authoritarian movement in education, which she describes as, 'an astounding hodgepodge of sense and nonsense'.[539] Arendt raises this example to illustrate the depths of the crisis of authority. However, educators both inside and outside of the progressive education movement addressed the issue of authority to discover its legitimate foundations, much like Arendt and Weber have done in the political arena.[540] In fact as Christopher Winch notes,

> Authority is relevant to education not only through questions of
> teaching and learning (as part of a general discussion of the concept of
> authority) but also in politics because the provision of education as a
> public or semipublic good is not just a social but also a political matter;
> that is, it is regulated or organized by the state and set within a
> framework of law.[541]

Arendt is too quick to rule out the questioning of authority in education because of her perception of progressive education as something that seeks to undermine legitimate authority relations. In the following section I shall show that the discussion here in the political arena is mirrored in the discussion taking place in the educational arena.

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[537] Arendt (1993a), p.91.

[538] *ibid*, p. 92.

[539] Hannah Arendt, 'The Crisis in Education', in *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought* (New York: Penguin Books, 1993b), pp. 173–96 (p. 178).

[540] See also, Arendt (1956).

[541] Christopher Winch, 'Authority in Education', in *Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics. Vol. 1: A - D*, ed. by Ruth F. Chadwick (San Diego: Academic Press, 1998), pp. 222–28 (p. 222).

## §6.3 Political Authority in Education

I shall now shift the discussion from the political to the educational context and mirror the structure of this section with that of the previous one.  Therefore, I shall first provide a brief analysis of those who wish to defend authority and explain its legitimate manifestation in the relationships between people of authority and those subject to that authority.  Beginning with R. S. Peters and Paul Nash who seek to employ Weberian analysis of authority into the classroom in order to justify the authority of the teacher and find a balance with the freedom of the child.  I shall then introduce the radical and progressive educational theories of A. S. Neill and the free school movement which sought to challenge the role of authority in education.  This, together with the analysis of authority in the political context in the previous section will lead into my categorisation of authority as containing three aspects that need to be distinguished.

It is the case that the question of authority and its tension with freedom continues in the educational context, and the political theory of freedom and authority is incorporated into the debate.  These questions arise out of a concern with regards to the relationship between the teacher and the students, and with regards to the stated aims of the school.

R. S. Peters is one of the most prominent voices in the philosophy of education.[542] Along with Paul Hirst, Peters is credited with bringing an analytic approach of philosophy of education to the UK.[543]  In *Authority, Responsibility and Education*, Peters engages directly with the concept of authority and employs Weber's tripartite analysis of authority in his discussion of its role in education.[544]  According to Peters, a person possesses

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[542] See, *Reading R. S. Peters Today: Analysis, Ethics, and the Aims of Education*, ed. by Stefaan E. Cuypers and Christopher Martin, The Journal of Philosophy of Education Book Series (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011); John P. Portelli, 'ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION: DEVELOPMENT AND MISCONCEPTIONS', *The Journal of Educational Thought (JET) / Revue de La Pensée Éducative*, 21.1 (1987), 20–32; and Ivan Snook, 'Respectability and Relevance: Reflections on Richard Peters and Analytic Philosophy of Education', *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 45.2 (2013), 191–201.

[543] See, R. S. Peters, *Ethics and Education* (Oxford, UK; New York, USA: George Allen and Unwin, 2015); and Paul Heywood Hirst and R. S. Peters, *The Logic of Education*, (London; New York: Routledge, 2014).

[544] R. S. Peters, *Authority, Responsibility and Education*, (Northampton: George Allen and Unwin, 1965); R. S. Peters, 'The Authority of the Teacher', *Comparative Education*, 3.1 (1966), 1–12.  Richard Pring notes, '[t]he best general conceptual analysis of "authority" in an educational context is to be found in Peters'. Richard Pring, 'In Defence of Authority - or How to Keep Knowledge under Control', in *Values and Authority in*

authority when another sets aside their judgement in recognition of that authority. The teacher possesses a degree of all three types of formal authority. They possess the legal-rational authority in virtue of meeting agreed criteria; they possess the traditional authority, although this has waned with the changing of attitudes; and they often possess charismatic authority, a quality that if harnessed can be used well in teaching practice but also runs the risk of abuse.[545]

However, Peters, unlike Arendt, does not equate authority and authoritarianism.[546] Arendt draws no distinction between them and argues against the 'liberal' equivocation of the terms, authoritarian, totalitarian, and tyranny. According to Arendt, authoritarian government, 'committed to the restriction of liberty remains tied to the freedom it limits to the extent that it would lose its very substance if it abolished it altogether'.[547] Whereas, this is not the case for totalitarian government which aims for the total elimination of freedom, and tyranny which rules in accordance with the will and interest of a single person rather than the law.[548] But, this difference between Arendt and Peters is purely terminological. Peters argues that it is a delicate balance between coercion and authority that the teacher must tread for it is the responsibility of the teacher to cultivate the morality of existing society through their teaching, but it is also the responsibility of the teacher to cultivate pupils' ability to correct perceived mistakes. Peters writes, 'a teacher must both be an authority and teach in such a way that pupils become capable of showing him [*sic*] where he [*sic*] is wrong. The teacher is an agent of change and challenge as well as of cultural conservation.'[549] There is the authority that comes with social control and the authority that comes with one's expertise. Richard Pring notes that '[t]he distinction here is that between "in authority" and being "an authority".[550]

In his discussion of authority Peters draws apart the notions of teaching, instruction, and indoctrination. Indoctrination, of which there is no legitimate expression, 'involves either merely the inculcation of beliefs or the addition of a rationale which discourages

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*Schools*, ed. by David Bridges and Peter Scrimshaw (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1975), pp. 20–37 (p. 36).

[545] Peters (1965), pp. 16–17.

[546] *ibid*, p. 33.

[547] Arendt (1993a), p. 96.

[548] *ibid*, p. 97.

[549] Peters (1966), p. 9.

[550] Pring (1975), p. 24.

the evaluation of beliefs—e.g. the appeal to authority as a backing.'[551]  Instruction is similar to indoctrination but encourages, 'the probing of principles at a later stage', when the child is at the right stage of development, and is therefore, according to Peters, sometimes necessary, especially with younger children.[552]  Teaching is neither of these things, instead it, 'involves the passing on of knowledge, skills, or modes of conduct in such a way that the learner is brought to understand and evaluate the underlying rationale for what is presented to him [*sic*].'[553]  What this means, for Peters, is that while the teacher is an authority in many ways they are more than merely an authority.  It is a part of the skill of a teacher to know when to express their authority as a command to be followed without evaluation of beliefs on the part of the subject.  If a teacher falls into unnecessary instruction, or does so in an authoritarian or doctrinaire manner they risk arresting a child's ability to move from reliance upon authority to developing their own reliable judgement.  Charismatic authority enhances this danger.  Therefore, in Peters' formulation of authority in the classroom, the teacher possesses authority, it is a property of the teacher, but they must express authority with caution over the children for fear of straying into authoritarian teaching.  However in Peters' view, as Winch notes, authority is not necessary in society outside of schools.  Only those situations, such as in the school environment where children have not developed their full psychological self, 'require the participation of an authority'.[554]

Paul Nash expresses a similar conception of authority as Peters.[555]  Nash accepts the concept of authority as a property of the teacher and seeks to find the balance of expression on behalf of the teacher.  Nash recognises a distinction between authority and

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[551] Peters (1966), p. 9.

[552] *ibid*.

[553] *ibid*.

[554] Winch (1998), p. 222.

[555] Paul Nash, *Authority and Freedom in Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education* (New York; London; Sydney: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1966).  William H. Kitchen claims that Geoffrey Herman Bantock shares a similar understanding of authority to Peters but this is unfair to Peters.  William H. Kitchen, *Authority and the Teacher* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2014), p. 35.  In fact, Bantock defends a very two-dimensional conception of authority where he equates authority with power and authoritarianism.  After claiming that '[t]he school necessarily involves an authoritative set-up', Bantock seamlessly moves from discussion of authority to write, 'Power is an inescapable element in adult life, to which we all at some time or other have to come to terms;…' Geoffrey Herman Bantock, *Freedom and Authority in Education: A Criticism of Modern Cultural and Educational Assumptions* (London: Faber and Faber, 1970), p.188.

authoritarianism, and condemns the latter while recognising the necessity of the former, in much the same way as Peters.  He writes,

> The necessity for avoiding the personality degeneration associated with authoritarianism does not absolve the teacher from the responsibilities of leadership.  It only makes the task of leading more subtle and difficult. To abdicate leadership is no better—and may be worse—than to wield authoritarian control.[556]

Both Peters and Nash argue that the imposition of authority is sometimes necessary in the school and in the classroom and warn against the dangers of too much or too little authority.  While appeals for a strong hand in school are heard regularly in populist political rhetoric few contemporary writers interested in educational theory and practice advocate authoritarian control by teachers.[557]  However, the opposite extreme, the abolition of authority is often expressed as the call to arms of the radical educator.[558] Much like in political theory where the anarchist theorist represents the boogie-monster of balanced critique between authority and freedom, in educational theory the radical educator assumes this mantle.  In their campaign for freedom radical educators have pushed the boundaries of educational practice.

The radical education movement is an extension of progressive education. Progressive education is the model of education which has linked our three main protagonists of this thesis and has been discussed briefly above.  It was noted that Darling

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[556] Nash (1966), p. 104.  It is safe to understand Nash's use of the word 'leadership', as equivalent to Arendt's use of 'rule'.  However, it is important to note that a teacher's rule is distinct from a government's rule according to Arendt.  She writes, '[i]f rule is at all involved here, it is entirely different from political forms of rule, not only because it is limited in time and intent, but because it happens between people who are potentially equals.'  Arendt (1993a), p. 118.

[557] Diane Ravitch and Eric D. Hirsch are the most often cited defenders of traditional or didactic education in schools.  See, Diane Ravitch, *The Schools We Deserve: Reflections on the Educational Crises of Our Times* (New York: Basic Books, 1985); and Eric D. Hirsch, *The Schools We Need and Why We Don't Have Them*, Anchor Books (New York: Doubleday, 1999); E. D. Hirsch, *Why Knowledge Matters: Rescuing Our Children from Failed Educational Theories* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Education Press, 2016).

[558] For a history of the radical education movement see, Nigel Wright, *Assessing Radical Education: A Critical Review of the Radical Movement in English Schooling, 1960-1980*, Innovations in Education (Milton Keynes; Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1989); Paul Avrich, *The Modern School Movement: Anarchism and Education in the United States* (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2006); and Michael P. Smith, *The Libertarians and Education*, Unwin Education Books (London ; Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1983).

and Nordenbo identified five themes which persist in all account of progressive education. These are, a criticism of traditional education; a challenge to understandings of the nature of knowledge; the view that children possess a natural desire to learn; a commitment to the value of democracy in schools because of children's right to determine their own learning; and a commitment to the development of the whole person. [559] According to these five themes, the problem of authority is not a necessary concern of the progressive educator, however it is easy to see how the problem of authority arises as a consequence of those themes. In challenging the nature of knowledge the traditional understanding of the teacher as the possessor and disseminator of a fixed body of knowledge is also questioned. Coupled with the commitment to the value of democracy in schools, the shift in power relations is evident. What is learnt and how it is learnt become debated, but not solely by the professionals and academics. The children themselves have a voice in their own learning. Therefore, neither the teacher nor the school, in a progressive educational model, possess unquestioned authority. They, instead, appear to be in the same position as the government of a liberal democratic state and seek to find a balance between the freedom of democratic participants and the authority of their institution.

A. S. Neill is a figurehead of the progressive education movement and a radical in the application of the principles of progressive education.[560] Neill speaks of the elimination of authority.[561] He established Summerhill School in 1921 after failing to have

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[559] Darling and Nordenbo (2003), pp. 295–308.

[560] Joel Spring refers to Summerhill as 'the most famous of free schools', Joel H. Spring, *Wheels in the Head: Educational Philosophies of Authority, Freedom, and Culture from Socrates to Human Rights*, 2nd ed (Mahwah, New Jersey: L. Erlbaum Associates, 2006), p. 54. In his analysis of radical education and the individuals that played a key role within it Nigel Wright writes, '… pride of place must surely go to A. S. Neill. In any account of education in the twentieth century, he must be afforded a prominent position.' Wright, (1989a), p. 91.

[561] See, Neill (1968). Homer Lane, Neill's mentor, and Alexander Bloom, a Headmaster at a state school in East London are also good examples of educators who speak of the elimination of authority. For an analysis of Homer Lane's educational practice see, Homer Lane, *Talks to Parents and Teachers* (S.l.: Bonobo Press, 2011); and Kevin J. Brehony, 'The Genesis and Disappearance of Homer Lane's Little Commonwealth: A Weberian Analysis', in *Persistenz Und Verschwinden. Persistence and Disappearance: Pädagogische Organisationen Im Historischen Kontext. Educational Organizations in Their Historical Contexts*, ed. by Michael Göhlich, Caroline Hopf, and Daniel Tröhler (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008), pp. 237–53. However, the Little Commonwealth was closed after accusations were made against Lane by two of the students. Unfortunately, many of the records relating to the Little Commonwealth, including the investigation into Lane's alleged impropriety, have not been kept by the Home Office and were never available to the public. As such we will never know the full details of why the reformatory was closed prematurely. What accounts do exist are defensive of Lane but it is important to note the source of these

the opportunity to teach at the Little Commonwealth, Homer Lane's, reformatory in Dorset. The model of education that Neill defends is informed by his background in child psychology.[562] He argues that adult imposed requirements may make a child fear that they cannot live up to the expectations of the adult. They then become anxious about losing the love and approval of the adult.

This problem is made worse if the rules are presented as moral rules because it then adds the element of guilt. In addition to this, anxiety of authority produces hatred. Neill believes that a child hates to be restricted and suppressed, and will hate the person responsible for this suppression. This authoritative disciplining produces self-hatred because forcing a child to be good, conveys the message that what they want to do is bad, thereby teaching the child to hate their inclinations and, by extension, themselves.[563]

Furthermore, the imposition of authority limits a person's ability to make decisions for themselves. Therefore, the removal of this imposition, as Darling notes, 'means that pupils learn how to handle freedom and how to take responsibility for their conduct and learning.'[564] However, for Neill, the removal of authority in this manner is not the rule itself but a consequence of the primary principle of unconditional love.

Unconditional love is needed to break through the expectations of children toward adults. To borrow Lane's terminology, children needed to know that the adults were 'on their side'.[565] As such, authority, understood as the undemocratic assertion of power over another, should be removed from the child's world, leaving behind self-governing

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accounts and the time and context of these accusations. See, E. T. Bazeley, *Homer Lane and the Little Commonwealth* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1928). For an account of Alexander Bloom's educational practice and his school *St-Georges-in-the-East* see, Michael Fielding, 'Bringing Freedom to Education', in *Education, Childhood and Anarchism: Talking Colin Ward*, ed. by Catherine Burke and Ken Jones, 2014, pp. 86–98.

[562] This analysis was influenced by the psychology of Sigmund Freud. Neill writes, 'I have derived inspiration from Freud, Homer Lane, and others', (Neill (1968), p. 89). References to Freud are littered throughout his books.

[563] Neill writes, '[t]o the frightened child sex *is* everything! Yes, the child uses sex as the chief peg on which to hang his fears. For he has been told that sex is wicked.' (Neill (1968), p. 121.) According to Neill, it is from this fear our unconscious and, often, unhealthy attitudes toward sex originates. (Neill (1968), p. 183-193.)

[564] John Darling, 'A. S. Neill on Democratic Authority: A Lesson From Summerhill?', *Oxford Review of Education*, 18.1 (1992), 45–57 (p. 48).

[565] A wonderful example of this is given in, Lane (2011), pp.170-178, in which a young child is sentenced by the magistrate to attend The Little Commonwealth reformatory for being caught stealing, and Lane entrusts him to make his own way there and provides him with the train fare. Lane writes, 'Tim came to the Commonwealth, not because my personality overcame him, but because my love for him released his own true personality.' (p.176)

cooperative authority. David Carr summarises this thought well when he writes that, 'until troubled children had been liberated from the negative associations of (parental, educational or other) authority, it would be impossible for them to recognise the intrinsic life-enhancing purpose and utility of the norms of civilised life.'[566] The result of the practice of self-government is the promotion of responsible self-direction and the promotion of authentic responsibility in a climate of mutual respect and trust.

Neill has been widely criticised for permitting too much freedom and compromising the education of his students as a result.[567] However, Neill drew a line between freedom and license. In Summerhill Neill drew the scope of individual freedom thusly, 'each individual is free to do what he likes as long as he is not trespassing on the freedom of others.'[568] Neill believes that the consequence of this definition of freedom is an equal sharing of responsibilities and rights—there being no such thing as complete or absolute freedom. Absolute freedom, or freedom without qualification, is a freedom of conflict because it necessarily impinges upon the freedom of others. Therefore, freedom must be, to some degree, limited.[569] The legitimate expression of authority is this limitation which imposes certain constraints upon people in the name of freedom. The line between freedom and authority that Neill draws is between the private and the public sphere.[570] An action that affects the interests only of the actor cannot be limited, in the case of Summerhill an example is going to class. Whereas, throwing stones is another matter. There are justifiable rules governing social life. Authority therefore, does still exist but it is not of one (or a few) over others but the authority of the community over each other.

Discipline and license occur when the balance between freedom and authority has not been found. Discipline and license have an inverse relation where all the rights are held by either the subject or the object. For the unfree child there are two possible

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[566] David Carr, *Making Sense of Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy and Theory of Education and Teaching* (London; New York: Routledge Falmer, 2003), p. 226.

[567] Amy Gutmann, *Democratic Education* (Princeton Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 89; Carr also notes this criticism of Neill in, Carr (2003), p. 227.

[568] Neill (1968), p. 163.

[569] Neill writes, 'There isn't such a thing as absolute freedom. Anyone who allows a child to get all his [*sic*] own way is following a dangerous path.' Neill (1968), p. 309.

[570] This is what Neill would call the difference between individual freedom and social freedom. See, Neill (1968), p. 309.

circumstances: either the teachers have all the rights, and children have no rights, or the children have all the rights and the teachers have no rights. The former example is what Neill calls discipline and the latter license.[571] Neither instance contributes toward freedom. Freedom is the practice of equal rights for both parties.[572] This is consistent with the types of freedom defended by Rousseau, Dewey and Freire because it is a freedom of constraints which are self-imposed and represents means to further freedom.

Neill's Summerhill is an example of one half of the progressive education movement in the UK, the independent progressive school. Inspired by educators such as Neill, the 1960s and 1970s saw an attempt to bring the principles of Summerhill out of the small world of independent schools and make it accessible to all. This is often characterised as the free school movement.[573] The first to be established in the UK was the Scotland Road Free School in Liverpool in 1971.[574] Nigel Wright identifies three ways in which free schools were free. They were monetarily free to attend, they were free of the influence of the state and church, and they practiced a model of education designed to maximise individual freedom for the children.[575] Wright estimates that, out of all attempts made to open free schools, only fourteen or fifteen of them can be said to have succeeded in becoming properly established. Wright worked at White Lion Street Free School for four years and concentrates on that school in offering a critical examination of the theory and practice behind the free school movement. Schools such as White Lion Street aimed to employ some of the principles of the progressive independent schools such as Summerhill but without the barriers of fees. Wright quotes a passage from the school's first bulletin.

> "The children will be free to learn what they want to learn – so long as it
> does not interfere with anyone else. It will be their decision, in the first
> place, that they want to come to the school… They will also have an

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[571] Neill (1968), pp. 267–69.

[572] Neil writes, 'in the discipline home, the children have *no* rights. In the spoiled home, they have *all* the rights. The proper home is one in which children and adults have equal rights. And the same applies to school.' Neill (1968), p. 105.

[573] Ironically there is now a very different type of free school that it is important not to confuse or conflate with the free schools that are being discussed in this thesis. See, https://www.gov.uk/types-of-school/free-schools.

[574] Wright (1989a), p. 93.

[575] *ibid*.

equal say with the adults in how the school is run.  Most children want to learn.  Not only useful things like reading and writing, but also how the world – as they see it – works.  But they cannot learn if they are forced to do it from lessons which have no connection with the lives they lead after school…"[576]

At White Lion Street School, there was '[n]o divisional office, no headteacher, no hierarchy, no compulsory curriculum, no reactionary colleagues, no need to submit to other people's constraints.'[577]  However, while a structure like this appears to have aimed at the complete abolition of authority a closer examination shows that authority has simply been recalibrated.  Decisions made by the school were made in two weekly meetings which were open to all children and parents as well as the workers.  Wright writes, 'For WL [White Lion Street School], democracy was at the centre of its philosophy.  All members of the school community – children, parents and workers – were invited to take an equal part in decision making.'[578]  It is clear from this that White Lion Street School did not practice 'absolute freedom' and nor did it aim to.

Furthermore, in spite of their commitment to freedom the workers exercised some form of interventionist role.[579]  Wright illustrates the tension between the freedom of the child and the authority of the adult that was present in the White Lion Street School in his discussion on nagging.  He writes, '"Nagging" was the technique used by WL [White Lion Street] workers to get children to do things (or refrain from doing things) whilst pretending that the children were free to do otherwise.'[580]  Therefore, authority persisted at White Lion Street School in various forms:  There was the authority of the workers in nagging, and interfering; there was the authority of the democratic system; and there was also the authority of the 'stooges', as they were referred to, who were the owners of and fundraisers for the school.

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[576] Nigel Wright, *Free School: The White Lion Experience* (Leicestershire, England: Libertarian Education, 1989b), p. ix.
[577] *ibid*.
[578] *ibid*, p. 12.
[579] *ibid*, p. 32.
[580] *ibid*, p. 33.

Wright is honest about his experiences at White Lion Street School and explains the problems they had in participation and engagement in the democratic system, and in protecting the values that underpinned it from potentially damaging decisions. It seems clear in Wright's analysis that White Lion Street School struggled with maintaining a consistency to its values and philosophy. Wrights draws attention to a tension that persisted at White Lion Street between how freedom was practiced by the children and how freedom was desired to be practiced by the workers. Wright observes that this was particularly evident in the persistence of bullying and the damaging of school property which occurred in the school. The presence of both led to questions of expulsion and control which were rejected because they were anathema to the principles of the free school.[581]

There is an element of lamentation in Wright's description of this part of his experience at White Lion Street School. Lamenting the felt need to lock rooms when not in use to protect them from theft and damage, lamenting the fact that many children did not practice their freedom constructively. He writes, 'I sometimes got the feeling at WL [White Lion Street School] that the outcome of freedom was not equality and fraternity, or sorority, but the emergence of a new aristocracy – cliques of youngsters whose attitude was that nothing need be done if they didn't feel like it, that all resources were at their exclusive disposal (and disposal was what they often did with them) and that anyone who got in their way was to be brushed aside.'[582] This point was made emphatically by Peters in *Ethics and Education*. He argues that the absence of the rule of law enforced impartially by the teacher leads to pressure from one's peer group and bullying, that freedom does not follow.[583]

However, Wright also tells of the beauty and the success, of the times when the children were active, reflective, and committed to working together to find resolution and consensus. He notes that the destructiveness of some was not the norm. There were other children who did use their freedom constructively.[584] Speaking of the more positive aspects of White Lion Street School Wright focuses on a few particular practices which

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[581] Wright (1989b), p. 28.
[582] *ibid*, p. 29.
[583] Peters (2015), p. 194.
[584] Wright (1989b), p. 29.

stood them apart from the regular comprehensive school system. One of these differences was in the nature and form of the relationships between the children and the workers. 'WL [White Lion Street School] went some way towards breaking free of these institutional constraints and putting relationships back into the "personal sphere".'[585] At White Lion Street School there was a great deal of physical contact between adults and children. Wright attributes the strong relationships borne out of this tactile relationship an instrumental value in many of their successes at the school. He writes, 'Although there were exceptions, WL [White Lion Street School] found that it was the children with whom workers had the closest, most open relationships who got most out of the school. They, in the main, were the ones who took a responsible part in the democratic process, who made constructive use of the school's freedoms, who took advantage of learning opportunities.'[586]

The clear difference between the radical pedagogies of Neill and White Lion Street Free School and the pedagogies of Peters and Nash is that the former argue in favour of the abdication, or at the least minimisation, of authority and the latter employ authority as an educational tool. The differences between them are often lost in the confusion of the concept of authority. A clearer understanding of this concept will illuminate a clearer path for pedagogical practice and authority relations between people. It is clear, after all, that what is common between them all is that they seek a balance between the competing forces of authority and freedom.

