PERSON, *DEIFICATION* AND *RE-COGNITION*: 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PERSON IN THE 
BYZANTINE AND *PRATYABHIJñA* TRADITIONS 

by 

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This Research was carried out in collaboration with the 
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ABSTRACT

PERSON, DEIFICATION AND RE-COGNITION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PERSON IN THE BYZANTINE AND PRATYABHIJṆĀ TRADITIONS

By Desmond Nicholas Bamford

This thesis will construct a model of person through a comparison of ideas relating to a concept of person in the Byzantine and Pratyabhijñā traditions. Questions will be asked, such as, whether a concept of person can be constructed within these two traditions, and how can ideas developed from these traditions be utilised to construct a model of person? This thesis will provide an in depth examination of terms and concepts that will be related to a concept of person within the two traditions, examining the ontological and existential implications of those terms. This work will also develop, from a subsequent convergence of the theologies of the two traditions, a model of person that is inter-religious and dialogical. Though this work is analytical in nature, in its deconstructing philosophical and theological models relating to person, it also constructive, taking what is useful from the Byzantine and Pratyabhijñā traditions so as to construct a new model of person through the development of the term, Ātman-hypostasis which looks to understanding human personhood in the fullest mystical state (deification) within the human condition. A comparison of the two traditions has not been attempted before in relation to the theological discourse of person; neither has such an extensive examination and deconstruction of the concept person in Byzantine and Pratyabhijñā traditions been undertaken in relation to contemporary studies; neither has a construction of this type of model of person been undertaken. This work, in constructing a new term Ātman-hypostasis, which emerged from this research as an outcome of the comparison of terms and ideas relating to a concept of person in both traditions, will contribute to the academic theological field of personhood and this thesis will also contribute to the field of inter-religious dialogue in developing an anthropological model that aims to overcome the barriers that separate and divide.
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DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP

I, Desmond Nicholas Bamford, declare that the thesis entitled, *Person, Deification and Re-cognition: A Comparative Study of person in the Byzantine and Pratyabhijñā Traditions*, and the work presented on the thesis, are both my own and have been generated by me as the result of my own original research. I confirm that:

- this work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at this University;
- where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated;
- where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed;
- where I have quoted from the works of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work;
- I have acknowledged all main sources of help;
- where the thesis is based on work done by myself jointly with others, I have made clear exactly what was done by others and what I have contributed myself;
- parts of this work and ideas relating to this work have been published by myself in the form of papers given at conferences listed below;

4.) ‘Christos Yannaras’ Postmodern Ecclesiology: A Way of Existing in Both Church and Contemporary World’, *Ecclesiological Investigations Study Day, Milltown Institute* (Dublin: April, 2008).
5.) ‘In Answer to Zizioulas’ Claim that God has “no ‘true’ being apart from communion”, *Zizioulas Colloquium, Chichester University* (Chichester: October, 2008).

Signed: Desmond Nicholas Bamford

Date: 30.7.2010
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Because of my dyslexia I sought editorial help from Dr Bruce Hunt for the thesis and ‘with the oversight of my main supervisor, editorial advice has been sought. No changes of intellectual content were made as a result of this advice’, as specified in the rules and guidelines set out for Southampton University, ‘Writing the Thesis’, no.15, in the Completion of Research Degree Candidature (August 2007), p.4. Advice was also given to me at various conferences which proved helpful, especially in relation to the methodological approach and I am grateful to the various opinions of scholars which proved helpful but, ‘no changes of intellectual content were made as a result of this advice’ and did not result in any denudation of originality or intellectual content.

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ABEVIATIONS


Ambig. – *Ambigua* of Maximus the Confessor (PG 91).


Anim. – *De Anima*, of Aristotle (OCT, and LCL 288).


Apol. – *Apologiae*, of Justin Martyr (PG 60).


Cap. – *Capita 150*, of Gregory Palamas (PG 150).

Carm. – *Carmina*, of Gregory Nazianzen (PG 37-38).

Cat. – *Categories*, of Aristotle 1, trans. H. P. Cooke (LCL, 325).


CH. - *De Caelesi Hierarchia*, of Pseudo-Dionysius (PG 3).

Con. Eut. - *Contra Eutychen*, of Boethius (PG 64).

De Trin. - *De Trinitate*, of Augustine (CCSL 50).

Dial. - *Dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo*, of Justin Martyr (PG 6).

D.N. - *De Divinis Nominibus*, of Pseudo-Dionysius (PG 3).

E.H. - *De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia*, of Pseudo-Dionysius (PG 3).

Ep. - *Epistulae*, of Pseudo-Dionysius (PG 3); of Basil of Caesarea (PG 32); of Gregory Nazianzen (PG 37); of Maximus the Confessor (PG 91).


F.O. - *De Fide Orthodoxa*, of John of Damascus (PG 94).


Haer. - *Adversus Haereses*, of Irenaeus of Lyons (PG 7).


Inc. - *De Incarnatione*, of Athanasius (PG 25b).

IPK - *Iśvarapratyabhijñākārikā* (KSTS 34).


IPV - *Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Vimarsini of Abhinavagupta* (KSTS 22, 33).


MT - *Mālinīvijayottara Tantram* (KSTS 37).


OCT – *Oxford Classical Texts*.

Opse. – *Opuscula*, of Maximus the Confessor (PG 91).
Or. – *Orationes*, of Gregory Nazianzen (PG 36).


P.Ap. – *The Proof of the Apostolic Preaching*, of Irenaeus of Lyons (PO 12.5.61).

PBH - *Pratyabhijñā Hṛdaya*, of Kṣemarāja (KSTS 3).


Ph. – *Phaedo*, of Plato, in *Platonis Opera* I (OCT, 88-186).


PSA - *Paramārthasāra of Abhinavagupta* (KSTS 7).

SK - *Spānda Kārikās*, of Kallata (KSTS 5).


Spir. – *De Spiritu Sancto*, of Basil of Caesarea (PG 32).

SS - *Śiva Sūtra Vimarśinī, the Sūtras of Vasu Gupta, with the Commentary called Vimarśinī of Kṣemarāja*, ed. J. C. Chatterji (KSTS 1).


Str. – Stromata, of Clement of Alexandria (PG 8).

SVTQ - Saint Vladimir's Theological Quarterly.


Thal. - Quaestiones ad Thalassium, of Maximus the Confessor (CCSG 7 and 22).

Tres Dii – Quod Non Sint Tres Dii, of Gregory of Nyssa (PG 45).

V. Mos. - De Vita Moysis, of Gregory of Nyssa (PG 44).
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Aims and Considerations

This thesis will have two broad aims, to compare concepts of person within the Byzantine and Pratyabhijñā traditions in Chapters 2 and 3, and then to converge and synthesise ideas developed from those traditions within a single model, the Ātman-hypostasis, in Chapter 4. Through this model, the place for considering new approaches to person will be affirmed, as will the use of one tradition to inform the other. The thesis will therefore develop a fusion of ideas through the study of personhood within a comparative analysis of these seemingly different traditions.

While this research will also be placed within the context of contemporary research, most specifically relating to the ideas of John Zizioulas, the intent is to provide a deeper understanding of the concept of person through two areas of study: firstly, in relation to terms in which personhood has become centred, hypostasis/prosopon and ousia within the Byzantine tradition; and puruṣa and Ātman within the Pratyabhijñā tradition. The second area of the study will relate person to the notion of deification or re-cognition. Through this examination terms will be adopted and synthesised within the new model to converge ideas and aid interreligious dialogue.

This thesis was conceived of as a response to the contemporary theological debate on person in the Byzantine tradition and the wish to bring that debate into the interreligious discourse. It will develop a model that is open to interreligious dialogue, which allows the study of person within the two traditions to be considered from a new perspective within a space for dialogue and convergence. Openness to interreligious dialogue indicates a rejection of clinging to a rigid adherence to

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1 The debate on personhood within an inter-religious context is exemplified by Descry, 'Unknowing and Personalism' in Bäumer (ed.), Mysticism in Shaivism and Christianity (Delhi: 1997); and K. P. Aleaz, A Convergence of Advaita Vedānta and Eastern Christian Thought (Delhi: 2000).
2 Exemplified by Jacques Dupuis who calls for an honest approach to inter-religious dialogue, see 'Christianity and Religions: Complementarity and Convergence', in Catherine Cornille, Many Mansions: Multiple Religious Belonging and Christian Identity (Maryknoll: 2002), pp.61-75.
traditional answers and allows personhood also to be considered within the context of multiple divine revelations. The very notion of multiple divine revelations can be considered as the driving force behind inter-religious dialogue. This answers the problem of perceived differing revelations and how these revelations relate to the human religious experience or the transformation of the individual. Thus, at the heart of understanding how religions can exist in-situ with each other, is the understanding of how the divine reveals itself and how this relates to the dispensation and reception of grace. While this thesis will not answer these problems directly, it will consider the place for different forms of manifested grace within different traditions, where the notion of transformation and restoration of all human persons become the focus for understanding the nature of revelation.

The relationship of multiple revelations in relation to grace and human becoming will be considered as implicitly related to how the divine nature and activity impacts upon each human person. Maximus the Confessor stated that “by grace, God, is the self-becomer, Author, of the deification of creatures”. Through grace and deification, human persons gain a better understanding of themselves through the divine intention for human persons. The concept of divine intention allows deified person to be correlated to the telos of personhood within different religious traditions. The term grace also implies an inter-religious perspective through an end result, deification/re-cognition, which when placed in an inter-religious context expands the role of the divine act to indicate a cosmic work of the divine to deify the whole of mankind. Maximus argued that grace indicates the divine purpose for the whole of humankind:

By grace he himself is God and is called God. By his gracious condescension God became man and is called man for the sake of man and by exchanging his condition for ours revealed the power that elevates man to God...by this blessed inversion, man is made God by divinization and God is made man by hominization.

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3 Kat à ths kata xaráv au'touyrgouv geveathai tvn gevounntovn theoúFear, Maximus Thal 60 (CCSG 22), 79, 117-120; translation by P. M. Blowers, On the Cosmic Mystery of Christ (Crestwood: 2002), pp.127-128.

4 Maximus, Ambig. 7 (PG 91), 1084C; translation by P. M. Blowers, On the Cosmic Mystery of Christ, p.60.
To some extent this thesis is forcing a change in the way a person has traditionally been considered, especially in contemporary models, through comparison and convergence and by allowing for reciprocity and the synthesising of ideas.

Due to the syncretistic and synthetic nature of this work it is appropriate here to provide some defence of this approach. This is necessary to answer criticisms that object to a syncretistic and synthetic model, and hence we can look to the Early Church Fathers for a defence of this methodology. Justin Martyr had referred to the "seed of reason (the Logos) implanted in every race of men", and Clement of Alexandria viewed other faiths and philosophies, apart from the Christian, as Logos-spermatikoi or the seeds of the Logos sowed through time by the Logos. Clement stated that the "truth, much more powerful than limitless duration, can collect its proper germs (spermata), though they have fallen on foreign soil". These seeds of truth represent a context by which multiple revelations can be understood and allow the place for syncretistic and synthetic approaches, which seem to be not only appropriate within this context, but also inevitable.

This thesis appeals to this early inter-religious model, which utilises the powerful imagery of the cosmic Christ who sows the seeds of truth in every faith and time to determine that certain philosophies and theologies represent descents of truth. Hence philosophies and religions can be said to stem from the perennial flow of truth that flows at all times in history. Inter-religious discourse within this narrative allows for non-hegemonic interpretations and cross-philosophical interpretations within a

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5 Justin Martyr, Apol.2.8, (PG 6), 441-471; translation by Coxe (ANF, 1), p.191.
6 Clement, Str.1.13 (PG 8), 756A; translation by Coxe (ANF, 2), p.313.
7 Πολύ δὲ πλέον δυνατοτέρα τοῦ αιῶνος ἢ ἄλλητεα συναγαγεῖν τὰ οἰκεία σπέρματα, κἀν εἰς τὴν ἀλλοδαπὴν ἐπίκτησιν. Clement, Str.1.13 (PG 8), 756A; translation by Coxe (ANF 2), 313. See also G. L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, (London: 1959), p.117, who highlights that "logos spermaticos" examples a Christian use of "Stoic conception", or "immanent germinative principle", (ibid).
8 An interesting contemporary use Logos-Spermatikos is exemplified by David Lawrence who sees this type of model as helpful when developing convergence within the philosophical narrative, especially in relation to Pratyabhijñā and Western epistemological models; see David Peter Lawrence, Rediscovering God with Transcendental Argument (Delhi: 1999), p.21; and Aspects of Abhinavagupta’s Theory of Scripture’, Satya Nilayam; Chennai Journal of Intercultural Philosophy 5 (2004), p.22.
9 Clement, Str.1.5 (PG 8), 685-708; translation by Coxe (ANF 2), p.305.
Philosophia perennis, as Clement of Alexandria believed, that the “way of truth is one, but into it, as into a perennial river, streams flow from all sides”.

In Eastern Orthodox terms, it is the Logos that inspires all philosophical endeavours before the Logos-Sarx Incarnation, the Christ, who perfectly embodies the culmination of philosophy, and who encourages ascents of truth.

To help argue the case for this open dialogical approach in the context of contemporary Eastern Orthodoxy, the Greek Orthodox theologian Philip Sherrard can be cited. Sherrard criticised concepts of “linear ‘salvation history’” that produce negative and exclusive claims, but rather looked to positive or optimistic models that stressed the economy of the divine Logos and eschatological fulfilment. He stated: “it is the Logos who is received in the spiritual illumination of a Brahmin, a Buddhist, or a Moslem”.

In addition this thesis will focus only on certain areas relating to personhood and will not seek to engage in an examination of all the areas relating to personhood. Hence, many theological problems will be left unaddressed, and will have to be addressed in future studies, such as the ontological issues relating to the Trinity in respect of the monism of Kashmir Śaivism. There have been no previous attempts to compare the notion of person in Byzantine and Pratyabhijā tradition, but some broad comparisons are now being made between Byzantine and Kashmir Śaivite schools especially in relation to the concepts of deification (theosis) and fullness (plerōma/pūrṇa). Therefore this work sits within an ever growing corpus of theologians who wish to examine how ideas in the Byzantine, Kashmir Śaivite and Vedāntic traditions

11 Clement, Str. 1.5, 713; translation by Coxe (ANF, 2), p.305.
13 Ibid., p.62.
14 See Bettina Bäumer (ed.), Mysticism in Shaivism and Christianity (Delhi: 1997).
can be better understood in relation to each other within a dialogical forum.\footnote{16} It will be argued that there is indeed a place for theological dialogue between the Byzantine and Kashmir Śaivite (Pratyabhijñā) traditions, and that through dialogue, each tradition can learn from the other\footnote{17} which can be mutually beneficial theologically.

1.1.1 Eschatological Hope

Comparison\footnote{18} and convergence\footnote{19} will be considered in relation to an “eschatological hope”,\footnote{20} as Wolfhart Pannenberg puts it, and fulfilment,\footnote{21} that is to say a fulfilment in the end (the \textit{eschata}), the \textit{telos}, of all things. This idea of hope will be placed within the discourse of inter-religious dialogue and seeking dialogue with the other\footnote{22} within the hope of fulfilment, which underlines the reasons for bringing the two traditions together in a comparison. But hope will not only be understood in terms of an outward fulfilment, but also of the inner life, where in the inner experience, the \textit{telos} of person is attained in an inner \textit{event}. This inner \textit{event} represents the end or completion of the person\footnote{23} within an inner mystical experience, and which represents the hope for all persons in the fulfilment experience of \textit{deification/re-cognition}.

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{16} See Aleaz, \textit{A Convergence of Advaita Vedānta and Eastern Christian Thought}.
\item \footnote{17} See Zizioulas, \textit{Communion and Otherness} (London: 2006).
\item \footnote{19} I will develop convergence similar to the type of K. P. Aleaz, who argues for the place of theological convergence of \textit{Vedānta} and Eastern Christianity, see \textit{A Convergence of Advaita Vedānta and Eastern Christian Thought} (Delhi: 2000).
\item \footnote{22} See John D. Zizioulas, \textit{Communion and Otherness} (London: 2006), pp.43-55. The notion of the other will also be understood from the context of Zizioulas’ Trinitarian theology, where the other becomes related to the divine \textit{hypostasis} and thus in this thesis will also relate to the nature of \textit{hypostasis} through \textit{Atman}.
\item \footnote{23} See Mathew 24:13-14, where Jesus refers to a single end (τέλος) event, but which can also be understood in terms of an inward completion.
\end{itemize}
Consequently, through this approach to person, this chapter will contain an evaluation of the problems and approaches relating to comparison and dialogical theology while admitting that all things cannot be known and will seek an *apophatic* approach\(^{24}\) to an eschatological hope. The reasoning for interreligious dialogue should be shrouded within an admittance of a divine plan that cannot be known and remains hidden to most. Such a plan for mankind indicates not only eschatological hope, affirming that approaches to interreligious dialogue should be attempted, but that the reasoning for dialogue should be placed within a context of what cannot be known. It cannot be known how or why the divine reveals itself, but that such varied revelations take place and from those revelations many types of theologies are born to explain those revelations, which allows for the space for inter-religious dialogue to be considered. This dialogue represents the recognition of the possibilities contained within the choice to engage rather than reject. In addition the emphasis will be not upon the methods of inter-religious dialogue, even though some examination of problems relating to approaches will be given later in the introduction, and it will be affirmed that dialogue is necessary, given that all humans are persons, sharing a common experience and nature.

What will be accepted is that an eschatological vision allows for fulfilment and yet recognises the place for difference, where the divine wish to bring humankind to God reflects the recognition for the place for revelatory participations. Theological and religious paradigms must go beyond previous, exclusivist, inclusivist or pluralistic claims of religion,\(^{25}\) to a cosmic\(^{26}\) vision, while at the same time considering models that encourage a mindset that look to new theologies.

### 1.1.2 Encounters of the Personal

In affirmation of this approach, a comparison should be sought between Indian philosophy (*Pratyabhijña*) and Christianity (Byzantine tradition) in an encounter of

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the personal, of the personal Christ to the world, and between persons (hypostases). It is due to the focus on the nature of person and the shared reality of being persons that an encounter with other traditions will be considered from an inter-religious perspective allowing for meaningful reciprocity.

The reasoning behind engaging in comparison and dialogue will be sought by affirming a depth of meaning within the encounters of the personal, not only in the meetings between human persons but in the encounters between the human person and the divine person. But there should be incorporated into attempts at understanding such encounters, elements of what cannot be known or grasped especially when considering how these encounters relate to revelation. It can only be affirmed that from a soteriological perspective, encounters on a personal level are to be considered in a way that rises above the mundane vision. Thus dialogue should be sought not only within the context of a shared common experience but through an eschatological vision or a hope of the unity of persons. The place for the eschatological unity of religions, and thus the need for seeking what is common, shared and hoped for in human beings was also called for in Nostra Aetate of Vatican II. In this eschatological context, the ground for dialogue is sought in the truth of the eschata, which becomes the basis for both unity and diversity, which helps negotiate, as Kärkkäinen states, “the dynamic and tension between one and many”.

The examination of the human person in the context of the Byzantine and Pratyabhijñā traditions will thus be placed within a soteriological and eschatological context in the “universal design of God for the salvation of the human race”, who reveals Himself, as Dupuis states, in “many and various ways”. The role of divine revelation for the whole of humankind will be viewed as central not only to the discourse of personhood but also to inter-religious dialogue, but will also stress the Christian role of Christ as the central salvific figure. I again cite Dupuis to support

27 For an example of this approach in relation to dialogue, see Kärkkäinen, Trinity and Religious Pluralism, p.87.
29 Ibid., p.177.
30 Pope Paul VI, Decree on the Mission and Activity of the Church: Ad Gentes (Boston: 1965).
31 Jacques Dupuis, Christianity and the Religions, p.114.
this view in his model of “one mediator” within “participated mediations”\(^{32}\) in which the uniqueness of Christ is upheld while also affirming the place of divine multiple mediations, and multiple revelatory events through the divine revelatory activity. The two positions will be viewed not in conflict, but as complementary.

Thus, this work represents an optimistic view of inter-religious dialogue, as exemplified by Keith Ward in his notion of disclosures\(^ {33}\) and Ninian Smart’s notion of shared experience\(^ {34}\) which also represents an optimistic approach to dialogue.\(^ {35}\)

Thus a growing body of theologians have developed and are developing theological models which are not content with underlining the same old barriers of separation, but look to optimism and solutions for discourse. This work will become part of an ever growing corpus which encourages new ideas, and even new Christologies.\(^ {36}\) It is hoped that ideas relating to the \(\text{\textit{Atman-hypostasis}}\) paradigm constructed in this thesis will add to and aid discourse that invites, what Samartha calls, “possibilities for Christological developments”.\(^ {37}\)

\(^{32}\) Ibid., p.163.
\(^{33}\) Keith Ward believes that from such disclosures comparative theology can allow “enquiry into ideas of God and revelation”, \textit{Religion and Revelation} (Oxford; Clarendon Press) p.50.
\(^{35}\) Within this context of optimism, and disclosures and truth, the concept of the Absolute will be understood in terms of God who discloses “Himself” and a disclosed truth. I refer to the term “Himself” giving a masculine attribute to God not in a sexist context but because this is utilised in the Greek Patristic tradition, see Pseudo-Dionysius, \textit{DN}, 7.3 (Luibheid), “He is known through knowledge” (PG 3), 872A; and in \textit{Pratyabhijñā} see IPK 4.3, which states “He is taken to be numerous types of finite persons” (Pandit). A notion of truth, through an \(\text{\textit{Atmanic}}\) reality, can be correlated to John Hick’s concept of the “Real” (see John Hick, \textit{Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion}, UK: 2001, p.14), which infers a notion of the Absolute divine transcendent, “Ultimate Reality”, which, for Ward, is versatile enough to be related to equivalent ideas in Hinduism and Islam (ibid). This line of thought is also taken up by Harold Coward in \textit{The Perfectibility of Human Nature in Eastern and Western Thought} (NY: 2008).
\(^{37}\) Samartha, \textit{One Christ many Religions}, p.93.
1.2 Methodology: Comparative and Convergent Approaches to Theology

While a comparison and convergence of terms will be considered discretely throughout the thesis, with a sharp focus in Chapter 4, the main emphasis will be upon comparing models of person that relate to the constructs of individuality, modes of existence, relationality and unity in Chapters 2 and 3. The comparison of such models will represent a wish to develop a convergence of ideas, as exemplified by Brück, and bring such convergence to a point of synthesis in Chapter 4. While the thesis will develop convergence and a synthetic approach, it will do so within a Christian framework.

1.2.1 Comparative Theology

The wish to evolve ideas through comparison is not new, and there is a voluminous corpus of material from scholars such as Max Müller to Swami Abhishiktananda, and in the contemporary field is exemplified by Francis X. Clooney and Gavin Flood, that seeks to engage in comparative theology to aid dialogue and reciprocity. What this thesis proposes is to utilise Aleaz’s notion of convergence to construct a model of person within a comparison that is workable. To some extent this process could be related to a “re-imagining” of God, as Richard Kearney put it, where we redefine and re-consider the way in which we view God and thus ourselves.

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43 Aleaz, A Convergence of Advaita Vedānta and Eastern Christian Thought.

But there are difficulties that confront the inter-religious dialogical theologian such as over confessionalism, which makes the rationale for theological comparison reductio ad absurdum. Problems relating to the confusion of theological concepts are highlighted by John Thatamanil, who shows that comparative theologians in their efforts to be comparative may even have become hyphenated as a Hindu-Christian or Christian-Hindu. In an inclusivist position the outcome may even become more radical in seeking common ground, as exemplified in Bede Griffiths’ promotion of hybridization. But while the over-confessional approach represents a stumbling block to comparison and convergence, a model that is too accepting can denude faith claims, and so what should be the approach to inter-religious dialogue? Clooney recognises that one way may be to accept “multiple religious identities”, in which one enters into partnership and experience with the other faiths, even though he prefers to work through his own tradition. This view is taken up Jacques Dupuis in his inter-religious dialogical approach. Dupuis argues that to engage with the “faith of the other” one must be open to the faith of the other to become a true partner in dialogue, where one enters “into the experience of the other in an effort to grasp the experience from within”. But here lies the problem; the term other can imply separateness and distance, and so one solution is either to identify oneself with the other or even become the other, taking on the other’s tradition in which one can experience the other’s religion and thereby gain respect for other traditions. This has led to the notion of “multiple religious belonging”, but there has not been enough work on this side of inter-religious dialogue to see where this line of dialogical theology is going.

45 Ibid.
46 See Catherine Cornille, The Guru in Indian Catholicism, p.177.
47 Francis X. Clooney, ‘God For Us; Multiple Religious Identities as a Human and Divine Prospect’, in Catherine Cornille, Many Mansions (Maryknoll: 2002), p.44.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 See also Barnes, Theology and the Dialogue of Religions, p.45.
52 Zizioulas argues though, the opposite, where the notion of the other has a relational quality, see Communion and Otherness, p.43.
Perhaps the notion of otherness in a relational context, of a collective religious belonging could help to support inter-religious dialogue when viewed in the context of friend. This highlights a reciprocal model, where the recognition of what is shared by all persons having the nature of hypostatic existence, and the participating in a faith in God, itself brings persons together through the sharing of a common nature and faith.

The theological development of comparativism or comparative theology, has also laid itself open to criticism for its broad generalisations, exemplified in Radhakrishnan's comparison of Eastern and Western ideologies. While Radhakrishnan looked to qualify his approach through notions of "self-discovery and self-knowledge", he made broad comparisons of the mysticism and ethics of the West and India and of what is to be understood by the term soul. But he was mindful of the danger in his approach and underlined that his attempts were but cursory. In addition so often a comparison may wish to accomplish something beneficial but the outcome may be detrimental to dialogue. In this case I am thinking of Hans Torwesten's work Ramakrishna and Christ, which compares Ramakrishna with Christ, and deny the uniqueness of Christ, which serves only to repel from a Christian point of view.

Another good example of comparison seeking a unity of ideas but actually underlining difference is Bede Griffiths' correlation of the Trinity with Sat-Cit-Ananda or Satcidananda. Bede Griffiths' Hindu-Christian syncretism, though well intentioned, actually muddles theological ideas. Hence criticism of the comparativist method thus seems somewhat founded upon real fears. William E. Paden reflects that,

54 See Thomas Aquinas, _ST_, Q114.1-2 (1670).
56 Ibid., p.35.
57 Ibid., p.145.
58 Ibid., p.117.
59 Hans Torwesten's _Ramakrishna and Christ_ (UK: 1997), p.21; also see Geoffrey Parrinda, _Avatar and Incarnation_ (Oxford: 1997); and R. S. Sugirtharaja, _Asian Faces of Jesus_ (Maryknoll: 1993).
62 These confused models make "superficial identifications" which should not be employed and this problem of "superficial identifications" is beginning to be understood as detrimental to encounter, see David Brown, _God and Enchantment of Place_ (Oxford: 2004), p.352.
"comparativism is not without its problems and critics for it can make superficial parallels, false analogies and misleading associations". It can also be shown that some modern Indian thinkers, such as, Swami Vivekananda and Sri Aurobindo confused or even blurred theological ideas in their attempts at seeking harmony, and made erroneous correlations between an impersonal divinity and theism, and so it is important to be careful when constructing synthetic models that seek a convergence of ideas.

The theological comparativist has also been accused of developing a non-existent *meta-narrative*, and agenda, and thus, as Paden puts it, comparativism has developed a "kind of conceptual imperialism". However, comparative theology should be used as a tool to push theological boundaries and to promote dialogue through convergence. Perhaps Hindu theological methods could provide a way into convergence, in as much as Hinduism has been doing comparison and convergence for a long time. This is exemplified in the *Bhāgavad Gītā*, which incorporated many of the philosophical and theological systems of India. In the *Gītārtha Samgraha*, Abhinavagupta informs us that it is the purpose of the Lord to manifest many paths of knowledge (*Sānkhya*) and action (*Yoga*), and that such a fusion enhances humanity’s existence:

> The Lord combines and presents both these paths in one because knowledge (*jñāna*) and action (*kriyā*) are the very nature of consciousness.

Taking these concerns into consideration in relation to comparison and convergence this thesis is placed within the context of inter-religious dialogue, where seeking common ground with other religions has become imperative for fostering mutual understanding and respect. The facing of other religions in inter-religious encounters, forces us not only to ask the question *why* engage in a comparison at all, but to also

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64 See Vivekananda’s *Neo-Vedānta, The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda* (1-8; Calcutta, 2000) and *Sri Aurobindo’s Synthesis of Yoga* (BCL, 20-21).
66 Ibid., p.217.
68 B. Marjanovic (trans.), *Abhinavagupta’s Commentary on the Bhagavad Gītā, Gītārtha Samgraha* (New Delhi: 2004), p.82.
ask why have we not engaged more in meaningful theological dialogue? Thus we
should then ask to what extent comparison and convergence can develop or aid inter-
religious dialogue. But the why of theological comparison should not only be based
upon an academic need to develop meaning in theological dialogue and convergence,
or a political will to harmonise cultures and religions, but that engagement with other
faith communities should have a deeper significance. The why of comparison must
have as its centre an ontological and existential quest that seeks a deeper rationale for
dialogue. While often the most suitable path to achieve an encounter in the study of
religions is found through comparison, so too ontological inquiry is important in
informing us of the nature of personhood when asking the questions not only ‘who am
I’ as a person, but also ‘who are we’ as persons? What is a human person?”69 Hence
comparison and convergence, while serving as a dialogical tool, can also be used to
increase our knowledge of who we are as human persons.70

1.2.2 Converging Theologies

The wish to attempt not only at comparison between theologies from different
traditions but also a convergence has recently been adopted by the Indian Oriental
Orthodox theologian K. P. Aleaz. He argues that such dialogical approaches can
promote a “unitive vision”,71 that is to say a holistic ideal, exemplified in an
eschatological vision.72 He envisions new meanings, and insights gained through
convergence73 of Advaita Neo-Vedânta74 with Christianity, within a category called
“Pluralistic Inclusivism”.75 Aleaz structures his approach to theology stressing
theological comparison and convergence, and drawing upon Neo-Vedânta to develop

69 See Rudolf Otto, Mysticism East and West (NY: 1932), who was attempted an ontological
comparison between Meister Eckhart and Šânkara’s use of Esse (ibid. pp.19-21) and Âtman
respectively in seeking such answers to these questions.
70 For this reason Gavin Flood states that “comparisons are not odious but necessary for human
understanding”, see Gavin Flood, The Ascetic Self, Subjectivity, Memory and Tradition (Cambridge:
2004); also see also on this Paul E. Murphy, Triadic Mysticism, The Mystical Theology of Saivism of
Kashmir (Delhi: 1999).
71 Aleaz, Christian Responses to Indian Philosophy (Kolkata: 2005), p.120.
74 Neo-Vedânta is generally considered as the resurgence of Vedânta or Upanisâdic theology which
brought together ideas not only of Śâivite, Yogic, and Vaisnâvite theologies but incorporated the
context of other religions and exemplified by Ramakrishna, Swami Vivekananda and Sri Aurobindo.
75 See Aleaz, A Convergence of Advaita Vedanta and Eastern Christian Thought, p.xv.
new Christologies through the incorporation of Hindu philosophies. As with Aleaz, this work will also affirm that isolationist theologies cannot provide new insights into old problems, and that what are needed are new approaches that enrich and bring new dimensions to theology. Aleaz demonstrates that new approaches sought in Indian Christianity, through the incorporation of the term Ātman, can be used as an epistemological and metaphysical tool in Christian reformulation theology.

While many approaches to inter-religious dialogue have, especially over the last forty years, been attempted, what will be considered here is that, a space for theological comparison and convergence enhances inter-religious dialogue, and pushes theological boundaries forward towards a goal that contemplates fruitful and harmonious encounters. To that end, this work will not present an overtly confessional or exclusivist approach, nor will it develop a religiously pluralistic model taken up by Keith Ward and John Hick, which accepts all types of spirituality. The necessity to look to new approaches can be justified in the Early Christian synchronistic use of philosophical terms. So too, present day Christianity, if it is to respond to pluralism, has to accept the place for the inclusion and convergence of ideas and terms not traditionally utilised in Christianity. Indeed the task of theology itself when considering an eschatological and a cosmic vision of God must be able to include and not exclude. In this context Keith Ward has stated that, “theology is a pluralistic discipline. In it people of differing beliefs can co-operate, discuss, argue and converse”.

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76 Ibid., p.xix.
77 It is now can be recognised that there is a distinct Christian approach in India which is called ‘Indian Christianity’ and which, regardless of the denomination, has a flavour that is distinctly Indian. See R. Boyd, An Introduction to Indian Christian Theology (Delhi: 1969, 2005); and M. Vekathanam, Indian Christology.
78 Vekathanam, Indian Christology (Bangalore: 2004), p.508.
79 There have in this context, even been some discussion on ‘multiple religious belonging’ see, Catherine Cornille (ed.), Many Mansions: and Peter C. Phan, Being religious Interreligiously (Maryknoll: 2004).
80 Problems relating to confessionalism is highlighted in V. M. Kärkkäinen, Trinity and Pluralism and Keith Ward who believes that one cannot hold a “religious view without holding a confessional view”, see Religion and Revelation (Oxford: 2003), p.108, which is in contradistinction to Hick’s interpretation of the “Real”, see Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion (UK: 2001), p.14. D’Costa upholds the view that dialogue is possible but only through exclusivism and “nothing called pluralism really exists” (ibid. p.169).
82 See Aleaz, A Convergence of Advaita Vedānta and Eastern Christian Thought, p.279.
83 Ward, Religion and Revelation, p.45.
While previous theological models have fallen short of convergence, and are exemplified in S. J. Samartha who did not intend to “articulate a systematic fully-fledged Christology” to “indicate possibilities for Christological developments in a religiously plural world”, Aleaz goes further, as he places convergence in relation to Christian Theology through his ‘Neo-Vedantic Christology’. This thesis will also develop a methodology in common with Aleaz’s approach and will endeavour to develop a fluidity and syncretism of theological language through a convergence of the terms and theologies of the Byzantine tradition and Pratyabhijñā.

1.3 Towards Dialogue: Dialogical Paradigms

This part of the introduction will examine some approaches and problems relating to inter-religious dialogue which have impacted on the way in which a comparative theology and theology of convergence are considered. Even though inter-religious dialogue has been affected by the hardening of confessional positions, or is due to the present political problems relating to fundamentalism, this environment itself highlights the importance and necessity of inter-religious dialogue.

Approaches to inter-religious dialogue seem to have been set within certain narratives that reflect a theological stance of faith constructs, developing methodologies that reflect those beliefs, and have been broadly determined within ‘exclusivist’, ‘inclusivist’ and ‘pluralistic’ models. Alan Race in 1983 and Gavin D’Costa in 1986 highlighted these paradigms as being helpful when categorising responses to pluralism, but these have now been superseded. Hence, the ever growing populations and interactions and encounters between religions are forcing theologians to re-think models and narratives through which inter-religious dialogue has been set.

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85 Ibid., p.93.
86 Ibid.
87 Aleaz, Jesus in Neo-Vedanta, p.1.
89 Ibid., p.2.
The increasing encounters between peoples of different faiths, although forcing the Western mind to re-address its standards and belief systems, should not be considered as a stumbling block to the Christian mind for many Eastern and Oriental Christians have lived and developed their faith within other faith communities. Also, initially Christianity emerged out of a pluralistic environment and was confident enough to engage within a pluralistic culture.\(^{90}\) This type of Christianity was confessional and yet incorporated non-Christian terms and ideas.\(^{91}\) The *Letter to Diognetus*\(^{92}\) highlighted the ability of early Christians to integrate and dialogue with other cultures using Hellenistic words such as *Logos*\(^{93}\) within a Jewish theological setting yet.\(^{94}\) But Christianity should not to be set merely within a narrative of pluralism, but should confess itself within pluralism and considering that God may manifest through many types of revelations. In the context of multi-revelatory events, religions can be considered as inherently related to each other, but which find fulfilment in Christ.

1.3.1 Exclusivism

Consequently the category of dialogical response that is exclusivist will be rejected, mainly because of the cosmic vision given by the Byzantine tradition, which affirms that religions and philosophies in some way express parts of the whole truth, but which is revealed totally in Christ.\(^{95}\) Exclusivism,\(^{96}\) defined through its rigorous

\(^{91}\) For example the Prologue to John’s Gospel is distinctly Platonic, see C. H. Dodd, *The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel* (Cambridge: 1953).
\(^{93}\) See the Gospel of John and C. H. Dodd, *The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel*, and also see Augustine’s admittance that the Prologue of John’s Gospel has Platonic influences, in *Confessions*, trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (London: 1961), bk.7.9, p.144.
\(^{94}\) ‘ΠΡΟΣ ΔΙΟΓΝΗΣΤΟΝ’ stated: “For Christians are not distinguished from the rest of mankind either in locality or in speech or in customs. For they dwell not somewhere in cities of their own, neither do they use some different language, nor practice an extraordinary kind of life...But while they dwell in cities of Greeks and barbarians as the lot of each is cast, and follow the native customs in dress and food and the other arrangement of life, yet the constitution of their own citizenship, which they set forth, is marvellous, and confessedly contradicts expectations” (Χριστιανοί γάρ οὖν ἐν αὐτῇ φιλοτεχνίαις ἐστὶν διάκεκριμένοι τῶν λοιπῶν εἰς τόν οἶκον τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὅτι κατοικοῦσιν ὑπὸ διαλέκτων τῶν πόλεων...κατακομβίων...κατακομβίων...οὐκ ἐστίν ἀνθρώπων...οὐκ ἐστίν ἀνθρώπων...οὐκ ἐστίν ἀνθρώπων...οὐκ ἐστίν ἀνθρώπων...οὐκ ἐστίν ἀνθρώπων...οὐκ ἐστίν ἀνθρώπων...οὐκ ἐστίν ἀνθρώπων...οὐκ ἐστίν ἀνθρώπων...οὐκ ἐστίν ἀνθρώπων...οὐκ ἐστίν ἀνθρώπων...οὐκ ἐστίν ἀνθρώπων...οὐκ ἐστίν ἀνθρώπων...οὐκ ἐστίν ἀνθρώπων...οὐκ ἐστίν ἀνθρώπων...οὐκ ἐστίν ἀνθρώπων...οὐκ ἐστίν ἀνθρώπων...οὐκ ἐστίν ἀνθρώπων...οὐκ ἐστίν ἀνθρώπων...οὐκ ἐστίν ἀνθρώπων...οὐκ ἐστίν ἀνθρώπων...οὐκ ἐστίν ἀνθρώπων...οὐκ ἐστίν ἀνθρώπων...οὐκ ἐστίν ἀνθρώπων...οὐκ ἐστίν ἀνθρώπων...οὐκ ἐστίν ἀνθρώπων...οὐκ ἐστίν ἀνθρώπων...οὐκ ἐστίν ἀνθρώπων...οὐκ ἐστίν ἀνθρώπων...οὐκ ἐστίν ἀνθρώπων...οὐκ ἐστί
\(^{95}\) See Clement, Str.1.13, 756A (Coxe); and Justin Martyr, *Apol.*2.7, 441-471 (Coxe).
claims, excludes any real attempt at dialogue, and conditions its theology through the term ‘extra ecclesiam nulla salus’ (outside of the Church there is no salvation). This axiom is the driving force behind the exclusivist view, and it negates any salvation for those perceived not to be called Christians. Theologians of this type affirm the erroneous character of other faiths. However, this axiom should not be a hindrance, for if the word, Church, indicates the hope of an eschatological fulfilment for humanity, it could be argued that all who are called to God and experience God within another religion apart from Christianity are brought into God’s Church through the grace of the Logos. Perhaps the very meaning of the word church or assembly (ἐκκλησία) has to be examined further, especially in the context of Christian affirmation in the light of other religions.

1.3.2 Inclusivism

The next category comes broadly under the term inclusivist which can be said to have evolved out of a response to exclusivist claims. Schleiermacher and Rudolf Otto were forerunners of inclusivism and of the later development of pluralism. The notion of inclusivism, which can be said to define those who work within the acceptance model, belies a reticence to affirm an equal place at the dialogical table. Examples of this type are found in Karl Rahner who argued for an inclusive view through his notion of the “anonymous Christian”, and Paul Knitter, whose inclusivism is

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97 See Cyprian of Carthage, Epistulae 73.21 (PL 3), 1169; and De Unitate (PL 4), 509-536; on this in relation to inter-religious dialogue see Gavin D’ Costa, The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity, pp.101-103.
98 See Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism, p.11.
99 See Aleaz Harmony of Religions, p.154.
100 Mentioned 114 times in NT, but only 3 in Gospels, all in Mathew, e.g. Mt.16:18; 18:17. There are 46 occurrences in Pauline the corpus.
103 Aleaz, Dialogical Theologies: Hartford Papers and Other Essays (Kolkata: 2004), p.85.
developed within his fulfilment model. Knitter goes beyond what is to be considered inclusivistic, and seems to develop an *all-inclusive* inclusivism. Aleaz includes also Raimundo Panikkar in the inclusivist category, but Panikkar could perhaps be placed within the pluralist model.

The inclusivism narrative is restricted in what it can accomplish, for it does not rely on reciprocity but on metered out generosities. For example Rahner's view, from a Hindu point of view, is innately patronising. Certainly, the increased encounter of Christianity with other religions provoked Panikkar to go further than Rahner, by declaring that the God of Hinduism is the “unknown Christ”, and that if Hindus are thereby *anonymous Christians* then “Christians are anonymous Hindus”. Panikkar believes that Christians have “no monopoly of truth” and neither do they have a “monopoly of salvation”, but that to be a Christian is to work in co-operation with Christ and creation, engaging in a cosmic dialogue. Those subscribing to this view would naturally be inclined to a theology of agreement and inclusion. As Panikkar states, “it is offensive and unacceptable for the so-called non-Christian religions to be described only by a negative feature”. He goes on to state, “it leaves a bad taste in the mouth to divide people up in this way”. For this reason Wilfred Cantwell Smith asserted that religious separation within self-sufficient positions of any religion cannot legitimately develop a “world theology of religions”. Rather, what Wilfred Cantwell Smith purported is a working toward religious dialogue through generic concepts such as *faith*, *God* and the like.

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109 Ibid.
110 Panikkar, ‘Christians and So-Called Non-Christians’, *Cross Currents* 22/3 (1972), pp.281-308.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
1.3.3 Pluralism

The last major dialogical category developed has been called pluralism, which called for even greater scope in dialogue between religions, but paradoxically, allowing religions and religious type movements their own space, discourages dialogue. Examples of pluralists are Keith Ward, John Hick and Jacques Dupuis. However, this category is at present ambiguous and is muddling models which could be interpreted in any variety of ways. Hence, new categories must be conceived of in which are fruitful, open, and allow optimistic theologies to develop, yet which retain identity and thereby significance. This open approach reflects an optimism to Christian interreligious dialogue, evidenced in Nicholas Cusa (1401-64), who in *De pace fidei* developed a dialogical approach by recognising the divine in another religion. Cusa considered that each person was a reflection of the divine Person, and thus dialogue gains significance in that encounter with persons of other religions.

The notion of optimism within interreligious dialogue allows for reciprocity and acceptance of other faiths and ideas not possible in comparison, without detracting from personal beliefs. Jacques Dupuis remarks that “affirming the Christian identity is best done in an open dialogue with the other religions”. He argues that Christians should engage in open dialogue and thereby be “enriched or even renewed”. He addresses the question of mutual enrichment, and highlights the importance of convergence in relation to dialogue. So models of convergence and synthesis offer a way to approach dialogue. This approach can be exemplified in early Christianity, and

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120 Ibid.
Kippenburg even argues that “early Christianity was a syncretistic religion”. In this understanding, new integrations could help to invigorate Christian theology and Aleaz offers such a model with his incorporation of *Vedānta* into Orthodox Christianity. Aleaz calls his model, pluralistic inclusivism, in which, “Inclusivism and Pluralism undergo change in their previous meanings”. In this category, he offers the possibility of developing “practical dialogical theology” through convergence exemplified in his Neo-Vedantic Christology. It is my intention to continue along the lines of Aleaz’s approach, but I do have reservations about the category of “pluralistic inclusivism” for it is not clear exactly what this means.

Aleaz believes that Indian Christianity, through the incorporation of Indian philosophical terms, could offer new ways of doing interreligious dialogue. He points to new types of theology, which are based largely upon *Neo-Vedānta*, in which a “harmony of religions” is substantiated through *Neo-Vedantic Christology*. Concerning the methodological use of convergence, the thesis will build upon K. P. Aleaz’s work, which looks to a convergence of theologies, specifically of *Advaita Vedānta* and the Byzantine tradition. But this thesis will go further, as Aleaz does not consider many of the nuanced debates on the concept of person, such as how a concept of person is related to the term *hypostasis* and the ontological implications when considering the inclusion of *Vedānta* into the Orthodox Christian model. Neither does Aleaz consider *hypostasis* in relation to the contemporary Orthodox existentialist debate. Although Aleaz’s general premise of convergence is accepted here, his comparison seems to me to be somewhat flawed in his use of *Advaita Vedānta*. This is because the rigid idealism and *monism* of *Advaita Vedānta* does

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124 Aleaz, *Dimensions of Indian Religion*, p.262.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid., p.1, and p.32.
128 Ibid., p.3
129 Ibid.
131 This is exemplified by Śaṅkarācārya who stated that “everything of the nature of the non-Self is negated from the eternally existing Self”, in *Upadeśa Sāhasrī*, trans. Swami Jagadānanda (Madras), p.218.
not allow for any meaningful reciprocity when related to the notion of revelation and
divine appearance in Byzantine theology, and especially in relation to personhood. It
could be argued that a comparison of the Byzantine tradition and Dvaita (dualism)\textsuperscript{132}
which stresses difference, or Viśisṭādvaita (qualified non-dualism or qualified non-
difference)\textsuperscript{133} might be more fruitful. It is the contention of this thesis, however, that
in both Dvaita and Viśisṭādvaita, the ontological outcome is too dualistic. Hence, the
most useful Indian philosophy from my point of view that provides a fruitful
comparison with the Byzantine tradition, in this context, is Pratyabhijñā.

Pratyabhijñā, as with the Byzantine tradition, allows for a mystically completed
(perfected) or maximalist notion of deified person without negating the place for what
is real through the philosophical incorporation of unity-in-diversity or bhedābheda.

When considering an appropriate model to focus the comparison, the traditional
Hindu openness for dialogue in accepting other faiths can be utilised, which
exemplifies a workable dialogical model for the convergence of theologies. This is not
to say that the pluralistic landscape in India has always been harmonious and
collaborative; on the contrary, in India there have existed historical tensions between
its main faiths such as Śaivism, Vaiṣṇavism, Buddhism, Jainism, Islam, Sikhism, and
Christianity. In the climate of post-Vivekananda Neo-Vedāntism, a consensus of an
agreed unity-in-diversity\textsuperscript{134} came to be evidenced, but this has somewhat experienced
a setback in the contemporary environment in India of political extremism. What is
needed is a return to the theological inter-religious vision offered by Ramakrishna
(1836-1886). This vision of religious and spiritual harmony which uses synthesis to
underpin its dialogical efforts\textsuperscript{135} is also shared by contemporary scholars such as
Samartha and Aleaz to develop Indian dialogical theologies.\textsuperscript{136} Aleaz states:

\textsuperscript{132} The Dvaita of Mādhavāchārya in Indian philosophy indicates a dualism is not a Gnostic dualism but
relates to the concrete realness of the world, which is not negated as unreal. For a synopsis of how
these ideas relate to different philosophical systems see Mādhavāchārya, The Sarva-Darśana-

\textsuperscript{133} In Rāmānuja affirmed the "reality of the world", Swāmī Tapasyānanda, Śrī Rāmānuja, His Life,
Religion and Philosophy (Madras), p.32; N. Bhashyacharya, A Catechism of the Vīṣṇudvīta
Philosophy of Śrī Rāmānuja Acharya (Madras: 1887); see also S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy
(2; New Delhi: 1923, 2002). This type of theism comes very close what is accepted by Byzantine
theology.


\textsuperscript{135} This vision was also shared by Sri Aurobindo, see Synthesis of Yoga (BCL 20-21).

\textsuperscript{136} Aleaz, Jesus in Neo-Vedānta p.121, and footnote 43; also see S. J. Samarth, One Christ: Many
Religions, Towards a Revised Christology (Bangalore: 1992), pp. 94-104.
The present author’s Christian thought in relation to Sankara’s Advaitic Vedānta is a practical demonstration of an Indian dialogical theology, more specifically an Indian dialogical Jesuology in terms of the perspective of Pluralistic Inclusivism for the relational convergence of religions, in this case of Hinduism and Christianity. It is also points to the fact that our hermeneutical context, a major factor of which is Advaita Vedānta decides the content of our theology.\(^{137}\)

This model of dialogue will be developed through the notion of eschatological fulfilment, where all faith persons dialogue through a shared encounter with the divine. This model safeguards the uniqueness of each religion, yet upholds unity-of-faith, that is to say it allows for faith principles to be safeguarded through the concept of the personal revelatory event or experience of each person while upholding the need to consider what is shared. In this context, categorising is replaced with ideas relating to the experience of what it is to be a human being, the shared reality of the human person. This type of approach has recently been argued by H. Coward in his analysis of human nature and ‘perfectibility’\(^{138}\) in Western Philosophy, Jewish thought, Christianity, Islam, Yoga, Hinduism and Buddhism.

The problem seems to be that inter-religious dialogue has been forced into categories of exclusivism, inclusivism, pluralism, and now the pluralistic-inclusivism of Aleaz. What is needed is a shift in ideas where these categories are replaced with personal dialogue, where persons enter into dialogue with other faith persons, because each person, as an icon of the divine, should be engaged with. Inter-religious dialogue has learned ignorance, to cite the words of Nicholas of Cusa,\(^{139}\) in which it has learned to dialogue through forced categories, which are foreign to a notion of sharing and the fulfilment of each person. Inter-religious dialogical theologians have learned ignorance: they have learned how not to dialogue by setting up barriers through these categories. But learned ignorance should be applied to dialogue so that religions learn to see what they cannot know, the truth, for as Nicholas of Cusa stated, “by means of learned ignorance we will ascertain what is the truer”.\(^{140}\) In this context of “learned ignorance”, the ignorance of this thesis will encourage theological synthesis and convergence of theologies relating to person in the Byzantine and Pratyabhijñā.

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137 Ibid., p.121.
139 Ibid., p.153.
140 Ibid., p.153.
traditions (in Chapters 2 and 3). By acknowledging the need for a *space* for convergence, a *theology of convergence*, a model of person will be constructed by bringing together terms from each tradition within that *space*.

1.4 Traditions, Terms and Definitions

In this part of the introduction I want to examine some terms and ideas relating to the traditions utilised in this study.

1.4.1 Tradition

Firstly, concerning the notion of tradition, I will accept that there have arisen certain narratives which affirm the place for historical traditions. However, does that imply that there is an authentic academic approach to a certain tradition? The word tradition itself, while it seems to imply that conforming to an authentic or traditionalist position is paramount, can be helpful in defining certain parameters which marks out specific geographical, historical and theological perspectives. Taking these issues into consideration, this thesis presents a study through what can be called Byzantine and *Pratyabhijñā* traditions. Within the Byzantine tradition, the focus will mainly centre upon Eastern Orthodox approaches and interpretations to that tradition, especially in relation to contemporary scholarship. When considering the *Pratyabhijñā* tradition such a qualification is not necessary as there is no proven living continuous tradition of Kashmir Śaivism, and so the study of ideas relating to a concept of person within *Pratyabhijñā*, of the ninth to eleventh-twelfth centuries in Kashmir, will be considered.

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141 Traditionalist view is examined by G. L. Prestige who argues that the term traditionalist should not be necessarily viewed pejoratively, see, Prestige, *Fathers and Heretics. Six Studies in Dogmatic Faith with Prologue and Epilogue: being the Bampton Lectures For 1940* (London: 1968), pp.1-22.
The term tradition can also be considered a hindrance, for example David Gwynn argues that an appeal “to the authoritative past”\(^{142}\) in relation to Chalcedon has led to the denuding of the true Patristic spirit. He considers that although Christian tradition has never been “truly static”\(^{143}\) the notion of tradition can be utilised to preserve the “essential continuity”\(^{144}\) of Christianity while adapting and presenting new ideas to suit the demands of the times.

The wish to adhere to a traditional perspective in relation to contemporary Christian debates, as exemplified by Zizioulas,\(^{145}\) has paradoxically led to the emergence of new ideas and new models, which are manifesting new traditions within an older tradition. Consequently it may even be evident that those who view themselves as part of authentic tradition may have departed from ideas that, that very tradition is supposed to uphold. D’Costa also raises important questions regarding problems centred on tradition by asking, “who’s ‘God,’ which tradition?”\(^{146}\)

1.4.2 The Byzantine Tradition

Is there a theological tradition which can be called Byzantine that adheres to specific theological parameters? Does Byzantine theology belong to the Roman Christian tradition or the Christian Greek East? These questions cannot be answered here but they show how difficult the term Byzantine is to define especially in relation to theology. This is especially true when considering the misunderstandings between Latin West and Greek East\(^{147}\) and when considering the historical and theological divergences between those traditions. Nevertheless, the term Byzantine will be used in a theological context to affirm a general adherence to a Greek Christian tradition


\(^{143}\) Ibid., p.23.

\(^{144}\) Ibid.

\(^{145}\) Zizioulas, BC, pp.16-50.

\(^{146}\) D’Costa, The Meeting of Religions and the Trinity, pp.18-51.

\(^{147}\) Some of these misunderstandings and differences have been highlighted by Judith Herrin, Byzantium: the Surprising Life of a Medieval Empire (London: 2007), pp.192-211. The distinction between Latin West and Greek East has also be defined as such by Andrew Louth where he underlines a “split” between these “two Christian civilizations”, see Andrew Louth, Greek East and Latin West, the Church AD 681-1071 (The Church in History, Volume III; Crestwood: 2007), p.3.
which historically had its roots in the Greek Patristic period (first – to eighth centuries)\(^{148}\) and which flourished in the Byzantine era (fourth to fifteenth centuries).\(^{149}\) This Eastern Greek tradition can be said to have continued in what is now referred to as Greek Orthodoxy\(^{150}\) or the Eastern Orthodox Christian Church. Although this is not a precise correlation, it can suffice as a rudimentary model. Consequently, I will focus most of my analysis on the concept of person within this tradition, specifically focusing on the Cappadocians, Pseudo-Dionysius and Maximus the Confessor, while also considering contemporary interpretations of the Greek Fathers. I will also consider Western theologians when appropriate. This constitutes a flexible approach to Byzantine studies, which is also exemplified by Sarah Coakley. She cites the opinions of various denominational theologians who all claim a link to the Greek Fathers, and the inclusion of such differing views allows for fresh perspectives and an exchange of ideas.\(^{151}\)

1.4.3 Byzantine Terms

Within the Byzantine tradition, or rather through that tradition, I will focus on certain terms to develop a model of person in relation: \textit{hypostasis/prosopon} and \textit{ousia}\(^{152}\) and in relation to the notion of \textit{deification}. These words will correlate, in the \textit{Pratyabhijñā} tradition, to \textit{purusa, Ātman} and \textit{deification} which will be equated to \textit{re-cognition}. Also the word “\textit{man}” (\textit{ανθωνίς})\(^{153}\) will be utilised, which was not used pejoratively by the Greek Fathers, but was a generic determination utilised to denote human beings.


\(^{150}\) This correlation of the Byzantine with the Greek Christian tradition is made by J. Herrin in \textit{Byantium}, p.43.


\(^{152}\) All these words are contained within Basil’s \textit{Letter 38}. The meaning of the words \textit{hypostasis} and \textit{ousia} in this letter seem to be clearly indicating what is particular and general. Basil ascribed to the term \textit{hypostasis}, particular existence, “note of His person (\textit{ὑποστάσεως})...and by this note He is also recognised individually Himself” (PG 32), 329C-332A (Deferrari); \textit{ousia} indicated what was ontologically shared or generic, that which implied a sharing (in the Trinity) the essence in a “community of substance (\textit{οὐσίως κοινότητι})” but in which there was “no accord or community as regards the distinguishing notes”, (PG 32), 329C-332A (Deferrari). However the use of the word \textit{προσώπων} in \textit{Ep. 38} (PG 32), 332A, is ambiguous and could refer to person or face.

\(^{153}\) Also see Basil of Caesarea, \textit{Ep. 38} (PG 32), 325B, where Basil states “Those nouns which are predicted of subjects plural and numerically diverse have a more general meaning, as for example ‘man’ (\textit{ανθωνίς})”, (Deferrari).
The term Cappadocian is also manifests certain problems, for while taking into consideration the influences upon the three Cappadocians such as the sister of Gregory of Nyssa and Basil of Caesarea, Macrina, it infers that there is a general corpus of material that is unified to such an extent it can be termed Cappadocian. Clearly this is not the case. Although there was no systematisation of ideas that exemplified a consistent type of theology that can be called Cappadocian, the term Cappadocian can be said to indicate a general type of theologising. Christopher Beeley affirms that the term Cappadocian does obscure the fact that there are “painful differences” between the theological positions of the Cappadocians. Nevertheless, there is a consensus given by Eastern Orthodox theologians that Cappadocian is a valid term to indicate a genre in Greek Patristic thought and theology.

Another point that has to be raised here, relates to the authorship of Letter 38 of Basil of Caesarea, which is also attributed to Gregory of Nyssa in the work To His Brother Peter: On the Difference between Ousia and Hypostasis (Ad Petrum). Turcescu in his examination of hypostasis and ousia, in Ad Petrum, argues that authorship belongs to Gregory of Nyssa, rather than Basil. However, Turcescu does state that some scholars do indeed attribute authorship to Basil. It can be affirmed that Letter 38

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154 Basil of Caesarea (c. 330-379); Gregory of Nazianzen (c. 329-389); and Gregory of Nyssa (c. 335-395); see also John A. McGuckin, Patristic Theology (London: 2005), and Chapter 1.5.

155 See Catherine P. Roth ed., St Gregory of Nyssa, The Soul and the Resurrection (Crestwood: 1993), pp.8-25; and also NPNF 5, footnote 1, p.430.


159 See Gregory of Nyssa and the Concept of Persons, p.47.
does bear strong resemblance to Gregory of Nyssa’s work *Tres Dii*, R. J. Deferrari\(^{161}\) and B. Jackson\(^{162}\) argued that the Synod of Chalcedon ascribed the work to Basil hence Basil will be cited as the author while at the same time admitting the possibility that authorship can be ascribed to Gregory of Nyssa.

The notion of person as *hypostasis* will also be correlated to otherness, or the other\(^ {163}\), which expresses an idea of difference and yet unity, where the notion of the other shall include a sense of relationality or relationship with the divine to indicate an ontological centre by which the other can be understood through unity. This sense of unity should not be confused with “sameness”\(^ {164}\) but it is not “sameness” that will be argued, but sharing for the sharing of a common ontological reality does not necessarily indicate “sameness”. The relationship of difference or otherness in relation to unity will be examined throughout the thesis and synthetically brought together within the *Ātman-hypostasis* model. This thesis establishes a conceptual bridge between non-difference, and that which is below\(^ {165}\) or difference, in a unified model of being or a model which accepts unity-in-diversity in the *Ātman-hypostasis*. The qualifying of *Ātman* within *hypostasis* will also be argued to establish in a model of person, the possibilities of an *Ātmanic* mode of *hypostatic* existence\(^ {166}\).

The notion of *deification* will be equated to the restoration of human person through the highest reality. It will be correlated in *Pratyabhijñā* to the experience of re-

\(^{161}\) See (LCL 190), p.197.

\(^{162}\) See (NPNF 8), p.155.

\(^{163}\) This term in the context of divine the other which expresses a type of existence or otherness (*hypostatic* life), see *Communion and Otherness*, pp.43-55. The notion of the other can indicate a variety of things, either inferring separation, difference, or unity in relational communion, but I will understand other to implicitly indicate both existential difference, yet the possibilities of unity through the sharing of a common nature of *hypostatic* experience. On otherness also see Emmanuel Levinas, *On Thinking-of the-Other: entre nous* (London: 1998); *Humanism of the Other* (Urbana and Chicago: 2006), and *Outside the Subject* (London: 1990); Michael Barnes, *Theology and the Dialogue of Religions* (Cambridge: 2002), p.65; Zizioulas, *Communion and Otherness* (London: 2006), pp.13-98; and see also Christos Yannaras, *On the Absence and Unknowability of God* (London: 2005), pp.78-79.

\(^{164}\) Ibid., p.43, where Zizioulas highlights Levinas notion of “sameness” in a detrimental context.


\(^{166}\) This borrowed from Zizioulas (*BC* p. 50) and modified to include in the existential reality of the human persons, a relational context within the experience of the essential reality of *being* (*Ātman*).
cognition and to the activity of Consciousness (Citi-Sakti).\textsuperscript{167} Deification will indicate the possibilities of human becoming through the mediation of the Christ hypostasis (person) as the “great will of God”.\textsuperscript{168} This will and activity of the divine to unite human persons with Himself represents a mystery (μυστήριον)\textsuperscript{169} and the reasoning for the divine becoming in Christ, which established a union (ἐνσωσίας) of God with the world. As Maximus the Confessor stated this union was established:

between a limit of the ages and limitlessness, between measure and immeasurability, between finitude and infinity, between Creator and creation, between rest and motion.\textsuperscript{170}

While basic theological similarities can be drawn between the Byzantine and Pratyabhijñā traditions in the use of deification and re-cognition, distinctions and differences also remain. The most important being the ontological implications to the human existence and the ways in which the apparent gulf between the divine reality and the world could be overcome. While both traditions stressed the difference between the divine and human natures, the Byzantine tradition, while overcoming this gulf in the Christ through the hypostatic union (ὑπόστασιν ἐνσωσίας),\textsuperscript{171} still maintained

\textsuperscript{167} As its states in the Pratyabhijñāhrdayam (PBH), in Sūtra 9, that “in consequence of its limitation or contraction, Śakti, which is all consciousness, becomes the mala-covered samsārin or individual soul”, चिदले, तच्चक्षिंसंकोचायत्मललबूतंसंसारी, cidvat tucchakti-samkocat malavritah samsārī; translation by Singh, PBHs, p.71. This is also expressed in the Paramārthasāra (PSA) of Abhinavagupta who states in verse 16 that, “pure consciousness, having adopted Māyā, as a part of and parcel of itself, becomes impure and appears as the finite subject known as puruṣa”, मायाधिकल्पवशादोषीय भौतिकमिलिन: पुरुषान् प्रमप्रभवति, Māyā-parigraha-vaśād bodho malinah pumān paśur bhavati, (Pandit).

\textsuperscript{168} See Maximus the Confessor, Thal.60 (CCSG 22), 75.43; translation by Blowers, The Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ, p.124.

\textsuperscript{169} Ibid., 75.43.

\textsuperscript{170} यद ग्रोषते तद्व अतिःमृत्यु तथात्मतिः त्रायुत्काया मेतेदुः केत्रात्तकस्यायुमां भवति: संसारी, चिदले, तच्चक्षिंसंकोचायत्मललबूतं संसारी, translation by Singh, PBHs, p.71. This is also expressed in the Paramārthasāra (PSA) of Abhinavagupta who states in verse 16 that, “pure consciousness, having adopted Māyā, as a part of and parcel of itself, becomes impure and appears as the finite subject known as puruṣa”, मायाधिकल्पवशादोषीय भौतिकमिलिन: पुरुषान् प्रमप्रभवति, Māyā-parigraha-vaśād bodho malinah pumān paśur bhavati, (Pandit).

\textsuperscript{168} See Maximus the Confessor, Thal.60 (CCSG 22), 75.43; translation by Blowers, The Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ, p.124.

\textsuperscript{169} Vidvat tucchakti-samkocat malavritah samsārī; translation by Singh, PBHs, p.71. This is also expressed in the Paramārthasāra (PSA) of Abhinavagupta who states in verse 16 that, “pure consciousness, having adopted Māyā, as a part of and parcel of itself, becomes impure and appears as the finite subject known as puruṣa”, मायाधिकल्पवशादोषीय भौतिकमिलिन: पुरुषान् प्रमप्रभवति, Māyā-parigraha-vaśād bodho malinah pumān paśur bhavati, (Pandit).

\textsuperscript{171} See Maximus the Confessor, Thal.60 (CCSG 22), 75.43; translation by Blowers, The Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ, p.124.

\textsuperscript{170} यद ग्रोषते तद्व अतिःमृत्यु तथात्मतिः त्रायुत्काया मेतेदुः केत्रात्तकस्यायुमां भवति: संसारी, चिदले, तच्चक्षिंसंकोचायत्मललबूतं संसारी, translation by Singh, PBHs, p.71. This is also expressed in the Paramārthasāra (PSA) of Abhinavagupta who states in verse 16 that, “pure consciousness, having adopted Māyā, as a part of and parcel of itself, becomes impure and appears as the finite subject known as puruṣa”, मायाधिकल्पवशादोषीय भौतिकमिलिन: पुरुषान् प्रमप्रभवति, Māyā-parigraha-vaśād bodho malinah pumān paśur bhavati, (Pandit).

\textsuperscript{171} See Maximus the Confessor, Thal.60 (CCSG 22), 75.43; translation by Blowers, The Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ, p.124.

\textsuperscript{169} Vidvat tucchakti-samkocat malavritah samsārī; translation by Singh, PBHs, p.71. This is also expressed in the Paramārthasāra (PSA) of Abhinavagupta who states in verse 16 that, “pure consciousness, having adopted Māyā, as a part of and parcel of itself, becomes impure and appears as the finite subject known as puruṣa”, मायाधिकल्पवशादोषीय भौतिकमिलिन: पुरुषान् प्रमप्रभवति, Māyā-parigraha-vaśād bodho malinah pumān paśur bhavati, (Pandit).

\textsuperscript{171} See Maximus the Confessor, Thal.60 (CCSG 22), 75.43; translation by Blowers, The Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ, p.124.
a level of distinction. In Pratyabhijñā tradition, the gulf between the lower and the higher nature was resolved by focusing on the unity that binds the differing natures. But both traditions did focus on the notion of the transformation of the lower nature (in humans) through deification/re-cognition to indicate how the ontological gulf was to be resolved. In addition the terms Neo-Vedānta and Indian Christianity\textsuperscript{172} will also be utilised in this work. The former will indicate ideas that came from the resurgence of Vedānta in the late nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century, which synthesised ideas from many traditions including Christianity within a theistic non-dual setting, and were exemplified in the teachings of Ramakrishna (c. 1836-1886), Vivekananda (c. 1863-1902) and Sri Aurobindo (c. 1872-1950). The notion of Indian Christianity indicates forms of Christianity in India that incorporate many denominations and yet have a flavour that is Indian.\textsuperscript{173}

1.4.4 The Pratyabhijñā Tradition

I shall now consider the Pratyabhijñā tradition (the word literally meaning re-cognition, the re-cognition of one’s true condition),\textsuperscript{174} which indicates a philosophy-theology of the ninth to eleventh centuries A.D. in Kashmir and belonged to the wider Kashmir Śaivite or Tīrika school. The main text of this philosophy that will be used in relation to this study is the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā which is divided into four chapters. The first, the Jñānādhikāra, deals with the relationship between the metaphysical Absolute reality (Paramātman), from a position of unity or non-difference, while the second chapter, Kriyādhikāra, understands the relationship of the Absolute divine activity (kriyā) in relation to the world or unity-in-difference. The third chapter, Āgamaṇḍikāra, describes the principles of divine activity and difference while the last chapter, Tattva-saṃgrahādhikāra, acts as a conclusion.

\textsuperscript{172} It is now recognised, that there is a distinct Christian approach in India called ‘Indian Christianity’, see Boyd, \textit{An Introduction to Indian Christian Theology} (Delhi: 1969, 2005); and Vekathanam, \textit{Indian Christology}.

\textsuperscript{173} For an example, see Paul M. Collins, \textit{The Quest for ‘Indian-ness’} (Delhi: 2006).

\textsuperscript{174} \textit{Descriptive Analysis of the Kashmir Series and Texts and Studies}, (Srinagar: 1911-1947), p.5.
Historically, *Pratyabhijñā* is thought to have emerged within the wider non-dual/dual Kashmiri tradition, it may have been older and Lakshmanjoo refers to *Pratyabhijñā* as being reintroduced at the end of the eighth century by Somānanda, indicating an older system of *Pratyabhijñā*. However, *Pratyabhijñā* will be related to the system founded by Somānanda and developed by Utpaladeva, and the later Abhinavagupta, the author of the *Tantrāloka*, and by his disciple Kṣemarāja. It has been argued by most of the contemporary scholars from J. C. Chatterji to Jaideva Singh and Moti Lal Pandit that this form of *Kashmir Śaivism* known as *Trika* was synonymous with non-dualism and monism, and as such *Pratyabhijñā* represented a continuation of this school. Even though in the *Descriptive Analysis of the Kashmir Series and Texts and Studies* it is argued that the whole series was related to “just one subject” that is the ‘‘Trika Shāstra’’ (‘Threefold-science’), which was thought to be monist and integral to this system was the philosophy of *Pratyabhijñā*. This simplistic type of categorising has recently been questioned by Alexis Sanderson.

Consequently, the way in which *Pratyabhijñā* is categorised has to be re-considered. But generally the *paramparā* of the non-dual *Trika* lineage is said to pre-date history and come from Śiva himself who revealed the Āgamic literature, such as the *Mālinīvijayottaratantra*. Nevertheless, in the ninth to eleventh centuries in Kashmir there was a resurgence of the non-dual *Śaivism* through the literature of the Śiva *Sūtras* which were revealed to Vasugupta by Śiva who came to him in a dream telling him that the Śiva *Sūtras* were carved on stone (Samkaropala) on the Mahādeva Mountain. It was the disciple of Vasugupta, Somānanda (c. 850–900 A.D.),

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177 (KSTS 23, 28, 29, 30, 35, 36, 41, 47, 52, 57, 58, 59).


179 *Descriptive Analysis of the Kashmir Series and Texts and Studies*, p.1.

180 Ibid., p.2.

181 See Sanderson, ‘The Doctrine of the Mālinīvijayottaratantra’.


183 (KSTS 23, 28, 29, 30, 35, 36, 41, 47, 52, 57, 58, 59).

184 See SSVs, p.xvi and also Flood, *An Introduction to Hinduism*, p.167.
author of Śivadrśti, who was responsible for propagating the resurgent Pratyabhijñā and Somānanda's disciple Utpaladeva (c. 900-950 A.D.), who wrote the major work on Pratyabhijñā, the Iśvarapratyabhijñākārikā. This philosophy was also later developed by Abhinavagupta (993-1015), author of the Tantrāloka, and Guru to Kṣemarāja who was the author of the Vimarśinī on the Śiva Śūtras. The corpus of literature from this period has come to be known as non-dual Kashmir Śaivism, or Trika. In the light of Alexis Sanderson's work, such assumption can be questioned in light of the dualistic influences on Trika of the earlier Mālinīvijayottaratantra. This resurgent non-dualistic Trika will be referred to as the new Trika. In the new Trika schema, Pratyabhijñā, along with the Śiva Śūtras, emerged as a polemic to dualism, Vijñānāvāda Buddhism, Advaita Vedānta, and formed parts of the system of the resurgent Kashmir Śaivism. Chatterji identified the main thought in this resurgent Kashmir Śaivism or Trika as being non-dual which was for Chatterji, the main philosophical characteristic. In support of this view, Jaideva Singh also believed that Trika was non-dualistic in its philosophy and consequently within the resurgence of the new Trika the Śiva Śūtra has to be considered the most important text given its monist perspective.

However, in the pre Śiva Śūtras era the Mālinīvijayottaratantra, Svachchāndatmantra, Vijñāna Bhairava and Mrgendra, were some of the main works of Trika and had elements of dualism. Alexis Sanderson believes that the Mālinīvijayottaratantra retained its place of precedence in the light of the new Trika's schema and in relation to dualistic influences. The view of Sanderson is supported in that Abhinavagupta

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186 On this see J. C. Chatterji, Kashmir Shaivism, p.39. Most of Somānanda’s work Śiva Drśti (KSTS 54) is lost.
190 See SSs, p.xvi, but this is disputed by Alexis Sanderson who argues that the nature of the MT and thus Trika is dualistic, see Sanderson, ‘The Doctrine of the Mālinīvijayottaratantra’, p.300, but I will examine this more in Chapter 3.
191 See IPKp, p.13
192 Chatterji, Kashmir Śaivism.
193 SSs, p.xvi.
194 See MT.
thought the *Mālinīvijayottaratantra* to be the “core-text of the Trika Tantras”.\(^{196}\)

Although Alexis Sanderson has questioned the *non-dualism* of *Trika* in the light of *dualistic* influences,\(^{197}\) in this thesis it will be affirmed that Sanderson’s points have to be qualified because of the *non-dualism* evident in the Trika and new *Trika*. Paradoxically, Sanderson’s ideas will be used to support the ideas presented in this thesis to include notions of the *dualistic*, which allow for the notion of concrete person in Chapter 3.

### 1.4.5 Consciousness as *Cit*

This thesis will also incorporate the notion of *Cit* (consciousness)\(^ {198}\) within an *Ātmanic* paradigm. The use of the notions *Cit* and *Logos* will be utilised to denote *hypostatic* difference in which unity is established, through the *hypostatic* union and through the activity of *Cit*. The *Logos-cit* model will also underline the importance of *theistic* revelation, rather than affirming a static monism. It is important here to qualify the use of the term consciousness, or *Cit*,\(^ {199}\) in *Pratyabhijñā*. *Cit* will indicate awareness can be related to the mundane experience and to an awareness that goes beyond material experience, encompassing a divine experience. Consciousness is not to be considered purely within material limitations or as merely indicating the psychological *self*, but that which is illumined by “the light of consciousness”

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196 Ibid.


198 The notion of consciousness will be explained later but in the model offered in *Pratyabhijñā* it becomes a theological tool to understand the nature of divine awareness and will in the *theism* of *Pratyabhijñā* which differs to the modern interpretation see Ned Block, et al (eds.), *The Nature of Consciousness* (Massachusetts: 1997), also see also J. B. Chethimattam, *Consciousness and Reality* (London: 1971). *Cit* has also been used synergetically with *Logos*, *Cit-Logos* to argue for a *theistic* model in the self-knowledge of the incarnate Christ in relation to the world, see Vekathanam, *Indian Christology*, p.395.

199 Or *Citi*, which represents the dynamic form of Ātman, and the consciousness inferred within the *Ātmanic* model, as the *PBH* stated in *Sūtra* 4, “*Citi*, the aspect of the contracted Ātman or ultimate reality, is the individual experient in contracted form”, *citisamkocātma cetano pi samkucita-viśvamayahi*. *Citi* in Kṣemarāja’s model also takes on a role of a dynamic feminine aspect of the masculine (Śiva) and unmoving Ātman, having an almost particular *hypostatic* existence (see *PBHs*, p.55.). This understanding also represents a sort of *dualistic* approach to *Pratyabhijñā*. 

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and becoming that light. I will accept the idea of many levels of consciousness within the individual concrete existence, that also allows for the mystical condition, and which allows for changes of consciousness. Thus consciousness reflects the experience of all areas of being and culminates in divine consciousness: the union of self into the divine Self. This will represent a synthesis by which concrete person can be expressed through unity with the divine, and it represents a model similar to the synthesis of ideas developed by Sri Aurobindo. He recognised the problem in reconciling transcendence and immanence in relation to revelation, thus developed the notion of the “evolution of consciousness” by incorporating into the individual mind-body schema, the development of consciousness through the “Lower Mind”, “Higher Mind” and “Super Mind” schemas. In Sri Aurobindo’s works, consciousness devolves from the Divine and evolves back towards the Divine in stages or evolutions of consciousness from separated, isolated, individual existence, to gaining spiritual awareness and culminating in Supreme consciousness.

The understanding of consciousness in this work will follow a similar pattern, in that it affirms the place of ordinary awareness, but which is renewed and divinized through a higher spiritual consciousness. Both levels of cognition will be included in a model of person in this thesis, which affirms the place for a sense of difference while having at the centre of difference, non-difference through the inclusion of a notion of the ultimate reality of being (or Atman). This mirrors ideas from Pratyabhijñā, which recognises that citta (mind) and Citi (Supreme consciousness) are actually non-different, as Utpala stated:

\[\text{Citi (universal consciousness) itself descending from (the stage of) Cetana (the uncontracted conscious stage) becomes Citta (individual consciousness) inasmuch as it becomes contracted (samkociṇī) in conformity with the objects of consciousness (cetya).}\]

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200 IPK, 1.34, p.15; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.5.3.
201 See Aurobindo, Life Divine (BCL 19-20).
202 Ibid.
203 Ibid.
204 Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) also developed the relationship between self-consciousness and God-consciousness, to being and becoming, see Friedrich Schleiermacher Der christliche Glaube, or The Christian Faith (London: 2005).
205 चित्रेव चेतनपददर्शन पौरुषसंकल्पिनी चित्मण्, Citi evacetanapadād avarūḍha cetya-samkociṇī cittam/, PBH, Sūtra 5, translation by Singh, PBHs.
The Byzantine tradition also developed an important relationship between human cognition and divine awareness, for persons are rational creatures sharing a nature of like with the divine awareness. Human persons are rational because they are created in the image of God; they share a divine mode (tropos)\(^{206}\) of being which is noetic or rational.\(^{207}\) It shall be argued that this noetic nature can be correlated to the Ātmanic, which will allow for a substantialist and rational model of person. Through an experience of this noetic or higher consciousness (or Cit), personhood will relate to a mode of existence that experiences a conscious awareness of the Ātman, within a Cid-ātmanic\(^{208}\) mode of hypostatic existence. The possibilities of existence through modes is accepted, because humans made in the image of the divine, can experience a mode of existence that is noetic and also essential (or Ātmanic), while having the ability to experience a mundane conscious. This existence or Ātmanic mode, it is argued, allows human persons to become what they should be through the union of natures in Christ. Gregory Nazianzen stated:

> Through the medium of the mind (νοῦς) he had dealings with the flesh (σαρκί), becoming man (γενόμενος ἄνθρωπος), God descended (ὁ κάτω Θεός): Man and God blended (συνανεκράθη Θεός); and they become one (και γέγονεν Εἰς)...in order that I might become God (ινα γένομαι ουσίαν θεος), to the same extent that he was made man (δειν ἐκοίνος ἄνθρωπος).\(^{209}\)

The union of natures “from above” with what is “below”\(^{210}\) indicates the possibilities of convergence of the two traditions in the affirmation of many types of revelations. In this convergence, the notion of consciousness becomes significant on a personal and revelatory level, and in this thesis the revelation of divine consciousness in the world will be considered in terms Logos and Cit. Both terms will be brought together

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\(^{206}\) See Maximus, *Thal.60* (CCSG 22), 75.30, who refers to the *tropos* or mode of the divine existence which through the economy of the divine hypostatic union, reveals the nature of humanity through the divine nature (ibid., 75.25-35).


\(^{208}\) This term is modified from Utpala’s *IPK* (2.51, p.57), which states that the Ātman (Self) “consists of pure consciousness with the capability of appearing diversely”, अभिष-भेद एकत्रा cid-ātman tu yujyate// (translation from Pandit, *IPK*, 2.4.19, p.149) and is thus cid-ātmanic. A hypostasis consisting of a mode of deified existence shares this cid-ātmanic existence.

\(^{209}\) Gregory Nazianzen, *Or.29.19* (PG 36), 100A-B.

\(^{210}\) See Julius Lipner in already cited passages, *The Face of truth*, p.44.
in a model of Logos-cit\textsuperscript{211} to provide a way to understand the nature of the human person through the Christ-hypostasis. It is the contention of this thesis, that the Byzantine notion of the hypostatic union resolves the ontological gulf between creator (Logos) and the created (world), and provides a model which can be applied in both traditions. In this paradigm the activity of the conscious divine (Cit), in the Logos-cit reality, unites the world to the divine.

In both the Byzantine and Pratyabhijñā traditions, the Logos and Cit respectively, represent models which in both cases overcome the gulf between the metaphysical (ousia or Ātman) and the concrete existence (hypostasis), between creator and created. It is in the context of participation and change of consciousness, in the experience of deification in Byzantine tradition and re-cognition in Pratyabhijñā, that being and existence can be understood in the experience of union between the one who reveals and the one to whom revelation is given. In this sense revelation can be considered in terms of the subsequent changes of consciousness. The Logos and Cit, here presented in a single Logos-cit model, provide a mode of intercession between the transcendent God and world, in respect of consciousness, and facilitate a change in consciousness. It is the revelation of the Logos-Sarx (the Christ) and Cit or divine conscious awareness that provides the basis for that change. Thus the principle of Cit was developed in Pratyabhijñā in the same way as the Middle Platonists\textsuperscript{212} who used the term Logos. Both Cit and Logos were used to bridge the gulf between divine transcendence and manifestation. Just as the Logos, as Hägg puts it, becomes the “mediating principle between the transcendent God and the world”,\textsuperscript{213} so Cit becomes the dynamic revelatory principle in Pratyabhijñā.\textsuperscript{214} The synthesis of the Logos and Cit as a mediating principle of Logos-cit between the world, or persons (hypostases), and supreme divine being (or the Paramātman) will be examined in greater depth throughout the thesis.

\textsuperscript{211} This syncretistic use of Logos-cit or “Cit-Logos” is also exemplified by M. Vekathanam, Indian Christology, p. 395, where the term refers to the self-knowing of the Logos, “and it is from this self-cognition of God that the ‘Cit-Logos’ is eternally generated” (ibid.).


\textsuperscript{213} Ibid., p.230.

\textsuperscript{214} See SS, Sūtra 1.
1.5 Contents of the Thesis

Throughout the thesis a notion of person will be philosophically sought through a qualified form of non-dualism. Within this non-dual theme, a model of person will be developed that will relate to a notion of concrete human existence (hypostasis/purusa) within a category that also considers the place for the metaphysical reality of that existence (ousia/Ātman).

The first chapter will consider comparative structures and the method by which a comparison of the two traditions will be considered. Chapters 2 and 3 will provide an examination of the concept of person within the Byzantine and Pratyabhijñā traditions with a stress on difference in relation to unity. The comparative in Chapters 2 and 3 will lead to a convergence and synthesis of theologies, set within the discourse of inter-religious dialogue. A convergence of ideas leading to the construction of Ātman-hypostasis will be presented in Chapter 4. It is through this model of person that terms, taken from each tradition relating to a notion of person, will be brought together within a synthesis and a space for convergence, or a theology of convergence developed in Chapter 4.

In part 2.2 of Chapter 2A, the relationship of contemporary Eastern Orthodoxy to Byzantine theology will be examined and the subsequent influences which shaped contemporary Eastern Orthodox notions of person. Some of the issues raised in the personhood debate by John Zizioulas will be considered as will ideas extant within the contemporary Eastern Orthodox theological landscape. The theologians Sergei Bulgakov (1871-1944), Vladimir Lossky (1903-1958), Georges Florovsky (1893-

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215 Though this thesis will be oriented to a Christian non-dual "world view" similar to that argued by Sara Grant, see Sara Grant, Towards an Alternative Theology: Confessions of a Non-Dual Christian (Bangalore: 1991). p.ix, it will incorporate ideas relating to revelation that qualify such a model. This world view will be placed in relation to Kashmir Saivism which understands Advaita in a qualified sense as highlighted by Upasani Maharaj see, see H. D. Sankalia, Satchidananda-Sopana: The Teachings of Upasani Maharaj (Rahata: 1988). See also Swami Muktananda, Secret of the Siddhas (South Fallsburg: 1994).
1979), John Meyendorff (1926-1992), Archimandrite Sophrony (1896-1993) and Christos Yannaras (b. 1935) will also be considered.