In contrast to this there has been a recent attempt to redefine authority outside of this dichotomous relationship with freedom or autonomy. Nicholas C. Burbules, Charles W. Bingham and Barbara Applebaum each attempt to redefine authority and break with a tradition which has persistently perceived authority as a quality possessed by a person or group which is expressed over another person or group. Instead of authority existing as a property of an individual that is unilaterally expressed, Burbules argues that one ought to understand authority as relational. He writes that authority is,

> a *relational* concept, arising from the particular bonds or respect,
>
> concern, and trust that particular teachers and students establish among

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[585] Wright (1989b), p. 51.
[586] *ibid*.

themselves.  Authority in this sense exists neither before nor beyond the interactions, communicative and otherwise, that join two or more parties in a relation of mutuality and shared interest.[587]

Echoing these words Bingham describes authority as,

enacted in circuits where each participant has a role to play, where authority is not simply a monological enactment, where it takes the participation of at least two people for authority to gain purchase.  It works as a circuit instead of working unidirectionally or monologically.[588]

Applebaum, motivated by the project of discovering the model of authority consonant with her role as feminist educator, also seeks to understand authority relationally.  Applebaum writes, '[m]y primary purpose is to recommend a reconceptualization of authority, which I refer to as "relational authority," that can, I maintain, dissolve the sharp dichotomy between nurturance and authority that … other feminists embrace.'[589]  Applebaum challenges the patriarchal dichotomisation in educational practice between 'authority' and 'nurturance'.  She argues that maternal nurturance is perceived in opposition to masculine power and authority, 'the masculinist tradition of education has similarities to what Alven Neiman, following R. S. Peters, describes as a necessary feature of education, namely, the socio-political authority of the teacher.'[590]  In her analysis Applebaum identifies two types of authority; the control and command model of authority, and the influence and inspire model of authority.  The difference between the two, according to Applebaum, is that the former, 'implies

[587] Nicholas C Burbules, 'Authority and the Tragic Dimension of Teaching', in *The Educational Conversation: Closing the Gap*, ed. by James W. Garrison and Anthony G. Rud, SUNY Series, the Philosophy of Education (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), pp. 29–40 (p. 36).

[588] Charles W. Bingham, *Authority Is Relational: Rethinking Educational Empowerment* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), pp. 6–7.

[589] Barbara Applebaum, 'On Good Authority or Is Feminist Authority an Oxymoron?', in *Philosophy of Education: An Anthology*, ed. by Randall R. Curren (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2007), pp. 307–17, (p.307).

[590] *ibid*, p. 309.

unidirectional encounters while the latter intimates reciprocal experiences and relationships.'[591]

In redefining authority Burbules, Bingham and Applebaum have provided a platform to escape the dichotomy between authority and freedom which is inherent within the dominant conception of authority. In understanding authority as relational it is no longer a property possessed by the teacher which is then expressed through their presence and their commands. This is because relational authority does not issue from one person or group, but is instead offered and accepted by object and subject alike. It is earned through interaction. A teacher gains authority, according to Burbules, in two ways. Firstly, it is essential to recognise the impact of their role upon their students and respond to it, and 'encourage students to question it'.[592] Secondly, it is in acknowledging differences in knowledge, experience, or ability without reifying them'.[593] This allows for relational authority to remain fluid rather than fixed over time because, in the honest and dialogical environment being encouraged through this model of authority, there 'manifests reciprocity and respect by who listens as well as by who speaks'.[594] Over time, Burbules argues that a relationship built on these foundations may lead to the dissolution of authority between the participants of that relationship.

What is unclear in all of these attempts to square authority and freedom is whether a genuine debate is taking place. There is an inconsistent use of terminology, and no accepted understanding of what authority is, sometimes the concept of authority is simply assumed, and yet to me it remains vague. The definition of authority, the source of authority, and the ontology of the concept of authority differ from theory to theory. I shall conclude this Chapter by isolating these conceptual details regarding authority and linking them back to the analysis given over the last two sections with an aim to clearly delineate a conception of authority which allows for its legitimate expression.

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[591] Applebaum (2007), p. 314.
[592] Burbules (1995), p. 34.
[593] *ibid*, p. 38.
[594] *ibid*.

## §6.4 The Three Aspects of Authority

What is clear from the analysis of the problem of authority and the different approaches to resolving that problem in the field of education is that the concept of authority is not clear and discrete. I separate out the disagreements on what authority is into three different areas, there are disagreements with regards to the definition of authority, what the legitimate source of authority is, and with respect to the ontology of authority. I shall address each in turn.

The first area of disagreement in any conception of authority is with respect to its definition. We all have a feel for what authority means but important distinctions in definition appear in the different accounts on authority and its legitimate expression. As I have spelt out above, Arendt argues persuasively that authority is the, 'unquestioning recognition by those who are asked to obey; neither coercion nor persuasion is needed.'[595] This definition of authority is shared by Rousseau, and the prescription against persuasion and coercion is shared by Friedrich, and, in the educational context, Peters.[596] Mark E. Warren refers to this definition as 'the prevailing consensus' in political philosophy.[597]

Weber differs from Arendt and Friedrich in not distinguishing authority and power. Instead for Weber, authority is one of two basic types of power. Peter M. Blau describes these two types of power as, 'the domination of others that rests on the ability to influence their interests, and the domination that rests on authority, that is, the power to command and the duty to obey.'[598]

Alternatively, a definition of authority which shifts the focus into a rights based conception of authority and does not explicitly rule out coercion and persuasion is often

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[595] Arendt (1970), p. 45.

[596] Nyberg and Farber also incorporate Friedrich's conception of authority into their educational theory. They write, '[a]uthority is a term of internal relation; it is a matter of getting other people interested in doing or believing what you want without using force or rational argument. However, to say this is not to say that authority is unrelated to reason and rational argument. It helps to understand this point if we think if authority as "a quality of communication, rather than of persons," and think of authoritative persons as those who possess "the capacity to issue authoritative communication."' David Nyberg and Paul Farber, 'Authority in Education', *Teachers College Record*, 88.1 (1986), 4–14 (p. 7).

[597] Mark E. Warren, 'Deliberative Democracy and Authority', *American Political Science Review*, 90.01 (1996), 46–60 (p. 46).

[598] Blau (1963), p. 306.

employed. Wolff offers a good example of this when he argues that, '[a]uthority is the right to command, and correlatively, the right to be obeyed.'[599] In the education literature this view is shared by Mary Haywood Metz whose formal definition of authority follows,

> [a]uthority is the right of a person in a specified role to give commands to which a person in another specified role has a duty to render obedience. This rights and duty rest upon the superordinate's recognised status as the legitimate representative of a moral order to which both superordinate and subordinate owe allegiance.[600]

According to Pace and Hemmings, Metz drew upon the work of Weber and Durkheim in the formulation of this conception of authority.[601] Within Metz's conception of authority coercion is not clearly separated. Pace and Hemmings write of Metz's conceptualisation of authority that, 'teachers may use coercion. This includes tactics such as reprimanding or embarrassing students, making them move their seats, sending them out of the classroom, giving them detention, and expelling or failing them.'[602] The primary difference between these two definitions of authority is that the latter does not explicitly exclude coercion or persuasion from incorporation into the practice of authority.[603]

These competing definitions of authority disagree over the distinctions between a number of similar concepts and whether to understand authority within the language of

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[599] Wolff (1998), p. 3.

[600] Mary Haywood Metz, *Classrooms and Corridors: The Crisis of Authority in Desegregated Secondary Schools* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 27.

[601] Judith L. Pace and Annette B. Hemmings, 'Understanding Classroom Authority as a Social Construction', in *Classroom Authority: Theory, Research, and Practice*, ed. by Judith L. Pace and Annette B. Hemmings (Mahwah, N.J: L. Erlbaum Associates, 2006), pp. 1–32 (p. 6).

[602] *ibid*, p. 8.

[603] While Wolff embeds coercion directly into his definition of authority in order to undermine it, others, like Metz, do so in defence of authority. As mentioned above, education theorist Geoffrey Bantock seamlessly moves between the concepts of authority and power in his discussion of freedom and authority in education. Bantock (1970), p. 188. Additionally, Anthony O'Hear writes, '[t]here cannot be true education without a pinch of sourness, a hint of despotism and a willingness to revere; for all these things are necessary to bend the lawless and turbulent spirit of the young to the forces which ought to master them.' Anthony O'Hear, *Education and Democracy: Against the Educational Establishment* (London: Claridge, 1991), p. 24. Kitchen similarly argues in favour of authoritarian teaching in Kitchen (2014).

rights leaving the definition of authority nebulous from the outset. Unfortunately, the definition of authority is only the first area of conflict within the concept of authority.

The second area of conflict within the concept of authority is with regards to the source of authority. Over the course of this chapter a number of different sources of authority have been discussed. It has been argued that authority may find its legitimacy in the commands and regulations expressed by the law (Legal-Rational Authority), it may find it in the customs and traditions which place persons in positions of authority such as the patriarchal practice of primogeniture (Traditional Authority), or it may find its source in the particular character of an individual (Charismatic Authority). As was noted above, Weber argued that all three of these were sources of legitimate authority. This model of understanding was incorporated into the educational context by Peters.

Furthermore, some critics of Weber's tripartite account of authority argue that legal-rational authority should be understood as a combination of professional and bureaucratic authority and it is necessary to distinguish between.[604] This is done, according to Blau, 'to clarify some of the central issues and conflicts in today's organisations which tend increasingly to be both professionalised and bureaucratised.'[605]

Arendt, defended legal-rational and traditional authority. Whereas, Friedrich's conception of authority defends traditional authority alongside another potential source, that of expertise (Epistemic Authority).[606] This results from the quality of authority through communication. It is in specific people who possess this quality that the source of authority is found.

Despite the wealth of different sources of authority that have been argued for, one thing is common between them. They all require the belief of those subject to that authority. Whether authority's foundations be built on tradition, the law, expertise, charisma, or some other quality or feature it is necessary that the people believe it.

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[604] David T. Hansen makes a distinction between professional and bureaucratic authority in his explanation of classroom authority, in 'Epilogue: The Sources and Expressions of Classroom Authority', in *Classroom Authority: Theory, Research, and Practice*, ed. by Judith L. Pace and Annette B. Hemmings (Mahwah, N.J: L. Erlbaum Associates, 2006), pp. 175–86 (p. 177).

[605] Blau (1963), p. 311.

[606] Appeals to epistemic authority are common in educational theory as a root of the authority of the teacher. See, Alven Michael Neiman, 'Education, Power, and the Authority of Knowledge', *Teachers College Record*, 88.1 (1986), 64–80; David Nyberg and Paul Farber, 'Authority in Education', *Teachers College Record*, 88.1 (1986), 4–14, for examples of appeals to epistemic authority.

Weber's sociological account of authority is defined in terms of the belief of the participants. Weber's account is in part descriptive and in part normative. This is because it claims to identify that which underpins authority, it is explaining how authority manifests in society but it also claims that, 'the structural constraints [are] rooted in the collectivity of subordinates rather than instruments of power or influences wielded by the superior himself [*sic*]'.[607]

Friedrich requires the consent of the people subject to authority because of the role that communication plays in his account of authority. In Friedrich's account the value of communication must be possessed by persons of authority but it should not be expressed. When the potentiality is not present it is 'false' authority, it is not authority at all. Friedrich argues that, 'the falseness of such authority is revealed the moment the pretended potentiality has to be actualised.'[608] But, if Friedrich is correct and that the potentiality need not ever be practiced it remains to be seen how those under authority are able to determine when it is genuine and when it is false. Furthermore, because the value judgements made by a person accorded authority are rooted in the political community from which they originate they are relative to that community. A consequence of this, as Cochran notes, is that, according to Friedrich, Hitler and Stalin exercised genuine authority. Therefore, there is a problem with the potentiality of given reasons which undermines the stability of the source of authority. As a result Friedrich does not adequately specify a source of authority. Cochran expresses this point when he writes of Friedrich,

> [c]ommunal values and traditions point beyond themselves; they do not
> claim to be their own warrant. They are warranted, or claim to be
> warranted, by their accord with truth and a reality which transcends
> them and of which they are only immanent manifestations. Even
> authority itself points beyond tradition and community…[609]

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[607] Blau (1963), p. 312.
[608] Friedrich (1958), p. 47.
[609] Cochran (1977), p. 549.

Arendt, on the other hand, laments the loss of authority that has resulted from people no longer submitting unquestioningly to it. This takes centre stage in her account of the loss of authority in the modern age. According to Arendt, people should recognise authority, an authority which has sure foundations built upon the traditions and structure of society, and held in offices which are a part of that tradition. However, according to Arendt, our relationships with those traditions has broken down. It has eroded through challenges to authority and has been replaced with power and violence.

Without their cooperation the object of authority – that person or institution which claims to hold it – wields nothing but the ability to make people conform through persuasion or force. While Raz does not share Arendt's pessimistic account of the eradication of authority he too depends in some way on those subject to authority in his account of its legitimate source.

Raz's account of authority can be understood as a commitment to some form of epistemic authority. Through three theses; the normal justification thesis, the dependence thesis, and the preemptive thesis Raz aims to establish the source of authority.[610] Together they form the service conception of authority which argues that the source of a person or institution's authority is based on the judgement of the subject of that authority, and the primary reason for a subject to recognise them as a legitimate authority is whether there is sufficient evidence,

> *that the alleged subject is likely better to comply with reasons which apply to him [sic] … if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than by trying to follow the reasons which apply to him [sic] directly.*[611]

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[610] Hershovitz refers to Raz's accounts as 'the most influential account of authority', Hershovitz (2011), p. 1. Raz's account of authority is found in, Joseph Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, Reprinted (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009); Joseph Raz, *Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); and Joseph Raz, 'Authority and Justification', in *Authority*, ed. by Joseph Raz, Readings in Social and Political Theory (Oxford, U.K: Basil Blackwell, 1990), pp. 115–41.

[611] Raz (1990b), p. 129.

In other words, the object of authority is adjudged to possess authority because it is better to follow that authority than strike out independently of it. Raz refers to this as the normal justification thesis. Hershovitz describes the normal justification thesis as, 'a person has authority over another if her orders would help that person conform better to reason's requirements than she otherwise would.'[612] It is a minimal commitment to the authority of reason which leads the subject to succumb to the epistemic authority as the object's greater rational judgement. However, Stephen Darwall argues that it should be distinguished from other forms of epistemic authority and understood as a form of practical authority.[613] This being said, it is unclear that this is sufficient as a source of authority. For example, Darwall argues that the normal justification thesis does not provide adequate grounds for either a right to rule or an obligation to obey.[614] Hershovitz notes that, '[i]n a draft paper, Raz has made a stunning concession to Darwall's argument: "[N]o legitimate authority," he says, "can be based on superior knowledge alone."'[615]

I share with Arendt and Raz their recognition of the importance that those subject to authority play in understanding the legitimate source of authority, and like Raz I defend a model of epistemic authority. However, I argue that the legitimate source of authority is in the reciprocal relationship between persons. It is the mind of the person that wilfully, and as a part of this dialogical and mutually reinforcing relationship, subject themselves to the authority of another. Authority is illegitimate when that subjection is imposed – in any way. All impositions of authority – whether by manipulation, force, or existing institutional and interactional structural norms – are in opposition to autonomy and freedom.

This view is made clearer by the third area of conflict within the concept of authority, that of the ontology of authority. It is this aspect of authority that is most fruitful in the reconciliation of freedom and authority.

The ontological assumption which underpins any one conception of authority is rarely discussed. Authority is most often understood as a property of an individual or

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[612] Hershovitz (2011), p. 1.

[613] Stephen Darwall, 'Authority and Second-Person Reasons for Acting', in *Reasons for Action*, ed. by David Sobel and Steven Wall (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 134–54; and Stephen Darwall, 'Authority and Reasons: Exclusionary and Second-Personal', *Ethics*, 120.2 (2010), 257–78.

[614] Darwall (2010), p. 258.

[615] Hershovitz (2011), p. 18.

group which is expressed by that authority over those subject to it.  Therefore, in accounts of authority of this type, authority is a property of a person held over others and expressed unilaterally.  Wolff expresses this view of authority clearly, when in sharing Arendt's distinction between persuasion and authority, he remarks,

> authority resides in persons; they possess it – if indeed they do at all – by virtue of who they are and not by virtue of what they command.  My duty to obey is a duty owed to them, not to the moral law or to the beneficiaries of the actions I may be commanded to perform.[616]

Friedrich offers a slight shift in this perspective because the ontology of authority moves from the object of authority to the communication by that object.  It is in the communication that authority is found.  In addition to Wolff's definitional objection of authority above, he identifies an aspect of authority which illustrates the boundaries between freedom and authority from the ontological perspective.  He argues that when one acts autonomously they are not subject to any person's will besides their own and they remain autonomous even if their action coincides with the command of authority.  According to Wolff, while one may act in accordance with the commands or will of another, if they are acting autonomously, they do so, 'not *because* he [*sic*] has been told to do it.'[617]  In this way a person can satisfy the conditions of being politically free even when their actions match the actions of one responding directly to the issued command of authority.

In effect Wolff is arguing that an expression of authority is successful only if the intended subjects of that expression follow it and do so because that individual or group commanded them to do so.  Wolff expresses this insight when he writes, 'my complying with his command does not constitute an acknowledgment on my part of any such authority.'[618]  Therefore, an account of the ontology of authority must consider the state of mind of the subject as well as the object of authority.  In other words, according to Wolff, it is not enough to say that authority is possessed by an individual or institution

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[616] Wolff (1998), p. 6.

[617] *ibid*, p. 14.

[618] *ibid*, p. 6.

because it is, in part at least, dependent upon that authority being acknowledged and recognised by those subject to it.

This claim jars with that made by Raz, who writes, 'from the point of view of the person in authority, it is not what the subject thinks but how he [*sic*] acts.'[619] These two claims can in fact be consistent because they issue from differing perspectives of the equation. However, the spirit of these two claims are wholly inconsistent with one another. It may be the case that from the point of view of the person issuing commands it matters not the reason for compliance, but this runs roughshod over coinciding reasons and those implicit reasons which inform the nature of one's compliance.

What this means is that unilateral conceptions of authority either impose their will on those subject to that authority without consideration of any private judgement or independent action, thereby denying an individual the freedom to choose otherwise or to rely upon their own judgement. Or they simply miss their intended targets, and while those subjects may have acted according to their own reason or autonomously they have acted contrary to authority. Therefore, unilateral conceptions of authority are seemingly in irresolvable conflict with reason and freedom, and defenders of such conceptions must either accept this incompatibility, or offer an explanation which shows otherwise.

As described above, the conceptual idea that authority is a property of a person, institution, or role is being challenged by people like Bingham, Burbules and Applebaum who argue that authority is instead a relation. The difference is that a property of a thing persists in that thing independently of other objects. Whereas, a relation of a thing persists only in relation to other things. For example, a red apple possesses the property of "redness" but possesses the relation of "larger than" only in relation to a smaller thing.

Over the course of this chapter I have provided a mostly descriptive account of a number of different models of authority in both the political and educational contexts. I have shown that within these different models there are at least three different debates occurring. A concept of authority must give an account of the definition of authority, the source of that authority, and the ontology of authority if one is to offer a resolution to the problem of authority, and in turn an answer to the tension between the individual and society. I have drawn these three aspects apart in order to highlight their differences. In

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[619] Raz (1990b), p. 119.

the following chapter I shall take a step back from these overlapping debates and explore how the problem of authority manifests within the politico-educational projects of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire.  The analysis of authority in Rousseau, Dewey and Freire shall provide the necessary link back to Part I of the thesis and the conception of the Critical Citizen which is the subject of this enquiry.  This will lead into Chapter 8 in which I analyse the practical and theoretical attempts of finding a resolution between freedom and authority, between the interests of the individual and the interests of the state and society in education.

**Chapter 7**

**The Manifestation of Authority in Rousseau, Dewey and Freire**

**§7.0  Summary**

In the previous chapter I presented an analysis of the concept of authority from a political and educational perspective with an eye to providing a clearer understanding through the identification of three necessary aspects of authority, that is its definition, its source and its ontology.  I presented this analysis from the perspective of the tension between authority and freedom.  In this chapter I shall build upon this analysis of authority and its tension with freedom and link it directly to the three major protagonists of the thesis; Rousseau, Dewey and Freire.  I shall draw out how the problem of authority manifests within their respective projects and link it back to the tension between the individual and society discussed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4.  This will lead into a discussion on the educative solutions to the problem of authority through models of democratic education in the following chapter.  This is because, as will be evidenced in this chapter, the problem of authority is addressed by Rousseau, Dewey and Freire through education and all three of these theorists supported some model of democratic education.

**§7.1  Rousseau and the Problem of Authority**

In this section I shall address the problem of authority in how it manifests within Rousseau's politico-educational project.  This is primarily drawn out through the account of Rousseau given in Chapter 2 above but, in addition, it teases out a few threads of that discussion to illustrate where authority arises in Rousseau's theory and how it becomes problematic.

In Chapter 2 the interpretation of Rousseau's politico-educational project that I offer is representative of an early model of democratic education.  In *Émile* the tutor educated his student in order to enter the social world and participate in it with the strength to withstand its corrupting and denaturing force.  In the *Social Contract* the citizens of civil society are Sovereign and in that role are compelled to act in the best

interests of civil society. They learn to do this over time and through practice. I argued that *Émile* and the *Social Contract* should be read together, and as such represent a key expression of democratic education, which is that the effective functioning of a democratic society is dependent upon the ability of that society to cultivate the virtues and values that sustain it in the people of that society. I further argued that, it is from Rousseau that we learn the importance of just institutions for the human animal to live freely in a free society. Without the project of the *Social Contract* the individual will unlikely ever escape the coercive force of society, they will become, in Rousseau's terms, 'social man', and in becoming so perpetuate the corrupting attributes of their society. The answer that Rousseau provides in the *Social Contract* is a form of democratic education with a focus on participation. Rousseau argues that people in their role as Sovereign, learn to express the General Will under the auspices of the Lawgiver. As such, through direct participation in society, become both 'man' and citizen.

However, while Rousseau's insight into the necessity of developing just institutions alongside the development of the person coherent with those institutions is taken as the fundamental starting place for any answer to the tension between the individual and society, Rousseau's method for creating those just institutions is unsatisfactory. In Rousseau's *Social Contract* there is a dependence on participation as the sole learning tool for developing the General Will. As has been discussed in the analysis of the citizen in Chapter 1, while participation is an essential feature of the citizen it is not strong enough on its own to cultivate all that is desired. Furthermore, the insidious authority of the Lawgiver over the Sovereign, while they remain corrupted, fails to provide a suitable practical model because the Lawgiver themselves is a fiction. There is no parental authority to guide, whether in the shadows like the Lawgiver or explicitly like a benevolent dictator, the citizens as Sovereign toward the General Will.

Rousseauian authority is found both in external sources and in oneself. Externally authority is found the tutor; in the Lawgiver; and in God. In oneself authority is found both in the state of nature and as Sovereign in the Republic. The problem with external authority in Rousseau is with the realisation of a being capable of assuming the role. For Émile's tutor to have legitimate authority in his role as educator he must be invented and

assumed. No living person can fulfil the necessary and sufficient criteria of the tutor.[620] This is also the case with the Lawgiver of the *Social Contract*. I argued in Chapter 2 that the function and necessity of the Lawgiver mirrors the function and necessity of the tutor, and that the Lawgiver too is a fiction. Therefore, for the Lawgiver to have legitimate authority in their role as educator they too must be invented and assumed.[621]

The fictions that Rousseau employs to deliver the ends-in-view of his politico-educational project are problematic because they assume their authority, not from the role but from their fulfilment of that role. The tutor and the Lawgiver have authority in virtue of the fact that they meet the criteria of the role they assume. In short, they have epistemic authority or the authority of expertise. This represents the source of authority for Rousseau.

In this way, the realisation of the tutor and the Lawgiver fit the conceptions of authority offered by Friedrich and Raz. These figures possess authority according to Friedrich's conception of authority because they clearly possess the '*potentiality of reasoned deliberation*'.[622] The tutor and Lawgiver possess the reasons behind their commands and utterances but never do they offer the reasons behind those utterances to the people subject to their authority.

According to Raz's conception of authority, the tutor and the Lawgiver possess authority because those people subject to their commands, both Émile and the Sovereign, accept the directives as binding and try to follow them, although they do so thinking that they are following their own directive. That this relationship represents one of legitimate authority in the conception offered by Raz is supported because the directives offered by the tutor and the Lawgiver assist in conforming to reason. Therefore, the authority of Rousseau's fictions meet the normal justification thesis and in turn the service conception of authority.

However, if the tutor and Lawgiver are necessarily fictions then the authority of the tutor and Lawgiver are unable to be assumed. Without fulfilment of the specified criteria by the tutor or the Lawgiver, neither can legitimately assume or express authority at the interactional or institutional level within Rousseau's politico-educational project.

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[620] See, 'Émile', *OC IV*, 263-64; *CWR Vol. 13*, pp. 176-77.
[621] See, 'Social Contract', *OC III*, 381; *CWR, Vol. 4*, p. 154.
[622] Friedrich (1958), p. 35.

This is not the only concern with Rousseau's figures of authority. Even if they were possible, the type of authority that they possess is troubling. The level of control that they possess extends beyond the application of directive and commands in the fulfilment of their role to include the active manipulation of those subject to their authority. This is clearest when considering the authority of God. As discussed in Chapter 2, the authority of God in the *Social Contract* is instrumental. The Lawgiver employs authority to ensure that the corrupted people who form the Sovereign follow the General Will even before they are capable of perceiving the General Will. The Lawgiver uses the authority of God as a tool to lend authority to their own pronouncements. The Lawgiver uses the authority of God to compel the people of society to obey, 'without violence and persuade without convincing.'[623] It is in this utterance that the definition of authority within Rousseau's philosophy is apparent. Authority understood in these terms is familiar from the previous chapter in particular with Arendt. A person holds authority when, without violence or persuasion, another person follows their issued command. But God is employed as a tool of control and that control is hidden from the eyes and minds of the Sovereign. Therefore, Rousseau's figures of authority should be employed to show the shortcomings of Arendt, Friedrich, Raz and any other conception which is consistent with Rousseau.

In Rousseau's politico-educational project there is also the authority of oneself. This was the subject of Chapter 2 in which I argued that in *Émile* and the *Social Contract* the individual is in continual tension. The tension reappears in the institutional setting because of the dual role that one is expected to play within the Republic. Émile is educated to be at first a free individual and then, once he possesses the virtues and strength needed to withstand the corruption of society, he is educated to be a citizen.

In the *Social Contract* the tension between the interests of the individual and society reappear within each individual because of their dual role as sovereign citizens and as free individuals. The authority that resides in one's self is thereby in tension because of the sharp separation between the public and private spheres which mirror the roles of Sovereign and free individual. As Sovereign it is one's responsibility to transcend perceived private interests and act in accordance with the interests of the Republic,

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[623] 'Social Contract', *OC III*, p. 383; *CWR, Vol. 4*, p. 156.

whereas in the role of private individual one retains the freedom and authority to do as one pleases provided that it has no impact on the machinations of the people or the Republic. This can be seen in the difference in freedoms experienced in the state of nature and in civil society. One, in joining in union with others in society, 'loses by the social contract … his natural liberty and an unlimited right to everything that tempts him and that he can get'.[624] However, as Neuhouser notes, where the General Will is silent the individuals of the Republic continue to possess a freedom from interference protected by a set of 'established rights.'[625] Therefore, one retains natural freedom in their private realm in all actions that do not affect the political realm. This is the separation of the public and private realms. However, it is difficult to see how these two worlds remain separate at all times. Furthermore, it is difficult to understand how any one person is able to compartmentalise their roles in society so sharply.[626]

In this analysis one can see the ontological assumption manifesting in Rousseau's figures of authority. The ontology of authority for Rousseau is a quality possessed by an individual like reason or empathy, it is a property of a person like 'red' can be a property of an apple. The problem in Rousseau's politico-educational project is in the realisation of a person who possesses this authority legitimately. In other words, a person who can issue effective commands that are neither coercive and therefore violent, nor through reason and therefore persuasive.

Judith Shklar and Thomas M. Kavanagh both show that Rousseau's conception of authority can be understood as coherent.[627] For Shklar, the purpose was to show that authority and freedom were not in tension within Rousseau. In fact, according to Shklar, it is the authority of the individual which creates freedom. Shklar writes, '[t]o Rousseau it did not appear that genuine authority limits freedom. The real tension was between authority and equality. Personal authority is not merely compatible with freedom, it creates it.'[628]

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[624] 'Social Contract', *OC III*, p. 364; *CWR, Vol. 4*, p. 141.

[625] Neuhouser (2010), p. 168.

[626] Cladis draws out the tension between the private and public lives of the citizens of the Republic in Cladis (2007).

[627] Judith N. Shklar, 'Rousseau's Images of Authority', *The American Political Science Review*, 58.4 (1964), 919–32 (p. 931); Thomas M. Kavanagh, *Writing the Truth: Authority and Desire in Rousseau* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

[628] Shklar (1964), p. 931.

Kavanagh explores the political vision of Rousseau's literary and autobiographical works and comes to a similar understanding of authority as Shklar. Kavanagh proposes a dialectic, 'of submission to authority intended as a radical defence of individual autonomy.'[629] However, Kavanagh mistakenly reads in Rousseau an elevation of the author to a level almost on a par with the tutor and Lawgiver. He writes, '[b]ecause his own itinerary has led him to travel paths scrupulously hidden by the conspiracy everywhere determining his society, Rousseau and Rousseau alone, has perceived the truth of what man is, where he began, and where he is headed.'[630] He makes this assertion in spite of reproducing a quotation from Rousseau's *Second Discourse* immediately prior, in which Rousseau writes, 'it is, in a sense, by dint of studying man that we have made ourselves incapable of knowing him'.[631] Rousseau, as I have argued in Chapter 2, is constructing his methodology upon the understanding of himself as a member of the degenerated 'social man'. He is fallible and is aware of this fact, and although he sees himself as less corrupted than most, it is still the case that Rousseau too is behind the curtain peering through and recognises himself as such. He may have perceived more than others in virtue of recognising his ignorance and perceiving the blindness of the human animal but, for Rousseau's argument to be coherent in Kavanagh's interpretation, Rousseau would have to be a God, a status it is clear his arrogance does not extend to. As Shklar comments, 'The personality that radiates authority eluded him.'[632]

Neither Shklar's nor Kavanagh's understanding of authority in Rousseau's philosophy adequately account for the imposition over those subject to his authority figures. It may be the case that these authority figures are necessary in Rousseau's political project for the realisation of freedom, but this should be of great concern. It must be asked whether Émile and the members of the Republic are ever really free if that freedom has been achieved through widespread coercion at the hands of distinct authority figures. It seems unlikely to be so.

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[629] Kavanagh (1987), p. xi.
[630] *ibid*, p. 138.
[631] 'Second Discourse', *OC III*, 123; *CWR, Vol. 3*, p. 12.
[632] Shklar (1964), p. 925.

**§7.2  Dewey and the Problem of Authority**

In Chapter 3 I argued that Dewey aims to resolve the tension from environment and the tension of overlapping interests.  These are representative of the tension between the individual and society.  Dewey resolves these tensions through a project of education which seeks to affect change at the institutional level by breaking down the barriers between school and society and educating the members of society in democratic skills through participation.  In this section I shall build on that analysis in order to illustrate that Dewey, like Rousseau, develops a model of democratic education with participation as a key component of his theory and that he employs his model of democratic education to resolve the problem of authority.  However, unlike Rousseau, he reframes the structure of authority in order to mitigate its coercive strength and incorporates theoretical devices that exceed the limitations of participatory democracy on its own.  Dewey achieves this through the interrelatedness of means and ends.

In order to do this, I shall present an account of Dewey's democratic education as it manifested through practice.  I shall argue that it is illustrative of his methodological approach because of the evident commitment to the principle of the interconnectedness of means and ends.  This shall lead into an analysis of authority in that democratic education practice, within which I shall highlight the definition, source, and ontological foundation at the heart of Dewey's conception of authority.  I shall also, highlight how Deweyan authority maps onto the differing accounts from the previous chapter, and the problems which are manifest within it.

Dewey's politico-educational project is a model of democratic education and is representative of both Dewey's interactional and institutional structure of education.  It should be understood as such because the existing structure of society outside of the school is challenged through education and by those being educated.  Dewey works within the existing state of affairs with the aim that the model of the school that he develops will come to enhance and change the model of society of which it is a part.  Dewey argues that school should not aim to prepare children to enter the world that exists now, but prepare them for society by breaking down the walls between school and the world around it.  This is democratic by Dewey's broader conception of democracy

which, as mentioned in Chapter 1, is defined as 'a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience'.[633]

Dewey's democratic education is best represented by his practical endeavour into education and schooling. During his tenure at the University of Chicago a primary school, commonly known as the Lab School or the Dewey School, was established under his guidance. The purpose of this school was two-fold, to contribute educational theory through analysis of practice and to contribute to the knowledge of educational practice through experiment.[634] The main principle of the Lab School was to create a, 'miniature community, an embryonic society'.[635] Therefore, Dewey's Lab School is an expression of democratic education because it aimed to develop a participatory democratic school. Liba H. Engel writes, '[t]he purpose was not to provide children with unbridled freedom but to help them grow toward effective social membership.'[636]

Katherine Mayhew and Anna Edwards wrote of their experiences working in the Lab School during Dewey's stewardship.[637] Mayhew and Edwards write,

> [t]he school felt and thought out its way as it went along. Its principle
> and practices were quite unlike those of contemporary method whether
> in the teaching or administrative area. The school was a social
> institution. Parents, teachers, administrators were joined in a search for
> a better way of schooling, where each individual whether child or adult,
> could have his [*sic*] chance for normal, happy growth and the satisfaction
> or creative expressions that was social in its character and purpose. In
> such a school, cooperation must replace competition, and the efforts of
> each must align, not vie, with one another in a search for a common
> end.[638]

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[633] Dewey, 'MW9', p. 93.

[634] Dewey, 'MW1'.

[635] *ibid*, p. 12.

[636] Liba H. Engel, 'Experiments in Democratic Education: Dewey's Lab School and Korczak's Children's Republic', *The Social Studies*, 99.3 (2008), 117–21 (p. 118).

[637] Katherine Camp Mayhew and Anna Camp Edwards, *The Dewey School: The Laboratory School of the University of Chicago 1896-1903* (S.l.: Mayhew Press, 2007).

[638] *ibid*, p. 365.

Dewey clarified the theory of the school in his own words.[639] Dewey comments that with no fixed plan for the school the teaching staff took the responsibility of applying and modifying the principles of the school to the conditions of the school. He writes, '[i]n avoiding hard and fast plans to be executed and dictation of method to be followed, individual teachers were if anything, not given enough assistance either in advance or by way of critical supervision.'[640] However, in spite of this, Dewey asserts that to err in this way was preferable to the alternative, with ends too fixed in advance. 'Whatever else was lost, vitality and constant growth were gained.'[641]

The principles of the school were worked out by the teachers cooperatively and through trial and error. Within the limits of the general principle of the school as an embryonic community with an emphasis on the connection between learning and active work, 'the development of concrete material and of methods for dealing with it was wholly in the hands of the teachers.'[642] There were weekly teachers meetings in which the prior week's experiences were discussed in the context of the general plan. The plan would be modified and adapted in light of the difficulties faced. The meetings 'translated' the abstract theory into the concrete teaching experiences and created a feedback loop between the two in an example of cooperative teaching practice, and a practical example of Deweyan pragmatic communal enquiry.

The clearest example of Deweyan democracy in action within the Lab School is in the construct of the curriculum. At the Lab School they did not teach discrete subjects. The concern was that by separating subjects out into separate bodies of knowledge the content becomes abstract and divorced from the world of the student, thereby, making the information difficult to process and contrary to the desires of the student. In

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[639] Reprinted in John Dewey, 'The University of Chicago School of Education', in *The Middle Works of John Dewey, 1899-1924, Volume 2: 1902-1903*, ed. by Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008), pp. 67–71. However, Dewey also wrote about the practices of the Lab School throughout his works, including but not limited to, 'Psychological Aspect of the School Curriculum', in *The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898, Volume 5: 1885-1898*, ed. by Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008), pp. 164–76; John Dewey, 'The University School', in *The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898, Volume 5: 1885-1898*, ed. by Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008), pp. 436–41.; and John Dewey, 'The University Elementary School', in *The Middle Works of John Dewey, 1899-1924, Volume 1: 1899-1901*, ed. by Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1976), pp. 317–20.
[640] Mayhew and Edwards (2007), p. 366.
[641] *ibid*.
[642] *ibid*, p. 367.

'Psychological Aspect of the School Curriculum', Dewey lays out his argument against teaching subjects as discrete bodies of knowledge. He argues that by defining the subject-material as distinct from the psychological aspects of the individual the question of method is reduced to one of how to most effectively teach pre-defined content which is fixed and decided outside of the classroom. Dewey perceives this as a grave mistake because it assumes that, 'facts and principles exist in an independent and external way, without organic relation to the methods and functions of mind.'[643] This then reduces the psychological aspect to what Dewey calls an 'empty gymnastic', and education becomes the training of powers such as perception, memory and judgement.[644]

Dewey writes, 'the primary point of concern in education is beyond question with the subject as a special mode of personal experience, rather than with the subject as a body of wrought-out facts and scientifically tested principles.'[645] Dewey uses geography to illustrate his point. According to Dewey, it is mistake to identify geography as the same thing for a young student as it is to a trained geographer because their life experiences differ. He writes, 'it is not a question of *how* to teach a child geography, but first of all the question *what* geography is for the child.'[646] It is Dewey's view that there is no set body of knowledge which can be circled off and identified as geography or any other subject. Instead, depending on perspective and interest any one event or fact can be understood in a number of different ways. Dewey illustrates this well when he writes,

> [t]ake a square mile of territory, for example; if we view it from one interest, we may have trigonometry; from another standpoint we should label the facts regarding it botany; from still another, geology; from another mineralogy; from another geography; from still another standpoint it would become historical material. There is absolutely nothing in the fact, as an objective fact, which places it under any one head.[647]

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[643] Dewey, 'EW5', p. 165.
[644] *ibid*.
[645] *ibid*, p. 169.
[646] *ibid*.
[647] *ibid*.

The alternative that Dewey proposes is what he refers to, somewhat misleadingly, as occupations.  They are a different way of understanding how to organise and classify the knowledge and skills developed in a school.  Instead of a body of knowledge classified by type and packaged as a discrete subject like maths, english, history, etc., Dewey repackages the information as a part of the interests of the student, i.e. through occupations learning becomes concrete and relatable.  Engel writes, 'a geographical or historical fact must be something the child can incorporate into his or her actions.'[648] Therefore, following the interest of the child, it was by occupations that Dewey organised a student's education.

Through occupations a student will be introduced to all subjects.  It is in this way that Dewey's Lab School was democratic because the education provided was directed by the students themselves.  Furthermore, Dewey's pedagogy is representative of democratic education because it aimed to break down the boundaries between school and community, encouraging the students to be members of that community, and engaging in the communal inquiry which sought change for better and for all.  The students of the Lab School were becoming, through practice, participants in a democratic society.[649]

Also, in evidence here is that Deweyan pedagogical practice was consonant with his principles of pragmatic enquiry and the interconnectedness of means and ends, which is a commitment to understanding ends not as ends of enquiry by as means to further ends. As discussed in Chapter 5, this means that aims and conclusions should always be understood within the context of the time that they come about and not the time in which they were conceived.  Therefore, ends are continually adjusted in light of the progress of enquiry and never fixed or beyond enquiry.  However, as discussed above, Dewey's conception of means and ends is not simply that ends need to be revisable.[650] Dewey is not only attacking the radical position attributed to figures such as Trotsky who claim explicitly that the ends justify the means.  Dewey is also attacking all ethical theories which pursue ends-in-themselves, ends which are disconnected from the means employed to achieve them.  To clarify, this does not mean that consideration of the

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[648] Engel (2008), p. 119.
[649] Dewey, 'MW9', p. 93.
[650] See, Chapter 5, pp. 147-151

means is weighed against the perceived ends and a decision of whether the means are justified is made on a cost analysis basis like the process of an insurance company. If this were the case then means and ends are not interrelated at all. The relationship between them is limited to whether the means are worth pursuing for the value of the end. Mantena states that this approach to the question of means and ends, 'tends to construe the problem of means narrowly, as a question of how to "apply" principles and norms to a specific set of institutional or policy situations.'[651]

In contrast to this narrow approach, Dewey perceives the relationship between means and ends to be much more intimate. The means themselves are derived from the end-in-view, that they are morally and causally connected to the perceived ends-in-view. It is for this reason that the ends are, while reasonably stable, also subject to continual change because as the means are employed the social environment alters and the collective enquiry receives additional data which must be considered and both the means and the ends-in-view thereby recalculated.

This point is illustrated clearly in the case of the pursuance of violent means for peaceful ends. It may be argued that there are instances, such as WWII, where the best or even the only means by which peace can be achieved is through acts of violence. G. D. H. Cole expresses this thought when in response to Mohandas Gandhi's argument that non-violence is the most effective weapon he writes as follows:

> But is it so when German and Italian airmen are massacring the Spanish
> people, when Japanese airmen are slaughtering thousands upon
> thousands in Chinese cities, when German armies have marched into
> Austria and are threatening to march into Czechoslovakia, when
> Abyssinia has been bloodily bombed into defeat? Until two years or so
> ago, I believed myself opposed to war and death-dealing violence under
> all circumstances. But to-day, hating war, I would risk war to stop these
> horrors. I would risk war; and yet, even now, that second self of mine
> shrinks back appalled at the thought of killing a man.[652]

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[651] Mantena (2012), p. 1.

[652] G. D. H. Cole, 'A Disturbing Book: Thoughts on Reading "Hind Swaraj"', *The Aryan Path*, 9.9 (1938), 429–32 (p. 432).

In this understanding of means and ends it is still the case that there is direct connection between the means employed and the ends-in-view, and that the means employed are revisable in light of new evidence or as the war progresses.  However, this is not how Dewey understands the relationship between means and ends.  Means and ends are related so intimately that the means define the ends and the ends define the means.  They are interrelated.  Therefore, if one employs violent means then the ends that result will be themselves violent.  There can be no peace from violence.  Violence can only manifest further violence.  Gandhi was a practitioner of means and ends understood in this way.  In his fight against imperialism pacifism was morally and instrumentally justified.  Gandhi argued that if violence was employed as a means for a free India then even if they were successful in shedding the yoke of British control the India that resulted would be one of violence.  In *Hind Swaraj*, Gandhi sets this argument out clearly written in conversation between an 'editor' who expresses Gandhi's message and a 'reader', an imagined Hindu nationalist.[653]  In response to the readers appeal to violence in response to violence done to the Indian people by the British Gandhi writes, 'It is perfectly true that they used brute force, and that it is possible for us to do likewise, but, by using similar means, we can get only the same thing that they got. You will admit that we do not want that.'[654]

The inverse of this formulation is taken to be true also.  If one visualises an end-in-view that represents their aim, then they must employ means which are consonant with it in order for it to be realised.  It is in this way that means are defined by ends and ends are defined by means, that they are interrelated.

Dewey's pedagogical practice is clearly a reflection of this as the teachers continually reflect on the student's needs and desires and frame their practice around these relatively stable but fluid ends.  Similarly, as was discussed in Chapter 3, this process takes place at the larger societal level also because the aim is that the form and values of society will shift over time through the continual re-evaluation of ends.[655]

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[653] Mohandas Gandhi, *Hind Swaraj and Other Writings,* Cambridge Texts in Modern Politics (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
[654] *ibid*, p. 81.
[655] Dewey, 'LW2', p. 245-61.

Authority is present in Dewey's democratic education, as it is in his larger politico-education project, in the role of the teacher or public official. Authority is also present in the norms and practice of society. I shall now draw out the definition, the source and the ontology of authority as they manifest within Dewey's conceptualisation.

In his most sustained discussion of authority Dewey objects to defining authority in opposition to freedom.[656] Dewey addresses the categorisation of freedom and authority as dichotomised poles. According to Dewey, the consequence of viewing freedom and authority in opposition to one another is that authority is condemned as the enemy of freedom. Authority is, as such, treated with great suspicion, and yet, in Dewey's view, it is necessary to employ authority as a tool to place limits on freedom and avoid it degenerating into license.[657] Dewey has in mind formulations of authority and freedom like that of Wolff who define them in opposition to one another and condemn them to incompatibility.