In parts 2.3-2.6 of Chapter 2A the terms ὑπόστασις, οὐσία and πρόσωπον will be studied in relation to a concept of person. In addition ideas relating to what is particular (hypostatic difference) and what is common (the ousia) will also be studied, while examining contemporary interpretations of the Cappadocians. The notion of person will placed in relation to a concept of unity through an examination of the term ousia and this notion of unity will in Chapter 3 be argued through the term Ātmā.

In Chapter 2B, notions relating to person (hypostasis) will be correlated to the concept of deified person, which will in Chapter 3 also be also correlated to the notion of re-cognition. The notion of person will be re-considered through the concept of deification or theosis which has in contemporary Eastern Orthodoxy become fundamental to understanding the nature of person.216 Part 2.9 of Chapter 2B will examine how deification relates to the physis of human personhood, and to the divine through the hypostatic union. The notion of person will be correlated to the notion of the restored or deified person, focusing on the contribution of Gregory Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa, Pseudo-Macarius, Pseudo-Dionysius and Maximus the Confessor to deification. The place for the Macarian vision of unity will also be considered. The relationship between awareness experienced in deification will be examined in relation to recapitulated consciousness, which will also be correlated to a Ātmanic consciousness as a mode of hypostatic existence.

In Chapter 3, the notion of person in Pratyabhijñā will be examined, and the question will be asked whether Pratyabhijñā had a concept of person and how to construct a notion of person in Pratyabhijñā while utilising its understanding of re-cognition. Parts 3.2 and 3.3 of Chapter 3 will provide the historical, theological and philosophical background against which a model of person that accepts both difference and unity can be constructed in Pratyabhijñā. In part 3.4, the tattvas (principles) will be examined, especially the puruṣa tattva in relation to difference or diversity within the concept of person (hypostasis), and in part 3.5 the relationship

216 See Dumitru Staniloae, Orthodox Spirituality (South Canaan: 2003), p.21.
between Ātman and a concept of person will be studied. Part 3.6 this thesis will examine the correlation between mundane consciousness of the experient (pramāṇa) and re-cognition, while in part 3.7 the paradox of divine being and manifest phenomena in relation to revelation will be examined through the philosophical use of bheda-bheda (unity-in-diversity). This model will intrinsically be related to how a concept of difference is related to a notion of person when juxtaposed to unity in the divine.

In Chapter 4, a convergence and synthesis of ideas will be attempted in relation to the construction of a new model of person, Ātman-hypostasis. This model represents an inquiry into the nature of human personhood, raising questions that go to the heart of existential and ontological issues raised in the contemporary debate on person and to the discovery of who we are, as human persons. The place for a space for convergence, a theology of convergence, will be argued in which terms from each tradition will be brought together, which will focus more precisely on a single term, Ātman-hypostasis. In part 4.3, the new term Ātman-hypostasis will be constructed, especially in relation to deified person. I will attempt to consider hypostasis in relation to the term Ātman and qualified through Cid, and by exploring the possible role of the notion of the other, or hypostatic difference, in such a model. The model of Ātman-hypostasis will be examined not only in relation to Cid and a Cid-ātmanic mode of hypostatic existence, but also in relation to relationality and the model of unity-in-difference (or diversity).
CHAPTER 2A

PERSON IN BYZANTINE THEOLOGY

2.1 Introduction: Setting the Scene

In this chapter I will consider models of person in relation to: *individuum*; the terms ὑπόστασις, πρόσωπον and οὐσία; a substantialist context; modes of existing; relationality; and unity, to provide a response to contemporary personhood, especially that of John Zizioulas' model of person. I will do this by re-addressing Cappadocian ideas in relation to developing models of person. Ideas issuing from this examination will be considered with a mind to juxtaposing those ideas in relation to Pratyabhijñā philosophy. The main emphasis will be upon *hypostasis* in relation to *ousia*, which focuses the debate within an existential context, of how persons exist in relation to the *what* of being.

The addressing of contemporary models through an examination of the Cappadocian use of *hypostasis* will represent a qualifying of overt existentialist interpretations of person as exemplified by Zizioulas. It will be observed that the term *hypostasis* evolved from the Nicaean stress on underlying nature, to the Cappadocian and Chalcedonian models, putting the focus on what was specific or individualistic, and then again in the contemporary setting *hypostasis* has come to be placed within

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2 The extensive influence in contemporary personhood is highlighted by Douglas Knight, *The Theology of John Zizioulas* (London 2007).

3 The relating of personhood to how persons exist is one of the main arguments presented by John Zizioulas, *BC*, p.6.


5 As argued by Colin Gunton, *The Promise of Trinitarian Theology* (London: 2003), pp.10-94, who changes the way *hypostasis* was originally used within a relational context.
relational and existential models. I will also evolve the term to include an *Atmanic* dimension throughout the thesis but specifically focused on in Chapters 3 and 4, so as to contend with a purely existential focus. While I will also agree that the term qualifies individuality and allow hypostasis to include a relational context, this context will be related to a substantialist model. As such, this chapter will address these ideas and consider that the term hypostasis should be considered in such a way to include a notion of unity by affirming the role of essential nature (relating to ousia) within the hypostatic model of Cappadocian theology. The notion of unity within subjectivity will be later considered in the proceeding chapters in terms of the relationship of *Atman* to hypostasis within the *Atman-hypostasis* model in Chapter 4.

The discussion will begin by posing the question did the Byzantine tradition have a concept of person? This question is very difficult to answer for the issue of personhood has become clouded with bias, and conditioned within specific hermeneutical approaches to Dogma, Creeds, and Councils. Nevertheless, in this chapter an examination of the term person will be given, in relation to re-addressing Cappadocian terms to understand how concrete individuality relates to being a person. Being a person will fundamentally be related to a unified concept of person in which the spiritual or the essential reality fundamentally provides meaning to what it is to be a person. This essential reality, equated to the term ousia, does not exclude somatic materiality but informs it. This model will harmonise Greek Patristic ideas pertaining to the rational (νοητός) and essential (οὐσία or property of being) reality, balancing the concept of hypostatic difference through unity or non-difference. This notion of non-difference expressed through the term ousia shall, in Chapter 3, be correlated to the notion of *Atman*. The model of “distinctiveness in unity” is not new as Gunton

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6 As exemplified by John Zizioulas see BC, pp.16-50.
7 As Gunton stated that the Fathers’ concern was to “avoid what we can fairly call individualism”, ibid., p.93.
8 Colin Gunton even concludes that the Cappadocian model of hypostasis, and particularly that of Basil, was originally considered in terms of developing “a relational conception of person”, Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, p.94.
9 The equating of ousia with *Atman* within a model of human personhood will qualify hypostatic difference through *Atmanic* unity will also be related to the conscious awareness (Cιτ) of the *Atmanic* reality. This type of consciousness will also be equated with a type of consciousness experienced in a noetic or deified mode of existence which shall be equated to a mode of existence that has a conscious awareness of the *Atmanic* reality or a Cid-*atmanic* mode of hypostatic existence, as already discussed on page 47 of this thesis.
10 Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, p.94.
argues that it was the “marked feature of the biblical characterisation”, but Gunton’s model is based on correlating distinctiveness in unity to an outer existentiality rather than focusing also on an inner reality.

Consequently, a concept of person will be constructed where person indicates something more than the outer ecclesial person and is more than isolated individual as highlighted in the individualism of modern and postmodern notions of self, or mere bodily existence. Indeed, the Cartesian bifurcation of the individual will be rejected and a holistic model will be sought. The Greek Fathers’ model of deified person will be utilised to indicate a profound mystical experience within hypostatic difference. Even though the term person has been used in contemporary models in a variety of ways to determine the character of individual existing, a concept of person should infer something more than an outward material existence. It will be argued that being a person or individual has to include a spiritual (noetic) nature, and that this implies something more than that which is argued by John Zizioulas’ existentialist approach to person. In response to the contemporary interpretation of Greek Patristic theology this chapter will also provide a background to the contemporary Eastern Orthodox debate on person. The study of person will also be extended to include a basic examination of the term prosopon (πρόσωπον) beyond the Cappadocians.

The relationship between specificity, indicated through the term hypostasis and human individuality, and unity will also be explored in terms of relationality. The notion of the essential reality of particular existence will be examined in relation to the nature of a shared and common experience within the Trinity (οὐσιαν κοινότητος). This Trinitarian model of relationality will be correlated to the human condition to consider how human personhood and human relationality can be

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11 Ibid.
12 Zizioulas states, that his work is addressed to those who seek “in Orthodox theology the dimension of faith of the Greek Fathers, a dimension necessary to the catholicity of the faith of the Church and to the existential implications of Christian doctrine and of the ecclesial institution”, see BC, p.26.
13 This link between the use of hypostasis in the Trinity and in the human model was made by Basil of Caesarea, see Ep.38, 325A-328B, where specificity was indicated “by the, expression hypostasis” (ibid. 328A) in the category of “man” and to affirm personhood in the Trinity (ibid. 329C) where the hypostasis of the Father is recognised by what is “individually Himself” (ibid. Deferrari).
14 See Basil of Caesarea, Ep.38, 333A.
understood in relation to a unity of being, especially when both ὑπόστασις and οὐσία together indicated a sense of complete being.\(^\text{15}\)

The re-addressing of the Cappadocian model of hypostasis will constitute an exploration of terms demonstrating that there was evident an evolution of Greek Patristic terms from the Council of Nicaea (c. 325) to Council of Chalcedon (c. 451). It is also evident that these terms are not static but are continually changing and indeed are still evolving,\(^\text{16}\) which permits a precedent for the terms to be evolved further in this thesis.

To understand the way the terms and ideas of the Greek Fathers are being developed it is important to consider the contemporary theological scene in which the hermeneutical models are presented. Within this scene, approaches to the Greek Fathers have become centred in certain approaches to person such as the equating of outward looking person with hypostasis and influenced through the ideas of John Zizioulas.\(^\text{17}\)

2.1.1 Individuum

The use of the term hypostasis in contemporary Eastern Orthodox models has come to be used within a context of an apologetic to Western models of individuum, or individual,\(^\text{18}\) hence before I examine the notion of hypostasis in relation to the

\(^{15}\) For examples see: Basil, Ep.38, 325A; Gregory Nazianzen, Or.28.11, 88C; and Gregory of Nyssa, Tres Diu. 115A.

\(^{16}\) It will be argued that the Cappadocian use of hypostasis was placed within a corpus of Greek Patristic notions that was evolving ideas within a narrative that included notions of “personal identity”, “autonomy”, and “freedom” (argued by Gerson in, Knowing Persons, p.5) and where such ideas represent not the end of the journey in discovering the nature of person, but the beginning. In such a narrative a variety of terms were employed as tools to understand a sense of individuality, such as: hypostasis; αὐτός or self (indicating individual or in connection with prefix, i.e. true-self or αὐτοκαταλήψις, true-God/ God-self, or αὐτόθεος, perfect-self or αὐτοτελής, see G. W. H. Lampe, A Greek Patristic Lexicon, Oxford: 2005); ἄτομος or indivisible part (see Lampe, A Greek Patristic Lexicon); ἵδιος or one’s own/personal (ibid.); and πρόσωπον (face/mask).

\(^{17}\) The debate on the development of person in relation to Zizioulas and an authentic Greek Patristic models is highlighted by Douglas H. Knight (ed.), The Theology of John Zizioulas. Personhood and Church (UK: 2007).

\(^{18}\) The equating of the term hypostasis with person as different to individual is exemplified by Archimandrite Sophrony see, His Life is Mine (Crestwood: 1977), p.23, and Archimandrite Zacharias’s notion of ‘The Hypostatic Principle’ in Christ, Our Way and Our Life (South Canaan: 2003). See also:
Cappadocians it is important to contextualise an examination to this apologetic. Eastern Orthodox paradigms have used the notion of person with the term *hypostasis* to indicate something different from individual, as Zizioulas states that being “a person is fundamentally different from being an individual.” However, it will be demonstrated that the Cappadocians did not view a concept of individual as different to the term *hypostasis*. Indeed, it cannot be affirmed that the Cappadocians even had a fully developed sense of individual as understood in the contemporary sense of the word. What can be asserted is that a concept of individual was beginning to be developed to mean person in Cappadocian theology, through the term *hypostasis*. However *hypostasis* initially meant something altogether completely different.

What can be asserted is that if the word individual does mean materialistic, bodily creature, then the Greek Fathers did indeed make a distinction between the fallen, lower condition of humanity, and the *noetic* (spiritual) or higher aspect of human beings or ‘man’ (ανθρωπος). In general terms, the Greek Fathers did not develop a distinct concept of person but utilised the general category of ‘man’, and *hypostasis* mostly in the context of divine existence, to develop a model that focused on specific particularity or distinctiveness. Distinctiveness was classified through a focus on what was general, which was denoted through the term “man”, in contrast to what was particular. Basil stated that “when you say ‘man’ (ανθρωπος), you thereby signify the general class, and do not specify any man who is particularly known by that name”.

Specificity was also correlated to a notion of *hypostasis* or to a specific existence (τὸν

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19 This is generally expressed in the works of Sophrony, *His Life is Mine*; Zizioulas, *BC*; Yannaras *Elements of Faith*; Vlachos, *The Person in the Orthodox Tradition*; and also Colin Gunton, *The Promise of Trinitarian Theology*, pp.10-11.

20 Zizioulas, *BC*, p.105. This view is also exemplified in the works of Archimandrite Sophrony where the term *hypostasis* takes on a theocentric dimension in expressing a relational character of the divine persons not evident in the term individual which infers isolation, see *His Life is Mine*, pp.23, 35, 37,43-45,116; Zizioulas. This view is also generally expressed by Hierotheos Vlachos, *The Person in the Orthodox Tradition*; Vladimir Lossky, *In The Image and Likeness of God*; ‘The Doctrine of the Holy Trinity: The Significance of the Cappadocian Contribution’, in Christoph Schwöbel (ed.), *Trinitarian Theology Today* (Edinburgh: 1995), p.55; and by Christos Yannaras, see *Elements of Faith*.

21 For examples of the use of “man” as a generic term see Gregory of Nyssa, *Hom.Opif.* 126A, 144D.


24 Ibid.
in the Trinity, while the term ἰδιως was a generic determination to examine the human, nature composite of body (σώμα) and soul (ψυχή). Through the generic term ‘man’, the individual was considered through somatic existence, compound (σώγκυμα) of material elements, and the soul. But it was the term hypostasis that was generally used, especially in a Trinitarian context, to denote specificity.

The term ‘man’ also indicated what can be accomplished in human beings where the lower parts can be restored through the higher. In this sense the Greek Fathers harmonised that which is above (spirit) and that which is below (body), as Maximus stated, “the principle of human nature is to exist in soul and body as one nature constituted of rational soul and a body”.

Within this approach to person Zizioulas and Yannaras’ ecclesiology comes to be opposed to the concept of individual, which is viewed in relativistic terms. The mistake was to relate this idea within an outward existential context. From an ontological perspective the notion of person cannot be distinct from individual, for what can be applied to one can be applied to the other, and so the question of being a person has to relate to how a person exists, which seems to lead back to an affirmation of Zizioulas’ approach. Indeed Zizioulas’ view can be considered useful if it indicates a focus on the inner nature of the person and not just the outer condition. This relation of the inner with the outer however, seems to be lacking in Zizioulas’ model, but it does seem to be well defined in the Greek Fathers.

25 Ibid. (328A), however, this was to establish in the Trinity an understanding of what was specific (τὸ ἰδιον) or different to other hypostases as compared to what was shared (τὸ κοινόν); this notion of commonness and particularity was also expressed in Aristotle, On the Soul, 3.1425a.15.

26 This general way of describing the human, see Gregory of Nyssa Hom.Opif., influenced by the Platonic model, see Phaedrus which states that “every body which derives motion from without is soulless, but that which has its motion within itself has a soul, since that is the very nature of the soul”, Phaedrus 24.245E-246A (Fowler); and from Aristotle where the soul “is the first cause and principle of the living body” (Aristotle, On the Soul, 2.4415a.9; Hett) and has a rational context, see Metaphysics, which refers to “the rational part of the soul” (τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐξοντι), Met.IX.1046a.35b (Tredennick), where the focus is upon rationality; not as with Plato which was upon essence, the essence of the soul (ψυχῆς οὐσίαν), Phaedrus 24.245E-246A.

27 PG 46, 16B-24B; Plato considered the soul to be immortal and the cause of life, indicating the nature of the human individual. Plato, Phaedo,107C, and Phaedrus 246A (Fowler).

28 See Maximus, Ambig.42, 1341D.

29 This argued by: Colin E. Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, Zizioulas, BC, and Kallistos Ware, “‘In the Image and Likeness’: The Uniqueness of the Human Person’, in John T. Chirban, Personhood: Orthodox Christianity and the connection Between Body, Mind and Soul (Westport: 1996).
2.1.2 An Authentic Tradition?

Even though the idea of hypostatic person in contemporary Eastern Orthodoxy seems to be presented as fixed, indicating an authentic interpretation of the Greek Fathers and in contradistinction to notions of individual, this view seems difficult to support as it implies a fixed superior position by which all other considerations are negated. This is clearly not the case as contemporary Eastern Orthodoxy, though representing some sort of continuation of the Byzantine tradition, has become influenced by Western ideas. Contemporary Eastern Orthodox models of person have not only utilised Western existentialist constructs, but in doing seem to have radically departed from early Patristic notions of hypostasis.

However, Eastern Orthodox contemporary scholars have not developed their ideas in isolation, but within a milieu that has forged those ideas, which is reflected in their interpretations of the Cappadocians. Nevertheless in contemporary Eastern Orthodoxy many Orthodox scholars view themselves as bringing a corrective to Western philosophical models. The importance attached to this corrective by many, but not all Eastern Orthodox theologians, cannot be underestimated, nor can the penitential attitude for believing that Eastern Orthodoxy has succumbed to Western processes which have distorted, “authentic Eastern patterns of theology”. This attitude could be the reasoning behind the need to polemicise Western theological constructs.

Contemporary exponents of this type include George Florovsky, John Zizioulas and Christos Yannaras. Consequently Zizioulas, who cites Florovsky, states that a return

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31 At the forefront of Orthodox developments, in the first half of the 20th century, were the Russian Orthodox scholars who developed what is called neopatristic theology. This style of new approach to the Greek Fathers which emerged from the meeting of Eastern Orthodox Russian émigrés in Paris with the West, and were exemplified in Sergius Bulgakov, George Florovsky, Vladimir Lossky, and Archimandrite Sophrony. They crafted a Russian style of “neopatristicism” (see Alan Brown, ‘On the Criticism of Being as Communion in Anglophone Orthodox Theology', in D. Knight ed., *The Theology of John Zizioulas, Personhood and Church*, p.36) that utilised Western philosophy and yet, at the same time, polemicised Western concepts. Nevertheless the Slavophiles were content to admit utilising modern concepts of person, and did so to radicalise the notion of persona to argue against the notion of individuum through the language of deification. Nikolai Sakharov affirms that in particular, Berdyaev, Florovsky and Lossky considered hypostasis to indicate the opposite of “individuum”. Sakharov states, “For Sophrony, person is the opposite of individuum: the entire content of life of person is the not ‘I’, my ‘Ego’ but other persons”. See Nikolai Sakharov, ‘Monastic Life According to Fr Sophrony’, *Sourozh* 99 (2005), pp.29-41
to the Greek Fathers represents "the rediscovery of this consciousness, lost in the tortuous paths of medieval scholasticism and the 'Babylonian captivity' of modern Orthodoxy". Zizioulas along with Lossky, Florovsky, Ware, and Yannaras represent a body of Eastern Orthodox scholars who argue that their work provides a corrective, by considering person as meaning something different from the Western notion of individual.

Paradoxically this corrective is accomplished by Zizioulas through the utilising of Western existentialism. Zizioulas directly relates his understanding of person to an "authentic" interpretation of the Greek Fathers. This authentic interpretation is presented through an existential model where the outward act, through communion (koinonia), is stressed rather than the inner reality of being. Also Zizioulas believes his views bring a corrective to substance based models, to an Augustinian stress on substance, and hence to Western models.

The notion of Eastern Orthodoxy correcting Western ideas through existentialist approaches, focusing on outward existence and difference rather than on essential being itself or unity, is also taken up by Yannaras. Yannaras negates the "ontological argument" to affirm the existentialist position and also to highlight that absolute being is beyond our understanding. He correlates the negation of the divine in the West, where "God is absent", with the Western focus on substance and being.

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32 This also echoes Luther, see Luther's Works (Philadelphia:1967), p.xxxvi.
33 Zizioulas, BC p.20. The phrase 'Babylonian captivity', of Georges Florovsky was utilised also by Yannaras, see On the Absence and Unknowability of God, p.4.
34 In the most recent study on the theology of Zizioulas, Douglas H. Knight (ed.), The Theology of John Zizioulas. Personhood and Church, for me misrepresentations and misreadings of the Fathers and the distinction between person and individual becomes the main core of the debate.
35 See footnote 2 of this Chapter, but this argument is presented by numerous Eastern Orthodox scholars throughout their works, see: Archimandrite Sophrony, His Life is Mine (Crestwood: 1977); Vladimir Lossky, In The Image and Likeness of God: Zizioulas, BC and Communion and Otherness (London: 2006); Christos Yannaras, Elements of Faith and 'Person and Individual' in Morality and Freedom (Crestwood: 1984); Hierotheos Vlachos, The Person in the Orthodox Tradition (Greece: 1998).
36 This has already been shown, see, Zizioulas, BC; and Yannaras, On the Absence and Unknowability of God.
37 Zizioulas, BC, p.26, though authentic is not stated as such here, this is the general implication.
38 Zizioulas, BC, pp.16-18.
39 See Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness, pp.118-119.
40 Ibid.
41 See Yannaras, On the Absence and Unnowability of God.
42 Ibid. p.25; which was developed by Anselm, see Proslogion (Charlesworth).
But for him the Christian East focuses on what can be known of God, the mode of *hypostatic* existence, which for him, through Eastern Orthodox Christianity, resolves issues the West cannot. Yannaras however, does not say that God is without essential *being*, but that God is beyond our understanding.\(^{44}\) Yannaras thus concludes that because he believes that the Absolute God is beyond the human condition, we can know only of the divine existence\(^{45}\) (*hyparxis*) or *hypostasis*, which radically affects the way humans consider their own *hypostatic* existence.

The focus, especially by Zizioulas and Yannaras, on developing a correction to Western models has paradoxically led to a synthesis\(^{46}\) between Greek Patristic concepts and Western existentialist ideas.\(^{47}\) This type of synthesis has led to a new type of theological existentialism, which utilises the discourse of relationality\(^{48}\) incorporated into a contemporary Greek Patristic narrative. This relationality has consequently impacted on the way in which Greek Patristic theology is *done*\(^{49}\) and led to a focus upon *hypostasis* through *act*, which has also allowed a focus on *energies* rather than on the essentity of *being*, or *ousia*.\(^{50}\) The exact relationship of the historical development of contemporary relational constructs in Eastern Orthodoxy

\(^{44}\) Ibid. p.83; see also R. D. Williams ‘The Theology of Personhood: A study in the Thought of Yannaras’, *Sobornost*, 6 (1972), pp.415-430.


\(^{49}\) However, in the Eastern Orthodox scholastic community, a division seems to have arisen and Alan Brown divides the contemporary field into those belonging to “Anglophone Orthodoxy” (see Brown, ‘On the Criticism of Being as Communion in Anglophone Orthodox Theology’, p.36) and a “Zizioulian” school” (ibid.) representing two distinct bodies of scholars within the contemporary field. The first, “Anglophone Orthodoxy”, emerged from the “English tradition of Orthodox patriarchal theology...within the Anglican-Orthodox milieu centred in Oxford” (ibid) which became open to Western philosophy and academia. The second body of scholarship for Alan Brown, pertaining to “Zizioulian” thought, has remained faithful to neopatristicism. For Alan Brown a split has developed between the two groups, the later remaining faithful, and the former (exemplified in John Behr and Lucian Turcescu) moving away from what is perceived as traditional Orthodoxy, concerning themselves with “Anglican postliberalism” (ibid.) and attacks on Zizioulas. See, Sarah Coakley, Michael René Barnes and Lewis Ayres, as highlighted by M. Ludlow, see M. Ludlow, *Gregory of Nyssa. Ancient and Post/Modern*, p.58.

\(^{50}\) Yannaras, ‘The distinction Between Essence and energies and its Importance for Theology’, *SVTQ* 19/4 (1975), pp.232-264. There is not enough space in this thesis to go into the energy-essence debate as developed by Gregory Palamas (c. 1296-1359) in the Late Byzantine period, and which has become so important in contemporary Eastern Orthodoxy, especially in the teachings of Vladimir Lossky, but the use of divine uncreated energies has become the driving force behind contemporary Eastern Orthodox Christology and understanding the human participation with God.
and personhood in relation to energetic models has not been examined, and will not be examined in this thesis, but still needs to be studied.

The development of person within the outward looking person has forced a focus on the nature of existence in persons, and based upon the Trinity as a community model, and has developed a stress on how God is, not what he is.51 When this was then translated into human personhood it has resulted in a focus, not on what human persons can know of their essential being, but only of their outward existence. In Zizioulas’ works the notion of essential reality of being is completely negated,52 which is not so much the case in Yannaras. In both theologians’ works the outward person is understood within a relational model that utilises communion to qualify, not only a Western model of individual, but to allow the notion of individual to gain an existential character or mode of existence without denuding a Greek Patristic emphasis on a higher condition of being. The concept of being is then transferred from a focus on the properties of being to activities, which becomes the nature of being. The focus is shifted to an emphasis on outer existence, where it becomes important not only to understand causality of being, but the way in which being operates through relationally.

2.1.3 Zizioulas and Relationality

Thus the contemporary focus on the way human persons exist has become related to relationality in the context of the term hypostasis.53 This relationality puts the stress in communion as an act of relationally. Consequently Zizioulas states that, not even God has “ontological content, no true being, apart from communion”.54

The word communion or koinonia becomes important for around it Zizioulas centres his whole ontological model stating that “without the concept of communion it would

52 The essential nature of the human being shall be correlated to the term Atman in chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis.
53 As highlighted by Zizioulas, see BC, pp.16-36.
54 See Zizioulas, BC, p.17.
not be possible to speak of the being of God”. This use of koinonia (communion) to express the outward unity of hypostases has had a huge impact upon present-day theologians and subsequent interpretations of Cappadocian thought. The notion of communion is very important for it is shaping the way in which theologians revisit the Cappadocians. However, as it shall be shown later in this chapter, the notion of communion in the Cappadocians, although expressed through the hypostases, centred on unity through the term ousia, where a communion was developed through a “community of substance”, and Basil stated:

Therefore we assert that in the community of substance (οὐσίας κοινότητι) there is no accord or community as regards the distinguishing notes assigned by faith to the Trinity, whereby the individuality of persons of the Godhead...is made known to us, for each is apprehended separately by means of its own particular distinguishing notes.

While contemporary notions of relationality have come to be equated with a heterogeneous model of person, negating the place for an autonomous notion of individual, in this thesis a compromise is sought where the notion of individual evolves a sense of relational person but through individual personal development and restoration. However, the Greek Fathers show no evidence of developing a distinction between individual and person, but related what was particular (τὸ ἰδίον), or hypostasis, to autonomy and the specific characteristics of each hypostasis (of the Trinity). But this was an outward existential denotation for in the united being of God, unity was related to the shared nature of God the ousia, the shared essence of the divine and to non-difference. Because of the ontological disposition of the divine, in which three hypostases represented the existential characteristics of the united divine

55 See BC, p.17.
I am thinking of the scholastic debate on personhood exampled in the work of Douglas Knight (ed.) The Theology of John Zizioulas: Personhood and the Church (UK: 2007).
56 As Gregory Nazianzen stated that though there is “numerical distinction, there is no division in the substance”, Or.29, 76B (Wickham).
57 See Georges Florovsky, ‘Creation and Creaturehood’, in Collected Works of Georges Florovsky: Creation and Redemption (3; Belmont: 1976), pp.47-48, who equated heterogeneity with the created; see also Zizioulas, BC; and Christos Yannaras, Elements of Faith.
58 See Georges Florovsky, ‘Creation and Creaturehood’, in Collected Works of Georges Florovsky: Creation and Redemption (3; Belmont: 1976), pp.47-48, who equated heterogeneity with the created; see also Zizioulas, BC; and Christos Yannaras, Elements of Faith.
60 Basil of Caesarea, Ep.38, 325A-C; Maximus Ep.15, 545A.
being, heterogeneity or otherness has come to be applied to the term hypostasis. This implies difference which is qualified through a type of existence or mode of hypostatic existence,\(^6^1\) which is thought to promote a relational model of person as argued by Zizioulas.\(^6^2\) It will be argued however that relationality should also be applied through a stress on what was shared (τὸ κοινόν),\(^6^3\) not just to hypostasis. This sharing allows a sense of difference, or hypostatic heterogeneity, to indicate that ontological unity underlines any expression of otherness. The notion of otherness does not undermine the nature of unity, especially when considering the Trinity, but relates the notion of communion to unity. Communion is established as the centre of unity in existential difference with an emphasis on the underlying nature of difference or the essential reality of being. In Zizioulas’ model of otherness however, communion, through hypostatic relationality is stressed where the emphasis is on the outward looking subject, which becomes the medium of unity not the divine ousia. This type of relationality shall be examined later in relation to the Cappadocians but it can be stated here that it provides an unsatisfactory resolution to individual and communion as it is never revealed what the two actually mean. Because of the forcing of a notion of relationality as being through communion and the term hypostasis, it is necessary to ask whether some contemporary Byzantine scholars, including Zizioulas, have read back into the Greek Fathers ideas that were not originally conceived by the Greek Fathers. Lucian Turcescu also thinks this to be the case, and argues that Zizioulas:

uses nineteenth- and twentieth-century insights which he then foists on the Cappadocians. This methodology leads him to misleading conclusions.\(^6^4\)

Turcescu considers that contemporary ideas of person were alien to the ancients\(^6^5\) and criticises Zizioulas for making a distinction between person and individual.\(^6^6\)

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\(^6^1\) Zizioulas, BC, p.50.
\(^6^2\) This is what is argued throughout the works of Zizioulas, see BC and Communion and Otherness.
\(^6^3\) This is explicitly made by Basil who refers to a "community of substance" (κοινότητι ούσιας) and states that, "that which is separated in person is at the same time united in substance" (καὶ τὸ κεχωρισμένον ἐν ὑποστάσει καὶ τὸ συνημμένον ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ διάσκοιτο), see Letter 38, 336 (Deferrari). This point is also made in relation to Maximus the Confessor by modern scholars, see also M. Törönen, Union and Distinction in the Thoughts of St Maximus the Confessor (Oxford: 2007), p.25.
\(^6^5\) This is the point made by Lucian Turcescu who argues that "the ancients did not have a notion of person before the Cappadocians...They (the ancients) did not connect soul with individual, because before the Cappadocians they only had rudiments of a theory of individual", see Gregory of Nyssa and the Concept of Divine Persons, pp.7-8. Here it can also be seen that Turcescu links the notion of individual with person.
Turcescu believes that such distinguishing is a modern concern. Consequently I do not think Zizioulas’ fault is reading ideas back into the Cappadocians or a manifesting a certain personhood narrative, for that is what I shall do, but that his interpretations tend to over-stress outward existentiality, or difference.

Yannaras and Zizioulas utilise the relational models of Buber, Heidegger and Levinas to accomplish their existential tasks.\(^67\) This seems to be inconsistent with an authentic position being so dependent on Western models, in developing a kind of relational existentialism. This modified form of existentialism negates the concept of essential or pure \textit{being} and replaces it with the notion of relational \textit{acts} of existence with other persons who also act in a way that conforms to an authentic form of relationality.

The notion of an existential communion is qualified in this thesis through a relationality in which a communion established through an experience of the nature of pure \textit{being} expresses unity, and is equated with a notion of \textit{Atman}. In this communion a concept of \textit{hypostasis} is qualified to contextualise difference through a unity-based-relationality. This unity can then be expressed outwardly through a mode of existence, but a mode of \textit{hypostatic} difference is not the essence of \textit{being}, but expresses the outward nature of unity. In this existence, the notion of \textit{mode} will be developed to include the idea of an \textit{Cid-\textit{Atmanic}} mode\(^68\) of \textit{hypostatic} existence or an awareness of the \textit{Atmanic} condition within the \textit{hypostasis}. This condition indicates a particular type of existence that incorporates a change of consciousness in the experience of \textit{deification} of the holy one, the enlightened master or \textit{yogi}. The completed person or \textit{yogi} through God’s grace comes to understand the nature of his/her existence (\textit{hypostasis}) through an experience or awareness (of consciousness or \textit{Citi}) of pure \textit{being} or \textit{Atman}. This view modifies the existentialist position of Yannaras and Zizioulas who highlight a methodology that puts the focus on outward relationality.


\(^67\) The connection between Heidegger, Buber and Levinas has already been given, and indeed Yannaras’ work \textit{On the Absence and Unknowability of God} is a testimony to the desire by some Eastern Orthodox theologians to orientate their ideas through modern philosophers. This is also evident in Zizioulas’ work \textit{Communion and Otherness}, pp.43-56. See also: Martin Buber, \textit{I and Thou} (London: 1937, 2004); Martin Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time} (Oxford: 1962, 2004); John Macmurray, \textit{The Self as Agent} (NY: 1957); Levinas, \textit{Outside the Subject} (Stanford: 1993), \textit{On Thinking-of-the-Other: Entre Nous, and Humanism and the Other}.

\(^68\) As already stated in Chapter 1.4.6 of this thesis.
and existence. It also moves the stress away from the autonomous self, to a heterogeneous communion based on an “I-Thou”69 type of existentialism and a Heideggerian type of relational-cum-existentialist approach to person.70 Within this existential relationality the personal experience of the unique individual71 is reduced to an outer pre-determined act, making personal communion a sort of relational “determinism”.72 The character and nature of this type of model of person is valued only within an activity of an automaton collective. This model promotes the concept of a relational communion at the cost of personal identity and personal participation.

I however, qualify the notion of separate individual or the natural physis, through a relational value of an experience of ‘I am Thou’ rendered through unity with the divine. In this type of relational model a person is not only valued as an outward looking entity but experiences a relational and thus inward dynamic where the purifying of a lower nature is accomplished through the higher. This purifying activity is not to be considered in isolation or due to the gaining of a property of some impersonal nature. The spiritual activity of purifying the lower nature is directly related to the acting and willing of the divine who creates a low nature with the capability to escape that nature through the potentiality of existing hypostatically. Hence Maximus stated that existence is:

...shaped by the intention (gnōme) of the one who speaks. So being able to speak always belongs to the nature, but how you speak belongs to the hypostasis.73

Through this model hypostasis comes to reflect firstly, the reality of a bound condition and then the capabilities of a coming out of the lower nature (ek-stasis) through a mystical communion with the divine reality (en-stasis), which is able to look beyond that lower condition. The term hypostasis infers a double dynamic of

69 As developed by Buber who states “the primary word I-Thou establishes the world of relation”, in I and Thou, p.13.
71 See also Lossky, In the Image and Likeness of God (Crestwood: 2001), p.105, who basically makes the same point.
72 This view modifies Lossky’s opinion of “sacramental determinism” in which the “collective totality of the Church tends to suppress personal encounter with God”. See Lossky, In the Image and Likeness of God, p.105.
73 Maximus, OpSc.3, 48A (Louth).
existing and being.74 Within this model, communion does not only indicate an outer activity of the person but an inner awareness of the divine, which allows the person to understand both the limited and limiting condition which is then transformed within a unifying condition. If the *act* of communion was the centre of *being* it would not be able to conceive of another *act* outside of its initial relational activity and not be able to create a limiting condition and then a unifying condition in which limited *hypostases* exist. However, when *being* is grasped as coming from an essential divine reality not as an external *act*, all activities can be understood as issuing from this centre of the highest *being* as *principles* of the divine being. This will be examined later in the chapter on *deification*. Just as the *Logos hypostasis* transformed the natural *physis* to its true *hypostatic* existence, so too in the human person the *hypostasis* indicates the potentiality for restoration through a *deification* of natures. Within this *deification* experience a communion is wrought after *being*, which is the evidence of an activity emanating from the source of *deification*. The activity is not the source but the effect by which that source can be understood and by which human persons can then be understood.

In this type of relationality, through an experience of unity with the *hypostasis*, the ‘I-Thou’ of traditional relational models is changed to an ‘I Am Thou’ model. In this model the human *physis* is radically transformed within an experience of *hypostatic deification* or union with the divine, where the cognition of an inner reality, the *Atman*, affirms a true cognition in the *hypostasis*, transforming the natural *physis* and allowing for a true relationality. This model modifies Zizioulas’ notion of person, where the use of communion expresses a *heterogenic* existential relationalality, so as to affirm that the ontological condition of *hypostasis* indicates the true condition of the human *physis*. This condition reflects a mode of life that experiences an *Atmanic* condition. While in Zizioulas’ anti-substantialist model *being* is reduced to the outer existential of the undetermined, that is to say Zizioulas never tells us what this communion is, in this thesis, *being* also includes the essential reality (*Atman*) that underpins all existential conditions.

74 As Cyril of Alexandria stated that “(the body of the Word) in its own nature has been enriched with the Word who is united to it. It has become holy, life-giving, full of the divine energy. And in Christ we are too transfigured”, That Christ is One 1269 (PG 75); translation by Oliver Clement, *The Roots of Christian Mysticism* (London: 1995).
However, in Zizioulas’ model, a collectivisation becomes evident where a hegemonic type of ecclesial communion develops in which communion becomes qualified through some space outside of essential being, negating the space of the personal. In Zizioulas’ model we see a move towards a modified form of existentialism evident in his relational ecclesiology where persons attain an authentic personhood,\textsuperscript{75} not in the individual experience, but in an outward act. Paradoxically, whilst claiming to support the Greek Patristic hypostatic model of person (hypostasis), which qualifies hypostatic difference in notions of unity, Zizioulas’ form of relationality represents a de-hypostasising\textsuperscript{76} of the homogenous individual in its determining ontology through unknown dynamics. It cannot be stated with any certainty what Zizioulas’ type of ecclesial communion indicates, where hypostasis ceases to be known or fixed. It indicates a non-specific relationality and shifts the focus away from the homogenous person to the heterogeneous, de-personalising and thus de-hypostasising personhood through a general existential category. Zizioulas’ model, in putting the focus on ecclesial communion, stresses relatedness, the connection between beings, and not the beings themselves. The paradox of this type of relationality is that it is qualified in a common experience in the experience of the many as exemplified in the Trinitarian model. This places the focus back onto the generic, on the common experience rather than the particular or person, and thus to the general (ousia), a resolution that Zizioulas would not endorse.

A working relationality should include a dynamic of unity in diversity, which allows the notion of individual to exist simultaneously as hypostatic unity. In this model the nature of the rational existence reflects some ontological likeness with the divine, being “akin” to the divine, yet having difference, which also indicated the limits of human understanding. Within the Trinity, difference indicates specific and yet permanent characteristics, but within a united nature and it is this sense of unity and difference which becomes important when transposing such ideas into human models. Gregory Nazianzen stated:

\textsuperscript{75} Zizioulas, \textit{BC}, p.58

\textsuperscript{76} These conclusions are drawn in relation to my studies on metaphysics such as R. Schacht, ‘Existentialism’, in J. Kim and E. Sosa (eds.), \textit{A Companion to Metaphysics} (Malden: 1995), pp.150-156.
the aim is to safeguard the distinctiveness of the three hypostases within a single nature and quality of the Godhead.... The three are a single whole in their Godhead and the single whole is three in personalities (idiotes or properties). 77

Thus there was developed a model of unity-in-difference in which hypostatic difference was not taken out of the notion of a centre of unity but qualified through it. While term hypostasis (υπόστασις) 78 inferred a meaning which implied an underlying reality to a specific existence, the Cappadocians allowed it to indicate concrete individual existence. This provided answers to theological dilemmas, such as Sabellianism 79 in relation to the Trinity. But the Cappadocian emphasis on hypostasis relating to particular, concrete existence 80 seems to have led to a negation of the Nicaean stress on ousia and thus unity, and consequently in the contemporary debate has led to an emphasis on outer existentiality.

2.1.4 Existential Constructs: Tropos Hyparxeos

The focus on outward existentiality, through Cappadocian theology has highlighted a stress on how persons should exist in answer to modern existentialism. 81 In most contemporary models the focus is upon on difference, 82 which has become the driving force behind present-day models of personhood. Consequently, there is evident a

77 Gregory Nazianzen, Or.31.9, 113C; translation by Wickham, On God and Christ, p.123.
78 Etymologically υπόστασις derived from ύπο (under) and στάσις (standing), 78 referring to that which supports. In a scriptural context υπόστασις referred to the underlying substance of a thing, person or deed and occurs five times in the New Testament and twenty times in the LXX. See also Lampe, A Greek Patristic Lexicon. In the Latin tradition, person was equated through the term persona.
79 The use of the term hypostasis was also employed by Basil to refute those that denied the reality of the concrete existences of the Trinity in equating hypostasis with ousia. He stated that Sabellius understands "hypostasis and substance to be identical...But they did not there state (in the council of Nicaea) hypostasis and substance to be identical...It is on the contrary clear that while by some it was denied that the Son was of the same substance with the Father, and some asserted that He was not of the substance and was of some other hypostasis, they thus condemned both opinions as outside that held by the Church", Ep.125, (Jackson).
80 Example of see, Hom.Opif.11, 154C-D; and Hom.Opif.14, 175D.
81 Zizioulas recognizes the importance of Heidegger and Buber in the personhood, especially within the context of relationality, stating that "the comprehension of the being of Dasein includes the comprehension of "the Other", see Communion and Otherness (London: 2006), p.45. Yet Zizioulas also recognizes the limitations of the models of Heidegger and Buber and considers also the relevance of Levinas in his interpretations of the Greek Fathers, especially in relation to otherness see Communion and Otherness, pp.45-53.
82 For Yannaras, difference is the main ontological distinction between the world and God, see On the Absence and Unknowability of God (London: 2005), p.53.
consensus in contemporary Eastern Orthodoxy that the term person is a *hypostatic* denotation that relates to an existential interpretation, where the focus is upon person in respect of *act* rather than an inner reality.