Instead of categorising freedom and authority in this way Dewey reframes them. 'The genuine problem', writes Dewey, 'is the *relation* between authority and freedom.'[658] Dewey recognises that authority is both essential and unavoidable. Therefore, the solution cannot be to seek its abolition. It is essential because there is no freedom without qualification, without limits on freedom it degenerates into license, without limits the freedom of one person will impose itself upon the freedom of another. This approach to authority has a striking resemblance to that of Neill who also sought a balance between what he called licence and discipline, in order to achieve freedom, but what Dewey categorises a balance between freedom and social control to avoid authoritarianism or licence.[659]

Social control, to some degree, is unavoidable because the human animal is a social animal who exists within their own social environment. A person's environment necessarily shapes who they are. Dewey writes,

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[656] Dewey, 'LW11', pp. 130–31.
[657] *ibid*, p. 131.
[658] *ibid*.
[659] *ibid*. See also, Dewey, 'LW13', p. 33.

> [w]hen tradition and social custom are incorporated in the working
> constitution of an individual, they have authority as a matter of course
> over his [*sic*] beliefs and his [*sic*] activities.  The forces that exert and
> exercise this authority are so much and so deep a part of individuals that
> there is no thought or feeling of there being external and oppressive.[660]

This is further illustrated in Dewey's discussion of legitimate social control in Chapter 3, in which he argues that there are legitimate constraints on freedom which are externally imposed such as the rules of a game.[661]  It is Dewey's view that authority exists as a part of social control and can be both legitimate and illegitimate depending upon its expression and context.  This translates into an important question regarding the role and practice of a teacher in their classroom.  The authority of the teacher over the students is a matter of concern for Dewey.  This concern occupies large portions of *Experience and Education*.[662]  Dewey is sensitive to the tension between freedom and authority and places a lot of weight on the competence of teachers in finding the balance between the two forces so that educative growth results from the relationship between teacher and student.  As stated above, guidance by the teacher, or other official, should be directed so that their intervention be, 'an aid to freedom, not a restriction upon it.'[663]

In light of this, one can confidently place Dewey's conception of authority alongside that of Rousseau's.  The difference between them is less their definition of what authority is, and more how to resolve the tensions created by authority.  Rousseau, as I explain above, in the differing accounts of freedom given in the *Social Contract* and *Émile*, establishes the tension between the citizen subject to the authority of the state and the individual educated to be free of all such coercion.  He finds the solution to this tension in the hearts and minds of people educated by nature and in their identification and application of the General Will.

However, it is unclear how Dewey overcomes the tension between the terms simply in virtue of perceiving them in relation to one another instead of in opposition to one another.  The answer lies somewhere within the concept of collective intelligence, which

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[660] Dewey, 'LW11', p. 134.
[661] This was discussed in detail in Chapter 3, pp. 81-87 & pp. 94-95.
[662] Dewey, 'LW13'.
[663] *ibid*, p. 46.

is posited as a new resource to bring together a coherent understanding of authority and freedom. Collective intelligence is Dewey's pragmatic method in practice within the political realm. Of collective intelligence Dewey writes,

> [i]t is authoritative in the field of beliefs regarding the structure of
> nature and relevant to our understanding of physical events… When we
> turn to the practical side, we can see that the same method is supreme
> in controlling and guiding our active dealings with material things and
> physical energies.[664]

According to Dewey, collective intelligence, as the foundation of authority, evidences a coherence between the freedom of the individual and authority within the realm of science and can do so in our moral and political life also. In spite of the reliance upon the freedom of the individual to advance knowledge and throw off the shackles of tradition, custom and accepted truth, 'the authority of science issues from and is based upon collective activity, cooperatively organised.'[665]

The difference which is most striking between Dewey's conceptualisation of authority and those of others is that Dewey does not appear to prohibit persuasion. Arendt, Friedrich, Weber and Raz all make no space for persuasion within authority but for different reasons. In the case of Arendt it is because adherence to authority is meant to be 'unquestioning'.[666] For Friedrich the quality of reasoned deliberation need never be expressed, it exists in a legitimate authority in potentiality, they do not need to convince others through the reasons behind their commands.[667] As for Weber, authority is built on preconceived beliefs, belief in the legitimacy or the right of that authority whether it be by a belief in the law, in tradition, or in the character of an individual.[668] Similarly, Raz stipulates that a person does not follow their own reason beyond the recognition of the

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[664] Dewey, 'LW11', p. 141.
[665] *ibid*, p. 142.
[666] Arendt (1970), p. 45.
[667] Friedrich (1958), p. 35.
[668] Weber (1978), p. 215.

superior reason of the authority.[669] Whereas Dewey identifies authority as building from communication with others. From this, one can gather that Dewey is attempting to resolve the tension between authority and freedom by justifying authority on different grounds.

Dewey seeks to find a resolution by supporting the necessity of authority on the shoulders of experts committed to enquiry. This leads into a consideration of the source of authority in Dewey. In neither Dewey or Rousseau does a person have authority in virtue of their position within society, nor because tradition dictates that they possess authority. It is in virtue of being an expert that we see authority recognised. As stated above, the tutor, not the parent, has authority over Émile. Rousseau writes, '[h]e ought to honour his parents, but he ought to obey only me. That is my first or, rather, my sole condition.'[670] The reason for this is because the tutor fulfils the criteria for the role, it is the fulfilment of the criteria, not the role itself, that the tutor is able to assume authority over the education of Émile. The Lawgiver mirrors this fiction. They cannot legitimately exercise authority unless they fulfil the criteria of the roles. According to Rousseau, the strict criteria are necessary in order to do the job. Therefore, the tutor and the Lawgiver are experts and it is their responsibility to make the people they are responsible for experts also.

The role that experts play in Dewey's political philosophy is different because a person is an expert not simply in virtue of fulfilling criteria but in engaging in the method of collective intellectual enquiry. However, authority of expertise raises the problem of unjustifiable constraints anew in that the elevation of scientific enquiry to the position of legitimate source of authority may impose upon the freedom of non-experts, thereby compromising Dewey's democratic commitments.[671]

Melvin L. Rogers responds to this concern in his analysis of Dewey's conception of authority and the role that expertise plays within it. It is Rogers' view that according to

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[669] Raz (1990b), p. 129. See, R. B. Friedman, 'On the Concept of Authority in Political Philosophy', in *Authority*, ed. by Joseph Raz, Readings in Social and Political Theory (Oxford, U.K: Basil Blackwell, 1990), pp. 56–91 (p. 64), for an alternative argument that seeks to identify the space in between rational persuasion and commands.

[670] 'Émile', *OC IV*, 267; *CWR Vol. 13*, p. 179.

[671] This phenomenon is explored in Clarence J. Karier's, 'Liberal Ideology and the Quest for Orderly Change', in *Roots of Crisis: American Education in the Twentieth Century*, by Clarence J. Karier, Paul C. Violas, and Joel H. Spring, Rand McNally Education Series (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1972), pp. 84–107.

Dewey, both experts and citizens possess authority, but they do so in different ways.  He writes, '[e]xperts come to gain cognitive authority and so become bearers of knowledge because of the audience they address.  Citizens are thus authorities just to the extent that it is their problems that create the framework in which expertise functions.'[672]  These problems are identified through the deliberation that occurs among the citizens.

Deliberation is central to Dewey's conception of legitimate authority.  Rogers identifies two points which illustrate the significance of deliberation.  Firstly, it is through deliberation that the problems are identified, and it is through deliberation that those identified problems are addressed.  As a consequence of this conflicts are brought out into the open where they can be addressed and understood.  Secondly, deliberation shapes how we come to understand problems and how those problems are contextualised within expert knowledge.  Rogers writes, '[t]hese two elements suggest that the authority and legitimacy of lay and expert knowledge gains whatever vitality it has from being forged through a deliberative process that makes each responsive to the other'.[673]  Therefore, authority justified by expertise persists only in collaboration with the general citizenry.  This is consistent with the Deweyan pedagogical practice.  The teachers are experts and guide education based upon their observations and interactions with the students under their charge.  However, they retain the decision-making power.  The teacher, like the public official, is the authority.

However, there remains a risk of the elevation of experts over the general citizenry.  This is seen in the two voices of the general citizenry.  There is the passive voice which is the, 'habitual dimension to the functioning of social life'.[674]  This requires trust in the existent institutions of that society as a condition of a well-functioning society.  Alongside the passive voice there must be space for an active voice also, one 'for sharing in and regulating the uses to which power will be put.'[675]  However, the scope and weight of the active voice is limited because it is mediated by the experts.  Therefore, a tension persists between the experts and the non-experts. To be clear, a tension persists not because experts close the door to an authentic active voice – it is entirely possible that they will

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[672] Melvin L. Rogers, 'Democracy, Elites and Power: John Dewey Reconsidered', *Contemporary Political Theory*, 8.1 (2009), 68–89 (p. 78).
[673] *ibid*, p. 79.
[674] *ibid*, p. 82.
[675] *ibid*, p. 83.

not take such oppressive measures – but, because of its position as the *de facto* authority. Therefore, experts, in virtue of this structure, possess within their authority the mechanisms of controlling the active voice which is, as a consequence, under its dominion. A person's freedom is therefore constrained in virtue of the fact that an authority passively persists over them which may silence their active voice arbitrarily. This is inconsistent with Dewey's definition of and commitment to democracy because it reduces Dewey's political philosophy to a defence of two classes of citizen. There persists two-classes of citizen even if expertise is more contextual, by which I mean, that some people exercise authority in some situations, but less so in others. This is because individuals in certain roles retain authority over others at all times of the relationship in virtue of their role, such as the teacher and public official. As noted in Chapter 1, Dewey's conception of democracy is built around achieving equal participation.[676] This obviously cannot be attained in a stratified model of citizenship.

Despite this problem in Dewey's conception of authority, Dewey does mediate the coercive strength of authority somewhat by shifting the locus of authority toward experience and knowledge, and away from traditional or 'arbitrary' authority. However, again mirroring Rousseau, the expertise of the teacher and the public official rests upon an ontological foundation of authority where it is understood as a property that a person or group has over another person or group.[677]

What is evident from the analysis of Dewey's pedagogical practice is that there is a great demand on the teacher to observe and guide the students in their charge. They are expected to display a high level of expertise in their teaching practice. Furthermore, it is the teacher along with their colleagues who consult, discuss, reflect on the student's needs and best practice. The teacher and the public official retain their position as leader. The community through enquiry have input but it is the head of authority which makes decisions and issues commands. Furthermore, while, according to Dewey, there should be little need to impose one's authority in a well-regulated environment, the ontological assumption persists across every interaction between teacher and students.

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[676] See, Garrison (1994), p. 13.

[677] Dewey discusses authority throughout his work but especially in, Dewey, 'LW13', pp. 1–62; and 'Authority and Social Change', in *The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925 - 1953. Volume 11: 1935 - 1937*, ed. by Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1998), pp. 130–45.

This section has addressed authority as it manifests in the politico-educational project of Dewey whose conception of authority significantly overlaps with Rousseau's. However, while Rousseau's project is educational in that the tutor, the Lawgiver, and the individual through reflection upon the General Will all operate as educators, Dewey's analysis of authority incorporates an explicit consideration of pedagogical practice alongside its philosophical theory, and is therefore more keenly educationally focussed. Furthermore, the difference between the two conceptions moves authority away from the insidious force which it plainly is within the writings of Rousseau.

## §7.3 Freire and the Problem of Authority

In the two previous sections I have argued firstly, that Rousseau and then that Dewey developed models of democratic education as the vehicle for the promulgation of their politico-educational projects and as justification of their methodological approach. I have then shown how that model of democratic education seeks to resolve the tension between the individual and society and more specifically the problem of authority. In this section I turn my attention to Freire. I claim that it is the case that for Freire also that the key vehicle for the realisation of his politico-educational project is a model of democratic education.

I have already provided an account of Freire's pedagogical theory and discussed the role and character of Freire's teacher above.[678] In this section I shall follow on from this conversation with an intention to identify Freire as having developed a model of democratic education which aims to alleviate the problem of authority. As such, much like above in the sections of Rousseau and Dewey, I shall firstly identify Freire's model of democratic education. I shall do this with a particular focus on Freire's pedagogical practice. Then I shall go on to identify how the authority manifests within his politico-educational project and how it fits within the categorisation of authority that I have developed in this thesis. That is, what is the definition of authority, the legitimate source of authority, and the ontological foundation of authority within Freire's politico-education

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[678] See, Chapter 4, pp. 117-121

project and how does this relate to the previous instantiations of authority already discussed.

According to Freire, the existing social order perpetuates the oppressor oppressed dynamic and therefore must be challenged through a radical and revolutionary pedagogy which reinterprets the world.  As can be seen in the process described above this is not something that can be easily undone and the student-teacher must continue to question and challenge the world around them and their understanding of it.  Therefore, Freire, contrary to Dewey, shares Rousseau's pessimistic attitude toward social control.  As Freire states, '[k]nowledge emerges only through invention and re-invention, through the restless, impatient, continuing, hopeful inquiry human beings pursue in the world, with the world, and with each other.'[679]

However, there is a significant similarity between Freire and Dewey in the model of democratic education that is developed by the revolutionary educators.  Both Dewey and Freire sought to break down the barriers between the school and society and build a participatory model of democratic education.  This is most clearly evidenced in the case of Freire when he became Municipal Secretary of Education in São Paulo responsible for 662 schools with 720 000 students from early years to 13-14 years of age, in addition to leading adult education and literacy training on his return from exile.  In 1989 he proposed a democratic education programme which aimed to develop responsible and critical citizens and widen access and participation in school.[680]  This was exemplified in Freire's *escola cididã* or Citizen School.  Schugurensky writes, '[t]hrough this project, Freire continued his proposals for popular education, but in the context of the public school and in relation to reforms in the school administration, pedagogical planning, curricular organisation, and school evaluation.'[681]  Freire describes the Citizen School clearly in an interview in 2000.  He said,

> "Citizen School is the one that considers itself a centre of rights and
> duties.  It is characterised by education for citizenship.  Thus, the Citizen
> School is the school that enables the citizenship of those who are in it

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[679] Freire (2017), p. 45.
[680] Schugurensky (2012), pp. 51–52.
[681] *ibid*, p. 52.

and those who come to it. It cannot be a citizen school in itself and for itself. It is a citizen school in the same measure as it exercises the construction of the citizenship of those who use its space. The Citizen School is a school that is coherent with freedom. It is coherent with its educational, liberating discourse. It is a school that, as it struggles to be itself, fights for the educates-educators to also be themselves. And, as nobody can be alone, the Citizen School is a community school, a school for camaraderie. It is a school for common production of knowledge and freedom. It is a school that experiences the tense experience of democracy."[682]

The Citizen School aimed to provide a model of dialogical education at both interactional and institutional levels through, 'more dialogical relations in the classroom and more democratic forms of management, including partnerships with local groups and with parents, with a view to participatory decision processes in terms of planning, implementation, and allocation of resources.'[683] It was thought that this would increase the level of autonomy of schools and the level of responsibility of the local community for their schools. Thereby ensuring a greater transparency of policies which were influenced by both school and government. This was achieved through policies such as the election of the principal and vice-principal of the school where parents and children received fifty percent of the electoral weight, and the teachers and staff fifty percent. Any elected administrator was then limited to a maximum of two terms in office. Gadotti and Torres, in reference to this greater level of influence in the school from the parents and local community claim that the Citizen School has much in common with communitarian education.[684] They draw this connection out when they write,

[t]he curriculum reveals the political-pedagogical trajectory of the school, its successes and failures. If the school is to continue the project

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[682] Quoted from, Schugurensky (2012), p. 52.
[683] Schugurensky (2012), p. 52.
[684] Moacir Gadotti and Carlos Alberto Torres, 'Freire's Education for Development: Past and Present', in *First Freire: Early Writings in Social Justice Education*, Multicultural Education Series (New York: Teachers College Press, Teachers College Columbia University, 2014), pp. 1–11, (p.7).

of its members — teachers, employees, students and community — the curriculum has to be intimately related to the life project of each one of them. That is why the curriculum needs to be constantly evaluated and re-evaluated. The project of an *escola cidadã* is considered, in terms of process and context, an institutional and individual life project.[685]

Therefore, through the interactional pedagogical practice of the revolutionary educators and the institutional model of education evidenced by the *escola cidadã* it is clear that Freire developed a model of education which was participatory, political, and a force of social change through reflection and dialogue. The overview of Freire's educational practice above illustrates a commonality with Dewey. The vision of democracy and democratisation of both Freire and Dewey focuses on the breaking down of the barriers between the school and society, between the school and the family, between the individual and the external forces which arrest humanisation or educative growth. However, unlike Dewey, the Freirean model of democratic education attempts to resist the path toward the authority of expertise as the legitimate source, and authority as a property expressed unilaterally, as the legitimate ontological foundation of authority.

The destructive form of authority practiced by the oppressors remains an historical fact. Both the oppressors and the oppressed recognise this authority and act in accordance with it. However, this is not a legitimate manifestation of authority according to Freire because its foundations are built upon the fear of freedom. The *de facto* authority of the oppressors is a clear example of authority understood as a property of a person or institution which is expressed unilaterally over those subject to its commands.

Although Freire astutely observes the problem of authority he does not clearly define authority at any point. This creates a difficulty in interpretation because it is equally clear that there are two different types of authority present in his conceptualisation. Bingham raises this concern and argues that it shows a lack of coherence in Freire's conception of authority. According to Bingham, Freire fails to escape a perceived dichotomy between authority and freedom as a result.[686] This

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[685] Gadotti and Torres (2014), p.8.
[686] Bingham (2008), p. 129.

happens in two ways. Firstly, he retains use of the terms that are at stake. While Freire offers a response to the problem of authority, Bingham argues that Freire continues to use the terms with the same definition as the dominant tradition to which his theory objects. Bingham writes, '[h]e refutes the mutually exclusive nature of authority and freedom, but does not provide any nuance for understanding the difference between the two.'[687] Secondly, Bingham accuses Freire of forcing a new definition of authority without explication or explanation. According to Bingham it is a reconciliation by fiat.[688] Bingham refers to Freire's claim in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* that authority will be 'on the side of freedom'.[689] Bingham claims that there is no substantive difference between authority on the side of freedom and banking education being used as an interim measure in the revolution, something Freire expressly denies the possibility of. Therefore, there is no account of, 'what authority actually does once it is on the side of freedom.'[690]

The source of authority in Freire's conceptualisation however is much clearer. It is found in problem-posing education. This is similar to Dewey, in that it is in the ongoing communal enquiry between peers that one can see the source of authority. However, it differs from Dewey because it makes no claim of epistemic authority as an output of that process. This is because the model of enquiry is designed to be sympathetic to the nuances and particularities of each community. The contradictions that have been perceived, coded, and decoded, in accordance with the problem-posing process, have been packaged in a systematic way with a sympathetic understanding of that community and returned to the community not as answers to be remembered and adhered to, 'but as problems to be solved.'[691] The unending process of humanisation is then cemented by the problems being discussed and solved together by the group but not with the end in mind of finding the answer but in finding answers that are then themselves problematised and are returned to the dialogical environment as new problems.[692]

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[687] Bingham (2008), p. 135.
[688] *ibid*.
[689] Freire (2017), p. 53.
[690] Bingham (2008), p. 135.
[691] Freire (2017), p. 96.
[692] For more detail on the practice of Freire's revolutionary educators see, Gadotti and Torres (2014).

Furthermore, the revolutionary educators who direct this educative process are neither epistemic authorities, nor are they representative of any other source of authority discussed in this or the previous chapter. This is because, as discussed in Chapter 4, the revolutionary educator must fulfil two criteria; they must be genuinely committed to the revolutionary cause, and must subvert the role of the teacher by not assuming authority and by participating in the learning and teaching process through communication.[693] Instead, it must be understood that it is the educative process itself which represents the legitimate source of authority.

This leads directly into the ontological foundations of Freirean authority. Freire, like Dewey, reframes authority as in union with freedom. However, in addition, Freire proposes that authority is understood dialogically where both the subject and the object of a dialogical exchange possess and expresses authority within their relationship with one another. Freire challenges the ontological assumption through an analysis of its imposition on the freedom of those subject to it, an imposition which extends beyond the particular instances of authority commands and into the psychology of those subject to possessive authority. People are systematically oppressed as a result of possessive authority because they are conditioned to accept both the commands and position of their superordinate, and their position as subordinate. Freire writes,

> [t]hrough dialogue, the teacher-of-the students and the students-of-the-teacher cease to exist and a new term emerges: teacher-student with students-teachers. The teacher is no longer merely the one-who-teaches, but one who is himself taught in dialogue with the students, who in turn while being taught also teach. They become jointly responsible for a process in which all grow. In this process, arguments based on "authority" are no longer valid; in order to function, authority must be *on the side of* freedom, not *against* it.[694]

The dialogical conception of authority is in evidence in the proposed reframing of the roles of student and teacher in Freire's problem-posing education. No longer is it the

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[693] Freire (2017), pp. 83–84.
[694] *ibid*, p. 53. [emphasis in original]

case that the teacher possesses the knowledge and authority in virtue of their role or their expertise, instead they possess authority through their participation in the dialogical process with their students. They must earn authority. One important aspect of a revolutionary educator earning authority is in their assuming the role of such. To be a revolutionary educator one must submit to a 'profound rebirth', an 'Easter experience', or 'class suicide'.[695] They must do this because without the sacrifice, the baggage of assumed knowledge from one's own experience will be imposed upon all new communities. This imposition will be an illegitimate form of authority and an expression of dehumanisation for both the educator and those students subject to the imposition.

Similarly, the students are reformed as students-teachers. The students participate in the learning as they participate in the teaching and the world is transformed by their word. Freire writes, 'the teacher-student and the students-teachers reflect simultaneously on themselves and the world without dichotomising this reflection from action, and thus establish an authentic form of thought and action.'[696]

However, because Freire retains an unclear definition of authority, and in consequence two competing conceptualisations – one legitimate and one illegitimate – how authority manifests within the role of the revolutionary leader becomes problematic. It is a delicate balance that Freire's revolutionary leaders are asked to perform. Freire writes, '[t]he leaders do bear the responsibility for co-ordination—and, at times, direction—but leaders who deny praxis to the oppressed thereby invalidate their own praxis.'[697] Jim Walker states that the rebirth which Freire demands of the revolutionary leaders is, 'what creates the greatest theoretical difficulties for him, and lays him open to charges of cynical totalitarian elitism, from sophisticated conservatives.'[698] The difficulty leads from Freire's justification of permissible authority.[699]

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[695] Freire describes the 'profound rebirth' in Freire (2017), p. 35; an 'easter experience' in Freire, 'Education, Liberation, and the Church', *Religious Education*, 79.4 (1984), 524–45, (p.525); and 'class suicide' in Freire (1978). These terms are referring to the same thing. The overcoming of one's particular world view in favour of the world view of the oppressed.

[696] Freire (2017), p. 56.

[697] *ibid*, p. 99.

[698] Walker (1981), p. 134.

[699] Walker is not the only person to see a problem of authority in Freire's pedagogy. See footnote 414 above.

It is clear that Freire perceives this as a potential problem because he seeks to strengthen and clarify the concept of legitimate authority, and its relationship to freedom in his later work, *The Pedagogy of Freedom*.  This is because a clear statement of freedom is lacking in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*.  However, in *Pedagogy of Freedom* Freire explicitly analyses the relationship between authority and freedom.[700]  Freire argues that there has been a fundamental misapplication of the concepts of freedom and authority in progressive education, and that which enables the individual to handle the relationship between them is discipline.  Discipline is understood by Freire as that which results from the harmony between authority and freedom because both are necessary and dependent upon the other.  We again can see echoes of Neill and Dewey's conceptions of freedom in this formulation.  Where Neill sought a balance between licence and discipline to reach freedom; and Dewey sought a balance between authoritarianism and licence to achieve freedom; Freire categorises it as a balance between authority and freedom, understood as absolute terms, to achieve discipline.

According to Freire, there is no such thing as absolute freedom.  Instead freedom is understood through necessary constraints.  He writes, '[f]reedom becomes mature in confrontation with other freedoms, defending its rights in relation to parental authority, the authority of teachers, and the authority of the state.'[701]  Freedom therefore, exists as the balance between two extremes; license and authoritarianism.  In Freire's words,

> [a]uthoritarianism and freedom with no boundaries are ruptures in the tense harmony between authority and freedom….  Both authoritarianism and freedom with no bounds are undisciplined forms of behaviour that deny what I am calling the ontological vocation of the human being.[702]

Only those practices that preserve a space for discipline, existing as it does in-between these two extremes, are ones that promote Freire's vocation.  The relationship

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[700] Freire, (1998b).
[701] *ibid*, pp. 96–97.
[702] *ibid*, p. 83.

between authority and freedom in the practice of discipline is one of mutual respect, which Freire calls autonomy.[703]

Freedom within the context of the learning environment is that which results from the relationship between the teacher of genuine democratic authority and the students of freedom, where each of these roles themselves is the result of the same dialectic between authority and freedom.[704] Freire argues that the revolutionary leader maintains authority in the role of teacher and that this legitimate authority is found in the revolutionary leader's self-confidence, professional competence, and true generosity. Furthermore, that if present and accompanied by the freedom of the students an environment, 'of respect that is born of just, serious, humble, and generous relationships' is cultivated and 'authentic educational experience' will result.[705]

In the analysis of the shortcomings of Freire's resolution to the tension between the individual and society in Chapter 4, I acknowledged that a tension persists in the authority of the revolutionary leaders. This tension, which arises in Freire's attempt to explain freedom and its relationship with authority, raises questions about the role of the teacher as revolutionary leader that Freire does not provide an adequate answer to. Regardless of the origin of the revolutionary leader, whether a member of the oppressed in origin or reborn to the side of the oppressed, in entering a community with the aim of freeing people from oppression questions are raised regarding paternalism and, possibly, elitism. This occurs despite Freire's sensitivity and focus on communication. In fact, it is emphasised as a result of Freire's commitment to class consciousness as a form of privileged knowledge.[706] If Freire cannot address this issue then there are serious consequences for the individual that results from the pedagogical practice because if the authority exercised by the revolutionary leaders is in any way coercive then the freedom

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[703] Freire, in developing a conception of freedom which results in autonomous action, has developed a conception of freedom belonging to the positive tradition. For a recent account of Freirean freedom see Jacinto Ordóñez, 'Paulo Freire's Concept of Freedom: A Philosophical Analysis' (unpublished PhD, Loyola University Chicago, 1981) <http://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_di-ss/2208>. This is in contrast with the negative tradition which defines freedom as a freedom to do as one pleases. See footnote 311 above.

[704] Au, in describing the Freirean learning environment, writes, '[w]ithin his framework, students and teachers are not automatically "equals" in that their relationship is not completely horizontal.' Au (2009), p. 223.

[705] Freire (2017), p. 86.

[706] Freire (1994), pp. 24–27.

experienced as a result of their teaching is undermined by their practice and ultimately illusory.

This paternalist or elitist concern is intimately connected to the other limitations in Freire's resolution to the tension between the individual and society discussed in Chapter 4 because the justification of force as an 'act of love' performed by the revolutionaries is a violent manifestation of the paternalist ethic. Furthermore, as I argued in Chapter 4, it is never in the interests of the state to implement an agenda of problem-posing education because those interests continue to be in tension with the members of the state.

This chapter has shown that the problem of authority persists within the politico-educational projects of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire but that it does so in different ways. In the case of Rousseau, a tension between authority and freedom persists interactionally in the relationship between authority figures, such as the tutor and the Lawgiver, and those subject to their authority. But it also persists institutionally in the relationship between the private and public realms, in the relationship between the General Will and the freedom to live as one pleases. In the case of Dewey, the tension between authority and freedom persists in the relationship between experts and non-experts at both interactional and institutional levels, because citizens affect change through the participatory democratic conversation. The tension persists because, if experts possess an authority over the non-experts then they do so at the expense of the non-experts equal voice in both their everyday interactions and in the construct of society, i.e. institutionally. Lastly, as we have just seen, in the case of Freire this tension is not dissolved either. However, it is a problem even more central to Freire than either Rousseau or Dewey because Freire's pedagogy is explicitly revolutionary. It is its stated aim that the oppressed free themselves from their oppression, an oppression exerted over them by the authority of existing social norms and the people who assume authority in the roles of oppressors. It seeks to challenge and replace existing power relations.

As such, one must give an account which can respond to the problems identified within the projects of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire which persist in the classroom today. In the following chapter I shall present a critique of contemporary solutions to the problem of authority through models of democratic education. In doing so I shall set the stage for my conclusion in which I argue that the best avenue for addressing the tension

between the individual and society, and, within that, the problem of authority, is through internally democratic schools and the disestablishment of education and state.

**Chapter 8**

**Democratic Education**

## §8.0  Summary

In the previous chapter the problem of authority was explored in the context of the politico-educational projects of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire.  Their conceptualisations of authority were developed and identified with reference to the three aspects of authority from Chapter 6.  These were then addressed with reference to the models of democratic education proposed by Rousseau, Dewey and Freire as a resolution to the problem of authority was sought.  However, not one of Rousseau, Dewey or Freire provided a coherent response to the problem of authority.  In Rousseau's case this is because of the concealed control exercised by the authority figures of his political project.  Dewey, on the other hand, places too great a weight on the authority of experts and in the capability of the existing institutions to exact change.  Lastly, Freire, despite his efforts to frame freedom and authority as a false dichotomy, fails to escape the ontological assumption that underpins monological accounts of authority.

Contemporary models of democratic education continue to address the challenge posed by the tension between the individual and society and the problem of authority as an instantiation of that tension.  These accounts have much in common with those developed by Rousseau, Dewey and Freire both in the problems that they are designed to solve and the shortcomings that they suffer.  In this chapter I shall draw out that overlap with illustrations of how the insights of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire in conversation with one another point toward a resolution to the problem of authority through democratic education for the realisation of the Critical Citizen.  I shall do this by introducing educational practice with respect to citizenship and democracy in the UK since the Crick Report which made citizenship education in England and Wales compulsory in 1998.  This will lead into an analysis of education *within* democracy as a model of democratic education and a defence of the democratisation of education.  I shall argue that democracy *within* education is open to the objection that the citizen that operates as its aim is too prescriptive or defined in reference to existing value systems that wish to be

perpetuated. In contrast, models of democratic education which I categorise as being models of the democratisation of education resolve the concerns of preestablished aims. My response will constitute my recommendation for the interactional structure of education – that of internally democratic schools. This shall lead into an analysis of the tension between the interests of the subjects of education and the interests of external authorities over education, such as the state and the economy. I shall conclude in favour of what I refer to as federated disestablishment which aims to protect those in education from coercive force. This is my second recommendation and the institutional structure of education that I defend. Together with internally democratic schools a broadly defined model of education is defended which is conducive to the realisation of the Critical Citizen.

## §8.1 UK Citizenship Education

The question of democratic education is not consigned to theory. It is a live political and social issue that is being played out in schools and parliaments everyday across the world. In the following section I shall describe the democratic education, as it manifests as a result of citizenship education policy and practice, in the UK since the publication of the Crick Report in 1998. Evident within the teaching policy and practice of citizenship education in the UK are the competing ideologies of successive governments and as such it serves as the foundation upon which a model of democratic education in the UK must be built.

As noted in Chapter 6, the claim that a person should receive some model of citizenship education is broadly defended but the form and content of this education is hotly disputed. This is in evidence in the United Kingdom through the changing vision of compulsory citizenship education since being introduced. It is for this reason that post-Crick Report citizenship shall be the specific focus for framing my arguments in the education context.[707]

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[707] The reason for this narrow focus is instrumental. It provides a useful context for comparative analysis with the theory that I have developed throughout the thesis, and, additionally, citizenship education in England has undergone substantive political and theoretical change over the last twenty years that make it particularly suitable for the analysis that I offer. For a broader context, there is substantial literature on

The citizen of the Crick Report contains within it elements of both the liberal and republican traditions with an emphasis on participatory democracy. Therefore, one can immediately see within it elements which are consonant with Rousseau and Dewey. While Crick refers to the view expressed by the report as one of civic republicanism, it takes on distinctly liberal notions also.[708] It places itself within the narrative of the classical debate and as following on from the liberal theory of T. H. Marshall and the former Speaker of the House of Commons Bernard Weatherill's Commission on Citizenship, *Encouraging Citizenship*.[709] In the case of the former, the Crick Report retains the three elements of citizenship identified by Marshall in 'Citizenship and Social Class'; the civil, the political, and the social.[710] The civil element stresses a reciprocity between rights and duties; the social adds to the welfare state defended by Marshall a focus on community and voluntary engagement; and the political element emphasises the importance of political understanding and action which will inform one's civic spirit and voluntary activity.[711] This is done with the aim of developing a form of 'active citizenship'. The Crick Report adds the stronger tones of 'active citizenship' from the Commission on Citizenship to Marshall's three elements of a citizen, but supposedly goes beyond both because neither Marshall nor the aforementioned commission focus on the importance of learning political understanding and action. The report states,

> [p]erhaps it took political citizenship for granted (which, historically,
> it has never been safe to do). Civic spirit, citizens' charters and
> voluntary activity in the community are of crucial importance, but
> individuals must be helped and prepared to shape the terms of such
> engagements by political understanding and action.[712]

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citizenship education and its practice within the UK as a whole and across many countries. The most ambitious of which has been the IEA Civic Education Study which is participated in by 94,000 14 year olds across 24 countries, Wolfram Schulz and others, *Becoming Citizens in a Changing World: IEA International Civic and Citizenship Education Study 2016 International Report* (Springer Open, 2018).

[708] On the underlying theory of Crick's approach to citizenship see, Bernard Crick, *Essays on Citizenship*, Continuum Studies in Citizenship (London ; New York: Continuum, 2004); Crick (1999), 337–52; Bernard Crick, *In Defence of Politics*, (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2011).

[709] *Encouraging Citizenship: Report of the Commission on Citizenship*, ed. by Stationery Office (London: H.M.S.O, 1990).

[710] Marshall (1950).

[711] *Crick Report* (1998), pp. 9–13.

[712] *ibid*, p. 10.

With this in mind, one can describe the citizen of the Crick Report as a person with rights and responsibilities across the three elements of the citizen.  The citizen of the Crick Report embodies, in the plainest terms, the tension between the individual and society that persists in all conceptions of the citizen.  Additionally, the Crick Report includes within its conception of the citizen a respect for the rule of law.[713]  The strength of this proclamation is mitigated somewhat by an encouragement to see the difference between law and justice.  The report states, 'Citizens must be equipped with the political skills needed to change laws in a peaceful and responsible manner.'[714]  Therefore, the citizen of the Crick Report must find the balance between their being subject to the laws of the society of which they are a part, and an active challenger of those laws.  This feature of the citizen emphasises both the rights of the individual but also the individual's responsibility to the state and their local, national and global communities.  These rights and responsibilities are not solely to be enjoyed passively.  The citizen of the Crick Report is an active member of society through voluntary and political action and awareness.

The stated aim and purpose of the Crick Report is,

> to make secure and to increase the knowledge, skills and values
> relevant to the nature and practice of participatory democracy; also
> to enhance the awareness of rights and duties, and the sense of
> responsibilities needed for the development of pupils into active
> citizens; and in so doing to establish the value to individuals, schools
> and society or involvement in the local and wider community.[715]

Further to this, the report states that an understanding of the democratic apparatus and the bodies of the democratic state is necessary to perceive the relationship between political activity and civil society, and 'to cultivate awareness and concern for world affairs and global issues.'[716]

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[713] *Crick Report* (1998), p.10.
[714] *ibid*.
[715] *ibid*, p. 40.
[716] *ibid*.

The education of students which is designed to cultivate the Crickian citizen is composed of three strands.  There is social and moral responsibility, which constitutes the learning of, 'self-confidence and socially and morally responsible behaviour… towards those in authority and towards each other'; community involvement, which involves learning about and becoming involved in one's local community; and political literacy, a term at the heart of Crick's political theory which is described in the Crick Report as, '[p]upils learning about and how to make themselves effective in public life through knowledge, skills and values.'[717]

The aims of citizenship education in the Crick Report are identified by the declared learning outcomes.  The learning outcomes recommended by the Crick Report are separated into four categories: concepts; values and dispositions; skills and aptitudes; and knowledge and understanding.[718]  This is a particular approach to curricula which focusses primarily on achieving clearly established goals.  This is in contrast to content based models which construct curricula, 'on the basis of a pre-existing body of knowledge'; and process models which organise curricula, 'around a set of general pedagogical principles (such as fostering enquiry) or discipline-specific skills (such as developing empathy in history).'[719]

The Crick Report was never fully implemented into the education system of the United Kingdom largely because a standing commission on citizenship education was never established.[720]  It is the theoretical foundations on which citizenship education was

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[717] *Crick Report* (1998), pp. 40–41.  See also, Bernard Crick and Alex Porter, *Political Education and Political Literacy: The Report and Papers of, and the Evidence Submitted to, the Working Party of the Hansard Society's 'Programme for Political Education'.* (London: Longman [for] the Hansard Society, 1978).

[718] A complete statement or overview of what is required in citizenship education by the end of compulsory schooling is covered by these four categories.  See 'Appendix I' for a complete list of the learning outcomes from the Crick report.

[719] Tristan McCowan, *Rethinking Citizenship Education: A Curriculum for Participatory Democracy*, Continuum Studies in Educational Research (London; New York: Continuum, 2009), p. 92.  See, Jerome S. Bruner, *The Process of Education* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), for an analysis of the three major models of curricula and a defence of the process model.

[720] Furthermore, there is a discrepancy between the Crick Report and the curriculum that was introduced with respect to the language of learning outcomes within the curriculum.  However, it is unclear whether the shift away from the language of outcomes was more than merely one of words.  Janet Harland writes of the curriculum that, 'there is a clear endorsement of the learning outcomes as set out in the Crick Report.' Janet Harland, 'A Curriculum Model for Citizenship Education', in *Education for Citizenship*, ed. by Denis Lawton, Jo Cairns, and Roy Gardner, Continuum Studies in Citizenship (London; New York: Continuum, 2000), pp. 54–63 (p. 61). For this reason, I shall speak of the citizenship education in the UK at this time as having a learning outcome model of curriculum.  For the full list of recommendations made by the Crick Report see, Appendix II.

established but those foundations shifted with the policies of the governing party. This is important because the political shift that takes place in the policies of citizenship education and education more generally within the UK is a practical instance of the debate surrounding citizenship discussed above in Chapter 1. The changes to citizenship education since the inception of the Crick Report illustrate a political and ideological shift away from the political literacy of Bernard Crick and toward a more communitarian volunteerism promoted by the British Conservative Party.

Since its inception in 2002 there has been substantive change in the curriculum which has led citizenship education away from the original sentiments of the Crick Report. There has been a definite move away from the outcome model of curriculum and towards a content model. The most recent iteration of the curriculum was introduced in 2014 and focuses primarily on the knowledge that each person should gain and not the skills, concepts and values that were also central to the curriculum previously. Lee Jerome identifies the change in the role that rights and responsibilities play within the curriculum as a key indicator of the move. He writes,

> [i]n 2007 the curriculum included a range of content and guidance to explain how rights developed in different contexts, often through a process of struggle, and that responsibilities varied between individual, communities and government and thus opened up the concept to critical exploration. By contrast, the 2014 curriculum limits itself to the observation that, in relation to the underlying concepts, the curriculum should "develop" … and then "deepen" "pupils' understanding of… the rights and responsibilities of citizens."[721]

Jerome identifies, in addition to the Department for Educations stated aim to focus on essential knowledge, an ideological bias present in the language of the new curriculum. Jerome highlights the phrase 'precious liberties enjoyed' as illustrative of this

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[721] Lee Jerome, 'What Do Citizens Need to Know? An Analysis of Knowledge in Citizenship Curricula in the UK and Ireland', *Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education*, 48.4 (2018), 483–99 (p. 487).

bias in that instead of pupils learning the struggle for rights, as they did previously, they now are to be taught of passively enjoyed freedoms which, 'should be appreciated as "precious", which implies a somewhat reverential tone.'[722]

Furthermore, a change has occurred in the aims of citizenship education alongside the UK's governmental response to terrorism.  The Prevent Strategy presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department in June 2011 outlined, amongst other things, the government's plans to minimise the risk of children and vulnerable people being "radicalised".[723]  The Prevent Strategy defines radicalisation as 'the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism.'[724]  Terrorism is defined by UK law in the Terrorism Act 2000 section 1, as a violent act performed in order to influence government and advance some political, religious or ideological cause.[725]  Therefore, I see little controversy in a governmental strategy to minimise the risk of terrorist acts.  However, the Prevent Strategy defines extremism as, 'vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs.'[726]  This definition has been a cause of some concern.

The recently published report by the Select Committee on Citizenship and Civic Engagement entitled, *The Ties That Bind*, recommended that fundamental British values be reframed as 'Shared Values of British Citizenship' because, '[i]t should recognise that the values are both shared with people from other countries and are essentially British.[727] However, in addition to this it is important to take note that democracy as a form of rule and the rule of law are both defined as essential values of the British citizen.  Therefore, the existing authority relations are defined as necessary in society and in the individual.

Accompanying the changes in citizenship education, it has been noted that there has been a decline in citizenship education within the UK.  The decline in citizenship education has a number of contributing factors according to the report.  One of which is the revision of the national curriculum in 2014.  The other reasons cited are the

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[722] Jerome (2018), p. 487.
[723] Home Office, *Prevent Strategy* (Norwich: TSO, 2011).
[724] *ibid*, p. 108.
[725] *Terrorism Act*, 2000.
[726] *Prevent Strategy* (2011), p. 107.
[727] *The Ties That Bind*, p. 18.

academisation of schools, meaning a reduction in those schools obligated to teach citizenship education; 'the low esteem in which the subject appears to be held'; and 'the decrease in the numbers of trained teachers and the corresponding fall in numbers taking Citizenship GCSE.'[728]

A further concern raised by *The Ties That Bind* is with respect to the UK's approach to what constitutes an "active citizen".  The meaning of which has shifted with the political landscape since the publication of the Crick Report.  No longer is the active citizen a politically engaged person but primarily one who is engaged within their local and national communities through their voluntary associations.  In the report it is written, '[a]ctive citizenship is too often defined purely in terms of volunteering, social action, or learning facts, and too rarely in terms of learning about and practicing democracy in the sense of political engagement and democratic participation.'[729]  This charge is levelled at both compulsory and post-compulsory citizenship programmes.

A major source of this shift is found in the influence of 'modernisers' within the British Conservative Party which has been the governing party in the United Kingdom since 2010.  Once the popularity of the Conservative Party had waned under the burden of Thatcherism in the 1990s, political alternatives gained popularity within the party.  One such thread was communitarianism.[730]  With the launch of David Cameron's Big Society in 2010 this communitarian ideology became the mainstream conservative platform.  The Big Society aimed at developing policies which encouraged community action and dissolved certain powers into these communities.[731]  This has been described as a move away from the strong individualism and libertarian influence of Thatcherism that was dominant throughout the 1980s but there are themes which persist.[732]  This is because both seek to decentralise authority and place the burden of responsibility upon the

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[728] *The Ties That Bind*, pp. 4–5.
[729] *ibid*, p. 10.
[730] This is evidenced David Willetts, *Civic Conservatism* (London: Social Market Foundation, 1994), a shift in policies that speak of social justice, and David Cameron's leadership.
[731] Daniel Sage, 'A Challenge to Liberalism? The Communitarianism of the Big Society and Blue Labour', *Critical Social Policy*, 32.3 (2012), 365–82.
[732] Jay Wiggan, 'Something Old and Blue, or Red, Bold and New? Welfare Reform and the Coalition Government', in *Social Policy Review 23: Analysis and Debate in Social Policy, 2011.*, ed. by Chris Holden, Majella Kilkey, and Gaby Ramia (Bristol: Policy Press, 2011), pp. 25–44; and Nick Ellison, 'The Conservative Party and the Big Society', in *Social Policy Review 23: Analysis and Debate in Social Policy, 2011.*, ed. by Chris Holden, Majella Kilkey, and Gaby Ramia (Bristol: Policy Press, 2011).

individuals, whether that be in the context of their community or not.  The National

Citizenship Service (NCS) announced by the then Prime Minister David Cameron in 2010,

and formally established through the National Citizen Service Act 2017, is a flagship

government programme which reflects these communitarian sympathies.[733]

The conservative communitarianism that has been assurgent over the last twenty

years has shifted the conception of the citizen away from Crick's emphasis on the

political.  Reflected in the subsequent iterations of the curriculum for citizenship

education the concept of active citizenship has returned to something more reminiscent

of Bernard Weatherill's Commission on Citizenship, *Encouraging Citizenship*.[734]  The civic

spirit of Weatherill's active citizen trades little on political understanding and action,

focussing instead on citizen's charters and voluntary action in their community.  They are

in Westheimer's typology introduced in Chapter 5, the responsible citizen and the

participatory citizen, but they are not social-justice oriented citizens.[735]

There are numerous education initiatives in the UK which aim to offer an alternative

model of citizenship or character education.  One such initiative, developed by Unicef UK,

is the Rights Respecting Schools Award (RRSA), which is practiced within the United

Kingdom to some level by 4,500 schools.[736]

The RRSA provides a sharp contrast to the recent move away from political literacy.

The RRSA started in 2004 and helps schools to use the United Nations Convention of the

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[733] The NCS runs a two and a four week programme with three parts; adventure activities, skills for work and life, and local social action projects for 15-17 year olds.  See, www.ncsyes.co.uk for more information.  The NCS was a focus of direct concern in *The Ties That Bind*, according to the report the NCS, 'needs to do more to ensure quality across providers of democratic engagement and young people's involvement in project choice and development' and emphasise the political more in its branding and communication. *The Ties That Bind* (2018), p. 51.

[734] *Encouraging Citizenship*, (1990).

[735] See, Westheimer (2015); and Westheimer and Kahne (2004).