The existential perspective has consequently manifested too much stress on the material, on the outward existence and a sense of difference. This is exemplified in the writings of George Florovsky who in defence of this existentialist approach stated that, “the main distinctive mark of Patristic theology was its existential character”. 83

Through this existential approach the notion of person comes to be qualified through a *way* of existing. This emphasises not only difference and isolation, in the focus on difference, but that has come to infer that persons have no ontological centre by which unity is expressed. The focus on a *way* of existing does highlight that many types of existing can be affirmed, which allows unity to be developed through a *way* of existing with a substantialist stress. Nevertheless, focusing on a *way* of existence allows a focus on the *way* God exists, which provides a pattern for human persons. The *way* the divine exists should be considered as consequence to the divine *being* and not the other way round, but for Zizioulas *being* is a type of existence having no innate centre. 84 Another way of putting it is that by observing *hypostatic* difference in the divine, humans come to understand their own sense of importance through the ontological condition of being a person. Zizioulas also affirmed this stance and states: “the fact that a human being is a member of the Church, he becomes an ‘image of God,’ he exists as God Himself exists; he takes on God’s ‘way of being’”. 85 Here again as with Yannaras the focus is on a *way* of existing or difference rather than on the *what* of *being*.

Thus the *way* (mode) of existence, *tropos hyparxeos* (τρόπος υπάρξεως, or *mode of existence*), 86 vouchsafes the notion of existential difference (or otherness) through the distinguishing particularity of each *hypostasis*, yet unity through communion, which is established through a type of *mode* of these *hypostatic* existences.

85 Zizioulas, *BC*, p.15.
86 See Basil, *Ep.* 38 (PG 32), 337A, which refers to υπάρξεως/υπάρξις, pertaining to a type of existence.
However, did the Cappadocians’ place an emphasis on the existential through a focus on *mode of existence* as Zizioulas and Yannaras suggest? Turcescu confirms that *tropos hyparxeos* was not used at all by Plato or Aristotle or Gregory Nazianzen, but was mentioned three times in Gregory of Nyssa and five times in Basil of Caesarea. 87 Hence the term was not widely employed by the Cappadocians, but it was used, for example in *Letter 38* of Basil, to indicate the different characteristics or existences of the *hypostases* of the Trinity. 88 Basil stated that:

> Then there no longer remains to the Father exclusively to be called ‘unbegotten’ in a sense peculiar to Himself alone if indeed the existence (*ὑπάρχειν*) if the Only-begotten is characterised by the individual not peculiar to the Father. 89

Maximus also utilises the idea of mode (τρόπος) many times to indicate the relationship of a particular type of existing with the mode of existing 90 even in the human condition, stating that the human principle exists as a soul and body as one nature and has a “mode...which naturally acts and is acted upon, which can frequently change”. 91 The reason for change indicates that human beings each have two natures within a single *hypostasis*, one relating to the lower nature and another relating to a higher nature, where the lower is restored revealing the higher in *deification*. The type of existence a person has, indicates the mode of a particular nature which that a particular person is operating within. This model is based upon Cappadocian Christology, where Christ has, within a particular *hypostasis*, characteristics specific to Him and natures human and divine, which becomes a model to understand the divine and human conditions.

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87 Turcescu, *Gregory of Nyssa and the Concept of Divine Persons*. p.104. This has to be contextualised to the notion that Turcescu believes some of Basil’s corpus to be written by Gregory of Nyssa. Ayres also states that the term was used 3 times by Basil see *Nicaea and its Legacy* p.210. It is fair to say the term was not employed much at all by the Cappadocians, which may, or may not be of importance.


89 Basil, *Ep.38*, 337A (Deferrari).

90 For some examples see Maximus, *Ambig.42*, 1341D; and *Thal.60* (CCSG, 22), 75.

One of the main reasons for considering God through a mode of existence is that it allows a focus on what can be known of God and highlights what cannot be known. The *apophatic* model underlines the limits of human knowing, where human beings can only understand Trinitarian *hypostatic* specificity or the divine operations, for the divine *ousia* was beyond the comprehension of the human mind. Gregory Nazianzen stated that: “to tell of God is not possible...to know him is even less possible”. This inability of the intellect to grasp a deeper nature, for Gregory Nazianzen, also implied a depth of *being* within the human soul. Gregory tells us that the soul, is “God like” when mingled with “its kin” (God) but he does not elaborate how this is accomplished or on the implications for the human person. Gregory stated that the when the individual is *deified* “the copy returns to the pattern it now longs for”. This pattern as the highest part of the soul could be grasped as a rational operation (*λογικὴς ἐνεργείας*). Gregory of Nyssa also affirmed that a capability for understanding was also part of the human condition, stating that “the soul, having perfection, is both in the spiritual and also in the mental (rational)”, which indicates the capabilities of human higher awareness to comprehend the depth of the spiritual realms. In the same passage Gregory of Nyssa goes on to explain that the rationality of the soul is not enclosed “within any thing...but the union of the mental with the bodily” where union indicates a capability of the human person to understand the spiritual within some framework of conscious awareness.

Nevertheless, the *apophatic* approach has come to be qualified through an emphasis on revealed types or modes of existence based upon Trinitarian theology and exemplified in the works of Christos Yannaras. Yannaras argues that the divine being, through his operations, extends his activities to the human realm, while God’s true

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92 As Gregory of Nyssa stated that, “His glory, His holiness ‘there is no end’: and if His surroundings have no limit, much more is He Himself in His essence what ever it may be, comprehended by no limitation in any way”, see *Eun.3.5* (Moore).
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
being is beyond the limits of human knowing. Revelation through the divine activities provides humans with the knowledge of ways of existing open to human persons. Humans are restricted to knowing about the divine “Being” but can know of the divine operations. Yannaras states that:

apophatic knowledge, as the event of participation...is equivalent to participation in the body of the Church that is the historical realisation of the mode of existence of Christ, of the mode of the new human nature.

The term “apophatic knowledge”, however, seems to be problematic for it implies a revealed hidden knowledge which is not completely hidden for it has been revealed but not understood. It is not that divine awareness cannot be experienced but that it cannot be grasped within the normative consciousness. But for Yannaras any knowledge becomes immediately reduced to a knowing within a mundane mode of existence that reflects that incapacity, where the “mode of existence” informs the human person only of who he or she immediately is. He tells us nothing of the implications for this existence other than it is hypostatic and thus reflecting some personal traits which are shared. Yannaras does argue that the nature of that existence is hypostatically relational. He states that “the mode of existence that we know only ‘by participation’ – only to the extent that we participate – we call personal”. Thus being-ness for Yannaras is only to be understood through an outer participatory personhood, which reflects a personal mode of existence that is ecclesial in nature.

The true and intimate nature of this participation is never fully explained.

2.2 How Does Hypostasis Indicate Person?

Within the theological topography of the Byzantine tradition, ideas relating to a concept of person have developed in relation to the Cappadocian use of hypostasis.

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100 Yannaras, On the Absence and Unknowability of God, p.73.
101 Ibid., p.53.
102 Ibid., p.95.
103 Ibid. p.95, which also becomes the mode of being (ibid., p.83).
104 Ibid., p.84.
105 Of course there have been many other important factors and influences relating to the contemporary debate of person including the ideas of Karl Barth, Colin E. Gunton, Alistair McFayden and Alan
and it is within this context that the notion of person is re-addressed. But the initial question, can hypostasis come to signify that which is understood by a concept of person in the contemporary context, is not the same as did the Cappadocians purposefully equate hypostasis with a sense of person? The latter is impossible to answer as it cannot be proved that the Cappadocians had a distinct notion of person, although they may have indeed had some sense of personhood constructed around the word hypostasis. The term hypostasis did infer in the pre-Cappadocian era that ideas relating to concrete material existence were included within a metaphysical context as hypostasis was an underlying reality of an existence. Hypostasis indicated the essential reality at the depths of being and existence, but was evolved through the Cappadocians.

2.2.1 Divine Operations

Through the development of term hypostasis, the Cappadocians re-cast ideas relating to subjectivity to focus on what they believed humans could know of God, the divine operations (ἐνεργείας). This focused the arguments on the extrusive or knowable operations of the divine, the characteristics of the persons of the Trinity, and denied access to understanding the divine ousia. Gregory of Nyssa attested that:

Torrance which should also be considered, but I shall restrict the study within the context of Eastern Orthodoxy. Considering the term person, there is a consensus that the Cappadocians did have a general approach to the use of hypostasis, which is exemplified in the works of V. Lossky, see, In the Image and Likeness of God, pp.111-123; and ‘The Cappadocians’ in Lossky The Vision of God (Crestwood: 1983), pp.73-89.

106 The dynamism of the term hypostasis to include both dimensions is also argued by G. L. Prestige, God in Patristic Thought (London: 1959), who states that “Hypostasis thus comes to mean positive and concrete and distinct existence, first of all in the abstract, and later, as will be seen, in the particular individual”, p.174; see also, pp.179, 189, 233, 240.

107 The word ὑπόστασις comes from ὑπό meaning under and στάσις meaning standing.

108 It is thought that initially, hypostasis was not viewed as indicating anything different than ousia, as J. Pelikan informed us; hypostasis was synonymous with ousia in the pre-Nicaean era. Later, even Athanasius (c. 296-373) “insisted that hypostasis is ousia and means nothing else but simply being”, see Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition, p.219. On how the notion of substance or the property of being relates to Christian models see Prestige, God in Christian Thought, p.168; Christopher Stead, ‘Greek Influence on Christian Thought’, in Doctrine and Philosophy in Early Christianity (UK: 2000), p.183; and Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: The Emergence of the Catholic Faith, 100-600 (1; Chicago: 1975), p.219; see also Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God.

109 This is exemplified in Gregory of Nyssa’s work Tres Dii, which stated “every operation apart from which extends from God to the Creation...is named according to our variable conceptions of it, has its origin from the Father, and proceeds through the Son, and is perfected in the Holy Spirit. For this reason the name derived from the operation is not divided”, (PG 45), 125C-D; translation by Moore (NPNF 5), p.334.
Now if anyone should ask for some interpretation and description, and explanation of the Divine essence, we are not going to deny that in this kind of wisdom we are unlearned, acknowledging only so much as this, that it is not possible that that which is by nature infinite should be comprehended in any conception expressed by words.¹¹⁰

While this approach seemed to allow an inevitable focus on the operations of the Trinity, it was at the expense of understanding the divine ousia or the nature of divine unity. Through this operational focus, especially relating to the Son, a notion of person was successfully born that affirms the place for concrete and unique person who shares a personal existence in relation to others (to other persons of the Trinity).¹¹¹ This model has then been applied within contemporary models of person in relation to the Cappadocians to fix person within an operational context. However, the nature of the relationship of Christ to the other persons of the Trinity, or the exact nature of communion, and the consequent implications to human personhood has far from been resolved.

The equating of hypostasis with concrete personal existence was first evidenced in the writings of Basil of Caesarea, who identified the specific characteristics (ἰδιωμάτων, pertaining to one’s own qualities)¹¹² of each hypostasis of the Trinity, allowing not only a lens through which specificity in the divine could be examined, but the consequent evolution of ideas relating to a sense of personal being. This clarity of examination was also very much evident in the works of Gregory Nazianzen who stated that:

The result is that though there is numerical distinction, there is no division in the substance. For this reason, a one eternally changes to a two and stops at three – meaning the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. In a serene, non-temporal, incorporeal way the Father is parent of the ‘offspring’ and originator of the ‘emanation’ – or what – every name one can apply when one has entirely extrapolated from things visible...This is why we limit ourselves to

¹¹⁰ See Eun. 3.5; translation by Moore (PNPF 5), p.146; see also Basil, Ep.38, 325A; Gregory Nazianzen, Or.28, 48C-49D, Or.29, 76A-77B; Gregory of Nyssa, Tres Dii, 142B-D.
¹¹¹ See Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness, pp.43-55.
¹¹² Basil stated that “Consequently, by all these means – the name, the place, the peculiar qualities of his character, and his external attributes as disclosed by observation – the description of the subject of the story becomes explicit”, Basil, Ep.38, 328; translation by Deferrari, Basil I: Letters 1-58 (LCL 190), p.203.
Christian terms and speak of ‘the Ingenerate’ (ἀγέννητον) ‘the Begotten’ (γεννητὸν), and ‘what Proceeds (ἐκπορευόμενον) from the Father’.

Thus hypostasis (ὑπόστασις) came to be related to what is individually characteristic, unique, existentially particular, which also forced a distinction between hypostasis and ousia. In contemporary interpretations, this has led to a theological view that in the Cappadocians the divine hypostases or particular existences become almost separate from essential being, the ousia, which becomes predicated as an aspect of the divine subjects or hypostases. The Cappadocians however, show no indications to divorce the divine ousia from the divine operations. On the contrary, the divine hypostases were implicitly related to the notion of unity expressed through the term “Godhead” (Θεότης). Neither did unity imply an existential collection of non-related characteristics or subjects, for Gregory of Nyssa declared, “to extend the number of the Godhead to a multitude belongs to those only who suffer from the plague of polytheistic error”. Unity indicated the way in which specificity should be ontologically considered through the divine essence or ousia, where Trinitarian specificity indicated not disunity or a division between ousia and hypostatic existences, but a unity in both types of existence and being. Specificity provides the ontological manner by which unity was outwardly existentially expressed. Gregory of Nyssa stated:

for our statement does not hereby violate the simplicity of the Godhead, since community and specific difference are not essence, so that the conjuction of these should render the subject composite.

Thus hypostasis (ὑπόστασις) came to be related to what is individually characteristic, unique, existentially particular, which also forced a distinction between hypostasis and ousia. In contemporary interpretations, this has led to a theological view that in the Cappadocians the divine hypostases or particular existences become almost separate from essential being, the ousia, which becomes predicated as an aspect of the divine subjects or hypostases. The Cappadocians however, show no indications to divorce the divine ousia from the divine operations. On the contrary, the divine hypostases were implicitly related to the notion of unity expressed through the term “Godhead” (Θεότης). Neither did unity imply an existential collection of non-related characteristics or subjects, for Gregory of Nyssa declared, “to extend the number of the Godhead to a multitude belongs to those only who suffer from the plague of polytheistic error”. Unity indicated the way in which specificity should be ontologically considered through the divine essence or ousia, where Trinitarian specificity indicated not disunity or a division between ousia and hypostatic existences, but a unity in both types of existence and being. Specificity provides the ontological manner by which unity was outwardly existentially expressed. Gregory of Nyssa stated:

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113 ὡστε κἂν ἀριθμὸς διαφέρει, τῇ γε ὀυσίᾳ μὴ τέμνεσθαι. Διὰ τοῦτο μονὰς ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς ἐς δυάδα κινήθεσα, μέχρι Τριάδος ἐστιν. Καὶ τοῦτο ἐστίν ἡμῖν οἱ Πατὴρ, καὶ ὁ Ἰδός, καὶ τὸ ἄγιον πνεῦμα· ὁ μὲν γεννήτωρ καὶ προθελεὺς, λέγω δὲ ἀπαθῶς, καὶ ἁρύνως, καὶ ἀσωμάτως· τῶν δὲ, τὸ μὲν γέννημα, τὸ δὲ πρόθλημα, ἢ ὅσον ὁ ὁπὸς ἀν τις ταύτα καλέσειν, ἄφελων πάντων ὁμοίων...Διὰ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων δρῶν ἑσάγων, τὸ ἀγέννητον εἰσάγων, καὶ τὸ γεννητὸν, καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον, ὡς ποῦ φησιν αὐτὸς ὁ Θεὸς καὶ Λόγος·· Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 29.2 (PG 36), 76B-C; translation by Wickham, On God and Christ, p.70.

114 This comes close to defining a notion of person as purusa which will be examined in Chapter 3 of this thesis.

115 As exemplified by Zizioulas, in BC, p.17, who sees almost no role for ousia at all.

116 See Gregory of Nyssa, Ad Eustathium de Trinitate or Ep. 189 of Basil of Caesarea (PG 32), 684.

117 In relation to the unity of the Godhead and the hypostatic operations see Gregory of Nyssa, Tres Dii, who makes clear his model of unity-in-difference (PG 45), 115A-136A.

118 See Gregory of Nyssa, Ad Eustathium de Trinitate or Letter 189 of Basil of Caesarea (PG 32), 684 (Deferrari).

When applied at the human level, *hypostasis* indicates not isolated individuals collectively forming random communities, but where hypostases become intrinsically related to each other. Gregory of Nyssa's sense of community can be applied so as to make clear that "specific difference"\textsuperscript{120} does not negate the place for unity within specific existences. This Cappadocian model of unity and difference was also highlighted in the "Cappadocian Settlement"\textsuperscript{121} of the Trinity, of "one ousia and three hypostases".\textsuperscript{122} This formula seemed to change the use of *hypostasis* in the light of the Council of Nicaea (c. 325), which was originally equated ousia with hypostasis, for the Council had stated, "from another hypostasis or substance" (ἐξ ἔτρεχας ὑποστάσεως ἡ οὐσίας).\textsuperscript{123} This statement has come be interpreted in a way that moved the notion of hypostasis away from ousia,\textsuperscript{124} where the notion of personal hypostasis has been dislocated from ousia. But if hypostasis is to be reviewed through the notion of unity, then this dislocation is to be revised within the qualifying of particularity (hypostasis), through unity (ousia), while recognising the place for concrete identity. In this model, the hypostasis or particular self-aware concrete existence is informed through its essential reality as much as through its hypostasis, because of the inseparable unity within the divine being.

To underline the role of unity whilst accepting the place for concrete specificity, the notion hypostasis has to be re-considered through the context of the Nicaean use of homoousios (ὁμοούσιον),\textsuperscript{125} to underline the need for unity within distinction. The term homoousios provides the context of hypostasis in the person of Christ who, "was the only begotten of God" (γεννηθέντα ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς μονογενῆ),\textsuperscript{126} and has existence that is distinct from the Father, and yet is God by virtue of sharing the divine nature or ousia. The term hypostasis in the context of Nicaea provides a model of simultaneity, of unity and difference, which significantly changes the way to approach the term hypostasis when considering the context of substance.

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{121} See Prestige, *God in Christian Thought*, p.232.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{123} See Albergio et al. (eds.), *Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, pp.1-15; and Norman Tanner, *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, p.5.
\textsuperscript{124} In contemporary times this shift in the notion of hypostasis is exemplified by Zizioulas, *BC*, p.48, where he divorces the divine essence from hypostatic existences stating "not on account of His substance but on account of His trinitarian existence".
\textsuperscript{125} See Albergio et al. (eds.), *Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, pp.1-15; and Norman Tanner, *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, p.5.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.
2.2.2 Subjectivity: the Particular and the General

While the Cappadocians had linked *hypostasis* to subjectivity, divine subjectivity was not disassociated from a sense of unity in the Council of Nicaea where *hypostasis* indicated the same as *ousia*.\(^{127}\) This allowed for the essential reality of the Trinity (or the *ousia*) to be juxtaposed to Trinitarian difference within an ontological framework that did not divorce essential *being* from outer existence. Nevertheless, through the Cappadocians, the conceptual use of *hypostasis* changed.\(^{128}\) The term *hypostases* came to be equated with specificity, moving the term from a denotation that implied concrete subjectivity or individuality and not an underlying substance. This movement away from essential *being* seemed to be exasperated further by equating the operations with a mode of existence (*tropos hyparxeos*).\(^{129}\) In addition, the term *hypostasis* was equated with concrete uniqueness or specificity, relating to one’s own existence (*tòn ἰδιωσ*),\(^{130}\) which also allowed the term to focus on an outer life.

To allow this conceptual change of *hypostasis*, Basil separated that which is individually specific, from that which is shared in both the human and divine cases, forcing a distinction between difference and unity. He gave the examples of “Peter, Andrew, John, or James”\(^{131}\) to provide examples of uniqueness, and in each case to underline unity in the sharing of what is common, a generic nature (*κοινότης τῆς φύσεως*),\(^{132}\) or the “common element”.\(^{133}\) Hence this classification difference was expressed through uniqueness, or “a certain characteristic of a particular thing” (*πράγματός τινος περιγραφή*),\(^{134}\) implying a sense of the person.\(^{135}\) Nevertheless, the

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\(^{127}\) Ibid.

\(^{128}\) See Basil, Ep.38, 325A, where *hypostasis* is considered existentially as something different to *ousia*, as Basil stated: “Seeing that many, in treating of the mysterious doctrine of the Trinity, because they fail to discern any difference between the general conception of substance and that of the persons, come to like notions and think that it matters not whether they use the term ‘substance’ (*ουσίαν*) or ‘person’ (*ὑπόστασιν*), Ἐπεξῆρρηκεν δηλαδή τὸ κοινὸν τῆς οὐσίας ἐπὶ τῶν μιστικῶν δογμάτων μὴ διακρίνοντες ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποστάσεως λόγου, ταῖς αὐτάς συνεμπίπτουσιν ὑπονοίαις καὶ συνανταὶ διωφέρειν μηδὲν οὕσαν ἢ ὑπόστασιν; translation by Deferrari, Basil I: Letters 1-58 (LCL 190), p.197.

\(^{129}\) Ibid.

\(^{130}\) See Basil, Ep.38, 325B.

\(^{131}\) Ibid., 325A-C.

\(^{132}\) Ibid., 325C.

\(^{133}\) Ibid.

\(^{134}\) Ibid.

\(^{135}\) Ibid.
starting point for the Cappadocians was an emphasis on difference, rather than the underlying unity of that difference.

It was due to the lack of clarity in developing the terms hypostasis and ousia\textsuperscript{136} that allowed the Cappadocians to use this lack of clarity to mould the term hypostasis into a form that could be applied to their outlook. Confusion surrounding these Trinitarian terms were especially acute when the terms were translated into Latin.\textsuperscript{137} The term hypostasis in Latin would indicate substance, having a generic quality, turning the Latin Trinitarian definition into three substances in one essence, which would either be nonsense or a Sabellian mia-hypostatic formula.\textsuperscript{138} Problems such as these allowed the Cappadocians to seize the initiative and provided the impetus to focus on specificity,\textsuperscript{139} where hypostasis came to be related to concrete particular existences in the Trinity, while ousia came to indicate what is generic. However, the ontological implications of the generic in the Trinity were never fully explored. The Cappadocian interpretation of hypostasis, as argued by Zizioulas, did represent a revolution,\textsuperscript{140} a revolution where the outcome moved the focus to subjectivity and shifted the stress away from the divine essence, or did it? Perhaps it was not as much of a revolution as Zizioulas would like for at the heart of the notion of difference was a sense of unity through the sharing of the divine essence. The upholding of this dichotomous position was later argued for by John of Damascus who stated that:

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{136} This lack of precision in the use of hypostasis in the Council of Nicaea allowed the term to indicate, as Stead shows, either, “same individual being” or “same species” for there was no clear distinction made. See Stead, ‘Greek Influence on Christian Thought’, p.184. Tixeront therefore asked, “what is an ousia, and what is an ὄςτασις?” Tixeront, History of Dogmas (USA: 1914), p.76. In my opinion, what Tixeront was really asking, was, what was the centre of being in God, or what has priority in God’s being?
\item \textsuperscript{137} As Augustine stated; “Our Greeks have spoken of one essence, three substances; but the Latins of one essence or substance, three persons; because as we have already said essence usually means nothing else that substance in our language, that is, in Latin”; Quod effari nullo modo possumus dictum est a nostris graecis una essentia, tres substantiae a latines autem una essentia vel substantia, tres personae quia sicut iam diximus non aliter in sermon nostro, id est latino, essentia quam substantia sollet intellegi. See Augustine De Trin.7.4.7 (Haddan); also see De Trin. 7.4.9, and 7.6.11; on this also see Christopher Stead, ‘Greek Influence on Christian Thought’, p.183.
\item \textsuperscript{138} See Stephen M. Hildebrand, The Trinitarian Theology of Basil of Caesarea (Washington: 2007), pp.82-89.
\item \textsuperscript{139} As Gregory Nazianzen stated, “what I am talking about is Peter and Paul and John’s not being three or consubstantial, so long as three Pauls, three Peters, and many Johns cannot be spoken of. We shall demand that you apply to more specific nouns the new-fangled rule you have kept in the case of the more generic ones”, Gregory Nazianzen, Or.31.19 (Wickham).
\item \textsuperscript{140} BC, pp.15-50.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
God is One, that is to say, one essence (οὐσία) and that He is known (ὑποστάσει) and has His being in three subsistences. 141

The starting point for John of Damascus in Trinitarian theology was to express unity and then to discuss “divine generation (and also procession)” through the term hypostasis. 142 Nevertheless, the term hypostasis, as did the term prosopon (face/mask), 143 came to be related to the outer existence rather than the inner reality or nature (physis), 144 within the Byzantine tradition. The Cappadocians came to be the instigators of this radical shift in understanding hypostasis. 145 But as Christopher A. Beeley argues, approaches to the Cappadocian formula “one ousia and three hypostases” 146 represent an over generalisation of Cappadocian thought. He states that there has been, in relation to Gregory Nazianzen an “overstatement of the role that this secondary formulation plays in his work”. 147 Nevertheless, hypostasis has come to be understood as a determination indicating particularity or “concrete existence as hypostases”, 148 as did persona in the Latin West. 149 Basil’s solution was, as was Augustine’s (c. 354-430), 150 to resort to define Trinitarian being through terms relating to the specific (τὸν ἴδιον) and the generic or common (τὸ κοινὸν), 151 with an emphasis on hypostasis to indicate the subject, stating that:

This therefore is hypostasis (person), not the indefinite notion of ousia (substance), which by reason of generality of the term employed discloses nothing of stasis. 152

The dividing the specific from the generic did nothing to keep unity at the heart of the Trinity but seemed to force a gulf between the two, where prosopon, persona and

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141 See John of Damascus, FO, 1.8 (Salmond); Concerning interpretations of John of Damascus’ trinitarian theology in relation to the trinity, see also Andrew Louth, St John Damascene, pp.96-108.
142 See Andrew Louth, St John Damascene, p.103.
144 Indeed Andrew Louth comments that this type of distinguishing between the understanding of the Trinity in terms of external persons of the Trinity rather than through the language of physis/ousia represented an historical distinction between Antiochene and Alexandrine models (ibid., p.113).
145 See Zizioulas, BC, pp.36-39.
146 See Christopher A. Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and Knowledge of God, p.222.
147 Ibid.
148 See Andrew Louth, St John Damascene, p.114.
149 Augustine, De Trin.7.5.6.
150 Augustine, De Trin. 7.4.7-8.
151 Basil, Ep.38, 325A-C.
152 Τούτῳ οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ὑπόστασις, οὐχ ἡ ἄριστος τῆς οὐσίας ἔννοια, μηδὲναν ἐκ τῆς κοινότητος τοῦ σημαινομένου στάσιν εὐρίσκοισα. Basil, Ep.38, 328A (Deferrari).
hypostasis all came to be included in what was indicated by the specific and particular notes of existence in the Trinity, or persons\textsuperscript{153} having within this specificity some sort of predicated ousia.

In the development of a notion of person, the subject of that existence becomes the individual identity and not an essential reality. Thus, within the Trinitarian theologies of the fourth to the fifth centuries, two distinct ontological problems become evident. Firstly, in determining what constitutes the specific, the particular or that which is hypostatically different, and secondly how the specific is related to a shared reality. The question as to the role hypostasis in relation to ousia became not only a question of resolving Trinitarian problems, but came to be expressed through differing traditions. These traditions sought different answers to Trinitarian and Christological problems which have still not been resolved. In the former tradition, which can roughly be correlated with the Antiochene schema,\textsuperscript{154} a stress was put upon hypostatic difference, which invariably leads to tri-theism. In the latter, which can roughly be correlated to the Alexandrine schema,\textsuperscript{155} unity is vouchsafed but where modalism seems to be the outcome.\textsuperscript{156} These schemas may not so much represent distinctive schools of thought but basic theological patterns which still remain.\textsuperscript{157}

\textsuperscript{153} However this was not new and previously Hippolytus (d. 235) and Tertullian (c. 160-225) had understood that prosopon and persona could indicate otherness (see Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, p.115) difference, or extrusive characteristics of the inward united being of the Trinity, or the concrete individual existences within the divine unity.


\textsuperscript{155} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{157} This view is also supported by Andrew Louth who refers to two distinct theological approaches of the Antiochene and Alexandrine traditions, see St John Damascene, p.123.
2.2.3 A Compromise

Through the schemas stated above, a focus seems to be placed either on unity (non-difference) and difference, but a compromise is needed. If a focus (through \textit{hypostasis}) is placed upon difference then a stress on the concrete subject becomes the outcome, while if the focus on unity (through \textit{ousia}) is overplayed the subject becomes conditioned to a specific nature and not able to overcome that nature.\footnote{For implications concerning ontological distinctions of \textit{hypostasis} and \textit{ousia}, see Stead, ‘Why Not Three Gods?’ in \textit{Doctrine and Philosophy in Early Christianity}, pp.159-163.} In the former condition, individuality and isolation pushes away any real value of person, while in the latter, concrete uniqueness is lost, where personhood is unitised, with the result being a loss of what is personal.

A compromise to the \textit{hypostasis-ousia} schema is perhaps found in the Biblical use of \textit{hypostasis} in Hebrews (1:3) which states that the person of Christ was, \textit{άπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης καὶ χαρακτήρ τῆς ύποστάσεως αὐτοῦ} ("the effulgence or reflection of his glory and the exact mark/expression of his substance/person").\footnote{See George Ricker Berry (ed.), \textit{Greek to English Interlinear: New Testament, King James Version} (Iowa Falls: 2002).} This passage allows an approach to \textit{hypostasis}, which utilises the Christological and confirms both a personal context in the subject of existence and a context of essential spiritual reality of \textit{being} (or unity, the spiritual \textit{physis} or \textit{Ātman}). This approach focuses on, in the subject or person, the substance of \textit{being}, affirming a Nicaean type of interpretation of \textit{hypostasis},\footnote{See Albergio et al. (eds.), \textit{Conciliorum Oecumenicorum}, pp.1-15; Norman Tanner, \textit{Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils}, p.5; and also Adolf Harnack, \textit{History of Dogma} (London; 1898), pp.5-16.} while at the same time accommodating the Cappadocian approach. In this understanding \textit{hypostasis} indicates the place for concrete personal existence yet also allows for a context of the essential\footnote{This view is somewhat affirmed by Pelikan, \textit{The Christian Tradition: The Emergence of the Catholic Faith}, p.219, and also argued by Prestige, see \textit{God in Patristic Thought}, p.240.} spiritual reality of that existence, the \textit{what} of \textit{being}, the underlying reality of the experient. When considering this passage (Hebrews 1.3) in relation to human existence, the essential spiritual reality of \textit{being} or the substance (\textit{ousia}) of \textit{being} can come to be understood as a significant aspect of the outward expression of the existential life and as the inward spiritual reality (\textit{Ātman}) of that life. The inner (\textit{physis}) and the outer (\textit{physis}) are not divided from each other.

The outward existence is qualified as exemplified in the model of the Trinity through...
the inward unity through *ousia*. This was also the point Tertullian made, where the internal substance was understood as the undifferentiated nature of *being* but which is related to, and non-different, from the outward Trinitarian characters, or in contemporary terms, persons.

Through the Biblical use of *hypostasis* the term can indicate either substance or that which pertains to the identity of being a particular subsistence or person. Balz and Schneider consider that *hypostasis* denoted the philosophical "reality or being" and under such a determination, in the Trinitarian usage, *hypostasis* could indicate the definite concrete identity of Father, Son and Spirit as persons and the substantial or essential reality of Trinitarian *being*. Perhaps this was what Basil was arguing for, a unity within a context of particularity.

### 2.2.4 Subjectivity and Unity

For Basil each *hypostasis* of the Trinity represents the outward individual existence of the divine oneness. Thus it is a mistake to ignore, in the interpretation of *hypostasis*, the relationship of the term to substance or the essentiality of *being* in God, which indicates how *hypostasis* comes to denote ontological unity in the Trinity by the Cappadocians. It is also a mistake to equate *ousia* in the Cappadocian usage only with a generic type of categorising, although this taxonomy was certainly present. The Cappadocians understood *ousia* to indicate a fundamental reality of the divine nature or *being*, of which the *hypostases* of the

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163 Ibid.
165 Ibid.
166 Basil stated that the "person (hypostasis) is the conflux of the individual traits of each member (of the Trinity)". See Basil, *Ep. 38*, 336B-337A (Deferrari).
167 Basil, *Ep. 38*, 336B-337A
168 Ibid., 337D.
169 See: Basil, *Ep. 38*, 325A; Gregory Nazianzen, *Or. 28*, 48C-49D and *Or. 29*, 76A-77B; and Gregory of Nyssa, *Tres Dii*, 142B-D. Sarah Coakley also points to *Ad Ablabium* or *Tres Dii* as being specifically significant in the debate on whether person is prior to 'substance', see Sarah Coakley, *Re-Thinking Gregory of Nyssa*, pp.2-3, and in relation to the contemporary influence of de Régnon (ibid, p.4).
Trinity shared in the single Godhead. This is exemplified in Gregory of Nyssa’s work *Tres Dii*, where he underlines the divine unity through the word Godhead (θεότης) stating:

How is it that in the case of our statements of the mysteries of the Faith, through confessing the three Persons, and acknowledging no difference of nature between them we are in some sense at variance with our confession, when we say that the Godhead of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit is one, and yet forbid men to say “there are three Gods”? 

Within Gregory of Nyssa’s works, *hypostasis* or the concrete particular existence cannot be divorced from an underlying reality, where form becomes the outward expression of the highest reality. In Aristotle, the existential form becomes related to the substances, by which a form is known. In this model, which was probably utilised by the Cappadocians, *hypostasis* becomes related to what Aristotle called the “primary substance”. The primary subject related to the singular substance, and came to denote the personal subject through the term ύποκειμένον (underlying subject), or as Balthasar states the “concrete bearer of the qualities that determine what a thing is”. The secondary substance indicated a generic quality, *physis* or universal essence. Aristotle gives complex categories relating to substances and subjects, but what is of concern is the use of individual (ὑποκειμένον) to convey distinctness in relation to substances. The substance indicates the what, which

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171 *Tres Dii*, 121D-124D. See also See Basil, *Ep. 38*, 332A-332C. The use of οὐσία by Basil to indicate more than a generic classification is also argued by Stead, ‘Why Not Three Gods’, in *Doctrine and Philosophy in Early Christianity*, pp.149-163.


173 Developed from Aristotle, *Cat.1b.v.10-15*.

174 This view is also owed much to the Stoics, see Stead, ‘Greek Influence on Christian Thought’, p.183.

175 Aristotel, *Cat.1b.v.10-15* and *Cat.3b.v.10-20*; this correlation is made by W. P. Alston, ‘Substance and the Trinity’, in, S. Davis et al., The Trinity (Oxford: 2001), pp.185-187, who states that “Basil and Gregory of Nyssa consistently mark the distinction between Aristotle’s first and second *ousia* by using *hypostasis* for the first and *ousia* for the second” (ibid.).


178 Aristotel, *Cat.1b.v.10-15*.

179 Aristotle stated of substances: “Substance in the truest and strictest, the primary sense of that term, is that which is neither asserted of or can be found in a subject (in relation of the universal to the particular). We take as examples of this a particular man or horse. But we do speak of secondary substances — those within which, being species, the primary or first are included, and those within which, being genera, the species themselves contained”. οὐσία δὲ ἑστὶν ἡ κυβριωτάτα τε καὶ πρῶτος καὶ μᾶλιστα λεγομένη, ἡ μὴ καθ’ ὑποκειμένων τινὸς λέγεται μὴ; ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τινὶ ἑστὶν, οἷον οὐ τις
when translated into Trinitarian terms implicitly related to what is understood as the subject. In Christological terms the Son has the characteristics of the Logos through the primary substance that relates to the Son while sharing the divine nature and substance (ousia), which focuses the unity in the Trinity. But here lies the quandary, for if the ousia is a secondary substance, how can it be the subject of unity. In Aristotle the secondary ousia relates to the category of the generic quality of man or species but not of the subject in the sense that a “man” has “manhood” but “manhood is not in a man”. But the divine ousia cannot be understood in this way for it is also the subject (Godhead) by which unity is established and not a shared predicated substance.

This notion of primary substance in relation to unity, will in Chapter 3, be correlated to Ātman, which will be considered the primary of reality of the hypostasis. In this sense the divine ousia and the Ātman can be understood in terms of both primary and secondary substances. But in the concept of person, the concept of Ātman will relate to an individual conscious awareness and not an unconscious substance, but a reality that allows the notion of person to be considered in terms of a conscious individual, intimately related to Ātmanic awareness. The primary substance will include a notion of consciousness by which subjects become aware of themselves and in relation to substances or manifested phenomena. This awareness will relate not only to the qualities of the subject, but the reality by which the subject comes to be ultimately understood.

The notion of subject as the centre of concrete existence also presented a problem when correlated to Aristotle's term ὑποκείμενον for it put too much a stress on isolated individual. Thus it came to be replaced with hypostasis by the Cappadocians because of the materialistic sense of ὑποκείμενον. The notion of hypostasis

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180 Aristotle, Cat.1a.iv.25-30.
181 Aristotle, Cat.3a.v.1-15 (Cooke).
182 The nature of Ātman in relation to personal existence will be examined in Chapter 3 and the word hypostasis will be exchanged with puruṣa even though a better correlation to puruṣa would be prosopon, but the reasons for not using prosopon will be explained later.
183 See Aristotle, Cat.3a.v.1-25 (Cooke). In Chapter 3 I will consider how the term Ātman relates to the concept of primary substance in relation to consciousness, the true subject and the Ātman-hypostasis model of person.
184 As argued by Zizioulas, BC, p.38, footnote 30.
qualified the notion of isolated individual through a quality of sharing in Cappadocian theology, where a relationship is present in relation to other persons of the Trinity. This quality of sharing did not originate *hypostatically*, but through an incorporeal nature establishing unity through the divine nature. Gregory Nazianzen stated:

> He can only be incorporeal. But the term incorporeal, though granted, does not give an all-embracing revelation of God’s essential being.\(^{185}\)

Incorporeality while allowing for a non-material centre, by which divine unity is experienced, does not allow for revelation of the divine reality, hence a focus on the outer operations then becomes the focus for subjectivity. In the model of this thesis it is the essential *being* which becomes the true subject of divine unity and the expression of unity for the divine *hypostases*, which cannot become isolated or the primary subjects of existence. But in Zizioulas’ interpretation of the Cappadocians, *hypostasis* starts to gain an outer existential character, indicating an outward looking concrete existence. In the Trinity this development would lead to tritheism, hence Zizioulas’ recourse is to modify the nature of individuality by establishing communion as the ontological platform on which this personhood stands. Zizioulas states that being a person “cannot be conceived in itself as a static entity, but only as it relates to”.\(^{186}\) Although this definition of person allows relatedness to a reality outside of the natural *physis*, it does not indicate how this relational context is to be ultimately expressed. A notion of “static entity” does underline its own failure to give itself meaning. This meaning can be found through a notion of *Ātmanic* becoming within the *hypostasis*, not only through an outward communion, but through an inward relationality, of God to the soul or *Ātman*. Within this model, communion can be correlated to an *event* of substance in an *Ātmanic* *event*\(^{187}\) of the soul within the *hypostasis*, where through a *hypostatic* mode of existence, or spiritual life and through

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\(^{185}\) Gregory Nazianzen, Or.28 (PG 36), 36C-37C; translation by Wickham, *On God and Christ*, p.43.

\(^{186}\) Zizioulas, *Communion and Otherness*, p.212.

\(^{187}\) The correlation of *Ātman* to the world within the human person as an event is defended through the Kashmir Śāivite notion of manifestation, where the world is a manifestation of *Ātman*, and the human person comes to this experience through the grace or *śaktipāta* of the master or God, which leads the person to understand this reality where the world is seen as pure consciousness. The *Paramārthasāra* stated: “Just as one’s face appears clearly in a clean mirror, so does this *Ātman* shine as pure consciousness in a mind purified by the bestowal of the divine grace of Lord Śiva”. *Ādarśe mala-rhite yadvad vadanam vibhāti tadvadayam/ Śiva-śaktipāta-vimale dhī-tatte bhāti bhārūpah\(\)l, PSA, 9 (Pandit).
the Christ hypostasis, the person comes to realise the nature of his or her true existence as an Atman-hypostasis.

2.2.5 Chalcedonian Influences

The development of a relationship of essence to a concept of person, or substance based relationality within hypostatic difference, especially within the context of the Trinity can also be supported through the Council of Chalcedon (c. 451). In this context the term prosopon, which will be discussed later, positions the Christ person or the particular existential character\textsuperscript{188} in relation to the divine nature. This also provides a pattern for human beings. But the nature (physis) of the divine is not merely an unconscious metaphysical matter\textsuperscript{189} but has a united awareness, expressed in a collective way in Exodus (3: 14) as “I am the Being” (I.XX, ἔγώ εἰμι ὁ θεός).

There are not different natures of the Godhead, but a single nature and awareness, a unity of nature and consciousness, and Gregory of Nyssa understood this nature to be intrinsic to the “Unity”\textsuperscript{190} of the Godhead where there is “no difference either in nature or of operation”.\textsuperscript{191} Even though difference is accepted through the hypostatic operations of the Trinity, there is also unity to the extent that the essential nature of the Trinity in the Godhead establishes the link ontologically between difference and non-difference.