[736] Right Respecting Schools are one scheme designed for state schools to practice around and beyond the provisions of state sector education.  Other examples of this are Co-operative Schools, Forest Schools, Human Scale Education, Learn to Lead, Learning without Limits, and RSA Opening Minds.  For more on alternatives in education within the private and public sectors see, Fiona Carnie, *Alternative Approaches to Education: A Guide for Teachers and Parents*, Second Edition (London; New York: Routledge, 2017); and *Alternative Education for the 21st Century: Philosophies, Approaches, Visions*, ed. by Philip A. Woods and Glenys J. Woods, 1st ed (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).  While each of these approaches to state education have a degree of overlap with the project addressing the tension between the individual and society in virtue of stepping outside of the prescribed norms of state education, the focus of Rights Respecting Schools on the political aspect of learning establish that model as the most pertinent in contrast to the government's communitarian volunteerism.

Rights of the Child (CRC) as their values framework.[737] There are four key areas of impact for children at a Rights Respecting School; wellbeing, participation, relationships and self-esteem. These four areas are reached through three strands: teaching and learning about rights; teaching and learning through rights – ethos and relationships; and teaching and learning for rights – participation, empowerment and action.

In the first strand the children learn what their rights are as persons with reference to the CRC, and teachers, non-teaching staff, and carers are also made to learn the CRC. Together, 'this shared understanding [is used] to work for improved child wellbeing, school improvement, global justice and sustainable living.'[738] The second strand represents the practice of employing one's rights inside the school and in accordance with the values attached to the rights of the CRC. To quote from the Unicef website,

> [c]hildren, young people and adults collaborate to develop and maintain
> a school community based on equality, dignity, respect, non-
> discrimination and participation; this includes learning and teaching in a
> way that respects the rights of both educators and learners and
> promotes wellbeing.[739]

The third strand encompasses the passive enjoyment of rights, the active application of one's rights, and empowerment to promote the rights of others locally and globally. Evidence of teaching these three strands will result in a school being accredited by Unicef as a Rights Respecting School.

This is a relatively new education initiative and as such research on its effects within schools is quite limited but initial findings are quite positive. Sebba and Robinson published an evaluation of Rights Respecting Schools in 2010.[740] Their main findings were that the education initiative, 'had a profound effect on the majority of schools involved in the programme. For some school communities, there is strong evidence that it has been

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[737] For a breakdown of the rights covered by United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child see Appendix III.

[738] https://www.unicef.org.uk/rights-respecting-schools/the-rrsa/the-rrsa-strands/

[739] *ibid*

[740] Judy Sebba and Carol Robinson, *Evaluation of Unicef UK's Rights Respecting Schools Award* (University of Brighton, September 2010).

a life-changing experience.'[741]  The main findings relate to six indicators: knowledge and understanding of the CRC; relationships and behaviour; pupils attitudes of empowerment towards the environment and the rights of others locally, nationally, and globally; pupil's ability to demonstrate positive attitudes towards an inclusive and diverse society; pupils level of active participation in the decision-making of their school; and pupil attainment. Additionally, Katherine Covell's recent paper, 'School Engagement and Rights-Respecting Schools' explores the impact of Rights Respecting Schools in Hampshire.[742]  Evidence in Hampshire of their Rights Respecting Responsibility (RRR) initiative, which is tied closely to the Unicef RRSA, indicates an increase in pupil engagement according to both teacher and to the pupils.  Unicef's more recent publication, *Safe, Respected, Engaged*, supports these findings also.[743]

The Critical Citizen, as defined in Chapter 5, differs from the Crickean Citizen, communitarian volunteerism, and the Rights Respecting Citizen, although it contains elements of each.  The primary difference is that the Critical Citizen is defined through the search for the values the subjects of education choose to embody.  It is a bottom-up rather than a top-down model of citizenship.  The Critical Citizen is therefore methodologically prior to its form or content and does not, as a matter of necessity, embody the values – perceived or imagined – of existing society.

One essential aspect which they all share is that they are all models of democratic education broadly understood.  This is because a proponent of democratic education may argue in favour of an education in the democratic institutions of society and the democratic virtues and values perceived as essential for membership in that society. However, a proponent of democratic education often defends a more extensive practice. Often democratic education aims to develop democratic skills in addition to democratic virtues.  These skills are needed for an individual to effectively participate within and challenge the authority of democratic society.  It is often argued that these skills are

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[741] Sebba and Robinson (2010), p. 3.

[742] Katherine Covell, 'School Engagement and Rights-Respecting Schools', *Cambridge Journal of Education*, 40.1 (2010), 39–51.

[743] Unicef published an impact report, 'Safe, Respected, Engaged', in 2017 which reports significant decrease in bullying, increase in happiness, improved relationships between pupils and staff accompanied by a decrease in behavioural problems, and increase in attainment and engagement with one's learning. See, *Safe, Respected, Engaged* (Unicef, 2017), <https://www.unicef.org.uk/rights-respecting-schools/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2018/05/Rights-Respecting-Schools_Impact-2017_180418_Final.pdf>, for the full report.

learned through practice, although this is not always the case. In the next section I shall address the disagreement about the form of the citizen through an analysis of competing models of democratic education. I do so to highlight how the Critical Citizen escapes this conversation and to motivate my defence of internally democratic schools as the interactional structure that is best suited for the development of that citizen.

## §8.2 The Citizen of Democratic Education

There are two approaches to democratic education, broadly conceived. The first, education *within* democracy, is firmly placed within the tradition of civic education discussed above. It aims to educate its members to develop the values, virtues and mind-set of the existing societal norms. Whereas, the second broad category of democratic education, the democratisation of education, aims to empower its members, not by simply preparing them to participate in existing society, but to challenge society through active participation and engagement.[744] This distinction prioritises opposite sides of the tension between the individual and society and is therefore illustrative of that tension. Educating a person to enter society as it is and embody the values of that society is an education for society because the individual has been subsumed by a collective identity which is identified as essential for the continued stability of that society. Whereas,

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[744] The distinction between education *within* democracy and the democratisation of education is similar to, and inspired by, the distinction drawn by Meira Levinson. Levinson defines 'education *within* democracy' as that which refers to a 'democratically justified educational system.' Meira Levinson, *No Citizen Left Behind* (Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England: Harvard University Press, 2014), p. 259. In education within democracy the focus is on the place of education within a democratic system and how it is measured, assessed, and controlled by the citizens of society. The other meaning of democratic education according to Levinson is education *for* democracy which is a model of empowered citizenship. A model which is 'egalitarian, collective, engaged, inclusive, eclectic, change-oriented rather that status-quo-preserving, responsive to lived experience as opposed to embodying solely theoretical ideals, informed by knowledge, enabled by skills, made consistent by habit, and motivated by efficacious, responsible, and critical attitudes.' Levinson (2014), p. 257. For Levinson education *for* democracy refers to democratic education when '[y]oung people are at the centre … and their civic empowerment is its primary goal', and education *within* democracy 'focuses not on youth but on adults, and on the extent to which public schools must be subject to democratic deliberation and citizen control in order to be legitimate.' Levinson (2014), p. 259. The difference between the distinction that I draw and that drawn by Levinson is that I resist using the term 'democracy' or 'democratic' to refer to the state itself. Therefore, I re-categorise the distinction in order to separate out the democratic state from democratic practice. Following Levinson, I refer to education *within* democracy as those models of democratic education which aim to education citizens for a democratic society, but, instead of education *for* democracy, I employ the term, 'the democratisation of education' to describe models of democratic education which aim to practice democracy as a method for developing critical, questioning, and autonomous individuals.

educating a person to be critical and questioning in their engagement with society; to be active and challenge the existing state of affairs; and to aim to retain the autonomy of the individual by encouraging their free development independent of perceived values of existing society, is an education for the individual.

In this section I shall challenge the justifiability of education *within* democracy by exploring the complications involved in ideas of the citizen who possess declarative virtues and embody a prescriptive character.  The issue of the form of the citizen relates directly back to the content of Chapter 5 in which I define and defend a model of the citizen that I refer to as the Critical Citizen.  This section supplements the discussion and supports the model of the citizen defined in Chapter 5 and links together the analysis of citizenship education in the UK with the theoretical work designed to address the issue of citizenship through democratic education.  Additionally, and crucially, it provides the backdrop to make the first of my two interconnected recommendations for the realisation of the Critical Citizen –internally democratic schools.  These schools are representative of the democratisation of education and it is through this model of democratic education that top-down models of the citizen are effectively overcome.

What constitutes the set of virtues for the citizen differs markedly across educational theory.  Amy Gutmann's conceptualisation of democratic education is arguably the most significant contribution to the discussion since Dewey's *Democracy and Education*.[745]  The education received aims to cultivate democratic virtues and a 'conscious social reproduction', which Gutmann identifies as, 'the ways in which citizens are or should be empowered to influence the education that in turn shapes the political values, attitudes, and modes of behaviour of future citizens.'[746]  Gutmann does not give an exhaustive list of democratic virtues and nor would she want to, because the function of conscious social reproduction is to permit change over time.  However, it is important to note that the virtues of the democratic character, according to Gutmann, are

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[745] Michael W. McConnell calls *Democratic Education*, 'perhaps the most important recent book on the relation between education and the American political regime'. Michael W. McConnell, 'Education Disestablishment: Why Democratic Values Are Ill-Served by Democratic Control of Schooling', in *Moral and Political Education*, Nomos, XLIII, 2002, pp. 87–146 (p. 94); and Nancy Rosenblum writes of *Democratic Education*, '[i]t is more than just another contribution to the genre of philosophy and public affairs. *Democratic Education* is exemplary.' Nancy L. Rosenblum, 'Review: Democratic Education, by Amy Gutmann', *American Political Science Review*, 82.4 (1988), 1355–56 (p. 1355).

[746] Gutmann (1999), p. 14.

equivalent to the deliberative character.[747]  Recently, Gutmann was asked what constitutes deliberative character, she responded,

> [f]oremost among the skills and virtues necessary for conscious social reproduction – which is not mindless replication but rather mindful change over time – are those of deliberation.  Future citizens need both the tools and the motivation to attend to different – sometimes vastly different – perspectives and to be able to discern what a society should maintain or change, and why.  The cultivation of truth-seeking and truth-telling, tolerance and mutual respect, the skills and virtues of robust yet reasoned debate, a willingness to forge and support beneficial compromises in decision-making, and a basic understanding of the value of deliberation – as well as its limits – all are keys to improving pluralist democratic societies.[748]

Gutmann's model of democratic education and the citizen that inhabits it is but one of countless attempts to define the desirable form of the citizen.  For example, in tension with Gutmann's argument, Stephen G. Gilles argues in favour of the priority of parental rights to inculcate children, as opposed to the state;[749]  William Galston argues that the state is obligated to ensure that every person receives a 'basic civic education' which he defines as, 'the beliefs and habits that support the polity and enable individuals to function competently in public affairs';[750] Meira Levinson notes that what constitutes the necessary set of civic skills and attitudes of an individual is dependent, to some degree,

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[747] Gutmann (1999), p. 51.

[748] Mitja Sardoc, '*Democratic Education* at 30: An Interview with Dr. Amy Gutmann', *Theory and Research in Education*, 16.2 (2018), 244–52 (p. 248).  In *Democratic Education* Gutmann defines democratic virtue as, 'the ability to deliberate, and hence to participate in conscious social reproduction.' (Gutmann (1999), p. 46.)  At another point Gutmann states that democratic virtue includes 'the willingness and ability of citizens to reason collectively and critically about politics.' (Gutmann (1999), p. 107.)  Elsewhere in *Democratic Education* Gutmann refers to the democratic virtues, such as toleration, truth-telling, and a predisposition to nonviolence. (Gutmann (1999), p. 173.)

[749] Stephen G. Gilles, 'On Educating Children:  A Parentalist Manifesto', *University of Chicago Law Review*, 3, 1996, 937–1034 (p. 939).

[750] William A. Galston, *Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State*, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Public Policy (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 252.

on their culture, heritage, community, and socio-economic background;[751] Eamonn Callan promotes is what he calls 'liberal soulcraft', ordinarily associated with conservativism, soulcraft is 'the moulding of citizens according to some traditional standard of human excellence'.[752]

These arguments are in line with the intention behind the teaching of fundamental British values.  In a departmental advice document for schools and childcare providers it is argued that, '[s]chools and childcare providers can also build pupils' resilience to radicalisation by promoting fundamental British values and enabling them to challenge extremist views.'[753]  In the Crick Report there are seventeen essential values and dispositions to be cultivated as a part of one's education.  Together they represent the 'democratic virtues' and while many, or maybe all, of these values and dispositions seem uncontroversial in themselves, accompanied by the stated aim of common citizenship they become significantly narrower in scope.[754]  Similarly, Unicef's RSSA is limited by the scope of the CRC operating as the values framework.  The children are taught to embody the values as they are defined by the existing CRC and to guide their actions by it.

Mark Olssen addresses this concern within the Crick Report.  He writes,

> [i]n the Crick Report there is the notion of a single national identity to which all is referred and to which citizenship education aspires.  It is argued throughout the Report that certain uniform conceptions of moral values and social development constitute an essential precondition for citizenship.[755]

In addition to its explicit statement, the argument in favour of a shared identity is also implied throughout the Crick Report, transforming the citizen into an insidious

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[751] Levinson (2014), p. 279.

[752] Eamonn Callan, *Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy*, Oxford Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010), p. 5.

[753] The Prevent Duty: Departmental Advice for Schools and Childcare Providers, June 2015 (DFE-00174-2015), p.5

[754] For the full list of values and dispositions see Appendix I.

[755] Mark Olssen, 'From the Crick Report to the Parekh Report: Multiculturalism, Cultural Difference, and Democracy—The Re-Visioning of Citizenship Education', *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, 25.2 (2004), 179–92 (p. 180).

construct. Terence H. McLaughlin draws attention to objections to the Crick Report of this manner.[756] It is claimed that the Crick Report possesses, 'an illicit bias in relation to particular substantive matters… through omission.'[757] While the report states its intention as developing a model of citizenship and citizenship education which is 'sensitive to ethnic diversity' and which respects cultural differences between groups, the language used elsewhere in the report betrays a more assimilationist attitude.[758] Osler and Starkey write, 'the report… falls into the trap of presenting certain ethnicities as "other" when it discusses cultural diversity.'[759] This view of ethnic minorities is most apparent when it is stated in the report that, 'minorities must learn to respect the laws, codes and conventions as much as the majority—not merely because it is useful to do so, but because this process helps foster common citizenship.'[760] This is the language of assimilation and integration and has led to the Crick Report receiving criticism for failing to respect the politics of difference.[761]

In representing those outside of the dominant culture as 'other' the Crick Report contains within it a latent racism, and in the words of Olssen, 'represents the white British as the majority who must learn to tolerate minorities'.[762] Furthermore, in speaking of a common citizenship which minorities must make additional effort to subscribe to shows too little respect for the conventions of those outside of the dominant culture and is expressive of a colonial attitude.[763] In extension of this objection to the Crick Report

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[756] Terence H. McLaughlin, 'Citizenship Education in England: The Crick Report and Beyond', *Journal of the Philosophy of Education*, 34.4 (2000), 541–70.

[757] *ibid*, p. 552.

[758] *Crick Report* (1998), p. 17.

[759] Audrey Osler and Hugh Starkey, 'Citizenship Education and National Identities in France and England: Inclusive or Exclusive?', *Oxford Review of Education*, 27.2 (2001), 287–305 (p. 292).

[760] *Crick Report* (1998), p. 18.

[761] Olssen (2004), p. 181. For more on the politics of difference and differentiated citizenship see, Iris Marion Young, 'The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference', *Social Theory and Practice*, 12.1 (1986), 1–26; Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2011).

[762] Olssen (2004), p. 182.

[763] The report of *The Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain*, commonly referred to as the Parekh Report, directly addresses issues of citizenship and multiculturalism. It recognises that citizens are both individuals and members of groups. The report states, 'Britain is both a community of citizens and a community of communities, both a liberal and a multicultural society, and needs to reconcile their sometimes conflicting requirements.' *The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain: Report of the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain*, ed. by Bhikhu C. Parekh (London: Profile Books, 2000), p. ix. See also, Stuart Hall, 'Multicultural Citizens, Monocultural Citizenship?', in *Tomorrow's Citizens: Critical Debates in Citizenship and Education*, ed. by Nick Pearce, Joe Hallgarten, and Institute for Public Policy Research

similar concerns have been expressed regarding the attitude towards gender contained within.[764]

The disagreement around the set of values and virtues to be inculcated in the citizen through education is rife and strong arguments persist from many different perspectives. Even a commitment to a basic civic education is itself controversial. This can be seen in the differing accounts of what constitutes a basic civic education or civic minimum in advocates of this position.[765] Gutmann notes that, '[s]ome [civic minimalists] defend no more that the 3R's … . Others defend teaching toleration as well as basic skills. Still others defend teaching racial and gender nondiscrimination, mutual respect, and other virtues of democratic citizenship.'[766]

Michael W. McConnell argues that there can be no set of values that constitutes the democratic citizen that does not fall to controversy. According to McConnell, there is a myriad of competing thick concepts of democratic values and that imposition of any one of these, 'contradicts the premise of a liberal pluralistic society: that there be no official orthodoxy.'[767] One may defend a thin conception, equivalent to civic minimalism, however, in order to find agreement one would lose the meaningfulness of the democratic citizen and by extension the appeal of its construction. McConnell writes, 'there is no set of agreed-upon values for democratic citizens, except perhaps at a level of vagueness that ceases to be controversial because it ceases to be meaningful.'[768]

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(London: IPPR, 2000), pp. 43–55; and Audrey Osler, 'The Crick Report: Difference, Equality and Racial Justice', *Curriculum Journal*, 11.1 (2000), 25–37.

[764] Madeleine Arnot et al, '"The Good Citizen": Cultural Understandings of Citizenship and Gender Amongst a New Generation of Teachers', in *Politics, Education, and Citizenship*, ed. by Mal Leicester, Celia Modgil, and Sohan Modgil, Education, Culture, and Values, v. 6 (London; New York: Falmer Press, 2000), pp. 343–67; and Anne Phillips, 'Second Class Citizenship', in *Tomorrow's Citizens: Critical Debates in Citizenship and Education*, ed. by Nick Pearce, Joe Hallgarten, and Institute for Public Policy Research (London: IPPR, 2000), pp. 36–42, challenge the Crick Report from a feminist perspective.

[765] Differing accounts of what constitutes the civic minimum or basic civic education can be found in Milton Friedman, 'The Role of Government in Education', in *Economics and the Public Interest*, ed. by Robert A. Solo and Eugene Ewald Agger (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1955), pp. 123–44; John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe, *Politics, Markets, and America's Schools* (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1990); Gilles (1996); and McConnell (2002).

[766] Amy Gutmann, 'Civic Minimalism, Cosmopolitanism, and Patriotism: Where Does Democratic Education Stand in Relation to Each?', in *Moral and Political Education*, ed. by Stephen Macedo and Yael Tamir, Nomos, XLIII (New York: New York University Press, 2002), pp. 23–57 (p. 33). Gutmann says something very similar in, Gutmann (1999), p. 295.

[767] McConnell (2002), p. 102.

[768] *ibid*, p. 101.

Furthermore, even if a set of values and virtues can be agreed upon to focus only on one's aims is narrow and short sighted. Richard Pring, echoing the discussion of authority above, questions where the citizenship teacher gains the authority to teach others how to be good citizens. Pring writes, '[j]ust as Socrates asked in the *Meno* where are the teachers of virtue…, so, too we might ask "Where are the teachers of Citizenship?"'[769]

The Critical Citizen, as defined at the end of Chapter 5, represents another alternative arrangement that contrasts deeply with all of the conceptions above. However, the key difference in the Critical Citizen is that it is defined by those who choose to embody its values. It is a bottom-up model of the citizen defined through the search for it by those who seek to embody it. Therefore, while existing citizens, the state, and the parents may disagree with the form that the citizen takes it avoids the problem of coercion, in this instance, because it flows outs of the subjects of education and not some projection of the citizen by an external authority. However, this approach is not consistent with education *within* democracy because the citizen is not found in some set of shared values. Nor is it consistent with the aim to perpetuate a certain form through the cultivation of values identified as 'democratic' or ideal within the students of its educational institutions.

The second approach to democratic education – the democratisation of education – employs democratic practices within the school itself and involves the students, to some degree, in guiding and defining their own learning. In these internally democratic schools the practice of free action and thought by the students can be harnessed to build a democratic structure in the image of the values discovered by the students through dialogue with each other.

The internally democratic school emphasises the voice of the student and puts it into conversation with the state, community, school, and family. A necessary feature of Neill's Summerhill and the free schools of the 1960s and 1970s, which were discussed in detail in Chapter 6, were their employment of internally democratic practices.[770] The

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[769] Richard Pring, 'Citizenship and Schools', in *Citizens: Towards a Citizenship Culture*, ed. by Bernard Crick (Oxford; Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), pp. 81–89 (p. 81).

[770] The RRSA often employs some internally democratic practices. Sebba and Robinson report that in the majority of schools visited as a part of their evaluation involved pupils within governing bodies, staff appointments, or teacher and learning evaluations, and only a few of the schools involved the children in all three. However, '[d]ecisions influenced by pupils mainly focussed on important but not central issues, such as playground equipment, lunchtime arrangements and toilets.' Sebba and Robinson (2010), p.5.

democratic voice of children is largely ignored by many proponents of democratic education. While in her account of democratic education some democratic decision-making in schools is justified, Gutmann dismisses the role of young people themselves in playing a democratic role within their education. Following Aristotle, Gutmann declares, 'being educated as a child entails being ruled…[and]… [b]ecause being a democratic citizen entails ruling, the ideal of democratic education is being ruled, then ruling.'[771]

Gutmann objects to, what she terms, 'overly' internally democratic schools. Gutmann argues that children are not capable of making the right decisions for themselves. Although sympathetic to increased participation by children in many decisions that directly affect their schooling, '[t]he solution', Gutmann writes, '… cannot be to give students equal control over the conditions of their schooling.'[772] This is because the students do not possess the skills necessary to be directly involved in decision-making at school. Children can be immature, self-centred, and lack the life experience that give adults invaluable powers of reflection and empathy.

Gutmann also objects to internally democratic schools because they risk cultivating, what she terms an, 'insolence of office.'[773] The insolence of office is the result of a professional being granted too much autonomy within their role. Gutmann argues that with no authority other than that of the teachers and the children, in an internally democratic school there is a distinct risk of the development of the insolence of office which develops as a result of their isolation. Further to this, through a lack of interaction and accountability, there is a risk of students maintaining this insolence, thereby alienating and isolating themselves once they leave an internally democratic school and enter the real world. This risk is brought to bear by Judith Suissa who writes of Summerhill, a school identified by Gutmann as an example of practicing overly internally democratic education,

> there is little attempt to engage with broader social issues or to confront
> present socio-political reality. Indeed, there is very much a sense… of

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[771] Gutmann (1999), p. 3. Aristotle argues in the *Politics* that a person learns to rule by first being ruled. See, Aristotle (1981).
[772] Gutmann (1999), p. 88.
[773] *ibid*, p. 77.

the school having created a little island, in which Summerhill, and the

superior kind of education which it represents, is regarded as being

against the rest of the world, with its misguided ideas.[774]

These objections are easily undermined and the problem of authority is resolved by internally democratic schools. Furthermore, internally democratic schools provide an effective response to the competing claims on what form the citizen should take. It is through internally democratic schools, through children becoming the authors of their own lives, through the practice of democracy that they will discover the form of the citizen that they wish to embody. The democracy that is spoken of is not the mere act of voting it is a Deweyan democracy, a democracy that forms an 'embryonic community', a democracy which breaks down the boundaries between school and society. Therefore, the children in their learning are not left without foundations on which to build, are not left untethered and lost but active and engaged within a local community that will inform their development through existing practice. Yet, through Freirean problem-posing education these practices will not avoid critique. Conversely, they will provide both the foundations upon which practice and morality is built but also by which it is developed through the continual reproblematisation of the existing state of affairs and dialogue of the community.