This model of difference-in-unity was initially considered from a starting point of difference, which was highlighted in the Council of Chalcedon. Here it was argued that the hypostatic difference in Christ constituted not a division from the divine nature but a simultaneous hypostatic union. Chalcedon stated that Christ was:

\textsuperscript{188} Albergio et al. (eds.), Conciliorum Oecumenicorum, pp.59-63, and Norman Tanner, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, p.86.
\textsuperscript{189} As Gregory of Nyssa argued that, “most men think that the word ‘Godhead’ is used in a particular degree, in respect of nature: and just as the heaven or the sun, or any other of the constituent parts of the universe are denoted by proper names”", see Gregory of Nyssa, Tres Dii, 121A; translation by Moore, On Not Three Gods (NPNF 5), p.333.
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid. The relationship of consciousness (Cit) and the revealed divine nature or Logos-cit in the world as juxtaposed to the absolute divine reality will be discussed later.
perfect in divinity and perfect in humanity, the same truly God and truly man, of a rational soul and a body; consubstantial with the Father as regards his divinity, and the same consubstantial with us regards his humanity.\(^{192}\)

The term “consubstantial with us” (όμοούσιον ήμιν)\(^{193}\) also hints at the possibilities of human personhood attaining union with the divine through the Christ hypostasis. The Christ hypostasis unifies difference, through his particular existence, due to His unified condition within the Godhead reflecting a model of difference and unity. This is wrought through Christ having an essential divine nature\(^{194}\) and a human nature,\(^{195}\) “in one person and a single hypostatic or subsistent being” (εἰς ἐν πρόσωπον καὶ μίαν ύπόστασιν συντρεχόσης),\(^{196}\) where the unity of natures within the Christ hypostasis unites humanity to the divine condition. The term hypostasis here indicates the particular character, in the term συντρεχόσης\(^{197}\) (lit. of the running together) having an underlying ontological quality. Yet in contemporary Eastern Orthodox theology, the sense of the essential nature seems to be ignored and the terms prosopon and hypostasis have been stressed to focus on difference.\(^{198}\) So do the terms prosopon and hypostasis indicate the same? If they do, why does the Chalcedonian statement state εἰς ἐν πρόσωπον καὶ μίαν ύπόστασιν,\(^{199}\) or is it just repeating itself and seems to be meaningless in that repetition? Basil had previously argued that when such a repetition occurs as in the statement of the Council of Nicaea, the two words do not mean the same but one qualifies the other, stating:

But they did not there state hypostasis and substance to be identical. Had the words expressed one and the same meaning, what need of both? It is on the contrary clear that while by some it was denied that the Son was of the same substance with the Father, and some asserted that he was not of the substance and was of some other hypostasis (person)...they declared (Nicaea) the Son to be of the substance of the father, but they did not add the words “of the hypostasis”... We are therefore bound to confess the Son to be of one

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\(^{192}\) Συμφώνως ἀπαντες ἐκδιδάσκομεν τέλειον τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν θεότητι καὶ τέλειον τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν ἀνθρωπότητι, ἤθον ἀληθὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἀληθὸς τὸν αὐτὸν, ἐκ μυστικῆς λογικῆς καὶ σώματος, ὀμοούσιον τῷ πατρὶ κατὰ τὴν θεότητα καὶ ὀμοούσιον ἡμῖν τὸν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα, Albergio et al. (eds.), Conciliorum Oecumenicorum, pp.59-63; and Norman Tanner, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, p.86.15-25.

\(^{193}\) Ibid., p.86.23.

\(^{194}\) Ibid., p.86.4

\(^{195}\) Ibid.

\(^{196}\) Ibid., p.86, 39-41.

\(^{197}\) Ibid.

\(^{198}\) For examples see Sophrony, His Life is Mine; Zizioulas, BC; Yannaras Elements of Faith; and also see Vlachos, The Person in the Orthodox Tradition.

\(^{199}\) Albergio et al. (eds.), Conciliorum Oecumenicorum, pp.59-63; and Norman Tanner, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, p.86.15-25.
substance with the Father, as it is written, but the Father to exist in His own proper hypostasis (person), the Son in His, and the Holy Ghost in His.\(^{200}\)

Consequently, when the Chalcedon stated “one person and one hypostasis”\(^{201}\) it has to be concluded that the words prosopon and hypostasis indicate different aspects of Christ, the outward face or person and the substantial person. Thus both prosopon and hypostasis can indicate different aspects of difference, but the term hypostasis allows for a movement from ontological non-difference within the Trinity to qualified-difference in hypostasis through the concrete prosopon or person of Christ. This allows the term hypostasis to be equated with a term that focuses not only on concrete individuality but the essential nature of that reality. Nevertheless, while Sarah Coakley argues that Chalcedon did not successfully resolve or explain the terms nature and hypostasis but offered a general paradigm,\(^{202}\) it could also be asserted that this generality of Chalcedon allows for such developments. Within the possibilities of developing the terms, hypostasis can indicate both the concrete person and unifying reality behind the individual, or an Atmanic nature on a human level. This implies that in a context of difference there is always present a sense of non-difference, which is highlighted through the hypostatic condition. The notion of hypostasis must therefore include a deeper ontological meaning than is understood by contemporary terms, which is highlighted through the inclusion of the notion of ousia and will form the topic in the next part of this chapter.

2.3 Hypostasis and Ousia: which level of Being?

In this part of the Chapter, I qualify contemporary interpretations of the Cappadocian use of hypostasis by focusing on unity, through the ontological stress of ousia. The approach to a notion of ousia also represents a relational application of the term. This

\(^{200}\) Ep.124 (Jackson and De Ferrari).

\(^{201}\) Albergo et al. (eds.), Conciliorum Oecumenicorum, pp.59-63; and Norman Tanner, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, p.86.15-25.

is to utilise *hypostasis* within the context of the metaphysical reality of *being* so as to re-address the perceived failings of the Cappadocians to do so. Despite the unique Cappadocian approach to *hypostasis*, in indicating existence on a particular level (indicating difference), Grillmeier believed that the Cappadocians exhibited manifest failings in their reliance on material categories and their "insufficient definition of the relationship between substance and *hypostasis* (prosopon)".203 which represented a failure to qualify a sense of difference in relation to unity. Sarah Coakley also points out that Gregory of Nyssa seemed to promise so much in his Trinitarian clarifications relating to "individualising *versus* generic characteristics",204 but then disappoints by withdrawing his terms within "apophatic effacement".205 The Cappadocians were reluctant to provide clarity on their terms due to their *apophatic* approach when trying to grasp the nature of God, which for them remained unknown.206 The stress on Cappadocian *apophaticism* may be over-emphasised for they did attempt a workable ontological Trinitarian model. Nevertheless, in this chapter the notion of *hypostasis* in the Cappadocians is qualified in the light of these failings to provide a link between difference and unity through an examination of *ousia*. It must be stated here that while Cappadocian failings are accepted through a collective responsibility, most of these mistakes can be directed to Basil and his over emphasis on what is particular over what is shared.207

What is clear is that within a collective understanding the Cappadocians shifted the stress from οὐσία to ὑπόστασις and in doing so shifted the focus from underlying substance to what is specific and concrete, to the individual or the person itself. Contemporary theologians such as Zizioulas and Gunton have rejoiced in such an outcome208 and interpreted Cappadocian thought as though it clearly expressed a distinct pattern different from the Western models.209

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204 Coakley, *Re-Thinking Gregory of Nyssa*, p.3.
205 Ibid.
206 For an example of this see Gregory of Nyssa, *Tres Dii*, 120A-124C.
207 As exemplified in *Ep. 38* (Deferrari).
209 See Zizioulas, *BC*, p.20 and *The Promise of Trinitarian Theology*, pp.30, respectively. However questions are being asked in respect of the validity of the charges by Orthodox theologians who state that Western, that is to say Augustinian theology is "insufficiently personal" (Ayres, *Nicaea and its Legacy*, pp.364-365) and thus "insufficiently Trinitarian" (Ayres, *Nicaea and its Legacy*, pp.364-365) and thus encourage a re-addressing of the Cappadocians to question contemporary interpretations. The re-addressing ideas relating to the Trinity is also examined in Lewis Ayres, 'Fundamental Grammar of
However, the Cappadocian qualifying of *hypostatic* difference is placed, in this thesis, in relation to unity through *ousia* or the metaphysical “stuff”\(^{210}\) of being. This notion of *stuff* is equated with the concept of *Ātman* within a model of difference understood in *Pratyabhijñā*. This provides a context that implies that person and the world (or difference) is a manifestation\(^{211}\) of the Lord or created by God,\(^{212}\) and related to the will and power of God, that is personal but also related to the Absolute metaphysical essential reality. Although manifestation may imply something different to creation, what is important is the stress on the divine will and purpose and the power to carry out that will, which overcomes the natural condition. It needs to be stated here that the Cappadocians did not make much use of such a notion of the essential reality of the divine nature other than to affirm unity in the divine nature. Gregory of Nyssa stated:

> Yet their nature is one, at union itself, and an absolutely indivisible unit, not capable of increase by addition or of diminution by subtraction, but is in its essence being and continually remaining one, inseparable even though it appear in plurality, continuous, complete, and not divided with the individuals who participate in it.\(^{213}\)

On the whole, the Cappadocians retained an *apophatic* reticence in relation to the divine nature (or *ousia*).\(^{214}\) Nevertheless, the contemporary emphasis on *hypostasis*, reducing *ousia* to a predicate of *hypostasis* has resulted in the negation of the reality of *being* itself, as Zizioulas states that, the “substance of God, ‘God’, has no

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\(^{210}\) Examples of the use and acceptance of the term *stuff* can be found in Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought*, p.197; and M. W. Ury, *Trinitarian Personhood* (Eugene: 2002), p.62. This expresses a substantialist view without specifically qualifying what *stuff* is other than to observe that, in the Trinity, there is this ontological relationship to *stuff*.

\(^{211}\) The word manifestation or *abhāsa* is a word that will be used in Chapter 3 in relation to creation.


\(^{214}\) For an example of this *apophatic* approach see Gregory of Nyssa, *Eun. 3.5*; translation by Moore (NPNF 5), p.146.
ontological content, no true being apart from communion”. This view requires some response in terms of re-addressing the Cappadocians, especially as the notion of person or hypostatic difference is to be understood through the concept of an essential reality of being.

2.3.1 Ousia as a Point of Unity

The term ousia (οὐσία), or the stuff of divine being, is historically recognised as a determination that was initially related to hypostasis (ὑπόστασις) prior to the Cappadocians, and in Origen ousia was the primary substance of the “divine triad”. Prestige shows that ousia came to be applied to the “Persons of the Trinity” and that even Athanasius referred to the “ousia of the Father”, where “the Father’s ousia is the Father Himself”. It was also not uncommon to refer to multiple ousiai to explain the substance of what was common and the substance of what was particular. The language used by Origen also centred on nature (φύσις), where Origen considered that in the Christological context, it was appropriate to refer to two natures, divine and human. The focus on physis allowed the terms to be discussed in relation to unity as opposed to difference which marks the distinction between the Alexandrian and Antiochene schools respectively. Origen related the divine

215 See Zizioulas, BC, p.17. 216 Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, p.191. 217 Ibid., p.192. 218 Ibid., p.194. 219 Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, p.195. The term ousia according to Lampe had many denotations and could indicate the underlining reality of being and personal subsistent existence (G. W. H. Lampe, A Greek Patristic Lexicon; Oxford: 1961, 2005, pp.980-985) but came to be predominantly understood in Trinitarian terms through homoousios (Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, p.197). 220 Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, p.191. 221 Origen, Prin.1.2.1., who stated “that in Christ there is one nature, his deity, because he is the only-begotten Son of the Father, and another human nature”. 222 This is also argued by Andrew Louth who states, “Hypostasis was also used – in different ways – in Christology by theologians of both the Antiochene and the Alexandrine traditions... the difference between these terms and others, as we have already seen and will see in greater detail later in this chapter, gave rise to controversy between those who accepted Chalcedon and its assimilation of Christological and Trinitarian terminology in the distinction between hypostasis/prosopon and physis/ousia, and those who rejected this synod and its definition. Those who rejected this assimilation of terminology (usually called Monophysites) accepted Cappadocian distinction between hypostasis and ousia, but could not accept the distinction between physis and ousia (and saw hypostasis as more or less equivalent to physis, at least in some texts), and partly because they drew a line between theologia and oikonomia, a distinction that had a long history, especially in the tradition of Alexandrine theology”, St John Damascene, p.113.
existence to nature (physis), where ousia or the substance of God and hypostasis indicated the same. This was in the sense that the metaphysical substance of the divine unity was correlated to the "wisdom of God" and did not indicate "anything without hypostatic existence". This was not something impersonal, but was related to a metaphysical substance of the divine, a theistically personal essential and Self-aware divine reality. Origen rejected the view that hypostasis was a physical denotation relating to the body, but that it was related to the incorporeal divine substantial existence. Origen stated:

The only begotten Son of God is God's wisdom hypostatically existing. I do not think that our mind ought to stray beyond this to the suspicion that this hypostasis or substance could possibly possess bodily characteristics, since everything that is corporeal is distinguished by shape or colour or size.

This model of unity in relation to hypostasis contrasts with the over personalising of individual hypostasis in Cappadocian theology and a seeming negation of a stress on ousia, which places the Cappadocians within an anti-Nicaean group. This group represented a shift away from a stress on ousia to concrete hypostasis. This was exemplified in Basil of Caesarea's initial aversion to homoousios and preference for homoiousios, which was due to a fear of a Sabellian equating of hypostasis with substance, stating "some, moreover, of the impious following of the Libyan Sabellius, who understand hypostasis and substance to be identical". This Basil thought to be a pretext to affix "an improper sense upon the Homoousion". Tixeront indirectly argued that a stress on hypostasis represented a pro-Arian stance in the one person Sabellian context, but, paradoxically also "gave to ὑπόστασις the sense of person". Within this sense the Cappadocians affirmed a distinction between ousia and hypostasis clarifying the Trinity ontologically, but arguably to the detriment of Nicaea. This is confirmed by Turcescu who states that:

223 Origen, Princ. 1.2.2.
224 Ibid.
225 Ibid.
226 Ibid.
227 Ibid.
228 This established very well by Hildebrand in, The Trinitarian Theology of Basil of Caesarea, p.76.
229 Basil, Ep. 125; translation B. Jackson (NPNF, 8), p.194.
230 See Basil, Ep. 125 (Deferrari).
231 Tixeront, History of the Dogmas, p.76.
232 Ibid.
Basil of Caesarea himself not only insists on the distinction between οὐσία and ὑπόστασις in Hebrews 1:3, but he alleges that the Nicene fathers distinguished between the two terms.232

In this context, Basil becomes anti-Nicaean by focusing on hypostasis as a concrete, particular and individual existence. Basil seemed to put a tri-theistic emphasis on the Trinity. Stephen M. Hildebrand’s resolution to understanding Basil, is to view Basil initially, within a pro-Nicaean context where Basil’s interpretation of Hebrews 1:3, makes hypostasis synonymous with ousia. He states of Ep.38, in relation to Hebrews 1:3, that “this text hinders those who wish to distinguish ousia and hypostasis in order to give technical linguistic expression to Trinitarian belief”.234 Hildebrand arrives at his conclusions, because Basil did not seem to wish to equate prosopon with hypostasis due to Basil’s position against the “mia-hypostatic tradition” and Sabellianism which modalised the persons of the Trinity. However, Hildebrand shows that eventually Basil, while accepting homoousios manifested a distinction between hypostasis and ousia, which confirms Basil as anti-Nicaean.

The focusing on the outer operations of the Trinity, or the how of Trinitarian personal existence, did seem to move the emphasis away from the Nicaean homoousios, from ousia to the act or the existential, which ascribed to the characteristics of the Trinity types of existence (tropos hyparxeos). This radically shifted the emphasis away from the substance of being to the manner of personal existence. Consequently, Vlachos states that the Cappadocians “separated ousia from hypostasis and in this way changed the terminology of the creed”.240 Turcescu also shows that because the title “Neo-Nicene”, given to Basil by Halleux, made a distinction made between

232 Turcescu, Gregory of Nyssa and the Concept of Divine Persons, p.52.
233 Turcescu cites Jean Pépin who asserted that indeed the Cappadocians were indeed anti-Nicene, ibid.
234 Hildebrand, The Trinitarian Theology of Basil of Caesarea, p.61.
235 See Basil, Ep.236.6 (Deferrari); Tixeront, History of the Dogmas, p.78; André de Halleux, ‘Hypostase et Personne Dans La Formation Du Dogme Trinitaire’, Revue D'Histoire Ecclesiastique (1984), p.327; and Törönen, Union and Distinction in the Thought of St Maximus the Confessor, p.50.
237 Hildebrand, The Trinitarian Theology of Basil of Caesarea, p.76.
238 Hildebrand, The Trinitarian Theology of Basil of Caesarea, pp.82-89; Basil, Ep.214.3-4 (Deferrari); see also Lienhard, ‘Ousia and Hypostasis: The Cappadocian Settlement and the Theology of One Hypostasis’, pp.112-121.
240 Hierotheos Vlachos, The Person in the Orthodox Tradition, p.195.
241 Turcescu, Gregory of Nyssa and the Concept of Divine Persons p.23, see also, ibid. footnote 69 of Chapter 1, pp.127-8.
It can be deduced that some departure from the Nicaean formula was evidenced. This departure from Nicaea, in focusing on hypostasis, where the divine subjects are existentially distinct, seems supported in the Council of Constantinople (c 381). In this Council hypostasis is equated with prosopon, “three most perfect hypostases, or three most perfect persons” (ἐν τρισὶ τελειωτάτας ὑποστάσεσιν ἃγουν τρισὶ τελείοις προσώποις),244 but where the divine subjects are united in the substance (ousia) of the Godhead. The Council stated that:

“the Father, the Son and the holy Spirit have a single Godhead and power and substance” (ὃς θεὸς ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς καὶ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἐννοοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος πιστευομένης).245

Through the Cappadocian influence, the term hypostasis came to be equated with proper “characteristics” (ἴδιοτητῶν)246 or that which ascribes difference, but at the same time a notion of unity through the term ὀυσίας247 was included to qualify the divine nature (φύσεως)248 of the Godhead. It can be seen that what was affirmed was a model that simultaneously admitted difference and unity. As a result there was a radical movement from the Nicaean hομοουσίας249 to hypostasis initiated by the Cappadocians and back to a stress on qualifying difference in unity. The Cappadocian model appeared to place the Cappadocians at odds with the Nicaean formulae250 as Catherine M. LaCugna states “the Cappadocians made a clear distinction between hypostasis (person) and ousia (substance), in direct contradiction to the Council of Nicaea”.251

There is also some debate as to what ousia implied. Did it infer a concept, or a predicated substance as the metaphysical part of the divine subjects, or itself the divine subject out of which the hypostases become part?252 As already stated, the Cappadocians saw the ousia of God as hidden and was therefore beyond

242 See André de Halleux, ‘Hypostase et Personne Dans La Formation Du Dogme Trinitaire’.
243 Ibid.
244 See Tanner, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, p.28.25-27.
245 Ibid., 20-25.
246 Ibid., 30.
247 Ibid., 33.
248 Ibid.
249 Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, pp.209-213.
250 Ibid., p.227.
251 Catherine M. LaCugna, God For Us p.79.
252 Which is underlined by Prestige, see God in Patristic Thought, pp.209-213.
comprehension; hence for them such speculations were useless. They affirmed that any conceivable ideas relating to ouσία are known by ἐνίβουη (the mental faculties) through a focusing on divine properties (ἰδιόματα). However, as evidenced in Contra Eunomium of Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory clearly argues that he did not consider that being and act (operations) were separate, where act was predicated to the subject or being, but both are inseparable, stating:

I do not think that he (Eunomius) would affirm that we should consider the being of God to be heterogeneous and composite, having the energy inalienably contained in the idea of itself, like and ‘accident’ in some subject-matter.

2.3.2 The Primary Οусία

The inability of human understanding to grasp not only divine nature but also the deeper noetic meaning of human nature was implicit in Gregory of Nyssa’s understanding of hypostasis, and this paradoxically placed a stress on existential personal unity, not the shared nature or the subject of unity. In this context, the stress on ouσία is negated, and begs the question whether substance should be viewed as a predicated substance or stuff of the divine subjects, as wood is related to a particular tree, or plastic relates to plastic cups, plates and the like, or what is primary in the Trinity? The relationship I make to ouσία and to a primary substance (πρῶτη ουσία) allows me to indicate singularity, that which makes individual be; of what is primary in being, and in relation to the Trinity is a difficult area for the outcome of such an assertion, depends on the model of Trinity that is being argued. The term πρῶτη ουσία

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254 On the concept of ἐνίβουη see Ayers, Nicaea and its Legacy, p.191-2, but the term did allow conceptual examinations to focus on theological problems, “intellectual contemplation of the reality of things” (ibid., p.193); see also and Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God, p.688; exemplified in Gregory of Nyssa, Eun.

255 Ayers considers that such properties relate in Basil’s works to divine operations or properties such as “door, way, bread light”, Nicaea and its Legacy, p.192, but the divine essence is unknown. Here Ayres also relates the term ὅπως ἐγγίζεται to the ouσία in Basil’s which highlights the subject of being in the divine which is the point Zizioulas makes in relation to hypostasis, see BC, p.38.

256 Humanity can participate in the divine hypostatic intelligence but not know the divine ouσία, as Gregory of Nazianzen stated, “no one has yet discovered or shall ever discover what God is in his nature and essence”, Or.28.17 (Williams); also see Hom.Opif9, 149B-151A, and Hom.Opif.14-16, 173D-187A.

257 See Aristotle, Cat.1a.1-II.25; and Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, p.191.
was historically used by Hippolytus and Origen, but was infrequently utilised by Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa. Stead argues that πρῶτη οὐσία was not a common usage to identify ontological specificity, particularity or precedence. This however, can be contested, as Alston argues, that Basil’s and Gregory of Nyssa’s forging a distinction between hypostasis and ousia can be considered as utilising Aristotle’s distinction between the primary ousia and secondary ousia, where hypostasis becomes the primary substance and ousia becomes the secondary substance. This also becomes a distinction of the particular and the general. But taking into account Zizioulas’ research on the Cappadocians, can hypostasis be considered in terms of substance? In addition, how do the obvious references to Aristotle’s model of primary ousia relate to the Cappadocian use of hypostasis, which indicates what is individual and what is concrete. The problem, from my perspective, is answered through a focus on consciousness. The notion of consciousness isolates the awareness of ‘I Am’ in each situation becomes the expression of the primary substance. It is because this ‘I Am’ cannot be divorced from the individual hypostases in the Trinity and also divine unity, that the substance of that existence or the collective expression of ‘I Am’ of the united Godhead, the ousia, can be considered as the primary substance by which unity is manifested. This is then expressed co-equally within the tri-hypostases.

In this context both ousia and hypostasis could be viewed as primary substances and are implicitly related to the underlying reality of being and existence, which is also argued by Prestige. Prestige argues that ousia, as “concrete entity” is the “primary ousia”. In this thesis, the model of Trinity focuses on unity where the subject of unity relates to the nature of the divine or the underlying reality that unifies the hypostatic difference.

258 Ibid.
259 Origen did incorporate to theological language πρῶτη οὐσία as contrasting with angels, see Stead, *Divine Substance*, pp.116-117.
260 Stead, *Divine Substance*, p.118.
261 As argued by Alston, ‘Substance and the Trinity’, in *Trinity* p.186.
262 Ibid.
263 See Zizioulas, *Communion and Otherness*, pp. 105-110; also *BC*, footnote 30, p.38.
266 Ibid., p.275.
2.3.3 Relationality through Substance

The notion of sharing must be broached here in relation to being in the Trinity. It is argued that a substantialist approach was not negated by the Cappadocians but that relationality or a sharing of what is common through a notion of substance was paramount to their approach to hypostasis. If relationality was conditioned through hypostases then that would allow a form of tri-theism in the Trinity, affirming a communion of three individuals. Hence, relationality indicated a common element, where unity was expressed through the term ousia. The sharing of what is common to the hypostasis allowed for concrete characteristics to be expressed individually, but also expressing a sharing of a common nature (κοινόν τῆς φύσεως). This nature, or ousia, is not a predicated metaphysical substance, but is the subject by which the appellation Godhead is given to express unity. It was argued by Gregory of Nyssa, who refers to a “community of substance”, that the notion of community, while allowing for participation through the divine operations, is centred within the divine substance. This clearly identifies that which is distinguishable within the ousia or the “undistinguishable character of their substance”. The substantialist model was not negated by Gregory of Nyssa, nor was it expounded due to the incapability of such an endeavour to discover the hidden things of God. Consequently, the shared nature of the operations of the Trinity was not investigated but was rendered to a safe context as an indication of what was common.

When applied to the human level, ontological sharing indicated for Basil what was common (κοινόν) to “Peter”, “Andrew, John and James”, but there is no sense that the generic substance of “man” indicates a sharing of an immaterial unity as understood in the Trinity. Basil stated:

This common element of the thing predicated, seeing that it refers to all alike who are included under the same term, demands a further note of distinction if

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267 In Basil indicated particular existence, Ep.38 325A- 339C.
268 Ibid., 325C.
269 Eun.1.34 (Moore).
270 Gregory of Nyssa, ad Eustathium de Trinitate (Moore), as Basil’s Ep.189 (PG 32), 684.
271 Basil, Ep.38, 325C.
272 Ibid., 325B-C.
we are to understand, not merely man in general, but “Peter” or “John” in particular.273

The sharing of a common nature of human beings however, for me indicates not only a sharing of common elements (a natural \textit{physis} of human persons), but within a notion of soul, a spiritual \textit{physis}, which is common to all and particular to each person. It is not that each person participates in a single soul, but an immaterial spiritual nature is evident in each person and through participation with that nature \textit{deified}, individuals become related to each other in a full and mystical sense, but this shall be examined in Chapter 2B.

Even though the Cappadocians used the analogy of human existence to argue for the place of particularity in the divine cases, as already shown, their models did not seem to allow for these determinations to be completely interchangeable between the divine and human cases. While in the divine case the notion of \textit{hypostasis} indicates a static unchangeable type of particularity, which is not identical to the other subjects of the \textit{being} of the Triune-Godhead; in the human case, the \textit{hypostasis} is always experiencing change.

In the Cappadocian model, \textit{ousia} indicates both the generic ontological condition in the Trinity and the centre of unity. Conversely, when translated to the human condition, \textit{ousia} through the Cappadocian model indicates only the generic ontological disposition. Unity in the human case should be sought, not from difference, but from the sharing of the human capacity to \textit{be}, as \textit{deified} persons, which is not only existentially viable, but related implicitly to the essential spiritual reality of being a human person, in having a soul.

Within the notion of the human soul, a sense of the particular within a material existence and the immaterial should both be considered, where the immaterial is equated with the metaphysical \textit{stuff} of essential \textit{being}. This \textit{stuff} comprises of an essence or property of being (\textit{ousia}) that in the highest sense indicates \textit{kinship} with the divine, but the notion of \textit{kinship} shall be examined in Chapter 2B. The existential

\footnote{273 ή οὖν κοινότης τοῦ σημαινομένου, ὁμοίως ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ δόμον τεταγμένους χωροῦσα, χρειάζεται ἢ περισσοτέλεις, δι’ ἦς οὐ τὸν καθόλου ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλὰ τὸν Πέτρον ἢ τὸν Ἰωάννην ἐπιγνωσόμεθα, Basil, \textit{Ep.38, 325B} (Deferrari).}
character of the soul when considered through kinship allows the soul to be understood within a human model as a copy of the divine. The notion of consciousness can be applied to the human noetic hypostasis, which has as its foundation kinship and as a copy of the divine applies not only to an intelligible but to an essential nature as Gregory Nazianzen stated: “our mind and reason, mingles with its kin, when the copy returns to the pattern it now longs after”. In this model God’s own being, the divine “Egoity” exemplified in the declaration ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ Θεός (“I am the being”, LXX Ex.3:14), indicates not a self absorbed natural ‘I’ of the individual, but a consciousness within a spiritual (here correlated to the Ātman) physis. This passage confirms that as the divine being is non-different from the divine awareness and as such, the essential reality of divine being, in having cognition of its Self, confirms a personal sense to being, or ousia. So too in the human condition a cognitive awareness of the divine reality within transfers to a change in consciousness. The character of the individual cognition reflects the nature of the awareness within a certain nature, in the lower nature a lower consciousness is experienced, while in the union with the higher nature a higher consciousness is experienced. The awareness of ‘I am’ within the individual becomes an awareness of ‘I Am That’, ‘I am’ true being, reflecting a divine type of existence in this consciousness. There is evident in awareness, a relationship to the nature of that existence, as expressed in Exodus. On a human level, the essential reality of each particular existence, or hypostatic difference, becomes the backdrop to that existence and when expressed through the highest part of the soul, representing a basis for unity in the hypostasis. This reality is equated with the term Ātman as the supreme knower, in that it is the conscious expression of its own essential reality.

2.3.4 Subjectivity in the Godhead

Another important point concerning hypostasis and difference is in relation to unity in the Godhead and the Subject of that unity, whether the unity is through the ousia or the three persons of the Trinity together forming an existential bond. Gregory of

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274 Or.28.17 (Williams).
275 As highlighted by Mark S. G. Dyczkowski in his contemporary studies of Kashmir Śaivism, see Mark S. G. Dyczkowski, A Journey in the World of the Tantras (Varanasi: 2004).
Nyssa directly linked *ousia* to the divine *being*,\(^{277}\) and to the one united being of the Godhead (\(\theta\varepsilon\omicron\omicron\tau\eta\zeta\)).\(^{278}\) This implies that a single notion of person (*hypostatic operation*) cannot form a whole in the Godhead, but that the three persons Father, Son and Holy Spirit together unified are called the Godhead. It is not exactly clear if this unity is due to *ousia* as the cause of unity or predicated to the unity of persons. In either case, the *ousia* attains a relational ontological quality in the sharing of a common nature (\(\kappa\omega\nu\tau\eta\nu\varphi\omicron\sigma\nu\))\(^{279}\) of the divine Godhead, whether expressed as three persons united through the *ousia* or together creating a bond understood as the divine *ousia*. While in contemporary personhood there has been an emphasis on relationality to argue unity, on heterogenic models of relationality\(^{280}\) or a focusing on the outward existence, or outward looking persons, the Cappadocians allowed a focus upon *what* was ontologically shared, not only on *how* relationality was expressed. This allows relationality to be focused on the inner condition, which highlights the nature of the bonds of relationality and expressed outwardly. Consequently a relational person can be expressed not only through a *way* of existing, but by highlighting the condition of unity, which becomes the true expression of the centre of relationality. Unity through *ousia* becomes the ground not only for unity but also ‘the ground of *being*’ as a foundation of outward existentiality.

Unity, focused through *ousia*, described not only the nature of *being* but qualified the subjective reality of the divine *hypostases*, sharing the ontological quality, that is God’s divinity. Gregory Nazianzen stated that his theology while safeguarding the “distinctiveness of the three *hypostases*”\(^{281}\) allowed the *hypostases* to be qualified through the:

\(^{277}\) Gregory of Nyssa, *Eun.3.5* (Moore).

\(^{278}\) Gregory stated: “Since then, as we perceive the varied operations of the power above us, we fashion our appellations from the several operations that are known to us, and as we recognise as one of these that operation of surveying and inspection, or, as one might call it, beholding, whereby He surveys all things and overlooks them all, discerning our thoughts and entering into those things which are not visible, we suppose that Godhead...is called God...Now if any one admits that to behold and to discern are the same thing, and that the God who superintends all things, both is and is called the superintendent of the universe, let him consider this operation, and judge whether it belongs to one of the Persons whom we believe in the Holy Trinity, or whether the power extends throughout the Three Persons...not one of the Persons of the Trinity could reasonably be excluded from such an appellation”, *Tres Dii*, 121D (Moore); also see Gregory of Nyssa, *Ad Eustathium de Trinitate* (Moore).

\(^{279}\) Basil, *Ep.38.2*, 325B.

\(^{280}\) As exemplified in emphasis on communion by Zizioulas, see BC.

\(^{281}\) *Or.31*, 10, 113C-116C; translation by Wickham, *On God and Christ*, p.123.
single nature and quality of the Godhead... The three are a single whole in their Godhead, and the single whole is three in properties (\textit{idiotes} or one's own-ness). \(^{282}\)

In the context of revelation, in relation to human beings, the Cappadocians understood the divine \textit{act} to be interpreted through divine operations (\textit{\`e\nu\`e\r`\eta\varepsilon\a}), \(^{283}\) not because God's \textit{being} has no ontological content, but because human beings cannot know the nature of the Godhead (\textit{\theta\epsilon\omicron\omicron\tau\eta\varsigma}). \(^{284}\) Gregory of Nyssa affirmed that even the word \textit{\theta\epsilon\omicron\omicron\tau\eta\varsigma} implied an operation, for we can know what the word means, but the Absolute nature of God is beyond all means of knowledge. \(^{285}\) This does not negate \textit{ousia} but supports the place for it, for \textit{ousia} is so important to the understanding of the Godhead, that it goes beyond the realm of human knowing.

Even though human beings cannot know the Godhead according to the Cappadocians, human beings can know about the \textit{hypostases}. \(^{286}\) The knowledge of God, because it is restricted to his existential operations identified in the \textit{hypostases} of the Trinity, paradoxically highlights the nature of unity within the divine reality, for the \textit{hypostases} cannot stand alone or be divorced from \textit{ousia}. This unity highlights, in the personal existential operations of the \textit{tri-hypostatic} Godhead, the underlying subjectivity behind the \textit{idiotes}, united in the one operation of the Godhead. The three \textit{hypostases} of the Trinity are not disconnected parts or disunited from the divine nature but all the \textit{hypostases} work together within this unity, as Gregory stated that when Christ operates as a salvific function, so too does the Father and the Spirit. \(^{287}\) However, there seems to be implied in the Cappadocians, different levels of operations. There is a unified operation of the Godhead, and operations pertaining to the specific and particular identity of each \textit{hypostasis}, “Begetter”, “Begotten” and that which “Proceeds”. \(^{288}\) What is not clear is how the operations of the \textit{hypostases} are different, if at all, from the operations of the unity of Godhead, \(^{289}\) and if there is no

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\(^{282}\) Ibid.
\(^{283}\) Gregory of Nyssa, \textit{Tres Dii} 115A-124C.
\(^{284}\) Ibid.
\(^{285}\) Ibid., 120A-124D.
\(^{286}\) This view was later restated by Gregory Palamas, see \textit{TDS}.
\(^{289}\) Gregory Nazianzen, \textit{Or.} 29.2, 76B.
difference, why state a difference? Does the operation of the Godhead have priority (as a προτήθη οὐσία) over the hypostatic operations, or does particularity have ontological primacy? If so, why was there a focus on the operations of the Godhead (ousia) at all? The answer is that for Gregory of Nyssa, the word Godhead (θεότης), indicates that the divine operations of the Godhead extend “throughout Three Persons” of the Godhead, and implying a nature of being which underpins all existences.

But on what level is the distinction between hypostatic operations and that pertaining to ousia on an ontological level? Ousia represents the metaphysical stuff of hypostatic being, for without ousia the notion of hypostasis is outward looking, an operation without depth, or an activity with no centre. Thus an approach to the Cappadocians (mainly Gregory of Nazianzen and Gregory of Nyssa) can be developed that acknowledges a balance of both hypostasis and ousia, of activity and being in the Godhead. If the use of ousia was restricted to what is implied by Zizioulas, the reducing of essence to a generic quality shared by the persons of the Trinity, not an ontological nature, as Stead observes, the result would be a “lucid but undemanding pluralistic doctrine”. This is exactly what Gregory of Nyssa sought to oppose in Tres Dii or Not Three Gods. Gregory sought not to overplay the individual existences in the Trinity, which would lead to tri-theism, or overplay divine union which would lead to Sabellianism or Arianism. But neither does he negate divine nature. Hypostasis is not used in isolation but in connection with ousia, which has important repercussions in understanding unity-in-difference in relation to the human condition.

In the human model of hypostasis οὐσία, or the essential nature, is non-different from who a person is. This has to infer that there are two substances within each hypostasis, the material and spiritual substances, which represents that which is generically shared and that which is particular. Here lies the crux of the debate. Is it my nature that is me or my cognitive awareness? It is both, where both allow a united expression of a unique person. This uniqueness is then translated into a higher condition when considered relational to unity with the divine. The spiritual nature of a person

290 Coming from “θέα, or beholding, and it is He who is our θεότης or beholder”, see Gregory of Nyssa, Tres Dii, 121D-124D, 121D; translation by Moore, On Not Three Gods (NPNF 5), p.333.
however, goes beyond considering a general application of just having a soul but infers that participation with this spiritual substance, which allows the notion of the individual hypostasis to change and become something quite different as a spiritual or deified hypostasis. If a notion of person were restricted to an outward looking hypostasis with no substantial centre then person would indeed become an empty face (prosopon), it is the essential depth of a person that brings depth to a meaning of hypostasis. Conversely if there were no unique hypostatic characteristics, person would indicate a lump, not able to express itself outwardly. There has to be both for person to gain meaning. However the Cappadocians, especially Basil, placed priority on what was particular. While Prestige argues that Gregory of Nyssa’s views are ambiguous for his focus was on specific characteristics, while also focusing on the soul and thus to the stuff of being. Basil does not expand on these ideas.

Concerning stuff. Prestige affirms that this stuff should not be considered as a metaphysical character unable to exist outside of a “Subject”, but that it is implicitly related to an essential reality of equal importance within a stress on particularity. In this balance of particularity and essentiality or stuff, person comes to be related to difference and non-difference (unity), where the stuff is not predicated to the subject but equally important as the subject. Such a focus on both aspects of subjectivity can be vindicated through the Trinity, where the hypostases can be considered as ontologically equal to the stuff of the Godhead. However, Basil’s focus on the specific, the hypostasis, underlines the importance of the subjective individual existence and seems to support Zizioulas’ interpretation of the Cappadocians, where substance becomes, as already shown in Zizioulas’ interpretation, predicated to hypostasis. If the term hypostasis is to attain a full meaning the term should however, have an immaterial substance related dimension. But in Basil’s model it is not clear how the inner reality (unity) and outer existence (difference) come together. However it can be observed that conceptually, hypostasis has evolved and should evolve further with a stronger emphasis on ousia. In the evolution of hypostasis and ousia, the two should not be considered as disconnected, but implicitly related to each other in a model of difference-in-unity or rather unity-in-difference.

293 Ibid., p.189.
294 Ibid., pp.271-281.
295 Zizioulas, BC, p.17.
2.4 Some Perspectives on ἄτομος and τόδε τί

In this part of the thesis the terms of ἄτομος, αὐτό, and τόδε τί will be examined within the context of isolated individual juxtaposed to Zizioulas' relational model of person (hypostasis). Zizioulas' relationality can be considered helpful if redirected to include, within the Cappadocian hypostatic model and Pratyabhijnā, an essential reality of being. In this context the concept of individual (ᾰτόμον) or difference-in-isolation shall be addressed, so as to qualify hypostasis through qualified-difference, or difference-in-relation in the context of essential being. This relationality can be expressed, not as 'I-Thou' but as 'I am That' in which the possibilities for union with the divine become the basis for understanding human personhood and identity. The notion of qualified-difference can then be understood through a notion of unity, which can be correlated to the τί (what) of existence, where hypostasis is qualified through this what. The idea of hypostasis can then be expressed through concrete personhood, but relationally in terms of unity-in-difference.

2.4.1 Zizioulian Perspectives

Zizioulas' model provides a platform by which to qualify the notion of isolated and disconnected individual where the human person becomes implicitly related to a way of existing that mirrors the divine way, or operational way of existing. Hence, he argued that the notion of individual indicated, in the Cappadocians, something different from person. Zizioulas however, while regarding person as different to individual, does not necessarily equate ἄτομον with individual as the terms, for him,

296 See Timothy Ware who states in relation to distinction between individual and person that, "The difference is particularly clear in the Greek language. Atomon, the individual, denotes the human being as unit-turned inward, self-contained, isolated, a bare number recorded in a census. (Prosopon, the person, denotes the human being as face-outward-looking, in relationship, involved with others.) Whereas atomon signifies separation, prosopon signifies communion", in 'In the Image and Likeness: The Uniqueness of the Human Person' in John T. Chirban (ed.), Personhood: Orthodox Christianity and the Connection between Body. Mind and Soul (Westport: 1996), p.4.

297 Or as face-to-face, which was also expressed by Emmanuel Levinas, in Outside the Subject (Stanford: 1993), p.23.

298 See Communion and Otherness, pp.174-175. Zizioulas' rejection of the idea of the individual is also evident in his rejection of the term αὑτό (self). Zizioulas, BC, p.28.
do not coincide in the Cappadocians.²⁹⁹ He agrees that ἀτόμον indicated “the idea of ‘concrete’ ‘specific’ (iδιωτή) and indivisible existence of ousia”,³⁰⁰ but if concrete specificity is implied in ἀτόμον in a notion of isolated individual, ³⁰¹ when applied to the Trinity, tri-theism would result. If the notion of individual expresses too much of a notion of concrete and isolated existence within personhood, the isolation of individuum destroys the notion of persons in relation to a hypostatic model. Zizioulas model is useful in highlighting that the notion of individual if indicating isolation and delusion (of the natural human physis), has to be qualified within a concept of hypostasis in relation to God. But the notion of hypostasis should also express an ontological quality not argued by Zizioulas, where the notion of individual is expanded in a relational model of hypostasis, which becomes perfected in its essential spiritual reality or Âtman.

Paradoxically, the strength of hypostasis to denote concrete identity was why the term was employed in Greek Patristics so as to convey weight in the specific equal characteristics of the hypostases of the Trinity and thereby negate modalism and subordinationism. This exemplified in Gregory Nazianzen, who stated:

It is their difference in, so to say “manifestation” or mutual relationship, which has caused the difference in names. The Son does not fall short in some particular of being Father. Sonship is no defect, yet that does not mean the he is the Father. By the same token, the Father would fall short of being Son – the Father is not the Son. No the language here gives no grounds for any deficiency, for any subordination in being...The aim is to safeguard the distinctions of the three hypostases within the single nature and quality of the Godhead....The three are a single whole in their Godhead and the single whole is three in personalities (idiotes). Thus there is no Sabellian “One”, no three to be mischievously divided.³⁰²

The terms hypostasis and ἀτόμον both convey the idea of specificity, such of a specific person. The Father is the cause (Πατρὸς αἰτίας) “from whom indeed He (the

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²⁹⁹ Ibid., pp.174-176.
³⁰⁰ Ibid.
³⁰¹ Individuality was clearly expressed through the term ἀτόμον, Hans Urs von Balthasar, in relation to Maximus, showed that ἀτόμον, though indicating the generic, can also be indeed equated with the particular individual existence or hypostasis, see Hans Urs von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, p.233.
³⁰² Gregory Nazianzen, Or.31.9,113C; translation by Wickham, On God and Christ, p.123.
Spirit), proceeds. Basil goes on to show that particularity is specifically related to subjectivity, individuality or person, stating:

He has this distinguishing note characteristic of His person that He is produced after the Son and with Him and that He has His subsistence from the Father.

This is contrary to those who argue that the Cappadocians did not employ a notion of concrete individuality. In this context a focus on the type of particularity or the mode of particular existence becomes important, which defines the sense of individuality within a term. Törönen also demonstrates that the Greek Fathers (in relation to Maximus) equated what was particular with individual (ἐτομον) or in contemporary thought, person. He goes on to state that: “for Gregory of Nyssa all the three notions – hypostasis, person and individual – are identical”. Also previously the Cappadocians did not view ἐτομον as meaning something different from person or the individual. However in the context of individual in the Greek Patristic usage, hypostasis has to indicate something a bit different to individual as individual implies isolation and ignorance while hypostasis is related to a depth of being. How is depth conveyed? It is conveyed through the relationship with ousia or the essential reality of being.

Thus the notion of homogenous individual has a context of depth through the property of being (ousia), which is an unacceptable development for Zizioulas as this is viewed as contrary to Byzantine theology. Zizioulas counters substantialist models with a focus on an existentialist interpretation of the Greek Fathers so as to focus on the

101 Basil, Ep.38. 329C (Deferrari).
102 Ibid., τοῦτο γνωριστικόν τῆς κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἱδιότης σημεῖον ἔχει, τὸ μετὰ τὸν Υἱὸν καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ γνωρίζεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ὑφεστάναι.
103 Törönen, Union and Distinction in the Thought of St Maximus the Confessor, p.51; see also Demetrios Bathrellos, The Byzantine Christ (Oxford: 2004), p.102, footnote 15 citing Opuscule 16, 197C-D.
104 For examples see Basil, Ep.38. 325B-D; and Gregory of Nyssa Hom. Opif., 125A-256C.
106 Such accusations are countered by A. Papanikolaou, ‘Is John Zizioulas an Existentialist in Disguise? Response to Lucian Turcescu’, Modern Theology (2004), pp.601-607, who focuses mainly on answering the themes of: differences between person and individual; relationality and mode of existence. But this is not what makes Zizioulas an existentialist. What makes Zizioulas and existentialist is that in his negating a substantialist context, he draws a notion of person to a definition
experience of communion, of one hypostasis to another, within a model of the outer act. This act of communion becomes related to an “event of communion”, to an outer event, and is not related to an inner essence, or a coming out of the biological existence through ek-stasis, in an ecstatic experience of the inner reality. In the evolution of the terms in this thesis, another word could be employed, en-stasy, which denotes an inward mystical turn within the hypostasis through the Atmanic experience. This could add a deeper dimension to the understanding of hypostasis, and an ek-static experience. Zizioulas however, does not expand his idea of ek-stasis to examine exactly how divine participation as an existential ek-stasis occurs and is understood in hypostasis.

2.4.2 The τόδε τι

When focusing on the inner reality or essence of the individual, there comes a point in which the focus shifts to understanding the nature of the individual, the true nature. The understanding of the nature of the subject was for the Cappadocians accomplished by examining the properties or operations of a subject, and seemed to utilise Aristotelian ideas to do this. However in Aristotle the examination of the operations of a thing paradoxically focused the attention on what the thing was, the τόδε τι (this something), or the individual itself. Aristotle stated:

The term “being” has several senses, which we have classified in our discussion of the number of senses in which terms are used. It denotes first the “what” of a thing, i.e. the individuality.

This was mainly due to the Aristotelian equating of individual with enumerated individual thing, the τόδε τι. It is this enumerative quality to the individual in

which is outward looking, lacking ontological depth, and though relational, paradoxically putting a stress on the outer person.

Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness, pp.13-98.

310 Zizioulas, BC, p.22.


312 Aristotle, Met. VII.i.1-2.1028a10-20 (Tredennick).

313 Aristotle, Met. VII.i.1-2.1028a10-20 (Tredennick).

314 Ibid., τὸ δὲ λέγεται πολλὰχως, καθάπερ διειλόμεθα πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ ποσαχῶς σημαίνει γάρ τὸ μὲν τι ἐστὶ καὶ τόδε τι.

315 Ibid. In BC, p.17, Zizioulas, states that individual is equated with τόδε τι (this what, what is this), but in Met. VII.i.1-2.1028a10-20, Aristotle refers to a τόδε τι (this something). Has Zizioulas confused
Aristotle that Zizioulas and Lossky found particularly unhelpful when interpreting person as a theological term. It also became the ground for a polemic against the term individual and the reasoning behind the use of person or hypostasis. Consequently both Zizioulas and Lossky argued that the Cappadocians shift the attention away from innumerate individual to a sense of person, and yet no such distinction exists in the Cappadocians for the Cappadocian use of hypostasis was dependent on focusing on specific identity.

In addition Aristotle’s emphasis on ousia in understanding being becomes a problem for those who wish to emphasise being through an existential type of personal relationality. Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, focuses on substance to understand being, where being in the generic case, “being qua being”, has “inherent properties”, implying a sharing of a common nature (φύσις). Although physis indicates a generic secondary substance, it should not necessarily be considered in terms of predicated, but that which allows the informing of the subject. The notion of substances related to the classifications of primary and secondary substances, and it is thought were equated by the Cappadocians to hypostasis and ousia, the particular to the general, respectively. The properties of being can imply an inherent quality in the individual or the specificity of a thing (τι ἐστιν, “what it is”). Hence the individual (τὸ ὁδὸς τινός, this something) indicates more than just material being, predicated substances of outward existential person in the Cappadocians, for there is a metaphysical relatedness to the soul. The τι (what), whether used in τι ἐστιν, or utilised by Aristotle by itself as the τι (what, or the of being, τι τὸ ὅν), indicates the what of the subject. It is this τι in this thesis that indicates, in the human person, the metaphysical essentiality of being a person, not just merely having metaphysical

the τι (what) with τι (something)? Probably not, for in Communion and Otherness this is corrected; see p.107.

317 Aristotle, Met.IV.i.1-3.1003a20-b5 (Tredennick).
318 Ibid., IV.ii.3-6.1003b20-25.
319 See Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, p.216.
320 These ideas have already been explored in Chapter 2.3.4. The notion of ousia in Aristotle meant being which is divided to the primary and secondary substances. The primary indicates unity of being which in the Trinity applies also to hypostasis, while the secondary ousia indicated a “universal essence” or physis.
321 Aristotle, Met.IV.ii.3-6.1003b20-25; and VII.i.1-3.1028a10-20. Aristotle makes use of the distinctiveness between τι (what) and τι (something/someone).
322 Aristotle, Met.VII.ii.6-8.1028b1-10.
323 Ibid. IX.vii.4-7.1049a20-30.
notes of a person. While the ἐστι (it is) or τὸδε (this something/someone) indicates the particularisation of an individual person, the τι infers a backdrop to existing in asking what, what is it that is? The what, informs that there is an objectification, and that the object relates to a subject and the nature of that subject, which becomes in the highest sense the real existence.

An example of the usefulness of τι can be exemplified in the New Testament where a metaphysical relatedness inherent in the particular is shown to be indicated through a common what. The words σῶμα πνευματικόν (“spiritual body”) of the Apostle Paul (1 Corinthians 15; 44), indicates that the appellation of the general, here implied through the words “spiritual body”, which indicates the true nature of the particular existence. For the Apostle Paul, each particular person can attain to a better understanding of their particular existence through the general category of the what.

Thus the determining of the nature of individual existence indicates the possibilities for the particular (hypostasis) existence. A contemporary Eastern Orthodox use of hypostasis in this way is exemplified by Sophrony, who establishes the principle, the “hypostatic-principle”\(^{324}\) as a denotation of being. He makes use of both the inner and outer existential sense of being, where the person’s hypostatic being and existence is recapitulated through a personal relationship with the divine, through a relational category. Recapitulation is possible because of the inherent capacity of the nature, or the what, or the essence (unity) of the human being (hypostasis). Each person is born with a potentiality of existence and human stuff\(^{325}\) which is hypostatically realised in the union with Christ. This confirms the place for a substance based hypostatic model, which shall be correlated to an Ātman-hypostasis in later chapters. In this language hypostasis becomes related to potential substance of being, although this is not exactly what is stated by Sophrony, this allows the fullness of individual personhood to be realised. In the Ātman-hypostasis, each person has an essentiality both physical and metaphysical, in body and nous, which is particularised in the hypostatic existence of each person.

\(^{324}\) Zacharias, Christ, Our Way and Our Life, p17-42, for an example in the works of Sophrony, see His Life is Mine, p.44.

\(^{325}\) The use of stuff has already been explained in Chapter 2.4.
2.5 Person and Πρόσωπον

In this part of the chapter I examine the notion of person through the term *prosopon*,\(^{326}\) which started to gain significance in the fourth to sixth centuries and especially in relation to the pre-Chalcedonian and post-Chalcedonian debates. This was very much evident in the works of Cyril of Alexandria (c. 378-444) whose emphasis on unity began to change the Cappadocian stress on operations as signifying multiple subjects within the Trinity. He equated words such as *ousia* with *physis* and *hypostasis* with *prosopon*,\(^{327}\) to quantify how to vouchsafe the personal attributes in the Trinity, and Christologically, without denuding the notion of unity.\(^{328}\) He used the term *prosopon* as *hypostasis* to underline both a “sense of actual reality as opposed to appearance”\(^{329}\) and a “substantive experience”.\(^{330}\) Cyril highlights how unity is preserved in Christ, united in a single *hypostasis* or *prosopon*, to show how the divine operations related to the ontological condition in God and yet expressing the existential character of revelation through the *communicatio idiomatum*.\(^{331}\) Christ, for Cyril, becomes the exemplar of unity, stating that “the incarnate nature of the Word is immediately conceived of as one after the union”\(^{332}\).

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\(^{328}\) As exemplified by Cyril of Alexandria, see *The Unity of Christ II Prooem* (ACO 1), 1, 6, pp.32.6-34.9; translation by Norman Russell, *Cyril of Alexandria*, p.142. See Cyril of Alexandria showed that Christ’s unified nature comprising of the material and immaterial (here singular) did not indicate two persons, stating that, “if anyone…allocates them to two prosopa or hypostases, attributing some to a man conceived of a separate from the Word of God…let them be anathema”, *Anathema 4* (ACO 1), 1. 5, pp.15.16-25.28; translation by Norman Russell, *Cyril of Alexandria*, p.181. On prosopa see also Norman Russell, *Cyril of Alexandria*, pp.42-44.


\(^{330}\) Ibid.


2.5.1 Studies on Prosopon

Although the word *prosopon* initially indicated mask or face, it came to highlight what was individually unique in a person, especially in the Council of Chalcedon, where it was shown that the term indicated fixed individuality. The word *prosopon* could also indicate: the outward being and individual *self*; a legal term; and person or a "concrete presentation of an abstract *ouσια*, individual external appearance."  

Concerning the use in the Cappadocians of *prosopon* and especially by Gregory of Nyssa, Daniel Stramara’s study of Gregory of Nyssa shows that *prosopon* was mentioned by Gregory 313 times. This indicates the importance of the term, especially within a Trinitarian and Christological context, and ultimately negating the equating of the term with "mask" through a focus on what was individually concrete in Trinitarian theology. Stramara’s study argued that *prosopon* equated person with a "centre of consciousness" (τὸ κέντρον τῆς διανοιας). However, this view is rejected by Lucian Turcescu who, while accepting that *prosopon* meant more than mask, asserts that *prosopon* has to have more than psychological implications. Prestige also confirmed that "prosopon was a non-metaphysical term for individual". Certainly *prosopon* came to indicate concrete identity as in Chalcedon, but this correlation was not entirely evident in the Cappadocians although *prosopon* was beginning to be considered in such a way. Prestige also confirms that the

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336 As exemplified by Gregory of Nyssa, *ad Eustathium de Trinitate*, as Ep.189 of Basil (PG 32), 684; translation by Moore, *On the Holy Trinity and of the Godhead* (NPNF 5), pp.326-330. The concrete sense of person is also highlighted by Basil in the *Hexameron*, 9.6 (PG 29), stating “does not the second Person show himself in a mystical way”, and "And God said let us make man", tell me is there only one Person"; translation by Jackson (NPNF 8), p.106.


338 Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought*, p.179.
corresponding term in Latin, *persona* implies not only external but internal metaphysical qualities.

Gregory of Nyssa’s model of person or individual, if such a thing can be attested, centred on the development of Aristotelian and Stoic views, where the centre of a person or individual included both material and immaterial elements. The immaterial elements included the notion of the rational, the *nous* or *logikos* within the single person or *prosopon*. Michael Réne Barnes also affirms that in Gregory of Nyssa’s works, the soul is equated with the rational elements, and thus to the psychological. Hence it is not clear why Turcescu ultimately dismisses Stramara’s interpretation of *prosopon* as initially relating to the psychological. While Stramara seems to focus on *prosopon* as indicating “psychological agent”, Turcescu notes that both πρόσωπον (face) and προσωπέον (mask) indicated something more significant than mere personality. Turcescu evolves the terms within a contemporary context by equating soul to modern models while keeping *prosopon* within the parameters of Gregory’s model to conclude that both πρόσωπον and προσωπέον related to the soul as the “image of God in humans”. Certainly, in this thesis it is argued that notions relating to person such as *prosopon* must lead to a deeper understanding of being than expressed by ordinary consciousness, and must include a deeper, noetic (spiritual), and essential reality that informs personal existence.

It is now generally accepted in contemporary Eastern Orthodoxy that the term *prosopon* has become synonymous with person, historically rooted in the Council of Chalcedon, where *prosopon* and *hypostasis* both indicated relatedness to the concept of individual or person. In English the term person had its es etymological roots

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339 Ibid., pp.157-159.
341 Gregory of Nyssa, *Hom.Opif.14, 176A-B.*
343 Stramara, ‘Unmasking the Meaning of Πρόσωπον’, p.54.
344 Turcescu, *Gregory of Nyssa and the Concept of Divine Persons*, p.16.
345 See C. J. Albergio (ed.), *Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Decreta*, pp.35-40, which states, “and in one in face/person and substance, running together” (καὶ εἰς ἑν πρόσωπον καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν συντρέχοντας); and also see Brian E. Daley, ‘Nature and the “Mode of Union”’, who argues that “person” (πρόσωπον) in the council of Chalcedon from the perspective of Leontius indicated “the being and perceptible role of a concrete, historically identifiable individual, who participates — in order to be intelligible and real — in particular being”, p.168.
in the Old French “persone” and the Latin word *persona* indicating an actor’s mask which may be dated back to the Etruscan ‘phersu’. But as Ury shows, the exact root of person remains obscure. What can be affirmed is that the term has evolved as did the term *hypostasis*, and has come to indicate what we now mean by person.

In contemporary Eastern Orthodox scholarship, *hypostasis* is preferred to *prosopon*, but if the two terms are synonymous, why have a preference? It is not within the remit of this thesis to answer this question but it has been broached in chapter 2.3.5. But it is argued that the term *hypostasis* can indicate a deeper context to person through an *Atmanic* experience. This context may not be apparent in the term *prosopon* because of the overt concrete sense of individuality now implied in that term (*prosopon*), and because of the implied notion of underlying reality contained in the term *hypostasis*. *Hypostasis* can mean something more significant, that has both existential significance, indicating the *way* of existing, “a way of being” as considered by Zizioulas, and also has ontological depth in the inclusion of an essential reality of that existence as an underlying substance. The depth to the *hypostatic* existence can be understood as allowed to bear fruition through grace in the fulfilment of personal existence and points to an inherent capacity to be a person within what Zizioulas calls “authentic personhood”. This ability to be completed in *hypostatic* difference points to a metaphysical reality (*Atman*) within the *hypostasis*, to an underlying substance, the *what* of personhood, which affirms the human capacity to be realised in the human *hypostasis* through *Atmanic* potentiality.

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349 See Lossky, Sophrony, Zizioulas, Yannaras, and Vlachos in already cited works.
350 See Zizioulas, *Being as Communion*, p.15.
351 Ibid., p.54.
352 The notion of capacity will be examined in Chapter 2B of this thesis.
353 This will be examined in greater depth in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
2.5.2 The Cappadocian use of Prosopon

Within the context of potentiality of being the term prosopon, even though it may not have the depth of hypostasis, it could indicate an activity of being. The focus on this property is exemplified by Gregory Nazianzen who used it in association with divine actions, such as, “His walking”, “sitting”, “His motion”, and His face, “his watching over us is his ‘face’” (τὴν δὲ ἐπεσκοπὴν πρόσωπον). But here the use of prosopon is used in the context of predications and not the subject itself. Gregory of Nazianzen also used the term prosopon to refute a type of monotheism that established a single “monarchy”, of a “single person”, stating “but the monarchy was not in a defined (or single) face/person” (μοναρχία δὲ, οὐχ ἂν ἐν περιγράφει πρόσωπον). The recognition of the dangers of prosopon to denote a single person or denuding concrete identity as an aspect of divine was also exemplified in Basil of Caesarea’s awareness of the connotations in prosopon, which is why he was reserved in his use of the term, preferring hypostasis stating that:

If then they (Arians) describe the persons (prosopa) as being without hypostasis, the statement per se absurd; but if they concede that the Persons exist in real hypostasis, as they acknowledge, let them reckon them that the principle of homoousion may be preserved in the unity of the Godhead...Father, Son and Holy Ghost, in the perfect and complete hypostasis of each of the Persons named.

Hence, Basil was aware of perceived limitations to the term prosopon and was reluctant to use prosopon due to Sabellian mia-prosopon overtones stating:

This term (homoousion) also corrects the error of Sabellius, for it removes the idea of the identity of person (ὑποστάσεως), and introduces a perfect (τελείαν) notion of Persons unified (προσώπον τὴν ἔννοιαν). For nothing can be of one substance (ὁμοούσιον) with itself, but with another (ἔτερον ἔτέρω). Here Basil introduces the notion of relationality of “Persons” to negate a notion of a mia-prosopon (one person) model of Trinity through the notion of persons of the

154 See Gregory Nazianzen, Or 31.22, 157C (Wickham).
155 Gregory Nazianzen, Or 29, 76B (Wickham).
157 Basil, Ep.52.3 (Jackson and Deferrari). On Basil’s anti mia-hypostatic formula see also Turcescu, Gregory of Nyssa and the Concept of Divine Persons, p.23; and Halleux, ‘Hypostase et ‘personne’ dans la formation du dogme Trinitaire; Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, p.161.
Trinity sharing the substance of the divine with the other persons. This passage also shows the inability of Basil to conceive of a divine substance as subject, but to conceive only of persons in relation to the other, which is Zizioulas' conclusion to Cappadocian theology. Basil was correct in stating however, that if the term ὕποστασις indicates the notion of unity of one mind (προσώπον τὴν ἕννοιαν), the notion of particular subjects is denuded in the Trinity. Basil also develops in this passage a sense of relationality of otherness, which is not to be considered in the context of isolated and separated individuals.

2.5.3 Towards Chalcedon and Beyond

In the fourth to sixth centuries the theological focus on defining prosopon became more specifically related to a notion of concrete specificity (person) in the Council of Constantinople, and in the Christological context, centred on φύσις (physis/nature). This is exemplified by Cyril of Alexandria, of whom Davis states that “Cyril develops an Adam-Christ typology that distinctively hinges on the language of ‘nature’ (φύσις)”. Through the notion of physis a focus comes to be placed on what defines unity or the centre of existence, where the human condition comes into sharp focus through the Christological. However there was not a consensus of ideas but many differing approaches to Trinitarian and Christological models, as exemplified in the polemics between the Alexandrine and Antiochene models.

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158 See Tanner, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, p.28.
159 Prestige stated that physis “denotes the characteristics” of a subject, see Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, p.235. Prestige argue that physis was more easily related to generic qualities than ousia, (Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, p.23) to the metaphysical concrete reality of the subject which became identified with the subjects of the Trinity. Prestige distinguished between hypostasis, which had more a metaphysical connotation in relation to “concrete, objective entity” (ibid., p.235) and prosopon, which became was more easily identified with the subject. See also Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, Vol. 1; Bathrellos, Byzantine Christ.
161 Andrew Louth argues that the Alexandrine tradition equated physis with hypostasis, see St John Damascene, p.113. There has also been a consensus that there is a distinction between these two schools of thought, see: Tixeront, History of Dogmas; Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines Sellers, The Council of Chalcedon; Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, Volume 1; Studer, Trinity and Incarnation; Bathrellos, The Byzantine Christ; But this is denied by Dragas, see G. D. Dragas, Saint Athanasius of Alexandria (New Hampshire: 2005), p.2.
The schism between these schools can also be understood as reflecting conceptual differences in Western and Eastern Christian models not in approaches to Christology but also of Trinitarian theology. In the Greek model the Trinity was expressed with an initial stress on the three persons, of “three hypostases within the single nature”, while in the Latin Christian world God was defined through the formula “One essence or substance, three persons (una essentia uel substantia, tres personae)”. This difference underlined the stress on subjectivity and an increasing substantialist context in the Western models.

Confusion surrounding the exact role of prosopon, through the Antiochene tradition manifested in relation to the role of physis, where Christ came to be related to the double prosopa of Nestorius. Nestorius claimed that this schema related to the two natures in Christ stating “you (Cyril) should not have calumniated me as if I did not confess a single prosopon in two natures”. Although Nestorius claims innocence, he did stress a double prosopa schema and in answer, Cyril of Alexandria put the ontological stress onto physis so that the nature of Christ revealed a single hypostasis and not two prosopa (persons). He thus underlined the unity (henosis) of the two natures, “kath’ hypostasin”, that is to say, brought together in a single hypostatic unity or prosopon in Christ. The unity wrought in the Christ hypostasis indicates that, difference stressed unity. Cyril thus focused

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362 Gregory Nazianzen, *Or.31.9* (PG 36), 113C (Wickham); see also Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought*, pp.235 and p.233.
363 Augustine, De.Trin. 7.4.7, (CCSL 50), 255; also see Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought*, 235.
366 While Apollinarius and Cyril focused on unity, Theodore and Nestorius (d. 451) seemed to shift the focus to the outward subject, or prosopon. This however, confused the role of prosopon in Christ and instead of two natures, two prosopa (persons) were identified. But Gregory of Nazianzen had earlier stated that in Christ, “we have ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο not ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος” (Gregory Nazianzus, *Ep.101.21,* PG 37, 180A-B), negating the possibility of two persons. Here the neuter case is used in the determination of other to indicate that in Christ there are not two personal ‘1’s’, while as Grillmeier shows of this passage that in the Trinity the masculine is used to denote a multiplicity of concrete ἃνθρωποι for real persons. See also Bathrellos, *The Byzantine Christ,* p.18 where Bathrellos reaffirms what was stated by Grillmeier, see *Christ in Christian Tradition,* p.370, where in Christ there is not ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος but ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο, but in the Trinity the reverse is true; see also Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines,* p.297; and John Behr, *The Nicene Faith, Part 2* (2; Crestwood: 2004), p.403.
367 Cyril of Alexandria, *Unity of Christ* (ACO 1), 1, 6, pp.32.6-34.9; and *Quod Unus Sit Christus* (PG 75), 1253-1361.
hypostasis\textsuperscript{372} to stress that the union was possible through the super essential-subject,\textsuperscript{373} through the stress of the mia physis (one nature).\textsuperscript{374} There were not many disconnected divided parts that implied discontinuity in Christ but the human and divine parts had a true union (henosis).\textsuperscript{375} The stress on unity later came to be renewed\textsuperscript{376} in Monophysitism where the unity in the Christ hypostasis affirmed also a unity of natures or nature, in a "single prosopon",\textsuperscript{377} indicating the possibilities in hypostatic difference with the focus upon unity-in-difference rather than mere difference.\textsuperscript{378}

Distinctions between how prosopon related to hypostasis and nature seemed to be resolved at the Council of Chalcedon, where the model of two natures in one prosopon/hypostasis was postulated\textsuperscript{379} overcoming a δύο πρόσωπα model.\textsuperscript{380}

However, Chalcedon did not resolve Trinitarian issues regarding the centre of unity and the existential implications of prosopon with regards to a substantialist context. Another issue in Chalcedon that was observable related to the nature of the soul, where the soul (in Christ) was equated with rationality, ψυχής λογικής\textsuperscript{381} or a rational soul. This stands in contrast to mainly substantialist notions of soul developed in the West.\textsuperscript{382}


\textsuperscript{373} Ibid., p41.

\textsuperscript{374} McGuckin, \textit{Saint Cyril of Alexandria and the Christological Controversy}, p.207.

\textsuperscript{375} Ibid., p.208.

\textsuperscript{376} See Prestige, \textit{God in Patristic Thought}, p.280.


\textsuperscript{378} For Marie-Odile Boulnois, Cyril’s Trinitarian formula moves from the stress of three hypostases to “one substance in three hypostases” (Marie-Odile Boulnois, ‘The Mystery of the Trinity according to Cyril of Alexandria: the Deployment of the Triad and its Recapitulation into the Unity of Divinity,’ in Thomas G. Weinandy and Daniel A. Keating, \textit{The Theology of St Cyril of Alexandria} (London: 2003, pp.88-89) from hypostasis as subject, to hypostasis as the outward expression of the unified nature. Boulnois observes that Cyril: uses εοντις as the equivalent of οȧων and πρόσωπον next to ὑδόσιν and substance to indicate what is in common and person and hypostasis to describe the proper existence of each of the three, Marie-Odile Boulnois, ‘The Mystery of the Trinity according to Cyril of Alexandria: the Deployment of the Triad and its Recapitulation into the Unity of Divinity,’ in Thomas G. Weinandy and Daniel A. Keating, \textit{The Theology of St Cyril of Alexandria}, p89; see also McGuckin, \textit{Saint Cyril of Alexandria and the Christological Controversy}, p.212


\textsuperscript{380} See C. J. Albergio et al. (eds.), \textit{Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Decreta}, p.57; and Norman Tanner, ‘Council of Chalcedon 451’ in \textit{Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils}, p.86.

\textsuperscript{381} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{382} This is apparent in Boethius' \textit{De Trinitate}, ll.30-40 (LCL 74); translation by Tester, \textit{Boethius, Tractates: The Consolation of Philosophy}, p.11, where after affirming a substantialist model in the divine, this essentialist context is then placed within the context of the human soul. This is later
Chalcedon used *prosopon* within a model that upheld a double *physis* formula, which sharply contrasts with the Alexandrine or at least Cyril’s’ model, where *prosopon* was placed within a *mia-physis* formula. This model stressed unity rather than difference and exemplified by Apollinarius (c. 310-390), who focused on unity, by highlighting the nature of the incarnate *Logos*. Sellers explains that Apollinarius’ formula “Jesus Christ is one incarnate nature of the divine Logos (μία φύσις τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου σεσαρκωμένη)” underlined the intended unity, where *physis* indicated the divine nature of the *prosopon* of Christ. The person of the *Logos* becomes the σεσαρκωμένη (enfleshed nature) of God. Unity was also expressed as the focus point in *being* by Cyril of Alexandria where the model of “μια - τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου – σεσαρκωμένη” (one...after the union, God the Logos enfleshed) was employed to denote a *physis-hypostasis*. Cyril stated:

He became flesh, that is became man; appropriating a human body to himself such an indissoluble union that it has to be considered as his very own body and no one else’s. This is how he transmits the grace of sonship even to us so that we too can become children of the Spirit.

In this sense of unity, *prosopon* came to be understood as something not denoting mask or face, but the concrete subject by which difference is qualified through *physis*. The paradox however, is that the ontological strength of *prosopon* to denote singularity or individuality denudes a focus on the divinity in Christ, and becoming a model that either promotes Arianism or tritheism. This is why Chalcedon insisted on the two natures being united within the subject or person of Christ, which leads back to a focus on how unity is to be understood within the *hypostasis*. Thus the nature of the Christ subject has to be equated with an essential *physis-hypostasis* context so as to indicate the unity of the divine substance in which Christ, is the “the personal

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qualified as a person is considered as “individual substance of a rational nature (*persona vero rationabilis naturae individua substantia*), Boethius, *Contra Eutychen*, IV.5-10 (LCL 74); translation by Tester, *Boethius, Tractates: The Consolation of Philosophy*, p.93.


Ibid., p.333.


Ibid.

Cyril of Alexandria, *Quod Unus Sit Christus* (PG 75), 1253-1361(McGuckin).
bearer". While unity should be vouchsafed in the focus on the divine nature, at the same time a sense of personal characteristics should also be conveyed to express a sense of real person. These characteristics in the Trinity, though personally unique, have a centre of divine unity, which is why Cyril of Alexandria insisted that in Christ, "the whole θεοῦ ὑπὸ Θεοῦ λόγου produces a 'natural prosopon'". As such the person or prosopon should indicate the whole-ness of being having a unity of both physis and outer existential qualities. The notion of unity in prosopon in the Alexandrine School became displaced by Antiochene ideas focusing mainly on difference or the existential, the outward prosopon, which become a central theme in Chalcedon and this debate still has not been resolved. Hence, the evolution of prosopon became embroiled within a debate between the Alexandrian "Word-flesh (Λόγος-σώματος)" schema and the Antiochene "Word-man (Λόγος-ἀνθρωπος)" schema, for while the Alexandrine tradition stressed unity, the Antiochene tradition stressed Christ's outer existentiality.

Nevertheless, at the Councils of Constantinople and Chalcedon, prosopon (πρόσωπον) comes to be related to a concept, which can be said to be synonymous with concrete person, indicating single or enumerated autonomous individual. This forged a gap between the concept of unity and difference. In contemporary models the necessity to resolve this gap has been attempted by Zizioulas in his relational approach to hypostasis. Yet the Council of Chalcedon already provided a model to overcome this gap through the concept of the one hypostasis in two natures
where the focus is upon the nature of Christ who is to be considered through a sense of unity. In this model, difference is underlined in the notion of prosopon and a concrete identity, which is to be united to the nature of its own existence through the hypostasis. While Chalcedon did seem to stress the double nature within the hypostasis of Christ at the expense of unity, through the model in this thesis the focus is upon unity in the hypostasis. The nature of the subject or hypostasis indicates that an underlying substance or essence of unity is always predominant within the subject without denuding the sense of personal existing as a hypostasis.

Although Chalcedon tried underline unity through the stress on the one person of Christ uniting the two natures, the stress on operations did nothing to provide a solution to the prevailing Christological issues. The result was a continuation of Christological polemics exemplified in Leontius of Jerusalem whose response to monophysitism and anti-Chalcedonian supporters seemed to continue the debate. He rebutted those who believed Christ to have one compound nature, as exampled in Eutyches, rather than two natures, which were united in a personal or outer hypostasis. But as Prestige argued, this seemed to predicate ousia to the personal subject, or Christ, where the two natures or ousia become substrates, or “secondary substances”. That was not a problem when considering the human nature but is problematic when the Logos part of Jesus, his divinity, was to be predicated to an aspect of the hypostatic subject reducing Christ to a person in an Arian context. This model divides the subject of Christ away from the metaphysical object, reducing ousia to metaphysical aspects of the hypostatic subject, undermining both Christ's concrete hypostatic and essential existence. It divides Christ into separate subjects, the Logos Christ and the human Christ, where two ousia become evident in Christ, which is the consequence of a stress on the subject, and historically led to Nestorianism. When the ontological stress, in the Trinity, is placed on the

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398 See the Leontius of Jerusalem, Aporiae (PG 86), 1773A (Gray).

399 Gray, Leontius of Jerusalem; and Leontius of Jerusalem, Testimonies of the Saints (PG 86), 1805A.

400 Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, p.272.

401 Ibid.

402 Ibid., p.273
prosopon-subject, divine unity can become bifurcated. Conversely a stress on unity can lead to a dividing of the Christ person away from the divine nature, leading to an Arian model.

2.5.4 Trinitarian Implications

A concept of person, when understood through a focus on the subject or prosopon, should allow for difference, but where the stress is upon the true nature of the subject to highlight unity. When considering an emphasis on nature, if there was in Christ no existence outside of the divine ousia this would negate concrete specificity and a sense of the personal in Christ. Conversely if the focus was totally on the outer subject in the Trinity, there would be evident three subjects, who have as part of their being a metaphysical substance held together through a communion of persons. This reduces the Trinity to three hypostatic subjects having a predicated ousia, where God’s hypostases have a common element, but where ousia is not the ontological primary focus. The solution to this problem is to affirm a model which simultaneously affirms the place for hypostatic difference, which has at its centre an essential divine substance, and unity through that substance. The Godhead cannot be merely a collection of individual subjects together forming a union in an existential relational encounter, which seems to be the ever growing consensus in contemporary models as being forged by Zizioulas. Rather the persons of the Godhead should be considered as having existential difference, yet are in nature, absolutely unified through an essential underlying and aware reality. This approach is supported through the Trinitarian models of the Councils, where hypostatic difference was related to consubstantiality, and where ousia indicates the ultimate essential reality of divine being by which the hypostases came to be defined as God. In the Second Council of Constantinople (c. 533) this approach is especially underlined in its support for Cyril of Alexandria and in its arguing for a single nature or essence, stating that “if anyone will not confess

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403 This is argued by Prestige, ibid.
404 Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, p.272, p.271.
405 Ibid., p.273.
406 Ibid.
407 See Gregory of Nyssa, Eun.3.5 (Moore).
that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit have one nature or substance...that there is a consubstantial Trinity: let them be anathema". 408

When translated into the human model of person, the stress on inner unity transforms the notion of the outer person so that a notion of person attains a value not implied in outward existential models.

Thus perhaps the Trinitarian definition could be understood as one essential Godhead having three personal yet concrete characteristics,409 which stresses the unity in the "concrete ousia"410 (the essential reality of being of the Godhead), while simultaneously admitting difference or the concrete existences of the persons of the Trinity. This sense of qualified difference, through a focus on the essential reality in the emphasis on the ousia, puts the stress on what is providing ontological unity. The ability to consider difference and unity together in an ontological context is possible through the term hypostasis, but may not be possible in the term prosopon for it does not clearly indicate a metaphysical reality within the subject, and does not allow for an inherent quality of essential being. Taking all these movements and evolving of ideas through the dogmatic declarations, the Greek Patristic tradition reflects the struggle to assert concrete personhood within inner unity and therefore should be considered within the context of evolving terms and ideas to better understand the nature of God and thus human personhood.411

409 Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, which is not "three Persons in one Godhead", which has relational, perichoretic connotations, p.281.
410 Ibid., p.271.
411 This struggle is also evidenced in the Western theological constructs and exemplified in the Trinitarian theology of Augustine (d.430) and Boethius (d.525). The substance based model is also taken up by Boethius, Con.Eut.III.70-95; see also H. Chadwick, Boethius (Oxford: 1981, 2003), p.193; Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, p.157; and J. W. Koterski, ‘Boethius and the Theological Origins of the Concept of Person’, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 78/2 (2004), p.209. In the Western model the emphasis is upon substance, see Augustine, De Trin.1.9.19, 1.13.28, 5.8.10, 7.4.7. Augustine stated: "Wherefore the substance, or, if it is better so to say, the essence of God, wherein we understand, in proportion to our measure, in however small degree, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, since it is in no way changeable, can in no way in its proper self be visible", Quaprotect substantia uel si melius dicitur essentia dei, ubi pro nostro modulo ex quantulacumque particular intellegimus patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum, quandoquidemnullo modo mutabilis est, nullo modo potest ipsa per semetipsam esse uisibilis, De Trin.3.XI.1-5 (Haddan).
2.6 Conclusion

At the start of this chapter it was asked whether the Greek Fathers (Cappadocians), had a concept of person and whether the term *hypostasis* could correlate to that understanding. These questions go to the very heart of personhood, of defining what constitutes human personhood. While Zizioulas looks to interpreting the Greek Fathers from a relational and existential position focusing his interpretation on the outward existence and viewing persons a modes of existence, the approach in this thesis allows a notion of *hypostasis* to express a simultaneous sense of *being*. In this model the concrete particular life is affirmed, but which has at its centre and ultimate reality, an essential (*ousia*) metaphysical substance of *being*. This does not indicate that this substance is predicated to the subject of personhood or *hypostasis* but that the essence of being or *Ātman* cannot be, as the true subjective reality, divided from the notion of *hypostasis* even when expressed through *hypostatic* difference. Hence, ideas relating to non-difference (or *Ātman*) and difference (or *hypostasis*) are needed to successfully express a concept of person.

The relationship between *hypostatic* subjectivity and *Ātmanic* subjectivity shall be examined in Chapters 3 and 4. Zizioulas’ interpretation of the Cappadocians was also utilised to indicate something more than what is implied in the natural individual, which shall be expanded in the proceeding chapters to include a qualifying of the outer mode of existence to incorporate a notion of a *deified* mode of existence. This manifests a bridge between the outer experience of *hypostasis* and the inner state. It was also generally considered that the Cappadocians did have an understanding of person through the term *hypostasis* but which has evolved and was generated through the term *hypostasis*. They purposefully shrouded their models in *apophatic* language so as to focus on what they could know of God, which explained their focus on the outer operations.

However, this focus was not due to the resting of their philosophical and theological stance at that point, but to underline that this was where they were at that moment. This has been confused to express the only way to understand the divine, in relation to existential differences in the divine, as compared to the divine nature. But the
Cappadocian model is not the only model, but one way to understand God. The very fact that the Cappadocians evolved the concept of *hypostasis*, which was continued through to the Council of Chalcedon, underlines that the evolution of the terms such as *hypostasis* and *prosopon* are not only inevitable but necessary.

This project represents an attempt to evolve the ideas further. Indeed the Cappadocian model offers great scope in terms of contemporary interpretations, to develop personhood through uncovering the meaning of *ousia*, while at the same time considering the existential subject, or person, where the term *hypostasis* allows for a metaphysical dimension to individual. In this context, *ousia* can be viewed as a generic term, and in a holistic sense, bringing the notion of unity to ontological categories. Even though the *hypostasis/prosopon* model can also be viewed in general terms, indicating the *physis* of human persons and thus the possibilities of personhood, these terms tell us nothing of what a specific person essentially is, or the essential reality of *being* in the human person. In this way the terms *hypostasis/prosopon* (and also *purusa*) infer that there must be an underlying reality to that existence.

The next chapter is dedicated to understanding the relationship of subjective existence in relation to the experience of the underlying reality through *deification*. While the use of *hypostasis* by Zizioulas and Yannaras in their existential interpretation of Cappadocian theology initially led to a re-examination of Cappadocian thought in this thesis, these views also revealed that such terms as *hypostasis* should be qualified. This qualifying represents a quest for unity within the notion of difference.

Hence, in the next chapter the lack of focus on the essential reality of *being* in the Cappadocians are addressed and contemporary interpretations, through a focus on *deification*. The notion of *deification* indicates what it is to be a person in the completed sense while at the same time acknowledging the place for difference. This model of person in the human case leads to the inclusion of a notion of *deification* in human personhood where the notion of *deification* will be juxtaposed to the divine will and intention of God to *deify* human persons. Humanity is *deified* through the *hypostatic* union of the *Logos* and world in the Christ, where the uniting of the natures of God’s soul and body affirms a *deifying* of matter. This allows the *deifying* of the
human person and a model which informs us how _deification_ should be understood.
The human person is united in the perfect uniting of its body and soul in a completed sense, through the activity of the Christ _hypostasis_ and, in both the divine and human cases, this model of perfect union represents a model of both difference and at the same time union.
CHAPTER 2.B

DEIFICATION

2.7 Introduction

While in Chapter 2A a concept of person was situated mainly through an examination of hypostasis and ousia, in this chapter I will specifically consider person juxtaposed to the Greek Patristic doctrine of deification or theosis. Deification will be placed within a substantialist hermeneutical approach to person, so as to focus on whole person, where in person an immaterial essential and rational nature (the soul) is united within a material existence. Through the doctrine of deification, I will consider a notion of person as intimately related to what it is to be a person in a completed context, to the "attaining of likeness to God and union with him as far as possible". This completed context is not to be situated within an isolated experience of an individual, but fundamentally related to the deifying work of Christ who through the hypostatic union. This allows the human condition to be conformed to the divine, culminating in an end experience and perfection. As Maximus the Confessor (c. 580-662) stated:

He (Paul) is of course referring to Christ the whole mystery of Christ, which is, manifestly, the ineffable and incomprehensible hypostatic union between Christ’s divinity and humanity. This union draws his humanity into perfect identity, in every way, with his divinity, through the principle of person (hypostasis); it is a union that realizes one person composite of both natures, inasmuch as it in no way diminishes the essential difference between those natures.

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1 The doctrine of Theosis (God-ness) has been considered as mainly connected to the Greek Patristic tradition and thus intimately related to Orthodox theology, see Andrew Louth, ‘The Place of Theosis in Orthodox Theology’, in M. J. Christensen and J. Wittung, Partakers of the Divine Nature (Michigan: 2007), p.32. In Latin deification is from Deus meaning God and facio to do or to make; man made God.
3 As expounded by Cyril of Alexandria, Unity of Christ, II Proem (ACO 1), 1, 6, pp.32-34 and Anathema 1, (ACO 1), 1, 5 pp.15-25; translation by Russell, Cyril of Alexandria, pp.140-143, 179.
4 το μυστήριον το ἀποκεκρυμμένον ἀπό τῶν αἰώνων καὶ ἀπό τῶν γενεάς τῆς ἐφανερωθῆ, ταύτων λέγων διαλάβῃ τὸ χριστεῖ τὸ κατὰ χριστιάν μυστήριον τούτω προδήλως ἐστὶν ἄρρητος τε καὶ ἀπερινότητος θεότητος τε καὶ ἀδυναμότητος καθ’ ὑπόστασιν ἐνωσίς, εἰς ταύτων ἀγνοοῦν τῇ θεότητι κατὰ πάντα τρόπον τῷ τῆς ὑποστάσεως λόγῳ τῆν ἀνθρωπότητα καὶ μίαν ἀμφιτέρων ἀποτελοῦσα τὴν
The notion of deification highlights God’s purpose for humanity, which can be understood as a secret work of the divine for human reformulation. It is an ontological and eschatological task, where the “unsearchable riches of the Christ are announced and enlighten all (φωτίσαι πάντας) in the fellowship (κοινωνία) of the mystery which has been hidden from the ages in God, who created all things by Jesus Christ” (Eph. 3:8-9). Hence, deification will be correlated to an ontological event within the human person. It is equated to an awareness of the being of God within a mystical union, where the restoration of the essential nature in person allows for a change and awareness of the divine not previously experienced. Of course the question has been raised whether the word theosis actually means exactly what it seems to mean. If it does mean becoming God in a total way, as Louth points out, it challenges concepts of justification and makes the purpose of the cross irrelevant, for all that would be needed was a change in consciousness not ontological reformulation.