This response will not satisfy all people, most notably proponents of the rights of parents over their children and proponents of a strong state identity, because it limits the influence of parents and other external forces over the next generation and encourages the discovery of one's self rather than some prefigured identity, but complaints of this sort are unfounded because their influence is not negated nor is their authority denied. It is simply mitigated through checks and measures that protect the interests of the children subject to these influences.[775]

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[774] Suissa (2011), p. 96.

[775] Gutmann employs a similar response to critics of her conception of the citizen. Gutmann (2002), p. 40. However, Gutmann's failure to give children sufficient voice and limit that moral development in schools undermines this claim. I shall give a fuller response to this potential objection in the following section where I outline the institutional structure of education necessary for the development of the Critical Citizen.

The reasons that Gutmann rejects models of internally democratic schools are illustrative of an educator's fear of ceding their authority, and parallel arguments are used by defenders of a strong centralised government; or defenders of the status quo; and defenders of existing power relations regardless of the disparities between the oppressed and oppressor classes. However, most people will remain disenfranchised for as long as they are treated as such and their powers of self-governance will not develop in an environment where they are simply ruled over, rather than participating in the process of ruling.

Arguments such as those employed by Gutmann have been used by established authority since time immemorial against the suffrage of each successive group fighting for a voice. This alone should make us suspicious of the objection as it has already proven fallacious countless times as suffrage has been extended outside of nobility, to unpropertied males, to the uneducated, to women, to minority ethnic populations across the globe. Gutmann undermines her own rejection of internally democratic schooling in her discussion of democratic virtue. Gutmann argues that by educating all creeds and classes in the same classroom, 'by respecting religious and ethnic differences', through participation and involvement, the students are able to develop and exercise reason and judgement. If, as Gutmann claims, democratic virtues, like the principles of nondiscrimination and nonrepression, can be taught by practicing them in the classroom – by teaching black and white children, by teaching Christian and Muslim children, by teaching girls and boys side by side we can teach the values; 'respect among races, religious toleration, patriotism, and political judgment'[776] – then it must be explained why we cannot teach a child how to rule through that child ruling. I believe that if Gutmann's argument is to be consistent then it must commit to the view that a justifiable way to learn the value of democracy and one's place within a democratic society is by partaking in democracy directly.

However, this is not enough on its own to refute Gutmann's first objection. It must also be shown that young people, whether capable or not, should be the authors of their own education and should have the freedom to determine that education through a democratic voice in schools. Yet, empirical evidence of this sort is rejected out of hand by

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[776] Gutmann (1999), p. 63.

Gutmann. The reason for success in internally democratic schools is not because of the value of the model itself, but because of a predisposition and selective enrolment. According to Gutmann, only privileged schools can succeed with internal democracy for this reason but this flies in the face of the origins of these models. As was explained above, Neill based the structure of his school on the radical reformatory 'The Little Commonwealth' in Dorset, and Summerhill was initially frequented primarily by perceived delinquents. It represented not some privileged escape from reality but the end of the road for young people rejected by the authoritarianism prevalent throughout orthodox schooling.

Gutmann's second objection to schools which practice universal suffrage is a legitimate concern. Without larger institutional support and only a handful of schools practicing a model of democratic education which celebrates the voice of the students it seems likely that their successes will be diluted and ineffectual at an institutional level. However, it need not represent a reason to reject them as much as a reason to incorporate the democratisation of education in more schools. Therefore, following Rousseau, it is necessary for this interactional response to the tension between the individual and society to be accompanied by an institutional programme that is consonant with its aims.

The conditions for the development of persons in bottom-up models of democratic education differ to those of education *within* democracy. Where education *within* democracy is committed to the principle that people learn to rule by first being ruled, the democratisation of education through internally democratic schools commits to the contrary view that a person learns to rule by first ruling. Therefore, the conditions of the environment of the school differ drastically. Democratic education denies students a role in determining their own education unless it incorporates internal democratic practices which build the school in the image of the interests and desires of the students through their active participation. However, on its own, the existence of internally democratic schools is not enough for the realisation of the Critical Citizen. This interactional solution must be accompanied by an institutional structure of education which coheres with and supports the same end-in-view.

## §8.3 The Citizen, the State and Education

In the previous section I defend internally democratic schools as the preferable account of democratic education for the realisation of the Critical Citizen. I argue that it is preferable to education *within* democracy because it is better placed to cultivate an environment where the pupils are able to develop their own understanding of desirable character and learn to embody those values that they have identified. Internally democratic schools offer an interactional response to the tension between the individual and society because it provides us with the model that is best suited to guide our day-to-day interactional relationships with others. This section provides the institutional response to the tension between the individual and society, a response that is designed to complement and cohere with the interactional structure offered by internally democratic schooling. I frame the tension, at the institutional level, through the disagreement over the institutional authority of education and the compatibility of that authority with the citizen as an aim of education.

In contrast to the competing conceptions of the citizen described above is the challenge to the role of the state in education.[777] There are two different critiques of education that challenge the role of the state in education in the strongest possible terms. These critiques are motivated either by a radical individualism like the libertarianism of Milton Freidman and Michael W. McConnell, or by a radical egalitarianism, as in the case of Ivan Illich, Everett Reimer, and Clive Erriker.[778] Both motivate their critique of the state through their observation of the coercive nature of state mandated and controlled education. In this section I shall explicate the objections to state education raised by both groups of people but disagree with their respective

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[777] There is a larger question of the role of authority over education where authority could refer to the state, community, family, individual or other external force. I shall focus on challenging the state but similar arguments can be made with respect to any authority, and some of those authorities will raise their head in the discussion over the course of the section.

[778] Friedman (1955); McConnell (2002); James Tooley, *Education Without the State*, IEA Studies in Education, 1 (London: IEA Education and Training Unit, 1996); James Tooley, *Disestablishing the School: De-Bunking Justifications for State Intervention in Education.* (S.l.: Taylor & Francis, 2017); Ivan Illich, *Deschooling Society* (London: Marion Boyars, 2000); Everett W. Reimer, *School Is Dead: An Essay on Alternatives in Education*, Penguin Education Specials (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971); Clive Erricker, *When Learning Becomes Your Enemy: The Relationship Between Education, Spiritual Dissent and Economics* (Nottingham, England: Educational Heretics Press, 2002).

conclusions. However, I shall defend their general critique of the relationship between education and the state and suggest the alternative solution of a federated disestablishment.

The view that the influence of the state in education must be constrained and subordinated in the name of freedom where that freedom supports a radical individualism can underpin a defence of basic civic education or a civic minimum.[779] Milton Freidman in, 'The Role of Government in Education', addressed this issue and argued that in, 'a free private enterprise exchange economy, government's primary role is to preserve the rules of the game by enforcing contracts, preventing coercion, and keeping markets free.'[780] Friedman argues that state mandated and financed education is justified on account of the mutual benefit of all persons in the education of the next and each subsequent generation.[781] However, Friedman resists the third step in the state education argument, the justification of the, 'actual administration of educational institutions by the government, the "nationalisation," as it were, of the bulk of the "education industry."'[782] In its place Friedman proposes publicly funded private education through the distribution of vouchers to parents so that they can exercise their freedom and choose where to send their child to school. A number of people have taken up Friedman's mantle and, in the USA at least, the conversation between publicly funded and controlled and publicly funded private education continues.

One such advocate of publicly funded private education is Michael W. McConnell. McConnell argues, contrary to Gutmann, that a model of civic minimalism can represent the values of a pluralistic society better than democratic education. He argues that a model of democratic education either aims to inculcate in the next generation the, 'values that have been adopted, in fact, by the people through democratic processes', which he refers to as democratically derived values; or it aims inculcate the values that

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[779] Advocates of the civic minimum mostly follow the libertarian line and support a model of state issued school vouchers which can be spent by parents toward the tuition for either public or private schooling. See, Chubb and Moe (1990); McConnell (2002); James Tooley, *Reclaiming Education* (London; New York: Cassell, 2000); James Tooley (2017), for examples of this.

[780] Friedman (1955), p. 123.

[781] *ibid*, p. 125. Note, only for civic education. Not for vocational education. For some reason Freidman does not think that practitioners, such as dentists, nurses, or mechanics create sufficient benefit for the whole of society to warrant state mandated vocational education. It seems a strange line to draw but because my disagreement cuts across this distinction it is not necessary to address the curious distinction.

[782] Friedman (1955), p. 126.

are necessary for the development and stability of a democratic society, this he refers to as substantively democratic values.[783] This distinction does not map onto the distinction between education *within* democracy and the democratisation of education because in both democratically derived values and substantively democratic values there exists a preconceived idea of the values that a person is desired to develop and they are inculcated through education.

In the case of democratically derived values, McConnell argues that families are better placed than the state to choose the content of the values inculcated through schooling, 'just as we allow them to choose their own religion'.[784] This is because, so McConnell argues, democratic education cannot accommodate the interests of those who see religious faith as essential in the education of their children. McConnell writes, '[t]he objective of social reproduction is to reproduce, in the next generation, the set of values and beliefs that constitute the character of society.'[785] If that is so, then the parents and local communities are better placed to achieve this aim representing, as they do, the embodiment of the values that they wish to continue. Therefore, McConnell advocates the disestablishment of education and state in the same way that the church is separate from schooling.

A similar concern with compulsory education arises in the deschooling movement by authors such as Illich and Reimer.[786] Illich argues that education inhibits learning, he writes, 'for most men [*sic*] the right to learn is curtailed by the obligation to attend school'.[787] This is because, according to Illich, it is impossible to provide universal equal education in any meaningful way and therefore schooling encourages social stratification because people are valued not for their learning but for their schooling. Illich perceives a conflation between the process of going through an education and the substance of that which has been learned. A 'schooled' society will value the person who has received more process and not consider the substance of that which has been learned through

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[783] McConnell (2002), p. 98.

[784] *ibid*, p. 99.

[785] *ibid*, p. 101.

[786] Illich (2000); Reimer (1971). See also, Ian Lister, *Deschooling: A Reader* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971), for a discussion of deschooling ideas.

[787] Illich (2000), p. vii.

that process.  It is for this reason that Illich argues society, not just education but society as a whole, must be deschooled.[788]

This view is shared by Reimer who argues that school, in the extended sense to mean all educational institutions, is a system of continued oppression and widening inequality.  It is a place which, regardless of intention, suits the interests of the wealthy and powerful, not the poor.  Both Illich and Reimer use the word 'school' in this extended sense and Illich appears to use the word 'schooled' to convey the meaning of insidious training or belief.  According to Illich, within school the students are 'schooled' to conflate the meanings of a variety of different concepts, most notably 'process' and 'substance'.  The confusion leads to the belief that there is a direct correlation between participating in and progressing through; and between education and the depth and meaning of one's knowledge.  Illich believes this confusion goes further, '[t]he pupil', he writes, 'is "schooled" to confuse teaching with learning, grade advancement with education, a diploma with competence, and fluency with the ability to say something new.'[789]

Similarly Reimer argues that,

> [s]chool has become the universal church of a technological society,
> incorporating and transmitting its ideology, shaping men's [*sic*] minds to
> accept this ideology, and conferring social status in proportion to its
> acceptance.  There is no question of man's [*sic*] rejecting technology.
> The question is only one of adaptation, direction and control.[790]

This view of schooling that Illich and Reimer describe cements reigning power relations because, regardless of the money spent on the education of the poor, equality will not result, but the belief that the poor have been given that opportunity will serve to

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[788] It is important to note that Illich's views changed significantly over time but I shall focus on the arguments within *Deschooling Society*.  For Illich's later comments on this work see, Ivan Illich, 'A Plea for Research on Lay Literacy', *Interchange*, 18.1–2 (1987), 9–22; Ivan Illich, 'Forward', in *Deschooling Our Lives*, by Matt Hern (Philadelphia: New Society, 1996); Ivan Illich and David Cayley, *Ivan Illich in Conversation* (Concord, Ont: Anansi, 1992).  For an analysis of Illich's deschooling theory over time see, Rosa Bruno-Jofré and Jon Igelmo Zaldívar, 'Ivan Illich's Late Critique of *Deschooling Society* : "I Was Largely Barking Up the Wrong Tree": Illich's Late Critique of *Deschooling Society*', *Educational Theory*, 62.5 (2012), 573–92.

[789] Illich (2000), p. 1.

[790] Reimer, p. 19.

further the myth that education is the tool to achieve equality. Both Illich and Reimer employ empirical evidence to support their arguments. They reference evidence that money invested into education struggles to ever reach the children intended.[791] Educational opportunities cannot, according to Illich, be remedied in the schooling environment because those opportunities exist in the lifestyle difference between the rich and the poor.[792]

Whereas, Reimer states that, '[s]chools constitute a regressive tax because the privileged go to school longer and because costs increase with the level of schooling.'[793] Illich and Reimer go further however, as Gintis notes, for Illich, '[t]he institutionalization of values occurs not through external coercion, but through psychic manipulation, so its rejection is an apolitical act of individual will. The movement for social change thus becomes a cultural one of raising consciousness.'[794] In a similar vein, Reimer astutely observes that it is not only the financial funding that is prohibitive to the poorest students. It is not simply that the poor are not receiving the benefits, but they are subject to continued manipulation and psychological imprisonment by schooling. He writes,

> the poor suffer the handicap of the culture of silence, the inheritance of magic and myth designed to ensure their continued docility. It is this, rather than deficient genes, which handicaps the learning of their children; this plus the punishment of failure and disapproval which is their customary lot in schools. … If all of the public funds allotted to education in every nation were spent exclusively upon the poor it would still take many generations to offset the handicaps which generations of exploitation have imposed upon them.[795]

According to Illich, even for the poor most of their learning occurs outside of the classroom. He writes, '[m]ost learning happens casually, and even most intentional

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[791] Illich (2000), pp. 5–6; Reimer (1971), pp. 127–35.

[792] Illich (2000), p. 6.

[793] Reimer (1971), p. 129.

[794] Herbert Gintis, 'Towards a Political Economy of Education: A Radical Critique of Ivan Illich's *Deschooling Society*', *Harvard Educational Review*, 42.1 (1972), 70–96 (p. 74).

[795] Reimer (1971), p. 130.

learning is not the result of programmed instruction.'[796]  To support this claim Illich draws on some very persuasive examples; the learning of one's mother tongue, the learning of a second language, the learning of reading – these according to Illich are all examples of learning more effectively done casually and through the circumstances of life that bring us to them and not in the school environment.  Reimer, on the other hand, argues that because the people that most need the resources that education financing pays for are not the recipients of the benefits those resources incur, we cannot justifiably finance education by funding schooling publicly.[797]

Illich challenges the idea that education for all can be provided.  In its place Illich defends voluntary learning webs.  He writes, '[t]he most radical alternative to school would be a network or service which gave each man [*sic*] the same opportunity to share his [*sic*] current concern with others motivated by the same concern.'[798]  The idea behind which is that the authority of the individual is found not in their title, job, or place in social hierarchy but by their 'effective participation' in disestablished learning.

In contrast Reimer defends distributing a kind of educational welfare where the recipients receive the monetary value directly.  However, neither Illich nor Reimer pay sufficient attention to the coercive nature of the economy.  As Gintis notes, 'Illich's Good Society is based on small scale entrepreneurial (as opposed to corporate) capitalism, with perfectly competitive markets in goods and services.'[799]  Similarly, Reimer maintains an important place for the market and even though he recognises that, '[c]harlatans and profiteers might have a field day for a time', he maintains a faith that a balance would be achieved.  He writes, '[c]ontrols of the type offered by better business bureaus would be sufficient, since they would be too inefficient to do much harm but available for use against a real mountebank.'[800]

Where the existence of significant state coercion leads writers like Friedman, McConnell, Illich and Reimer to look towards free market capitalism in some form or another for the solution to that control, Clive Erricker argues that the coercion of the

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[796] Illich (2000), p. 12.
[797] Reimer (1971), p. 128.
[798] Illich (2000), p. 19.
[799] Gintis (1972), p. 75.
[800] Reimer (1971), p. 135.

state over its subjects is currently being fuelled by that economic perspective. According to Erricker, free market capitalism is not the solution but the cause.

Erricker, in a similar vein to Freidman, McConnell, Illich and Reimer, perceives unjustifiable constraints on the subjects of education when it is controlled by the state. However, Erricker sees the conflation of the values of democracy with the interests of free market capitalism as a major source of the coercion that takes place. He writes,

> Government pronouncements on family values, parenting, education, citizenship and many other matters seek to convince us that democratic ideals shape the changes that are taking place in these areas and that our society will become more democratic as a result.[801]

Erricker says that this is not the case. It is a subterfuge that is to designed to convince us of the unification of the interests of democracy and free-market capitalism. According to Erricker, there is no balance between these two forces. He argues that the force of capitalism is dominant and that the values of democracy bend to fit within the free market. He writes, '[t]he result is a cosmetic veneer of democratic rhetoric used to justify economically anti-democratic practices.'[802]

In this way Erricker's argument runs counter to all of those discussed so far in this section. He argues that the consequence of privatisation is not increased parental choice, individual liberty or equality because free-market capitalism has the ability to limit the options of the poor just as it increases available options for those with the means to take advantage of them. The market affects options through things such as rising house prices in good school neighbourhoods and the disproportionate weight paid to the interests of the wealthy by the market. Therefore, according to Erricker, 'schooling replicates the effects of the free-market economy, even if a system of parental choice is not operated.'[803]

Erricker therefore differs from those above because he recognizes the coercive impact of the economy on freedom, equality, and education as well as the state. He

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[801] Erricker (2002), p.iv.
[802] *ibid*.
[803] *ibid*, p.55.

writes, '[o]ur society is not served by, and our institutions are collapsing under, the weight of government regulation and the impetus to de-regulation in the economic world.  What is happening in schools and higher education institutions is symptomatic of this.[804]

Those, like Friedman, McConnell, Illich and Reiman, who shift authority into the private economic sphere through a policy of disestablishment argue persuasively against state influence in education.[805]  However, their solution, to me at least, is bemusing.

McConnell argues that education is the primary method of the state to inculcate the values and character of the citizen.  He writes, '[w]e depend on elementary and secondary schools to inculcate the values and ideals necessary for the next generation to become responsible citizens in our democratic society.'[806]  This fits with the intention of Rousseau's institutional structure of education where a civil religion transmitted through the Lawgiver to the Sovereign defines and develops the character of the citizen, and it suffers from the same objection of insidious and manipulative control.  McConnell attributes this view to Gutmann and to the present US Supreme court.[807]  In the UK a similar point can be made with the current application of Fundamental British Values, the prevent strategy, the existing curriculum, and the National Citizenship Service (NCS) discussed above.[808]  This imposition is unjustified, according to McConnell, not because it is inherently coercive as the deschoolers argue, but because it is coercive on those who think otherwise and wish to raise their children by other standards, with other values, and to possess a different character.  This is most obvious in the case of religion. McConnell writes,

> [c]ollective judgements about the ideological and philosophical content
> of the curriculum must be made; dissenters as well as believers will be

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[804] Erricker (2002), p.65.

[805] James Tooley makes similar arguments to McConnell in favour of the privatisation of education through disestablishment from the state.  See, Tooley (1996); Tooley (2000); and Tooley (2017).

[806] McConnell (2002), p.94.

[807] McConnell cites, *Arnbach v. Norwick*, 441 U.S. 68 in support of this of this charge of the US Supreme Court.

[808] Also, the recent select committee, *The Ties that Bind*, discussed above supports this view.  As quoted above at one point it reads, 'we have found that citizenship education, which should be the first great opportunity for instilling and developing our values, encouraging social cohesion, and creating active citizens has been neglected.' *The Ties That Bind* (2018), p. 4.

forced to pay for it; and dissenters must either allow their children to be educated according to precepts they dispute or finance the alternative from their own resources. This is an inherently coercive arrangement, seemingly at odd with liberal principle.[809]

As mentioned above, McConnell's resolution to this tension is publicly funded private education through state issued vouchers. He raises the point that even with this minimal role the state retains the power to exercise some coercion. Noting that, '[i]t may be objected that … the role of financing and of quality control—carries dangers of the establishment of orthodoxy. The power to deny accreditation to schools could indeed be used as a weapon against dissenting viewpoints.'[810] Yet, at no point does McConnell consider the coercive force of private industry. The coercive power of the state is seen with such clarity but on the coercive power of the economy McConnell is silent. How can this be so? While the market may be free in the libertarian formulation, those subject to the market, as Erricker persuasively argues, are not. In a free market, companies have an obligation to make profits for their shareholders. This subordinates the interests of non-shareholders to the share-holders. Yet, the most significant difference between the market and the democratic state is that the former is not subject to checks and measures, it is not subject to the voice of the people. It is an undemocratic institution that trades on its freedom as a justification for the coercion that every person suffers as a result of its ebb and flow.

I do not argue in favour of any form of private education, nor do I support the privatisation of schools through the academisation process in the UK. The umbrella companies that own the academy institutions are often for-profit organisations and they therefore cannot hold the interests of the students as primary. Nothing subject to the market and economic interest can ever be in the interests of the world's poor. It is my view that neither privately financed nor publicly controlled education serves the interests of the people that are educated. In the former, the interests of the economy must be primary and the individuals educated are tools for the furtherance of those who benefit

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[809] McConnell (2002), p.104.
[810] *ibid*, pp. 104-105.

from the economy.  In the latter, the interests of the state are primary and the individuals educated are tools for the furtherance of the values of that state.

The solution that I suggest is a federated disestablishment which supports the development of the Critical Citizen through maximising the institutional space for its realisation.  This is inspired by Gutmann's federal system of democratic education but reconstructs the structure in light of the coercive voice of the liberal democratic state.  Gutmann's resolution to the institutional structure of education seeks to find a balance between the authorities of the state, the family, and the individual.  Gutmann writes, '[a] democratic state of education recognises that education authority must be shared among parents, citizens, and professional educators'.[811]  What results is a theory of a federal system which protects principles of nondiscrimination and nonrepression at the state level; gives the family a voice to represent the interests of their version of the good life at a community level; and gives the professionals a voice to represent the interests of the children being educated at the level of the individual.  However, as discussed above, for Gutmann there is but a very limited sense in which the children themselves participate in this process.  I correct this mistake through advocating problem-posing education within internally democratic schools.

In separating the institution of education formally from the influence of the larger institution of the state one is cutting off the most significant external coercive power in the lives of the individual of those who comprise that state.  External coercive forces are further inhibited by other institutional balances, such as regional protections of local culture, and familial protections against imposition of one version of the good life.  This is done while also providing a platform for and validating the voice of these interests through the federated structure offered by Gutmann's model of democratic education.