Consequently, the very notion of deification has to be re-addressed so as to qualify what it means and so as to understand the ontological and existential implications of the term. It is asserted in this thesis that deification means the union with God as far as possible, but which does not throw down God in that union or the purpose of the Incarnation. It is argued that deification is the end result of the work of the Incarnation who opened the way for the whole human race to be deified, not just a few mystics. It can be considered as the result of justification, which does not impede justification models but supports them through a final experience of the human person in Christ. It

υποστάσιν σώματον, τῆς αὐτῶν κατὰ φύσιν οὐσιώδους διαφοράς μηδεμίαν καθοτιον ἐπάγουσα μείωσιν, οὕτω καὶ μίαν αὐτῶν γενέσαι, καθὼς ἔφη, τὴν ὑπόστασιν καὶ τὴν φυσικὴν διαφορὰν ἀπαθὴ διαμένειν, καθ’ ἣν καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἐνωσιν ανελάττωτος αὐτῶν καὶ ἰνωμένων ἢ κατὰ φύσιν διασώζεται ποσότης, Thal.60, (CCSG, 22), 73.5-15; translation from Blowers, On the Cosmic Mystery of Christ, p.123.


Louth, ‘The Place of Theosis in Orthodox Theology’, p.32.

This is also argued by Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen who states “that ‘justification’ can also be called theosis, according to the ancient doctrine of the fathers with whom Luther agreed”, see ‘Justification and Deification in Martin Luther’s Theology’, in *One with God: Salvation as Deification and Justification* (Minnesota: 2004), p.46. Conversely J. T. Billings states that “perhaps the greatest current danger in claiming that Calvin teaches ‘deification’ is that his view could be too quickly assimilated into late Byzantine notions of theosis, from which he retains distance”, ‘John Calvin: United to God Through Christ’, in M. J. Christensen and J. S. Wittung, *Partakers of the Divine Nature*, p.208.
also points not only to an existential restoration, but to an ontological restoration, where the whole person, the whole being, as an “image” (Gen.1:26) of the divine, is transformed and restored to a former state. The implications of deification, also becomes important in the thesis because of the comparison to Pratyabhijñā philosophy, examined in Chapter 3, and the equating of deification with an Ātmanic experience of re-cognition.

The purpose of human personhood will be set within a dynamic of deification, which will correlated to the divine will, and activity of the divine who historically incarnated to fulfil this activity, uniting Himself to the world through a deifying process. God deifies the world in “Himself”, where the human hypostasis becomes fulfilled through the Christ hypostasis. But this is not only a downward motion from the divine, but also an upward ascent within a personal encounter. This encounter with God is also made possible through an inherent capacity or potentiality of human persons to be fulfilled. In the model of this thesis this potentiality indicates the possibilities for union where union allows a restoration of the essential spiritual reality. Union with the divine overcomes the lower or natural physis, which dominates individual lower consciousness, but which is fulfilled in the unified experience of deification.

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8 This is similar to the Augustinian model of ‘imago dei’ see De Trin.7.6.12 (266). The notion of human beings created in the “image” and “likeness” of God shall be discussed later, but I argue that that in the highest sense, “image” and “likeness” infers an Ātmanic ontological condition.

9 The Ātman shall be equated with the nous or the highest part of the soul.

10 God is usually explained in Byzantine tradition through masculine terms such as “Father” and “Son” to be expressed in terms of human understanding, but the absolute transcendent God is beyond our understanding, see DN (PG 3), 588A. Pseudo-Dionysius stated “...and it is the work too of the Father and of the Son who supremely transcend all divine Fatherhood and Sonship”, DN, 2.8, 645B; translation by Colm Luibheid, Pseudo-Dionysius. (NY: 1987), p.64.

11 Maximus stated that through Christ “we attain, in the future state, the supernatural deification (theosis)”, Thal.61, 77.70-75; translation from Blowers, On the Cosmic Mystery of Christ, p.126.

12 In Byzantine theology, ‘man’ shares a ‘capacity’ within human being-ness to be deified, as Maximus stated that “he furnished it (human nature) with a certain spiritual capacity” Thal.61, 85; translation from Blowers, On the Cosmic Mystery of Christ, p.131.

13 As with the Christ hypostasis, the ontological condition infers a double will and nature in the human person, pertaining to lower and higher natures, which does not infer a discord, see Maximus, Opusc.3, 45B-56A; translation by Andrew Louth, Maximus the Confessor (London: 1996), p.193. The lower nature in the human condition “introduced into our lives sin and separation from God”, but is transformed in deification to become a copy of the divine.
2.7.1 Categories of Deification

Ideas relating to a notion of *deification* in the Byzantine tradition were initially considered through the language of recapitulation (*apokatastasis*) or restoration, first developed in a Patristic context by Irenaeus of Lyon (c. 135-200), Clement of Alexandria and Athanasius. It was then situated within a cosmic vision for humanity by Maximus the Confessor, who argued that through the *hypostatic* union the divine conceived of a “blessed end” for humanity. Humanity finds meaning to his existence in the person of Christ, where the event of the *hypostatic*-union brings to humanity the possibility of ontological restoration. Crucial to the Greek Patristic notion of *deification* was the relatedness of humanity to this Christ event, wrought through the *hypostatic* union of God’s nature with human nature. This union allows humanity to be deified and expressed through the axiom *God became man so that man might become God*. This simple equation allowed the notion of *deification* to become related to a spatio-temporal point where the divine nature in the Christ person was deified, and thereby allowing full participation (μετονομάσθε) with the divine.

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14 See Irenaeus, *P. Ap. 6* (664); and Athanasius, *Inc. 10* (112C), where the notion of restoration or recapitulation was implicit to a concept of *deification* as Maximus stated “inasmuch as it (providence) leads to God, it is the recapitulation of the things he has created”, *Thal. 60*, 40-43 (Blowers), which represents the final goal or telos of human beings (ibid. 30-35). On restoration also see Andrew Louth, ‘The Place of Theosis in Orthodox Theology’, in M. J. Christensen, *Partakers of Divine the Nature* (Grand Rapids: 2007), p.34.

15 See Maximus, *Thal. 60*, 73-75; translation by Blowers, *On the Cosmic Mystery of Christ*, p.124.

16 I will not examine the theology of “event”, but to understand more on this see, Paul Collins, ‘Event: The How of Revelation’, in *Trinitarian Theology West and East* (Oxford: 2001), pp.7-33.

17 See Maximus *Thal. 60*, 73.

18 See ‘Council of Chalcedon – 451’, in Tanner, *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, p.86, where the ousia is not divide from the *hypostatic* Christ existence, but there is however, no mixture (κρατίστη) but a “perfect union”.


20 Which is exemplified in the works of John of Damascus see, *De Imaginibus*, 1232-1420 (Anderson).

21 See Maximus, *Thal. 60*, 77.71-75. This understanding of *deification* in relation to participation was developed by Clement of Alexandria (ibid. p.122) and Athanasius through the term θεοτοκος (ibid. p.176). Russell argues, that ‘participation’ referred in the works of Gregory of Nazianzen, to the attaining the “imitation of Christ” (ibid. p.214). Later *deification*, as Russell shows, became more expressly related to the personal experience in Pseudo-Dionysius (ibid. p.260), Maximus (ibid. p.262) and in the monastic tradition which becomes the focus in Gregory Palamas, see *TDS*, B-C, and *Cap. 150*, 1121-1225.

22 Ibid., and p.27.
In the Greek Fathers deification represented one of the basic features in the relationship between God and the world (human beings), yet there was no systematic approach to deification. Sometimes deification was understood sacramentally, at other times eschatologically, and at others times understood through a personal experience. The emphasis changed according to differing interpretations. In this thesis, deification is correlated not only to the reforming of human personhood, but as already stated above, to an essential reality of being. This ontological approach was also expressed by Gregory Nazianzen who focused on the human person as an image of the divine, stating that God:

> took a portion of the new-formed earth and established with his immortal hands my shape, bestowing upon it a share in his own life. He infused it with Spirit, which is a fragment of the Godhead without form. From dust and breath was formed the mortal image of the immortal.

While it is thought that the Greek Fathers correlated their understanding of deification in relation to the whole person body and soul, they never quite qualify what this meant other than to indicate that deification implied the telos or end of human being.

The concept of deification initially evolved from the pagan language of apotheosis, Platonic language, and came to be incorporated into Clement of Alexandria.
Alexandria’s use of θεοποιέω and θεοποίησις. It was later developed by Gregory Nazianzen in the term θεωσις, and also utilised by Dionysius who stated that “our greatest likeness to and union with God is the goal of our hierarchy”. However, Russell argues that deification “only became fully assimilated with Maximus”. Later, the medieval writer Gregory Palamas used the term θεωσις with great effect in relation to a spiritual experience. Generally, in the Greek Patristic era, the concept of deification was developed in relation to baptism and “adoption by grace”.

Norman Russell shows that while the Cappadocians understood deification within the experiential, they mostly transferred deification to an ecclesiological term and ethics, and not a mystical experience. In this thesis however, the focus is upon how the experience of deification relates to informing the person of the true nature of being. Archimandrite Sophrony is utilised here to support this view in which he stated that:

like God the persona-hypostasis cannot be thoroughly known from outside unless he reveals himself to another person. God is a hidden God, and man has depths within him kept secret from alien eyes. God, not man, is the Origin of Being; but man is created with the potential of receiving and eternally bearing within himself the non-created Life of Divinity... the human hypostasis receives divinization through grace, wherefore the Divine image is actualized in him.

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31 From θεός meaning God and ποιέω (meaning to make or do); see Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition, pp.1-9; and S. Finlan and V. Kharlamov, Theosis: Deification in Christian Theology, p.7.


33 See Gregory Nazianzen, Or.4.72 (593); also see N. Russell, “Partakers of the Divine Nature” (2 Peter 1:4) in the Byzantine Tradition’, From the homage to Joan Hussey KAΘΗΙΗΠΙΑ (UK: 1998), and The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition, p.214.

34 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN,4.11, 708D.

35 Pseudo-Dionysius, EH, 2.1, 392A; translation by Luibheid, Pseudo-Dionysius, p.200.

36 The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition, p.215; and also Maximus Thal.60 (77).

37 The notion of theosis is expressed continually in Gregory Palamas’ works see, Triads and Cap 150; also see A. N. Williams, The Ground of Union (NY: 1999), p.104.


39 Ibid., and p.9.


41 Archimandrite Sophrony, We Shall See Him As He Is (Essex: 2004), p.192.
In other words, the experience of the fulfillment of personal being in the general language of *deification*, for Sophrony, informs human persons of what he or she *is* and also what he or she should *be*. Sophrony continued: “the human hypostasis receives *divinization* through ‘grace’, wherefore the fullness of the Divine image is actualized in him”.43 This view is affirmed, but also expanded to relate to an essential reality within the human person and correlated in the next chapter correlated to *Ātman*. Thus it will be argued that the metaphysical *stuff of being* in the human person (the soul *stuff*)44 provides the basis to understand *being* in the highest sense through *deification*.

The relationship of human persons to the divine was underlined by Gregory Nazianzen who correlated the human soul to the breath of God stating that:

> The soul is a breath of God (ἀνεμα Θεοῦ) and, for all its heavenly form, it has endured mingling with that which is earthly, light hidden in a cave, yet divine and immortal.45

The natural *physis* of human personhood, when restored, is conformed to its original state through the activity of *deification*. Thus the nature of human persons when *deified* is to be understood as participating with the *operations* of the divine and is thus “enhypostatic”,46 but is also related to the divine essential reality for the essence and operations cannot be divorced from each other.

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41 Ibid.
44 However Gregory Palamas, *TDS*, E.III.i.29, argued that God could not be seen in his essence but “according to His deifying gift and energy, the grace of adoption, the uncreated deification, the enhypostatic illumination” (Gendle). In this model however of *hypostasis*, there is an unbridgeable gulf between the divine essence (*theologia*) and divine revelation to the world (*oikonomia*). Gregory stated “his substance remains inaccessible” (τῇ δὲ οὐσίᾳ αὐτοῦ μένει ἄπρόσπιτος). *Cap.150*, 111 (Sinkewicz). This is considered by Catherine Lacugna who commented that “for a Western theologian this assertion” (of a distinction between ‘theology’ and ‘economy’ in the dividing of essence and energies) “creates grave metaphysical problems. If *theologia* and *oikonomia* are ontologically distinct, the defeat of trinitarian theology is total”, *God for Us* (SanFrancisco: 1991), p.196. Concerning grace in the experience of *deification* in relation to substance, Gregory asserted that, “the man divinized by grace will be everything that God is, apart from identity in substance” (καὶ ὁ διὰ τῆς χάριτος τεθεωμένος ἐστιν, χωρὶς τῆς κατ’ οὕσιαν τευτόνητος) *Cap.150*, 111 (Sinkewicz). Gregory here is citing Maximus from, *Thal.22*, 320A.
46 Gregory Palamas, *TDS*, E.III.i.9, where Gregory states that “it (human life) is ‘enhypostatic’”, but is not to be contemplated by itself, but in relation to divine *hypostases*, nor in essence, but in *hypostasis*, *TDS*, E.III.i.9 (Gendle).
While the Greek Fathers did not tend to emphasize a substantialist model, it can be argued that this must be the conclusion of the Greek Fathers given their placing an ultimate ontological stress on *ousia*. Hence, the focus is upon divine union or *deification* within the human person which is correlated to participation with the essential reality of *being*.

*Deification* cannot be merely analogical or mythical, but should relate to a real experience. But here lies the dichotomy, for in Greek Patristics, the ontological difference between *agenetic* and *genetic* does not allow for complete unity. Neither does the experience of unity indicate something completely somatic. The notion of *deification* however, does represent the divine intention for human persons, where God *deifies* each person as far as possible. This state Maximus called a “preconceived goal” for all creation in the recapitulation or restoration (*ἀποκατάστασις*) of all created beings.

Given the word limitations of this work it is not possible to expand upon *deification* in broad soteriological terms, or to examine the cosmological implications of the *deifying* work of the Christ, or expand in detail on the Christological ramifications. However, *deification* is not understood in terms of a merely *self-*informing or *self-*giving experience of the natural human condition (*physis*), but in terms of divine grace. Even though the human *physis* is important, what also has to be considered is the divine will in the divine wish to *deify*, and of the reciprocal wish of human persons to be *deified*. Human nature (*physis*) does play a part in *deification*, for without the fact of being a human person, having the qualities of what it is to *be* a

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47 For an example, see Gregory of Nyssa, *Eun.3.5* (Moore).
49 The problems ontological problems relating to the *genetic* (created) and *agenetic* is highlighted by Andrew Louth, *The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition from Plato to Denys*, p.xiv.
50 See Maximus, *Thal.60*, 75-79.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., *apokatastasis* was the general term that was used to describe the theology of return, restoration or recapitulation, see: Clement of Alexandria, *Str.1.21*, 853A; Origen, *Princ.3.1.19*; Gregory Nazianzen, *Or.41.11*, 444B; Pseudo-Dionysius, *D.N.4.4*, 697B; Maximus, *Ambig.42*, 1348B; other words were also employed by the Greek Fathers to indicate the same such as *κατορθώμα*, (meaning to make straight or amend); see Athanasius, *Inc.10*, 112C.
53 This idea of will is encapsulated in Maximus *dyothelite* theology; see *Op.6*, 65A-68D and Bathrellos, ‘The Dyothelite Christology of Saint Maximus the Confessor’, in the *Byzantine Christ*, pp.99-174.
human, deification would not be possible. The physis of a human person implies a quality or potentiality of God (Gen. 1:26-27), which through the “activity” of grace, the theandric energies of the divine or the God-man activity restores the human person into a new birth in deification. Consequently, deification has to be considered as an experience that is given as a gift from above to that which is below to rise up human persons to the divine.

The Greek Fathers also considered the human physis to be important when considering the nature of humanity, which is evident in the Greek Patristic exegesis of 2 Peter 1:4, “so that you may become partakers (or have communion) of the divine nature” (γένησθε θείας κοινωνία φύσεως). This passage was also used many times by Cyril of Alexandria in place of the notion of deification to denote union. The use of this passage by the Greek Fathers showed that the human physis had a specific relationship with the divine or a kinship and a capacity, which allows for the personal experience of deification. The relationship of being a person with human natural physis implies not only that a process or participation is possible between human persons in deification, but that through this experience the true ontological condition of a human person is revealed. It is within this experience, which leads to a

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54 Being a whole person consisting of body and soul; see Gregory of Nyssa, Hom.O,Ji14-16, 175D-185D.
55 See Maximus, Thal.6, 69.
56 See Hom.O,Ji10, 156A.
57 Ibid., 14,176A.
58 Pseudo-Dionysius, Ep.4, 1072C.
59 On the relationship between world and “man” within the notion of deification and gift, see Emil Bartos, Deification in Eastern Orthodox Theology (Eugene: 1999), p.116.
60 For a good examination of this passage in relation to Greek Patristics see, Norman Russell “Partakers of the Divine Nature” (2 Peter 1:4) in the Byzantine Tradition”. See also J. Starr’s ‘Does 2 Peter 1:4 Speak of Deification’, in M. J. Christensen and J. A. Wittung, Partakers of the Divine Nature, pp.81-92, where he questions whether this passage actually is related to deification, and if so if this reflects “Hellenistic, non-Christian thought” citing Käsemann, and asking what does “sharing in the divine nature do for a person?”, ibid., p. 82. This is the crux of the matter for it is this ontological context that provides real meaning to deification.
61 The word communion, or koinonia, has become such a loaded word especially in relation to Zizioulas and BC, I will prefer to use the word participation). Another way of putting it is, to be born of the divine partaking of (God’s) nature.
62 Here I am indebted to the research of Stephen J. Davis, Coptic Christology in Practice: Incarnation and Divine Participation in Late Antique and Medieval Egypt (OUP, Oxford: 2008), p.39.
65 Example of see Maximus, Thal.60, 77.
vision (θεωρία) of God, that informs persons not only of themselves but also of God. But deification should not merely relate to unfulfilled or superficial way of existing but implicitly related to being. The whole being or nature (physis) of the human person is deified and considered in terms of a grace given condition, a process or ascetical ascent, or in terms of eschatological fulfilment.

In the early Greek Fathers the concept of deification was not used widely to describe an actual experience. It was in Clement of Alexandria that deification began to be used in terms of ontological fulfilment, as the highest goal in Christian life stating:

And as Godliness (θεωρία) is the habit which preserves what is becoming to God, the godly man is the only lover of God, and such will he be who knows what is becoming, both in respect of knowledge and of the life which must be lived by him, who is destined to be divine (θεός).  

Later the concept of deification came to be used by the Cappadocians, Christologically, ethically and ecclesiologically. There also seems to have been some reservations on the part of the Cappadocians to relate deification to a direct experiential conclusion, shrouding the language of deification in apophatic language. The complex historical development of deification has led Russell to highlight different schemas to qualify how deification can be understood. He refers to the "nominal", "analogical", "ethical" and "realistic" approaches, where the Cappadocians are placed in the "ethical" schema and Clement of Alexandria and the Alexandrian school within the "realistic". Another important facet to the concept of deification was the influence of the ascetical writings, where the notion of union and

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66 Pseudo-Dionysius, EH, 2.3.1, 397B.
67 This point is also made by Pseudo-Dionysius, see CH, 2.5, 144C-D.
68 In terms of "purification", "illumination" and "union", see, Evagrius of Pontus (d. c. 399), "On Prayer", in G. E. H. Palmer et al., The Philokalia, pp.57-63; and Staniloae, Orthodox Spirituality, pp.75-734.
70 Clement, Str. 7.1, 732-736 (Coxe); see also Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition, pp.115-121.
71 This view is argued by Russell in, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition, pp.206-234, and exemplified in Gregory of Nyssa’s works Hom. Opif., Hex., and V. Mos.
72 For an example see; Gregory Nazianzen, Or.28.19, 49C-53C, where Gregory argues that the vision of God is beyond human understanding; and see Gregory of Nyssa, V. Mos., 376C-377A.
74 Russell believes these schemas to have been integrated by Maximus, ibid.
participation were an important way to describe the concept of fulfilment, especially in relation to Orthodox identity. This is because the notion of deification has become a central theological theme in Eastern Orthodoxy especially in relation to the resurgence of Palamism.

2.7.2 What is a Human Person: Who am I?

The notion of deification comes to express basic questions of existence, what is a human person, who am I? These are not merely existential questions of the outward looking person, but a quest to understand the nature of being. The question of ‘who am I’ is also epistemological, focusing the issue of deification on knowing. The knowing of who one is, to “Know Thyself” was for Clement of Alexandria, the premise for true knowledge. The “true Gnostic” was the Christian, who is the knower of truth. The axiom ‘Know Thyself’ not only implies a call to self-inquiry but also reveals a paradox in that the outward reflection of the prosopon is incapable of grasping true knowledge. Indeed, for this reason Diadochos of Photiki (d. c. 486) believed that by virtue of the activity of the soul (dwelling in the body), through baptism, the individual is renewed, where the soul indicates “the capacity for attaining the divine likeness”. Hence to know one’s self (ὁ αὐτός) is to know the depth of the soul. Ware also makes the link between personhood, deification, and knowing through the language of anthropological apophaticism and potentiality in relation to an inquiry into self. The inquiry into self allows the person to recognise the possibilities of becoming, becoming a deified creature (“Ζῶον θεομενον”).

Hence, in a sense, all examinations of person and deification are related to the

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77 This expression was utilised by Clement, *Str.1.14* (Coxe).
78 Clement, *Str. 7.1-2*, 732-736.
81 Ibid., p.9.
82 Ibid., p.12.
question who am I? Historically, it is a question that was extant in philosophical literature and exemplified in the words, “Know Thyself”. This phrase became integrated into philosophy influencing Socrates and Plato. In Plato there is a link between self-inquiry and knowledge and thus to a knowledge of what it is to be a human person. Russell also informs us that in the ancient world, religious identity and realisation were related to knowing oneself, stating that “the search for God began with an inward journey: ever since Plato, ‘Know thyself’ had been the starting-point of wisdom”. Russell clearly shows how in early Christianity, gnosis had moved from a term that indicated anthropological inward insularity to become related Christologically where anthropological fulfilment is achieved in a Christ related deification. The Christian quest for knowing then became an inquiry into the nature of one’s being and also of God’s. Clement had also argued that knowing oneself was a valid starting point in the quest for true knowledge, true gnosis, and to attaining the true “image and likeness of God”. In the Early Church, self-knowledge and revelation became linked to an anthropological task. Christians began to interpret pre-Christian knowledge within the context of divine revelation in relation to understanding human identity and through the Christ who is the “light that enlightens everyone”. Self-inquiry then is qualified through a Christological perspective.

In the Greek Patristic tradition self-inquiry becomes absorbed into the category of deification. In this context, I also examine the notion of deification in relation to the cognition as an informing experience. Deification is not be considered a static event but reveals what it is to be as a person and correlated to a notion of recapitulated consciousness, which implies kinship with the divine.

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85 Ibid.
86 Ibid., Str. 2.19, 709-712.
88 Though Louth is antagonistic to kinship, Dumitru Staniloae argues that kinship is integral to Eastern Orthodox theology. See Dumitru Staniloae, ‘Image, likeness, and deification in the human person’, Communio International 13/1 (1986), pp.64-83.
2.8 Being a Deified Person

The notion of completion or *deification* in the Byzantine tradition represents a shift in person within an ontological restoration of person, where an actual change in *being* occurs, which allows a shift of awareness from the natural *physis* to the spiritual. This ontological shift or alteration allows for *hypostatic* life to flourish within a spiritual mode of existence, culminating in *deification*, an ontological reformulation or completing of person. The consequent shift in *being*, results in a change in the mode of the person from the natural mode to a *deified* mode of *hypostatic* existence. The considering of existence through modes was employed many times by Maximus, especially in relation to a Trinitarian or Christological perspective, for example stating; “in the same way, leading mankind according to every mode with the word of hypostasis to the Godhead”.

92 Maximus refers to “every mode” to indicate that the considering of many modes within a single reality is possible. When translated to the human condition, I use this notion of modes to express, in *deification*, within a context of an ontological restoration. I argue that many types of modes are possible within a single entity, but within *deification* a change in the mode of existence includes the possibilities of a *Cid-átmanic* mode of *hypostatic* existence, as already expressed in chapter 1.4.6.

This focuses the discussion, in this and proceeding chapters, towards correlating a change in *being* to an existential condition through a substantialist position. Another point relates to Maximus’ use of *hypostasis* and *physis* through the *hypostatic* union, which reduced the gulf between the divine nature and human nature. Here the focus is upon *physis* to understand the existential role of *hypostasis*, which allows for a substantialist context, where *hypostasis* relates not only to an existential context but to how this union is accomplished within *hypostasis* through unity within the essentiality of *being*. Maximus himself directly made a distinction between existence (*hyparxis*) and *being* in the divine in an essential context stating that, the “whole

92 See Thal.60, 73.12, εἰς ταύταν ἄγουσα τῇ θεότητι κατὰ πάντα τρόπου τῷ τῆς ὑποστάσεως λόγῳ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητα, p.123 (my translation with help from Greek teacher H. Lyons); translation also by Blowers, On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ, p.123.

93 Maximus, Thal.60, 79, 105-110; translation by Blowers, On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ, p.127.

94 Ibid., 81, 127; p.128.
Holy Spirit exists by essence (κατ' οὐσίαν) and continuing that God "knows what he himself is in essence". This has repercussions when considering human personhood in relation to deification.

Thus the stress here is upon ontological re-formulation through restoration, which becomes a pattern already provided in the Christ, who allows deification to be considered in terms of ontological restoration. Through the incarnation of the Logos, the Logos established a mode through hypostasis that allowed material matter to be renewed, allowing for the restoration of the human nature. Irenaeus stated:

So he united man with God and wrought a communion of God and man, we being unable to have any participation in incorruptibility if it were not for His coming to us, for incorruptibility, whilst being invisible, benefitted us nothing: so He became visible, that we might, in all ways, obtain a participation in incorruptibility.

Questions then arise such as, what is the exact relationship of deification to the human physis? How far does the deification of the human physis inform the person through hypostasis of what or who he or she is, and then how does this translate to a mode within the hypostasis?

2.8.1 Deification and the Soul

The correlating of deification to a mode, which also includes an Atmanic dimension, that infers that the whole person is included within that mode but here I focus on the implications for the soul.

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95 Ibid. 79, 103: p.127
97 Irenaeus, P.Ap.31 (PO 12. 61, 683); translation by K. T. Mekerttschian and Wilson (Brepols: 2004).
Although the hypostasis cannot be reduced to hypostatic elements such as body, mind or nous,98 where there is no real centre in the person, the notion of soul, the noetic, allows a focus on what is ontologically going on within a person in deification. While the soul here is considered within a substantialist context, and applied to Štman indicating the highest part of the soul as the metaphysical stuff of the soul in the next chapter, it also includes a rational element and in Greek Patristics was equated with the nous (noetic).99 The rational focus on the soul allows an immaterial context within the material as a noetic part within a whole person. Maximus argued that:

we must distinguish intellectually at conception between, on the one hand, the vital inbreathing and the Holy Spirit which underline the noetic essence of the soul, and, on the other hand, the enshlement and breath which underline the nature of the bodies.100

The nous unites being and mind, but both soul and nous were interchangeable which in Byzantine theology manifested a confusion as to what constituted the soul. This was somewhat mitigated in that the nous has been considered the “purest part of the soul”.101 But the soul also indicated the individual existence and discursive reasoning. For this reason Gregory of Nyssa, using Platonic categories,102 divided the activities of the soul into categories pertaining to lower and higher parts,103 having three faculties: 'λογιστικόν (the rational logikos or nous); ἐπιθυμητικόν (the striving); and

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98 A note has to be made here that V. Lossky believed that this type of schema, that places the nous as central to being a human has to be rejected, for the nous is only a “hypostatic element” (see Lossky, In the Image and Likeness of God, p. 119-121). But on this Lossky goes into a sophisticated argument on what constitutes a person for if a person is reduced to constituted parts then that reduces personhood to a collection of natures, but if the person cannot be understood as being reduced constitutive parts such as body, soul and spirit then the lack or irreducibility confers on the person only an existential awareness of himself or herself. This is a dilemma that has not yet been resolved. Because of the Christological element in personhood where Christ was defined through two natures in Byzantine theology, the nature or physis of a person cannot be negated. In Chapter of this work I go on to affirm that it is the metaphysical nature, the true nature (Atman) of the human person that allows the person to re-cognise what it is to truly be.
100 Maximus, Ambig. 42, 1324D-1325C; translation by Blowers, On the Cosmic Mystery of Christ, pp. 87-88.
101 Ibid.; Hierotheos Vlachos here is quoting John of Damascus see Vlachos, Orthodox Psychotherapy. the Science of the Fathers, trans. E. Williams, (Greece: 2002), pp. 118-133.
102 (PG 46, 56), 144D, 361C-D, 353C; (PG 45) 224C, in relation to Plato’s notion of the soul, who refers to ἐπιθυμεῖν (desires) as part of the soul, or different levels of soul, see Ph.66C-D. Gregory of Nyssa also makes a Platonic distinction between the soul and body. Also see J. P. Cavarnos, St Gregory of Nyssa On the Human Soul (Massachusetts: 2000).
103 Gregory of Nyssa, Anim. et Res. 28C.
Aristotelian influences were also evident in the Cappadocian emphasis on activity (ἐνέργεια) or operations, but which seemed to have left an emphasis on the outer subject. The operations express the outer existence, but this tells us nothing of the nature of the inner reality of being.

When translating the Cappadocian notion of operations to the human condition, the soul is related to the operations of reasoning, the logismoi, within a material body. This dichotomist model developed throughout Greek Patristics, of body and soul united in the individual, while allowing for a unity of the rational and the bodily, did not focus on highest part of the soul, but on the rational, which did not explain how the highest part of the soul related to the rational in relation to the mundane and deification. This lack of focus did seem to be overcome or was at least deflected in the unifying activity of the Christ who allowed for a harmony of being and existing through his deifying activity. Gregory of Nyssa stated:

while two natures – the Divine and incorporeal nature, and the irrational life of brutes – are separated from each other as extremes, human nature is the mean between them: for in the compound nature of man we may behold a part of each of the natures I have mentioned, - of the Divine, the rational and intelligent element, which does not admit the distinction of male and female.

But this uniting of body and soul was not the only model considered in Greek Patristics. A trichotomist model was also developed similar to Plotinus' tri-hypostatic "One", "Intelligence", "Soul", that of mind ( νοῦς), soul ( ψυχή) and body.

104 For examples see Gregory of Nyssa, Hom. Opif. 8, 144D; and V. Mos. 353C, and 361C. This also followed the Platonic line which indicated the importance of reasoning in the soul (ψυχή), see Plato IX, Timaeus 36E-37C (LCL 234,72-73).
105 In the Cappadocians we see a continuous use of Aristotelian ideas relating to: activities and power (dynamis); of actuality of existence as compared to the potentiality of being; and of what is common compared to what is specific; see Aristotle, Anim. I.403a-II.414a; translation by Hett, On the Soul, (LCL 288), pp.8-80. In relation to the energy of the soul see Gregory of Nyssa, Tres Dii. 124C-D; and Basil, Ep. 38; For an example of this approach in Aristotle, see Anim. II.iv.415b.5-15.
106 For an example see Gregory of Nazianzen, Or. 29, 76B; and Gregory of Nyssa, Tres Dii. 124C-D.
107 Gregory of Nyssa, Hom. Opif. 16.9, 177D-185D (Moore). For other examples of this double nature see also Maximus, Ambig. 42, 1324A; Staniloae, Orthodox Spirituality, pp.96-97; and also Alfeyev, St Symeon the New Theologian and Orthodox Tradition, p.177.
108 Plotinus, Ennead V. 1.7, stating that the "intellect certainly, by its own means even defines its being for itself by the power which comes from the One, and because its substance is a kind of single part of what belongs to the One and comes from the One, it is strengthened by the One and made perfect in substantial existence by and from it"; translation by Armstrong (LCL 444), p.35.
109 Plotinus, Ennead I, 1.2.65-20.
(σῶμα); or nous (mind), logos (reason), and pneuma (spirit), which all represent the qualifying of the material existence within a spiritual or immaterial context. In Staniloae’s view the Fathers also appropriated “the Platonic thesis of the immortality of the nous and the mortality of the other two parts”, where the mind as the “soul itself”, becomes the informing part of being.

However, the Greek Fathers did generally adopt the twofold scheme of body and soul, and Ware believes the “threefold scheme of body, soul and spirit is more precise and more illuminating”. Gregory Nazianzen also referred to “body, soul and mind” to qualify how the corporeal life is changed, or made whole in the spiritual through divine condescension. This is certainly true when trying to understand the nature of the highest part of the soul in relation to mundane life and in the model presented in the thesis. The spiritual or noetic aspect in human persons can also be correlated to a trichotomist model of body, soul (nous) and spirit, which provides a more sophisticated model. This allows the lower part of soul to be correlated to the individual soul, while the spiritual or highest part is equated to the Atman and allows for a better understanding of what is going on ontologically in the person. It is in the context of an experience of the spiritual part of the soul of the person that the hidden nature of the person is revealed and restored to the person through grace. This was also argued by Gregory Nazianzen, stating: “for truly man is the great God’s creature and image, from God proceeding, and to God returning again”.

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110 Plotinus, *Ennead I*, 1.2.5-15; and *Ennead IV*, 1.2.1., where Plotinus stated that: “in our enquiry into what the soul’s essential being is, we have shown that it is not any body, and, again, that in the class of bodiless things it is not a harmony; we have abandoned the concept of entelechy, which is not true in the sense in which it is stated and does not make clear what the soul is; the intelligible nature of the divine order, we did perhaps manage to say something exact about its essential being”, translation by Armstrong (LCL 443), p.9; τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσίαν τις ποτέ ἔστι ζητοῦντες οὐμαί οὐδὲν ὁτινες δείξαντες εἶναι, οὐδὲν ἐν ἀσωμάτω παρὰ άρμονιαν, τὸ τῆς ἐνελεχεῖσας οὔτε ἄλλης ωσώς, ως λέγεται, οὔτε δηλωτικὸν ἀν τῷ τῷ ἐστὶ παρενες, καὶ μὴν τῆς νοητῆς φωτεινος εἰσοντες καὶ τῆς θειας μοιρᾶς; also see Louth, *The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition*, p.162.

111 See Staniloae, *Orthodox Spirituality*, pp.96-97 and also Timothy Ware, *The Orthodox Way* (Crestwood: 2001), pp.48-49.

112 See Staniloae, *Orthodox Spirituality* p.97; this was also developed in a another form by Dionysius of “One”, “Good”, and “Beautiful”, see Pseudo-Dionysius, *DN*, 4.7, 704B.

113 See Staniloae, *Orthodox Spirituality* p.96.

114 Ibid., p.97.

115 Timothy Ware, *The Orthodox Way*, pp.48-49.


Within the deepest part of the soul a Christological event\textsuperscript{118} takes place in deification, which is due not only to an existential dynamic, not merely an outward activity, but an inner operation. The deifying operation of the divine within the soul in turn reflects the characteristics of the divine operations as ontological reforming principles. This is vindicated through the material event of God enfleshed,\textsuperscript{119} which shows that deification is not merely an immaterial event but is stationed in the material hypostasis and in a uniting of the spiritual and material natures. The event of the Christ indicates the intention for human persons and that, at the very core of person, an event can and will occur, which has not only existential but ontological implications. The nature of being is changed through this event of restoration within human persons reforming them to their intended ontological condition through the “economy of salvation”.\textsuperscript{120} This equating of Christ’s manifestation with the uniting and restoring of, both existence and being, is also affirmed by Maximus, who stated that God deifies creatures by grace\textsuperscript{121} but who “transcends created beings...foreknows the existence of all his creatures”.\textsuperscript{122} Through deification the human hypostasis and ousia together is restored.

For me, the human spiritual ousia represents the stuff or essential reality of the soul; by which in the deification of the hypostasis the natural physis deified allows an awareness of the Atmanic condition through grace. In other words ousia cannot be relegated to an impersonal substance of material existence. Even though in Greek Patristic terms the human ousia was understood as created, and thus was distinct from the uncreated ousia of God, it did have this metaphysical dimension, as Maximus stated:

we must distinguish intellectually...the vital inbreathing and the Holy Spirit which underline the noetic essence of the soul, and, on the other hand, the enfleshment and ‘breath’ which underline the nature of bodies...Adam came

\textsuperscript{118} See Maximus, Thal.60, 73. Because of the word limit I cannot examine the theology of event, for this see Paul M. Collins, ‘Event: The ‘How’ of Revelation’, in Trinitarian Theology West and East, pp.7-33, and also p 96.

\textsuperscript{119} This event (in 1 John 1:2-5) indicates the reality of the world as the “word of life” (λόγου τῆς ζωῆς) “manifested” (ἐφανερώθην) to give “eternal life” (ζωὴν τὴν αἰώνιον).

\textsuperscript{120} Maximus, Thal.60, 79, 116; translation by Blowers, On the Cosmic Mystery of Christ, p.128.

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., 116.

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., 119-125.
into being in a secret way, with a different principle of his soul’s being and a different mode of its generation.\textsuperscript{123}

When relating the noetic essence of the soul to \textit{Atman}, it should indicate the highest spiritual dimension in human beings (metaphysical \textit{ousia}), where a secret inbreathing relates implicitly to the spiritual \textit{stuff} of being, and allows the imparting of an \textit{Atmanic} nature to human persons. What Maximus continues to argue is that there is a difference between the soul and the body which really amounts to two in-breathings, one of the soul and one of the body, which almost seems to bifurcate the person. This division of \textit{being} is united in a \textit{hypostatic}-union where divine unity becomes the copy for the human unity.\textsuperscript{124} Through this idea of simultaneity of disunity and unity, of possibility and actuality, a dynamic aspect is brought into the relationship of the soul with the body, where the highest spiritual context defines the somatic existence. In this context, as Maximus highlights, there are really three births relating to \textit{being} and becoming, firstly of the creation of “\textit{being}” (τὸ εἶναι) which is a bodily birth; the second is the “\textit{good-being}” (τὸ εὖ εἶναι) related to baptism; and the third birth is the “\textit{eternal being}” (τὸ ἁεὶ εἶναι),\textsuperscript{125} the transformation of the soul in true \textit{being}, where the person by grace is transformed into “\textit{eternal well-being}”.\textsuperscript{126} Hence, the person attains a state of \textit{being} and becoming, where the metaphysical \textit{stuff} (soul) when \textit{deified}, transforms material \textit{being} into true being, which is intellectually grasped (cognized) by the \textit{nous}.

It is important to note here that in contrast to contemporary Eastern Orthodoxy, the concept of the soul in the West seems to relate more to substance,\textsuperscript{127} to soul \textit{stuff},\textsuperscript{128} but which has many problems relating to such a term and Ury states that: “God is substance. This ontological statement, germinating in Platonic and Aristotelian constructs, has spawned a maze of tortuous options still unresolved”.\textsuperscript{129} Problems revolving around the \textit{stuff} of the soul also led Yannaras to state that in contemporary times, most people identify the soul with a Platonic “immaterial element, spiritual.

\textsuperscript{123} Maximus, \textit{Ambig.42.} 1324C-1324D; translation by Blowers, \textit{On the Cosmic Mystery of Christ.} pp.87-88.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., 1325A.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., \textit{Ambig.42.} 1325B-1325D; translation by Blowers, \textit{On the Cosmic Mystery of Christ}, pp.88-89.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{127} Exemplified in Plato, \textit{Ph.}78D (123); and also in Augustine, \textit{De Trin.}1.6 (37-44).
\textsuperscript{128} See also Thomas Aquinas, \textit{ST.} Vol.1.Q.29.2, and Vol.1.Q.75.2; Duns Scotus, \textit{Ord.4.1.1}, n.30-4.45.2, n.12.
\textsuperscript{129} Ury, \textit{Trinitarian Personhood}, p.62.
essentially different from our own material composition". He believes this to be at odds with the Biblical and Greek Patristic model of rational soul or psyche. However, the two are not mutually exclusive, but it is incongruent to talk in existential terms of which the uniting aspect is a noetic-hypostasis. This thesis accepts an essentiality of soul where the core of hypostasis has as its essential reality, the spiritual stuff of human persons, otherwise being a person would be determined by a conglomeration of elements. Also the term “living soul” (ψυχήν ζωσαν, LXX, 2:7), used in Genesis, for me implies a substantial sense of being as a centre of that existence as a “spiritual body” (σώματα ἐποιμάντα, 1Cor.15:40). Of course the “spiritual body” is different from the material body as Paul states, but the two are not mutually exclusive but rather homogenised in the human person who, as a rational animal (zoon logikon), is deified (zoon theoumenon).  

However, Gregory of Nyssa rejected prior essentiality in the human soul which he believed pointed to the validity for reincarnation, which he calls “invented doctrines”. But as argued in the last chapter, reincarnation does not prohibit the notion of unity in the soul (indicated in this thesis through the term Âtman), but relates to the particular individual experience, or difference. Reincarnation applies not to a model of unity but to a model of difference or the individual soul (jivâman), and implies that it is not related to Âtman but to the natural physis. In this context reincarnation is related more to an understanding of what is ignorant in human personhood and the outer existential condition, not to unity.