In this institutional structure the impositions placed upon the teaching professionals and the students subject to the institutions of education are reduced while not eliminating the significance that they hold within the communities at large.  Therefore, the internal structure of the school itself can be built by the members of that school to reflect their own educative journey and interpretation of the world, guided by the professional standards of the teachers who take part in that journey with the students.  I

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[811] Gutmann (1999), p. 42.

refer to the institutional model of education defended here as a critical reconstruction of the projects of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire because it maintains the spirit and aims of each, but concludes, in contrast with all three, with the more radical claim of a federated disestablishment of education and state.

It answers Rousseau because it removes, or at least adds significant checks and measures to, the authority of the state from the model of the citizen that represent the aim of education.  It answers Dewey because it does not depend on experts in order to develop the meaning and direction of education which leads to the formation of the citizen.  It answers Freire because authority is placed in the subject to define themselves but done so in concert with an institutional structure which tethers people to the community of which they are a part.  In this way authority is on the side of freedom because it becomes an uncoercive tool through a structured web of influence that is kept in check through the continual problematisation of held belief.

Therefore, the institutional structure of education for the development of the Critical Citizen must be one where education and state have been separated.  With the state reduced to protecting principles of nonrepression and nondiscrimination through legislation and in virtue of not influencing education for its own end.  Furthermore, it must be internally democratically run within a syndicate of schools and a loosely federated balance of power between children, parents, and professionals.

The most obvious objection to this suggestion is that it is impractical, that it would not work, it is too big a change and the social upheaval would be too great.  However, historically the church was responsible for education, much like it was responsible for registering births, deaths, and marriages.  People outside of the established church were severely inhibited in their education, employment, or even burial by a society largely controlled by the church.  As such, the idea of the disestablishment of church and state was more than radical.  It was perceived as logistically implausible.[812]

The barriers to the separation of education and state present similar practical concerns.  It is the state which, through its schooling system, provides education and it is the state which lends authority to the qualifications which result from that education.  Without going through their process, one is effectively barred from a societally

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[812] John Lawson and Harold Silver, *A Social History of Education in England*, 2014.

recognised education and from a significant volume of valuable work.  However, this should not deter support for my argument because a federated disestablishment of education formed by a network of internally democratic schools is the only reasonable resolution to the competing domains of coercion whether they be familial, political or economic.

## §8.4    How the Tensions are Answered

In this section I shall explain why I take internally democratic problem-posing schools and the federated disestablishment of education and state to be the appropriate practical response to the difficulties raised in the thesis.

Over the course of the thesis I have drawn out the tension between the individual and society in different key politico-educational theories that aim at the resolution to this tension and which inform the model and method of the argument that I have developed. I have identified the tension between the individual and society in the philosophies of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire and discussed both how that tension is resolved by Rousseau, Dewey and Freire, and the limitations of those resolutions.

I have also drawn out the tension in a variety of different ways.  I have done so at the interactional and the institutional level and argued that any attempt to resolve the tension between the individual and society, to be coherent and practicable, must aim to resolve the tension at both these levels.  I have drawn out the tension within the concept of the citizen itself and within citizenship education as a practice.  Lastly, I have identified the problem of authority as a key manifestation of the tension between the individual and society with respect to our relationships with each other, with our relationships with the institutions of society, and the relationships between those institutions.  This has proved to be a complex network of tensions and relationships.

In response to these problems, I have argued that internally democratic problem-posing schooling and the federated disestablishment of education and state are capable of offering a coherent resolution to the tension between the individual and society.  They do this because together they address the coercive force of one's social environment in two meaningful ways.  First, they mitigate potentially freedom constraining aspects of society through the removal of unjustifiable power relations.  Second, they render explicit

the tensions that remain in one's social environment and relationships with others thereby negating the insidiousness that often accompanies the tension between the individual and society.

Internally democratic problem-posing education mitigates the coercive aspects of one's social environment by creating a schooling environment which enfranchises the pupils and encourages the development of the person through dialogue with one's peers. I have argued that through the practice of a problem-posing model of education within the framework of internally democratic schools pupils are best placed to develop the skills needed to meaningfully participate in society once they leave school because they have developed those skills through experiment and practice in their school environment.

Furthermore, they have also exercised their freedom without being impaired by the expression of another's authority because that authority is understood relationally. In reframing authority as legitimate when it is freely given and reciprocated as a part of a dialogical exchange between student-teachers and teacher-students authority can longer be exercised over another and therefore constrain the freedom of another. Additionally, authority is both given and received in this interaction and therefore the value of each person is felt as their unique and privileged becomes a part of the conversation. Importantly, while an authority remains it is rendered explicit and exists as a part of the conversation to be questioned, revised, and challenged by the participants of the school's environment.

This interactional structure of education is supported and strengthened by the institutional structure of education that I defend in this thesis. The federated disestablishment of education and state, alongside internally democratic problem-posing education, further mitigates the coercive elements of one's social environment. It does so by challenging the coercive control exhibited and sought by unilateral authority claims. Institutionally these claims are often made by the state, but they can also be made by the economy or any other public, in the Deweyan sense, that uses its position as a platform to promote its interests over others.[813]

Federated disestablishment achieves the aim of mitigating coercive control by creating a functional voice for every interested party in the decision making of education,

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[813] Special interest groups, NGOs and Trade Unions are good examples of publics that operate in this way.

while also limiting the scope of authority of any one group by enforcing parameters on each voice. I refer to it as a functional voice because it extends beyond the mere act of voting to include a participatory and active role in the decision making process. Therefore, the role of the state is limited to protecting principles of nonrepression and nondiscrimination which are designed to protect the individuals of education institutions from the most obvious discrimination. At a local level a voice can be found for the interests of the local community such as the protection of language and customs that would be potentially be overlooked at the national level. However, any one particular school retains an great independence outside of these limited constraints to run as it pleases guided by the professional expertise of the teachers and the internally democratic structure designed by them in conjunction with the students of that school.

These clear layers or authority with clearly defined scope renders explicit the influence they have over us as individuals and in doing so places each authority into the conversation. This is a necessary feature of any resolution to the tension between the individual and society because it is neither possible nor desirable to eliminate all forms of authority and coercion without living in isolation but if those external forces are to be benign then they must be made explicit, transparent and subject to the critical questioning attitude that forms a central part of the Critical Citizen.

**Chapter 9**

**Conclusion**

**§9.0  Summary**

In this thesis I have argued in favour of two radical ideas, internally democratic schools and federated disestablishment of education and state.  The claim is that the implementation of these two recommendations, which are mutually dependent upon one another, are the most fruitful options for the realisation of my stated aim, the Critical Citizen.

These recommendations are the result of an enquiry into the tension between the individual and society, a tension which is prominent throughout political thought.  I begin with a discussion of the citizen which offers an historical exposition of the concept.  I do so to tether the discussion of the citizen and citizenship to its historical foundations and to provide a point of reference for all that comes afterwards.  This is followed by an analysis of the contemporary discussions around the citizen in philosophical and political theory which highlights the contributions and influence of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire within the debate.

One of the most significant expositions of this tension was written by Rousseau in his *First* and *Second Discourse*.  It is from Rousseau that the question that I seek to answer in this thesis is expressed.  He aims to,

> [f]ind a form of association that defends and protects the person and
> goods of each associate with all the common force, and by means of
> which each one, uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and
> remains as free as before.[814]

However, Rousseau's politico-educational project does not sufficiently answer this question because of the manipulative control exhibited by the tutor and the Lawgiver over an education that extends throughout one's life.  For this reason, I employ the

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[814] 'Social Contract', *OC III*, 360; *CWR, Vol. 4*, p. 138.

assistance of Dewey and Freire to move beyond Rousseau's politico-educational project that practices a rudimentary reflective methodology. The politico-educational projects of Dewey and Freire provide the perfect narrative in developing an answer to the question set by Rousseau. Rousseau, Dewey and Freire each offer educational responses to the tension between the individual and society and they do so from three different methodological approaches. Furthermore, the object of their politico-educational projects is a citizen informed by democratic participation and a pursuit of social justice.

Rousseau, Dewey and Freire form the historical and theoretical foundation of the thesis. Placed into context with contemporary debates on the citizen, Rousseau, Dewey and Freire, extended and strengthened, lead to my expression of the Critical Citizen which represents the end-in-view, and the conclusion of the first part of the thesis.

With the Critical Citizen as the end-in-view the focus shifts to the means of its realisation, away from the question of the form of the individual who does not suffer unjustifiable constraints to their freedom while maintaining active participation within cooperative association. The question is reformed as, 'how does this individual come to be within a society of vested interests and coercive forces without manipulation and while maintaining coherence with the values which inform that individual?'.

The means of realisation are discovered through an analysis of a persistence of the tension between the individual and society beyond the form of the citizen themselves, to incorporate their relationships with external institutions and figures of authority – this is the problem of authority. I explore the concept of authority and how it is discussed in the political and educational context and conclude that there are three aspects of authority that are under discussion; the definition of what authority is, the legitimate source of authority, and the ontological foundation of authority. I challenge what I refer to as the ontological assumption in authority and argue that it should be understood as a relational property.

I return to the politico-educational projects of Rousseau, Dewey and Freire and identify the manifestation of authority in each one and how each of these theorists resolve the tension that arises as a result. In doing so, I illustrate that democratic education, broadly understood, is the root by which Rousseau, Dewey and Freire sought to find a balance between competing interests of authority in politics and education. This

leads me to explore contemporary accounts of democratic education as a model for the realisation of the Critical Citizen.

It is through the analysis of the problem of authority in Rousseau, Dewey and Freire and the attempts to resolve this tension through democratic education that I defend my two recommendations for the realisation of the Critical Citizen, in line with Rousseau's original argument, one institutional and one interactional. Dewey proves instrumental in the formation of these recommendations in that his politico-educational project offers a delicate understanding of means and ends which is necessary for the coherence of the project. Additionally, because Dewey argues in favour of the breaking down of the boundaries between the school and society, and for the school itself to be modelled as an 'embryonic community'. Freire proves instrumental because of his problem-posing education which forms the backbone of teaching practice to ensure that the democracy developed by the students is one of critical and reflective process and extends beyond the mere act of voting as envisaged by Dewey. Furthermore, Freire, more than Rousseau and Dewey, recognises the revolutionary aspect of this challenge to the status quo and the 'humanisation' of the oppressed.

In this thesis I have attempted to show the desirability and feasibility of two reasonably radical ideas, that of internally democratic schools and of federated disestablishment. I have done so through a melding and building project of historical and contemporary theory and practice and framed it around the tension between the individual and society.

These recommendations however remain tentative because they are, at the moment, confined largely to the pages in this thesis. For a stronger and more persuasive account of internally democratic schools and a federated disestablishment to be made further research, practical experimentation, and policy development is necessary. These represent three important avenues for the development of the ideas and arguments that I have made in this thesis.

# Appendices

## Appendix I

## Learning Outcomes of the Crick Report 1998[815]

### Concepts

- Democracy and Autocracy
- Co-operation and Conflict
- Equality and Diversity
- Fairness, Justice, the Rule of Law, Rules, Law and Human Rights
- Freedom and Order
- Individual and Community
- Power and Authority
- Rights and Responsibilities

### Values and Dispositions

- Concern for the Common Good
- Belief in Human Dignity and Equality
- Concern to Resolve Conflicts
- A Disposition to Work with and for Others with Sympathetic Understanding
- Proclivity to Act Responsibly
- Practice of Tolerance
- Judging and Acting by a Moral Code
- Courage to Defend a Point of View
- Willingness to be Open to Changing One's Opinions and Attitudes in the Light of Discussion and Evidence
- Individual Initiative and Effort
- Civility and Respect for the Rule of Law
- Determination to Act Justly

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[815] *Education for Citizenship and the Teaching of Democracy in Schools* (Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, 1998), p. 44, [figure 1].

- Commitment to Equal Opportunities and Gender Equality

- Commitment to Active Citizenship

- Commitment to Voluntary Service

- Concern for Human Rights

- Concern for the Environment


**Skills and Aptitudes**

- Ability to Make a Reasoned Argument Both Verbally and in Writing

- Ability to Co-operate and Work Effectively with Others

- Ability to Consider and Appreciate the Experience and Perspective of Others

- Ability to Tolerate Other View Points

- Ability to Develop a Problem-Solving Approach

- Ability to use Modern Media and Technology Critically to Gather Information

- A Critical Approach to Evidence put Before One and Ability to Look for Fresh Evidence

- Ability to Recognise Forms of Manipulation and Persuasion

- Ability to Identify, Respond to and Influence Social, Moral and Political Challenges and Situations.


**Knowledge and Understanding**

- Topical and Contemporary Issues and Events at Local, National, EU, Commonwealth and International Levels

- The Nature of Democratic Communities, Including How They Function and Change

- The Interdependence of Individuals and Local and Voluntary Communities

- The Nature of Diversity, Dissent and Social Conflict

- Legal and Moral Rights and Responsibilities of Individuals and Communities

- The Nature of Social, Moral and Political Challenges Faced by Individuals and Communities

- Britain's Parliamentary Political and Legal Systems at Local, in National, European, Commonwealth and international Level, Including How They Function and Change

- The Nature of Political and Voluntary Action in Communities

- The Rights and Responsibilities of Citizens as Consumers, Employees, Employers and Family and Community Members

- The Economic System as it Relates to Individuals and Communities

- Human Rights Charters and Issues

- Sustainable Development and Environmental Issues

**Appendix II**

**Recommendations of Crick Report 1998**

1. 'citizenship education be a statutory entitlement in the curriculum and that all schools should be required to show they are fulfilling the obligation that this places upon them;'

2. 'the statutory entitlement is established by setting out specific learning outcomes for each key stage, rather than detailed programmes of study';

3. 'the learning outcomes should be tightly enough defined so that standards and objectivity can be inspected by OFSTED [Office for Standards in Education]';

4. 'there should be a DfEE [Department for Education and Employment] Order setting up the entitlement and this shall declare that citizenship education in schools and colleges is to include the knowledge, skills and values relevant to the nature and practices of participative democracy; the duties, responsibilities, rights and development of pupils into citizens; and the value to individuals, schools and society of involvement in the local and wider community';

5. 'the learning outcomes should be based on what should take no more than five percent of curriculum time across the key stages';

6. 'schools consider combining elements of citizenship education with other subjects';

7. 'schools consider the relation of citizenship education to whole school issues including school ethos, organisation and structures';

8. 'the Secretary of State should consider how the proposed entitlement to citizenship education should continue for all students involved in post-16 education and training regardless of their course of study, vocational or academic';

9. 'the introduction and implementation of the learning outcomes should be phased in over a number of years';

10. 'everyone directly involved in the education of our children – politicians and civil servants; community representatives; faith groups; school inspectors and governors; teacher trainers and teachers themselves; parents and indeed pupils – be given a clear statement of what is meant by citizenship education and their central role in it';

11. 'public bodies, at local and national level, consider ow best to meet their responsibility to citizenship education';

12. 'the implications of our recommendations and other proposed initiatives for the management of teaching time at each key stage, should be given careful attention by QCA [Qualifications and Curriculum Authority] in the context of its overall advice on the review of the National Curriculum';

13. 'there should be a standing Commission on Citizenship Education to monitor its progress and when necessary to recommend amendments to the entitlements, learning outcomes, methods of inspection and teacher training, as appropriate.'[816]

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[816] *Crick Report*, pp. 22–24.

**Appendix III**

**Summary of The UN Convention of the Rights of the Child**

**Article 1** (definition of the child) Everyone under the age of 18 has all the rights in the Convention.

**Article 2** (non-discrimination) The Convention applies to every child without discrimination, whatever their ethnicity, gender, religion, language, abilities or any other status, whatever they think or say, whatever their family background.

**Article 3** (best interests of the child) The best interests of the child must be a top priority in all decisions and actions that affect children.

**Article 4** (implementation of the Convention) Governments must do all they can to make sure every child can enjoy their rights by creating systems and passing laws that promote and protect children's rights.

**Article 5** (parental guidance and a child's evolving capacities) Governments must respect the rights and responsibilities of parents and carers to provide guidance and direction to their child as they grow up, so that they fully enjoy their rights. This must be done in a way that recognises the child's increasing capacity to make their own choices.

**Article 6** (life, survival and development) Every child has the right to life. Governments must do all they can to ensure that children survive and develop to their full potential.

**Article 7** (birth registration, name, nationality, care) Every child has the right to be registered at birth, to have a name and nationality, and, as far as possible, to know and be cared for by their parents.

**Article 8** (protection and preservation of identity) Every child has the right to an identity. Governments must respect and protect that right, and prevent the child's name, nationality or family relationships from being changed unlawfully.

**Article 9** (separation from parents) Children must not be separated from their parents against their will unless it is in their best interests (for example, if a parent is hurting or neglecting a child). Children whose parents have separated have the right to stay in contact with both parents, unless this could cause them harm.

**Article 10** (family reunification) Governments must respond quickly and sympathetically if a child or their parents apply to live together in the same country. If a child's parents live

apart in different countries, the child has the right to visit and keep in contact with both of them.

**Article 11** (abduction and non-return of children) Governments must do everything they can to stop children being taken out of their own country illegally by their parents or other relatives, or being prevented from returning home.

**Article 12** (respect for the views of the child) Every child has the right to express their views, feelings and wishes in all matters affecting them, and to have their views considered and taken seriously. This right applies at all times, for example during immigration proceedings, housing decisions or the child's day-to-day home life.

**Article 13** (freedom of expression) Every child must be free to express their thoughts and opinions and to access all kinds of information, as long as it is within the law.

**Article 14** (freedom of thought, belief and religion) Every child has the right to think and believe what they choose and also to practise their religion, as long as they are not stopping other people from enjoying their rights. Governments must respect the rights and responsibilities of parents to guide their child as they grow up.

**Article 15** (freedom of association) Every child has the right to meet with other children and to join groups and organisations, as long as this does not stop other people from enjoying their rights.

**Article 16** (right to privacy) Every child has the right to privacy. The law should protect the child's private, family and home life, including protecting children from unlawful attacks that harm their reputation.

**Article 17** (access to information from the media) Every child has the right to reliable information from a variety of sources, and governments should encourage the media to provide information that children can understand. Governments must help protect children from materials that could harm them.

**Article 18** (parental responsibilities and state assistance) Both parents share responsibility for bringing up their child and should always consider what is best for the child. Governments must support parents by creating support services for children and giving parents the help they need to raise their children.

**Article 19** (protection from violence, abuse and neglect) Governments must do all they can to ensure that children are protected from all forms of violence, abuse, neglect and bad treatment by their parents or anyone else who looks after them.

**Article 20** (children unable to live with their family) If a child cannot be looked after by their immediate family, the government must give them special protection and assistance. This includes making sure the child is provided with alternative care that is continuous and respects the child's culture, language and religion.

**Article 21** (adoption) Governments must oversee the process of adoption to make sure it is safe, lawful and that it prioritises children's best interests. Children should only be adopted outside of their country if they cannot be placed with a family in their own country.

**Article 22** (refugee children) If a child is seeking refuge or has refugee status, governments must provide them with appropriate protection and assistance to help them enjoy all the rights in the Convention. Governments must help refugee children who are separated from their parents to be reunited with them.

**Article 23** (children with a disability) A child with a disability has the right to live a full and decent life with dignity and, as far as possible, independence and to play an active part in the community. Governments must do all they can to support disabled children and their families.

**Article 24** (health and health services) Every child has the right to the best possible health. Governments must provide good quality health care, clean water, nutritious food, and a clean environment and education on health and well-being so that children can stay healthy. Richer countries must help poorer countries achieve this.

**Article 25** (review of treatment in care) If a child has been placed away from home for the purpose of care or protection (for example, with a foster family or in hospital), they have the right to a regular review of their treatment, the way they are cared for and their wider circumstances.

**Article 26** (social security) Every child has the right to benefit from social security. Governments must provide social security, including financial support and other benefits, to families in need of assistance.

**Article 27** (adequate standard of living) Every child has the right to a standard of living that is good enough to meet their physical and social needs and support their development. Governments must help families who cannot afford to provide this.

**Article 28** (right to education) Every child has the right to an education. Primary education must be free and different forms of secondary education must be available to

every child. Discipline in schools must respect children's dignity and their rights. Richer countries must help poorer countries achieve this.

**Article 29** (goals of education) Education must develop every child's personality, talents and abilities to the full. It must encourage the child's respect for human rights, as well as respect for their parents, their own and other cultures, and the environment.

**Article 30** (children from minority or indigenous groups) Every child has the right to learn and use the language, customs and religion of their family, whether or not these are shared by the majority of the people in the country where they live.

**Article 31** (leisure, play and culture) Every child has the right to relax, play and take part in a wide range of cultural and artistic activities.

**Article 32** (child labour) Governments must protect children from economic exploitation and work that is dangerous or might harm their health, development or education. Governments must set a minimum age for children to work and ensure that work conditions are safe and appropriate.

**Article 33** (drug abuse) Governments must protect children from the illegal use of drugs and from being involved in the production or distribution of drugs.

**Article 34** (sexual exploitation) Governments must protect children from all forms of sexual abuse and exploitation.

**Article 35** (abduction, sale and trafficking) Governments must protect children from being abducted, sold or moved illegally to a different place in or outside their country for the purpose of exploitation.

**Article 36** (other forms of exploitation) Governments must protect children from all other forms of exploitation, for example the exploitation of children for political activities, by the media or for medical research.

**Article 37** (inhumane treatment and detention) Children must not be tortured, sentenced to the death penalty or suffer other cruel or degrading treatment or punishment. Children should be arrested, detained or imprisoned only as a last resort and for the shortest time possible. They must be treated with respect and care, and be able to keep in contact with their family. Children must not be put in prison with adults.

**Article 38** (war and armed conflicts) Governments must not allow children under the age of 15 to take part in war or join the armed forces. Governments must do everything they can to protect and care for children affected by war and armed conflicts.

**Article 39** (recovery from trauma and reintegration) Children who have experienced neglect, abuse, exploitation, torture or who are victims of war must receive special support to help them recover their health, dignity, self-respect and social life.

**Article 40** (juvenile justice) A child accused or guilty of breaking the law must be treated with dignity and respect. They have the right to legal assistance and a fair trial that takes account of their age. Governments must set a minimum age for children to be tried in a criminal court and manage a justice system that enables children who have been in conflict with the law to reintegrate into society.

**Article 41** (respect for higher national standards) If a country has laws and standards that go further than the present Convention, then the country must keep these laws.

**Article 42** (knowledge of rights) Governments must actively work to make sure children and adults know about the Convention. The Convention has 54 articles in total.

**Articles 43–54** are about how adults and governments must work together to make sure all children can enjoy all their rights, including:

**Article 45** Unicef can provide expert advice and assistance on children's rights.

**Optional Protocols** There are three agreements, called Optional Protocols, that strengthen the Convention and add further unique rights for children. They are optional because governments that ratify the Convention can decide whether or not to sign up to these Optional Protocols. They are: the Optional Protocol on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, the Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict and the Optional Protocol on a complaints mechanism for children (called Communications Procedure). For more information go to unicef.org.uk/crc/op

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
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