When considering the nature of the soul, Gregory of Nyssa did not argue for an outward essentialist approach for his views were consistently Platonic, as were those of Gregory Nazianzen. This approach is very much evident in Gregory Nazianzen in de exterioris hominis vilitate, where he lamented the outward condition of the “wretched race of men” and extolled the inward glory of the soul in the possibilities of the soul to look “upwards”. This ‘inward glory’ points to the true

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11. Gregory of Nazianzus, Or.38.11, 321C-D.
nature of the inward soul which is “upward” looking and is intimately connected to the presence of God through the divine “breath”. In Genesis this breath is “taken from Himself” allowing for both an intelligible soul and the essential reality of human nature. The breath is denoted in the LXX through the words ψυχήν and πνεῦμα (Gen. 1:31 and 2:7), and indicates the depth of being within the human person issuing from the essence of God. The breath also becomes important Christologically, in the regeneration of humanity through the reception of the Holy Spirit in Christ’s breathing, who “breathed onto” (ἐνεφώσθησαν, John 20:22) the disciples, giving them the Holy Spirit. Through the divine breath human beings enter into a state of becoming through the soul, being a living soul (ψυχήν ζωήν), having a nature which was created “according to our image and likeness” (κατ’ ἐκόνα, καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν, LXX, Gen. 1:26-28). The word “image” indicates the nature of human existence, the soul, while “likeness” indicates sameness, referring to the nature of the “image”, which was “like” God, having difference (hypostasis) and unity in an essential reality. The term “likeness” implies the possibilities for the human person in the restoration of human existence through Christ, where Christ united himself with human persons purifying “flesh by flesh; soul by soul; and like by like”. Gregory Nazianzen stated that Christ assumed “the poverty of my flesh, that I may assume the richness of His Godhead”. Within this understanding the notion of the soul, as the “breath of the great mind”, can be said to include a nature which when deified with the body, attains a new “garment of skin”. This notion of “perfected form” underlying the potentiality or

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135 See LXX Gen.2:7; see also Gregory Nazianzen who uses the notion of breath to highlight ‘man’s’ connectedness to the divine, see ‘De Anima’, Carm.1.1.8, 446-456; ‘De naturae humanae fragilitate’. Carm.1.2.12, 754; ‘De exterioris hominis vilitate’, Carm.1.2.14., 777-778; and Or.38.11, 321C-D.
136 LXX, Gen. 2.7. See also Gregory Nazianzen, Or.38.11, 321C-D.
137 The word ἐνεφώσθησαν according to G. R. Berry, Greek to English Interlinear (Iowa Falls: 2002) is translated “breathed into” but it has also been translated as “onto”, from ἐνεφώσθησαν (See Balz and Schneider, Exegetical Dictionary of the New Testament. Vol.1.), but “onto” implies a movement of the Holy Spirit “into” the disciples not merely a placing on them the Spirit.
138 Gregory Nazianzen, Or.38.13, 325B-C; translation by C. G. Browne (NPNF 7), p.349.
139 Ibid., 324A.
142 Ibid., p.50.
capacity in the essential human nature where human beings can attain, as Nellas states, a “full unity of himself and the world in God, realised in actuality”.143

2.8.2 A Macarian Perspective

Pseudo-Macarius also harmonised the concepts of body and soul within a holistic unity in the heart. While Byzantine theology pointed to the idea of a double human nature and seemed to develop a bifurcated nature of “man”, Pseudo-Macarius significantly unified the nature of “man” in a holistic notion of the human being by emphasising the heart as a centre for the unity of body and soul.145 Pseudo-Macarius qualified his notion of human being where material existence attains spiritual fullness through participation with the divine Spirit, the two coming together in the heart. In Pseudo-Macarius’ model of being, the soul has a subtle but substantial existence which when mingled with the body, unites the whole being. The Lord himself enters into a state of becoming to allow humanity to become, and in this the Lord becomes creation itself, not divided or separate, and through divine transformation, “recreates the soul and fills it with spiritual happiness”.148 As such, the “body does not have life in itself” but is given life through the soul. Consequently, a spiritual life has to be considered in terms of materially and immaterially, where the divine activity in the soul informs and restores the outward condition, completing the whole person in deification.

143 Ibid., p.54.
147 Ibid., (410).
148 Ibid., this represents a condescension of God’s transcendent being, for an interesting examination of God’s transcendence and world see John Macquarrie’s revelatory typologies in, Principles of Christian Theology (London:1966, 2003), pp.166-167.
In this small sub-chapter I will consider some implications of Palamite theology to *deification*. Gregory Palamas argued, that knowing, in the experience of God, it is not mere intellectual symbolism, or a philosophical speculation, but a real experience where the "hypostatic light is seen",<sup>150</sup> but "ignorantly known".<sup>151</sup>

Palamas referred to the experience of the divine light through uncreated operations or energies as the essential *being* of God, which could not be rationally known. Hence *deification* for Palamas related not to the essence (*ousia*) of God, but to the uncreated operations of the divine. Here the notion of uncreated energies develops an existential and ontological *gulf* not only between what is *genetic* and the *agenetic*<sup>152</sup> but what was spirituality available to humanity. This *gulf* would be underlined in the strongest terms by Gregory Palamas, stating "the uncreated is unique, namely, the divine nature, and anything whatsoever distinct from this is created".<sup>153</sup> This distinction of the human condition to the divine is however somewhat mitigated in act of *deification*, where "the man divinised by grace will be everything that God is, apart from identity of substance".<sup>154</sup> This Palamite approach to *deification* underlined that participation (*theosis*) is operational and not related to the divine *ousia*,<sup>155</sup> for if one participates by substance one becomes, in some way, part of that substance.<sup>156</sup> But in Palamas' model, does the divine act become divorced from the essential *being* of God and when applied to the human condition, manifests in the human person, a bifurcated nature or at least a separation between the outward *hypostasis* and the inner essential spiritual nature where there is no means for unity? This cannot be answered here, but if the word ἐνέργεια (in-work)<sup>157</sup> is applied to operations and not energies a stronger

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<sup>150</sup> Gregory Palamas, *TDS*, D.II.i.8, (Gendle).

<sup>151</sup> Ibid.

<sup>152</sup> For examples of see Gregory Nazianzen, *Or*.29 (76A0D); and Gregory of Nyssa, *Eun.*. 22-225.

<sup>153</sup> See Gregory Palamas, *Cap.*150,73, 1172. (Sinkewicz), ἐν ἑστι τῷ ἀκτιστῷ, ἥ θεία φύσις, πᾶν δὲ τὸ διαφέροντα ταύτῃ ὑπάρχουν κτιστῶν ἐστι .

<sup>154</sup> Ibid., 111, 1197; see also *TDS*, E.III.i.34.

<sup>155</sup> *Cap.*150, 104, 1192; 109, 1196.

<sup>156</sup> Ibid., 110-111, 1196-1197.

<sup>157</sup> Through the Palamite dogma of uncreated energies (ἐνέργειας) the Greek word ἐνέργεια has come to be equated in English with energies, see *Cap.*150, C.85 9 (Sinkewicz), p.183; also see Lossky, *The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church*, p.70. But this correlation should not be made for in English energies is a term that has weak ontological implications. Also in the New Testament it related to operations and to δύναμις, the activity of the divine power not the resulting reflected energies, see Balz and Schneider, *Exegetical Dictionary of the New Testament*. In Ephesians 1:19, the use of ἐνέργεια is
ontological relationship between the divine nature and extrusive divine activities is made. While the word operations seems to be relational to the intrusive being of God and not a predicated activity, the words uncreated and energies indicated either separation or predication, which seems to make a distinction between the inner essence and an extrusive activity forging a gulf between creator and created.

2.8.4 Deification within a Substantialist Model

What is the relationship of deification to the physis of a person, of hypostasis to ousia within a substantialist context? While the Greek Fathers generally did not connect the term ousia to the metaphysical stuff of the soul, but to rationality, I understand person to refer to an existential (hyparxis) context through the property or essence of being (κατ’ οὐσίαν). He affirmed that God alone knows what he is “in essence” while also confirming that created beings are in themselves beings κατ’ οὐσίαν and that by a grace a knowledge of what they are in essence is granted. He rejects the view that the “essence of rational beings is coeternal with God”, but affirms the essential reality of rational beings. It can then be asserted that the human person shares not only a way of existing, having a hypostasis, but also essential being.

translated in Latin as operationem (operations). Nestle-Aland, Novum Testamentum Graece et Latine, p.505. Palamas’ model was created to manifest such a difference between a source (God) and the extrusive power coming from that source, so as to deny human accessibility to the divine source, but the energies were open to human participation. But if the energies were to be correlated to an extrusive power emanating from a source, these energies would have to be considered of the same substance as the source, as with the plasma coming from the Sun. Palamas model denies this, which makes the use of energies reductio absurdum.

For an example see, Gregory of Nyssa, Hom. Opif. 11-17, 153C-187A.

As exemplified by Gregory of Nyssa, who referred to a “reasoning activity” or λογικής ενέργειας (See Hominis Opificio, 14.2, 176A-B; translation by Moore, On the Making of Man, NPNF 5, p.403), and that there are three parts of the faculty of the mind (soul), the third being “rational, perfect and co-extensive”, where the “true perfect soul is naturally one, the intellect and immaterial”. He thus states the soul is the rational soul (ibid.). See also Maximus, Mystagogia, 23, 700D-701A; which is confirmed by Hans Urs von Balthasar, in Cosmic Liturgy, as “intelligible structure of being’, (λόγος τοῦ εἶναι)”, p.219.

Maximus, Thal. 60, 81, 127.

Maximus, ibid., 79-80, 95-130. In this passage alone the term is found at least 7 times.

Maximus, Thal. 60, 79, 124-5.

Maximus, ibid., 80, 127.

Maximus, Thal. 60. Maximus, Thal. 60, 81, 130-140; translation by Blowers, On the Cosmic Mystery of Christ, p.128.
As such, person can be considered as particularized through hypostasis, which highlights that persons have an essential reality of being.\textsuperscript{165} Gregory Nazianzen stated that:

He bears the title “Man” not just with a view to being accessible through his body to corporeal things – being in all other respects inaccessible, owing to the incomprehensibility of his nature – but with the aim of hallowing Man through himself, by becoming a sort of yeast for the whole lump. He has united himself all that lay under condemnation, in order to release it from condemnation.\textsuperscript{166}

When relating ousia and hypostasis in deification, the uniting of the two natures in Christ\textsuperscript{167} provides a model to understand the human person, having the two natures the somatic (material) and the soul (immaterial). Thus there can be said to be two ousia\textsuperscript{168} of human beings, the natural ousia and the spiritual ousia which Maximus called the essences of the body and soul,\textsuperscript{169} but which, for Maximus, related to the “intelligible structure”\textsuperscript{170}. This does not mean that the spiritual ousia is predicated to the person, but indicates how concrete person is related to a spiritual essential reality.

The bodily nature or stuff of the individual or material existence can thus be viewed as part of the outward person, but should not be confused with the spiritual essential stuff of being. It is the spiritual stuff which can then be considered, as the highest part of the soul, to be individually contained in each person and unitised within a singular reality.\textsuperscript{171}

If the human person is to participate with God through a union of its natures there must be an essential bridge that unites the divide between the inner with the outer.

\textsuperscript{165} This follows the Western model which is exemplified in Augustine, De Trin.5.8.9-7.6.12, 217-266; and Duns Scotus, Ord.1.5.1.un., n.10.

\textsuperscript{166}  Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 30.21; translation by Wickham, On God and Christ, p.111.

\textsuperscript{167} Alberigo et al. (eds.), Conciliorum Oecumenicorum, pp.57 -63; and Norman Tanner, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, p.86.

\textsuperscript{168} On the notion of two ousiai see Prestige, God in Patristic Thought, p.273.

\textsuperscript{169} Maximus, Ep.12, 488B-C.

\textsuperscript{170} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{171} This reality can be understood in term of being the individual in the truest sense. It could even be understood in terms of ὑποκειμένον, as Aristotle stated that “all substance appears individual. And this is indisputably true in the case of the primary substances. What each denotes is a unit”, πάσα δὲ ὁμοίως δοκεῖ τόδε τι σημαίνειν. ἐτι μὲν οὖν τόν πρώτον ὑποκειμένον ἀναμιμηθητον καὶ ἄλλης ἔστιν ὅτι τόδε τι σημαίνει: ἄτομον γὰρ καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ τὸ ὀνομάζομεν ἔστιν’, Aristotle, Cat.V.3a.10; translation by H. P. Cooke (LC.L., 325), p.29. This reality will be equated with Atman as the the primary substance, see Cat.V.1b.15- V. 2b.35.
This divide is overcome through the restoring activity of the divine operations and because the activity of the divine cannot be divorced from its own essential reality, human hypostases must participate in some way with the divine essence (ousia), whether in some known or unknown way. It is because the whole Trinity is revealed together, the divine hypostases and ousia: participation must indicate a communion with the whole God. This does not confuse the distinction between the divine and human realities, but confirms that participation is not just a superficial communion and that it must have ontological implications. Thus a model that is akin to that developed by Augustine and Duns Scotus, who argued that the divine substance, the essential divine reality, is not divided from the process of revelation and to whom that revelation and participation is given. Human persons are able to participate with God in this way because of the nature of the relationship of the Christ with the Father, as Augustine stated:

Further, that form of man which He took is the person of the Son, not also of the Father; on which account the invisible Father, together with the Son, who with the Father is invisible, is making Him visible. But if he became visible in such a way as to cease to be invisible with the Father, that is, if the substance (substantia) of the invisible Word were turned by a change and transition into a visible creature, then the Son would be so understood to be sent by the Father, that He would be found to be only sent; not also with the Father sending.

The Augustinian model above also affirms that the reality of divine substance in relation to sending, or revelation, and thus participation. Without the ontological predisposition, human participation with Christ and thus God becomes empty. Consequently the soul, which had for Scotus an essential reality, must in some known or unknown way participate in the divine substance manifesting a participatory

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172 See Augustine, *De Trin.* 7.11.4, 7, V.6; and Duns Scotus, *Ord.* 15.1.un., n.10. Augustine argued for a model of distinction and unity in substance stating that in the Trinity “some things are separately affirmed, the Persons being also each severally named; and yet are not to be understood as though the other Persons were excluded, on account of the unity of the same Trinity and the One substance and Godhead of the Father and of the Son and the Holy Spirit”, *De Trin.* 111.19; translation by A. W. Haddan (NPNF, 3), p.28, where Persons and substance, the whole Trinity together are revealed to humanity.

173 *Forma porro illa suscepti hominis fillia persona est, non etiam patris. Quapropter pater inuisibilis una cum filio secum inuisibilium eundem filium usibilem faciendo mississe cum dictus est; qui si eo modo usibilis fieret ut cum patre inuisibilis esse desisteret, id est si substantia inuisibilis verbi in creaturam usibillem mutare et transiens uerteretur, ita missus a patre intellegentur filius ut tantum missus non etiam cum patre mittens inueniretur, De Trin.* 2. V.9; translation by A. W. Haddan (NPNF, 3), p.41.

174 Duns Scotus, *Ord.* 41.1, n.30-43.2.2, n.17.
union in the individual and unifying the human person to the divine, which becomes what it should be in such a union.

This notion of union through participation was also echoed by Dionysius and Maximus who considered that divine revelation through *deification* had significant ontological implications on the human level relating to the true reality of being. While they distinguished between the *agenetic* and *genetic*, the mystical experience of *deification* seems to somewhat reduce any gulf in the fullness of that experience, for Maximus stated that, (at the resurrection) "humanity is born in an unchanging state of being". While the Cappadocians bridged the ontological gulf through an ethical and ecclesiological approach to *deification*, and the use of *apophatic* language, Dionysius and Maximus’ approach allowed for a bridging of the ontological gulf between the *genetic* and *agenetic* in a satisfactory model. They seem to harmonise notions of *being* and existence within a model that highlights what could be attained in human beings. Maximus stated:

God as it were, connected for me the principle of my being and the principle of my well-being, bridging the separation and distance between them that I had caused, and thereby wisely drew them together in the principle of eternal being. By this principle, it is no longer a matter of humanity bearing or being born along existentially...wherein humanity is born into immortality in an unchanging state of being.

In the works of Dionysius and Maximus the highest state of *being* in the human person is not ignored or relegated to the *apophatic*, although certainly the *apophatic* language is also incorporated, but *being* is incorporated into the language of existence. The notion of unity in the human being must include the material and the immaterial and consequently, the total human *being* participates with the triune God who as the cause of *being* unites that *being* to Himself. Thus Dionysius stated that

175 See Pseudo-Dionysius, *DN* 9.6, 931C; and Maximus, *Thal.* 60, 73-76 respectively.
178 Ibid. p.233.
179 For example see Gregory of Nyssa, *V. Mos.*, 328A-429D.
180 This also seems to be the conclusion of N. Russell, see *The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition*, p.9.
182 See also *Ambig.* 42, 1316A-1349A; and Pseudo-Dionysius, *DN*, 7.1-4, 865B-872C.
183 Ibid.
184 Pseudo-Dionysius, *DN*, 11.2, 949C-952B.
"He brings everything together into a unity without confusion, into an undivided communion where each thing continues to exhibit its own specific form". 1114 The notion of being is taken out of what cannot be accomplished or understood and related to what can be accomplished, that is to say that in deification 1185 the restoration of the whole of human personhood is attained. It is a glorious vision of God and humanity reconciled, as Dionysius declared that “He illumines all men” (ὁ φωτίζει πάντα ἄνθρωπον). 1186 But humanity is not illumined merely by the natural human physis, but through the grace of Christ, whereby the human nature gains access to the higher nature and God 1187 through that grace.

Christ came to restore broken human nature and recapitulate 1188 humankind to Himself, 1189 where humanity attains the restoration of its nature and makes the human person whole. However, this restoration is not merely a matter of the mending of a previous state but also of reciprocation. There has to be a personal wish to participate and be saved or made whole. Through the divine will (θέλημα), 1190 God creates humanity and wishes human persons to be restored, but it is the human wish 1191 to be restored, where divine participation begins a process of restoration. But how does the lower, 1192 fallen or possible (πάθος) 1193 will come to accept the divine, to allow restoration? This is where divine grace plays a part, 1194 where the divine grace allows that lower nature to accept the gift of grace.

The divine thus, places within the human nature a potentiality and a wish to be made whole or a willing disposition in accepting the possibilities for restoration in

1185 Pseudo-Dionysius. CH. 1.1-2, 121A.
1187 Ibid.
1188 Pertaining to άποκατάστασις meaning restoration, see: Clement, Str. 1.21, 853A; Origen, Princ. 3.i.19, and on the restoration of “all things” (άποκατάστασις πάντων). see Princ. 1.vi.1; Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 41.11, 444B; Pseudo-Dionysius, D.N.4.4, 697B; Maximus, Ambig.7,1080B; and in relation to return (apostrophe), see Maximus Ambig.42, 1348B.
1189 See Basil, Ep.38, 329B-D.
1190 On will see Gregory Nazianzen, Or.36.7; and also Bathrellos, The Byzantine Christ, pp.117-122; also see Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness, p.121.
1191 See Bathrellos, The Byzantine Christ, pp.117-122.
1192 The gnomic will is an unwilling will or γνώμη, see Thal.6, 69; see also Bathrellos, The Byzantine Christ, p.155.
1193 Maximus, Ambig.7, 1073B.
1194 See Maximus, Thal.60, 77.69.
This restoration, effected through the event of Christ, continually affects a state of deification for humanity, not only personally but as a whole, changing the nature of human personhood. The act of deification is accomplished through a conversion not only of willing but infers a context of substantial being, where whole being is restored. This corresponds to a conscious awareness within the human intelligence and being where a participatory willingness accepts the activity of the divine will within the human person through the deifying divine operations. The divine operations renders in the person, a condition of ontological restoration to the likeness of the “One” or the subject of knowledge that is Christ, who affects true participation.

2.8.5 Deification and Preexistent Transcendence

The relationship of the divine with the human persons is not only a matter of spiritual feeling but a reforming of essential being, wrought through principles of creation “which pre-exist uniformly in him”. Maximus argues that Christ as the stability (stasis) of created beings, with whom participation is had, allows a “stability wherein no created being will know any change at all”. In this context, a focus on principles that stream forth from the highest ousia (οὐσία), the Super Essential Godhead, manifests a pattern of substances, from the Godhead, to pre-existent principles and then to human essentiality. Through this flow from the divine of reforming principles, the ontological condition changes and acquires a permanent condition. This restoration of the essential or higher nature was correlated in Dionysius to the noetic; where in the highest experience of deification the nature of the transformation of being itself is grasped. The stress however, is not merely on the awareness of the outer hypostatic experience in deification, but also on the whole being. The notion of wholeness contrasts with a separate or broken humanity, which comes to experience

195 Maximus, Thal.6, 69-70.
196 See Irenaeus, in already cited passage p.136, P.Ap.31, 683; and Athanasius, who stated that “He became man that we might become God”, Inc.54, 192B.
197 As understood by Maximus, Thal.6, 69-70.
198 Ibid.
199 Maximus, Thal.60, 81, 130-140; translation by Blowers, On the Cosmic Mystery of Christ, p.128.
perfection because the nature of the "Cause" is wholeness and perfection. This very nature manifests pre-existent principles of the "Preexistent", contrasting with the previous condition of persons and allowing for ontological change to align the human condition with the divine.

In the ontological change within the soul the divine brings the soul into total completion, where in the soul an awareness of itself and God arises and the capabilities for person. Through the divine activity of the "Transcendent", created beings attain knowledge of the totality of being through deification as Maximus affirmed, because each person is a "portion of God" the human person has the capability to become so close to the divine as to be considered deified.

The created human being was not considered in isolation but implicitly related to the divine being or divine "Transcendence". This relational quality of the human being, due to the ontological condition of having a soul, allows the soul to be considered an ontological principle where that condition becomes juxtaposed to the divine being. This is exemplified by Dionysius who argued for relationality through the ontological reality of being situated in relation to the divine through his model of hierarchies. This model affirms not only the ontological disposition of existing in situ in relation to the divine Transcendence but through the inner participating with that Transcendence, indicates the nature of that participation. This is exemplified in the Angels who exist existentially, not only in relation to the divine, but because they are "godlike" and have "the most real experience...in the anteroom of the transcendent Trinity". Angels exhibit an ontological relatedness to the divine, which is intimately linked to the nature of their participation with the divine. Consequently this participation reflects a condition of the inner reality within being and in relation to existing for "beings are never without being, which, in turn comes from the Preexistent (προόντος)". He does not say that beings have only existence, but that being, which

202 Pseudo-Dionysius, *DN*, 5.8, 821D-824A.
203 Ibid.
204 *Maximus, Ambig.*, 7, 1348D-1349A.
205 Pseudo-Dionysius, *DN*, 1.5, 593C.
207 Ibid.
208 Ibid.
209 Ibid.
is derived from the essentiality of the transcendent divine “Cause”, gives rise to existence and thus being. Dionysius stated:

Being is of Him and not Him of being; also in Him being is, and not Him in being; and being has Him and He has not being; and he is also the eternality of being, and the beginning (first), and the meter, before essential being and existence (this) and eternity. Being is completed in “Him” (God), having the “final goal” as “Him” (God), who is the “All” in all persons, which allows persons to be.

Hence, the human condition of being and having the capacity for restoration in deification mirrors the “Pre-existent” divine intention of the divine to restore. Dionysius calls this “Pre-existent” the “capacity to effect unity” a principle that affords ontological return in deification through an “unknowing union”. The capacity to be in a perfected condition is wrought through the power (dynamis) of God who is the “Cause” of being, existence, substance and nature. For Dionysius “He” (God) is the essence of being, and yet not-being: “He is not” being, “He” is that which can be known, and that which is not-known, and yet “everything participates in him and none among beings falls away”. The very God (αὐτόθεος) is in “Himself”, the essence of the Godhead itself (αὐτοθεότης) and brings all persons to “Himself” because of the created condition of being, while at the same time is beyond all things and beings.

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211 καὶ αὐτὸν ἐστι τὸ ἔχει. καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸς τοῦ ἔχει· καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ἔστι τὸ ἔχει, καὶ οὐκ αὐτός ἐν τῷ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν τὸ ἔχει τὸ ἔχει. καὶ οὐκ αὐτός ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει. καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει. καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οὐκ ἃπαν ἔχει τὸ ἔχει· καὶ οUARTA211 ΚΑΙ ΑΥΤΟΥ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΟ ΕΙΝΑΙ. ΚΑΙ ΟΥΚ ΑΥΤΟΣ ΤΟΥ ΕΙΝΑΙ· ΚΑΙ ΕΝ ΑΥΤΟΤΕ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΟ ΕΙΝΑΙ, ΚΑΙ ΟΥΚ ΑΥΤΟΣ ΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΕΙΝΑΙ· ΚΑΙ ΑΥΤΟΝ ΕΧΕΙ ΤΟ ΕΙΝΑΙ· ΚΑΙ ΟΥΚ ΑΥΤΟΣ ΕΧΕΙ ΤΟ ΕΙΝΑΙ· ΚΑΙ ΑΥΤΟΣ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΟΥ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΑΙΩΝ. ΚΑΙ ΑΡΧΗ ΚΑΙ ΜΕΤΡΟΝ, ΠΡΟ ΟΥΙΑΣ ΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΟΥΝΤΟΣ, ΚΑΙ ΑΙΩΝΟΣ, (IBID), 824Α; TRANSLATIONS FORM LUIBEIH AND ROLL. 212 I(BID., DN, 5.8, 821D. 213 I(BID., 7.3, 872Α. 214 I(BID., 4.12, 709D, AND 5.4, 820Α. 215 I(BID. 216 I(BID., 5.5, 820Α-B. 217 I(BID., 4.12, 709D. 218 I(BID., 4.11, 708D. 219 I(BID., 5.4, 817C-D. 220 I(BID. 221 I(BID. 222 I(BID. 223 I(BID., 5.4, 820Α. 224 I(BID., 11.6, 956Α. 225 I(BID.
2.8.6 Deification and Principles of Being

This view is also expressed in Maximus whose approach to human beings becomes even more developed in relation to existence. In Maximus’ model the concept of being becomes related to the principles of creation, where pre-existent principles of divine knowing or logoi become integral to the understanding of being and existence, highlighting the relation of existence to being. The logoi (logoi) or active principles make specific things be, for example Maximus states that:

a logoi of angels preceded their creation, a logoi preceded the creation of each of the beings and powers that fill the upper world, a logoi preceded the creation of human beings, a logoi preceded everything that receives its becoming from God.

This underlines the importance of being, not only in relational or existential models, through modes of existence, but as significant in itself, as the inward reality of all modes of existence.

Maximus’ use of Origen’s use of logoi was also developed to conceive of a rational ontological principle, where logoi become intellectual principles of being. The logoi pertaining to human being-ness, along with many other logoi of divine powers, indicates the nature of human persons in relation to deification, which become an ontological principle. In this thesis this model is related to the notion of union which reflects the reality behind the nature of the human subject and the value of cognition in the essential reality of being with an Atmanic nature. When the awareness of this reality is attained in fullness, the person deified attains a completed mode of existence, a spiritual or Atmanic mode of hypostatic existence, and this spiritual mode of existence can be considered as relating to a principle of being. Maximus stated:

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226 Maximus, Ambig. 7. 1077A-1084D. Maximus’ use of logoi has come to be understood in terms of divine uncreated energies though this whole area is much debated; see Joseph P. Farrell, Free Choice in St Maximus the Confessor (Kansas: 1988), p.139.
227 Maximus the Confessor, Ambig. 7. 1080A; translation by Blowers, On the Cosmic Mystery of Christ, p.55.
228 See Origen, De Principiis I.viii.1.
229 See Farrell, Free Choice in St Maximus the Confessor, p.133.
230 Maximus, Ambig. 7. 1077A-1084D.
the mode thus innovated, while the natural principle is preserved, displays a miraculous power, insofar as the nature appears to be acted upon, and to act, clearly beyond its normal scope.231

The admittance of a scope of activity and being beyond the natural one in human persons, through principles of the divine, infers that the scope of true being goes beyond the natural or the mundane human existential condition or existential communion. The negation of essential being in human persons, as argued by Zizioulas,232 would constitute two problems. Firstly, there would be a negation the logos (principle), which comes from the “Preexistent (προϊάντος)”233 divine being to create the essential reality of human being-ness234 through the activity of the Logos.235

Secondly, the negation of the essentiality of being denies the active principles of the divine to transform being and thus the natural physis to its original state through deification. The notion of active principles confirms the place of a reality of being which creates the principles for being and precedes activity, not the other way round. The logoi activity or active principles of the divine originate from the being of the Logos,236 which allows human persons to be and then be recapitulated through that activity. Thus human persons attain a state of being and then the telos of being or personhood through the activity of the principles of being, emanating from the Logos. Maximus affirms that:

This same Logos, whose goodness is revealed and multiplied in all the things that have their origin in him, with the degree of beauty appropriate to each being, recapitulates all things to himself. Through this Logos there came to be both being and continuing to be.237

It is because the logoi (principles) originate from the divine reality or substantial being, they are en-hypostatic, that is they come from the hypostasis of the Logos, they have source or a centre of origin, which as Maximus affirms makes things be.238 If

231 Maximus, Ambig.42, 1341D; translation by Blowers, On the Cosmic Mystery of Christ, p.90.
232 See Zizioulas, BC.
233 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN, 5.8, 821D-824A.
234 Which will be correlated to the highest part of the soul or Ātman, and which pre-cedes human existence as the Godhead which shall be equated to the terms Paramātman or Paramēsvara, see the Hindi Bible, Gen.1:1, “In the beginning God made the heaven and the earth”, प्रादे दे परमेश्वर ने प्राकाश प्रदे पृथ्वी की स्थान की.
235 Maximus, Ambig.7, 1077A-1084D.
236 This reiterates the Gospel of John 3-11, ‘Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος... Πάντα δι’ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο.
237 Maximus, Ambig.7, 1080B; translation by Blowers, On the Cosmic Mystery of Christ, p.55.
238 Ibid., 1077A-1084.
*being* was considered only in terms of an activity or communion there would be no centre by which the divine principles could emanate. There has to be a centre to God's *being* by which these principles originate otherwise the *logoi* would not be able to fulfil the human condition of *being* and would be dispersed in an abstract communion.\(^\text{239}\) If *being* were to be considered only in terms of an outer communion, there would be no defined characteristic of *being* by which the notion of *being* could exist in the first place. Hence, it can be argued that where non-being was evident before creation, *being* entered into a state of becoming as material existence and essential reality at the depth of the soul, because of the essentiality at centre of the Godhead. Through this essential unity the creative will provides a centre in the human condition by which human existence comes to be expressed.

When correlating this to a personal level, to *deification* and *being*, it is the event of the *hypostatic-union*\(^\text{240}\) of Christ that manifests a change in *being* and thus existence, through the principles of divine *being*. *Being* and existence come to be significantly related to the activity of the *being* of the *Logos*,\(^\text{241}\) who manifests a change of *being* and existence through the activity of *deification*. This change of the natural *physis* creates a new condition in human persons through restoration, where *being* and existence are conformed to a new spiritual condition.\(^\text{242}\) The new ontological condition is however, not really new but appears to be so, in comparison to the former condition, and represents the true nature of the human being. This true ontological human condition for Maximus was an original condition that was meant for human beings before the "fall"\(^\text{243}\) and thus represents an authentic\(^\text{244}\) ontological condition. The notion of *being* is not ignored or related purely to an outer existentiality but both *being* and existence play a part in the unfolding human narrative.

Human personhood also implies a capacity\(^\text{245}\) and it is due to this capacity that participation in the divine can be experienced. It is this capacity that implies that in the human person there exists a nature not known, or not communed within the

\(^{239}\) Ibid., 1077C.

\(^{240}\) Maximus, *Thal.*60, 73-81.

\(^{241}\) In the next chapter this activity will be correlated to a *Logos-cit* activity.

\(^{242}\) Origen, *Princ.*II.x.1.

\(^{243}\) Maximus, *Thal.*61, 85.

\(^{244}\) Referring to the "truth", ἀλήθεια, see Maximus, *Ambig.*42, 1348B.

\(^{245}\) Maximus, *Thal.*61, 85.
human natural *physis*, which should be known and experienced, and informs us of how the person should be understood. This becomes significant on two levels: firstly persons, as *hypostatic* creatures, can attain the fulfilment of their spiritual nature having the “likeness” of the Christ *hypostasis*, which is made possible through *deification*; and secondly the experience of *deification* reflects what is known in the true experience of human personhood. The whole *being* is *deified*, as the whole person of Christ *deifies*. Thus, within the human person, if following the Christological model, there are two unions; firstly of the material body (the natural *physis*) with the immaterial (soul), and then of the particular unique existence (*hypostasis*) with its spiritual *physis* or the essential reality (*ousia*/*Āśman*). Also *being* a person is not merely a matter of existence, for Maximus does not say that Christ was God by existence or became “man” by existence, but by nature. In other words, there is an ontological relatedness in the essential nature of Christ to that existence. When again applying the Christological to the human level, the human existence or particular *hypostasis* attains its true understanding of what he or she is as his or her essential reality through grace and restoration of that nature.

Maximus also shifts the focus away from the existential in his use of *kinesis* or movement, for *being* precedes movement; as he states, one cannot have “movement before something has come into being.” This is to negate the Origenist idea of pre-existent movement, for that would imply a pre-existent soul, but rather movement is part of the *genetic* or creaturely condition. With regard to the re-incarnation the notion of movement comes after the soul and does not pre-exist the soul. In the same way, a being as communion through relationality cannot pre-exist the soul and hence communion cannot relate to a pre-existing movement but reflects an intended reality of the soul, meant for the soul when it was created. When placed within the model of the soul presented by this thesis and correlated to a notion of *Āśman*, reincarnation cannot apply to this original state, but to the existential activity or movement within the lower nature. As such reincarnation only applies to a sense of separation and has no part to play in the notions of *deification* or re-cognition.

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246 Maximus, *Thal.*60, 73-81.
247 Maximus, *Ambig.*42, 1316A-1349A.
249 On this see Farrell, *Free Choice in St Maximus the Confessor*, p.134.
Maximus' view on movement would seem therefore to negate existence as having priority over being and thus negating an outer existentialist interpretation of the Greek Fathers, which places the stress on hyparxis as replacing essentiality of being. \(^{250}\) Existence and movement are subsequent to being, and although they are important factors in restoration, cannot replace or precede being. While Maximus confirms that the noetic experience of ἐκστασις is an intellectual motion, \(^{251}\) coming from a subjective point and moving as it were outwards, this movement comes from a point of being. This is confirmed in his understanding of the mode of existence (tropos hyparxeos), \(^{252}\) which results from the human ontological condition, the “principle of human nature” \(^{253}\) (constituting soul and body). \(^{254}\) The τρόπος indicates activity and that which is acted upon, or that which changes, without changing the principle of human being-ness. However, Maximus states that God changes the mode of existence, not the principle of existence, and that in renewing human nature, change occurs in the natural τρόπος not in the principle of existence, \(^{255}\) which seems to put the emphasis back on the existential.

This can be understood, in the emphasis on the Ātman in this thesis, in relation to the tropos (mode) of human personhood. The essential principle of being in personhood indicates the mode that the person attains hypostatically in deification in an Ātmanic mode of existence. This also relates to the principles of the mode that comes into being. It is because the principles or logoi, are simultaneously perfect in God in the beginning and the end, their nature in manifesting deification indicates a true mode for human persons and implies the nature of the telos of human personhood, which in this thesis is understood as Ātmanic. In other words, the activity of the divine being changes human existence, which culminates in the recognition of the truth of the ontological condition. This mirrors the nature of the principle of perfection, through the activity of the divine, where the human τρόπος of existence is deified, through the principle of existence and being or Ātman. \(^{256}\)

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\(^{250}\) See Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness, pp.43, 105, 110.

\(^{251}\) Maximus, Ambig.7, 1073C-D.

\(^{252}\) Maximus, Ambig.42, 1341D-1344B.

\(^{253}\) Ibid.

\(^{254}\) Ibid.

\(^{255}\) Maximus, Ambig.42, 344D-1345A.

\(^{256}\) Ibid.
Conscious awareness in the experience of deification allows for the transformation of awareness of the despoiled human nature and thus consciousness in deification.

The notion of the transformation of consciousness then can relate to the transformation of self-awareness, to the attaining of an awareness that understands not the potentiality of the human person but how the human person can come to understand its true essential value in that experience.

The validation for the seeking ontological significance of transformation through the cognition of a higher experience can be sought through the book of Exodus where the reception of the “image” of God, and “likeness” through the breath of God infers that each person has a kinship with the divine in the attaining of that likeness. Through this potentiality of being, kinship is offered to each person through the transformation of human nature and awareness. Kinship in this thesis relates to an ontological value expressing an Atmanic characteristic of human beings that when restored, allows the potentiality of kinship to be fulfilled. But where kinship implies participation, potentiality indicates separation in the notion of what can be attained and what is lost. This loosing of the true human condition and consciousness can relate to the notion of the fall which paradoxically highlights the human ability for divine participation in that a promise for this restoration has been given in the Christological context. The consequent fall manifested a covering of the soul with “garments of skin” (φυλεταρχή θύρας, LXX, Gen. 3:22), which further highlights a gulf that separates humanity from the divine and, in Greek Patristic terms, indicates a fallen spiritual condition in which the soul covered by a fleshy covering loses its sense of the truth of its existence. However, it is this very notion of separation that becomes the benefit to the human condition in that the covering of the soul allows the restoration of the whole person where the Christ, endowed in the same garment, restores humanity to be
"like" the divine. "Garments of skin", while initially indicating the separation of humanity from God and the irrational nature of humanity also highlights the manner by which humanity is restored and the type of consciousness that is to be experienced. Consequently the restoration of the human nature represents the restoration of human consciousness and the telos of the human person.

2.9 Recapitulated Consciousness

In this last part of the Chapter and as a way of concluding the notion of hypostatic particularity and essential reality of being, or Atman, and consciousness is brought together through the affirmation of a cognitive unifying experience. In the context of awareness, in the experience of deification, awareness indicates a divine consciousness (Citr) of the highest reality within an Atmanic consciousness. What is argued is that the hypostasis or person becomes aware of its true reality through a unity with divine in deification. The conscious subject who experiences deification attains a new awareness, represents a restoration of the lower nature in human personhood within a recapitulated consciousness. In the human person there is evident, the possibilities of two types of knowing and experiencing, one relating to a lower nature and the other to a higher nature.

Maximus also highlighted that there can be considered two types of knowledge in human persons: the first is relative and relates to the natural physis, the ordinary life; the second is that which is authentic, and relates to the experience of deification, to "total perception". This "total perception" allows the individual to experience deification, in a unified cognition where the human person is completely united with God in hypostatic experience. The principle of deification revealed through the activity of the Logos, and after the birth of the Incarnate Logos through the hypostatic union in the Christ. Maximus allows us to consider that this experience

263 Telos (end) is mentioned 720 times in LXX, and in the New Testament 40 times but attains an ethical and ontological dimension in "be perfect" (τελειός, Mat. 5:48). See also references to 'Perfection' (τελείως and τελειότης, Heb. 6:1), and 'I will complete' (τελειώω, Acts 20:24); also see Maximus Ambig. 42, 1345A-D.
264 Maximus, Opusc. 34B-D (Louth).
265 Maximus Ambig. 42 (Blowers).
is not merely for the few, but is “unceasingly in effect”\(^{266}\) in the future and in the now. The restoring of the material nature allows the experience, and the possibilities for a change of conscious awareness in relation to the divine, to be opened to all, for all persons share a nature restored in the Christ. The possibilities to access this restoration within the hypostatic allows for the recapitulation to be grasped within a recapitulated consciousness, where the divine hypostatic union of the natures in Christ opened the way for the experience of the higher knowledge in the reformation of all human hypostases.\(^{267}\)

The idea of restoration (\textit{apokatastasis}) in Greek Patristics continued the theme of restoration exemplified in Acts 3:21, which referred to the “restoration of all things” (\textit{ἀποκαταστάσεως πάντων}).\(^ {268}\) It also allows for a correlation to a knowledge rendered in perfection.\(^ {269}\) The notion of recapitulated consciousness thus utilises this idea of restoration or a recapitulation consciousness within the human condition that is rational or intelligible, so as to include that which cannot be known in the ordinary consciousness.

The notion of knowing was somewhat confined to what could not be known and hence related to an apophatic knowledge in the Greek Fathers, which allows for the ideal of penetration of the human mind into the unknowable divine.\(^ {270}\) The total transformation of the natural mind\(^ {271}\) could be developed where the transformation and the exploration of the possibilities for the human person could be experienced in the cognitive experience of deification, but in the higher experiences the natural awareness gives way to a consciousness that is beyond the mundane state. In this state

\(^{266}\) Ibid.

\(^{267}\) Ibid.

\(^{268}\) This also correlates restoration with the notion of τοῦ πληρώματος τῶν καιρῶν (“fullness of times”, Ephesians 1:10); πληρώμα τοῦ θεοῦ (“fullness of God”, Ephesians 3:19); and πληρώματος τοῦ χριστοῦ (“fullness of Christ”, Ephesians 4:13). See also Origen, \textit{Princ.}\(1.1.1\). And related to a sense of defication, see: Gregory of Nyssa, \textit{Hom.Opifl.14}, 175D; and also Justin Martyr, \textit{Apol.1.23}, 364B; Irenaeus, \textit{P.Ap.6}, 7, 32, 664-684; Clement \textit{Str.1.21}, 289A, \textit{Str.2.22}, 1085B, \textit{Str.3.9}, 1168A, \textit{Str.4.21}, 1344B; Origen, \textit{Princ.}\(1.6.2, III.1.15, III.1.19, III.6.6, III.6.7, IV.4.9\); Athanasius, \textit{Inc.10, 112C-113C}; Gregory Nazianzen, \textit{Or.30.6, 109B-112B}; Gregory of Nyssa, \textit{Con.Eun.3.2} and also see \textit{Anim. et Res.}, 12; Pseudo-Dionysius, \textit{DN, 7.2-4}, 868B-872C; Maximus \textit{Ambig.7, 1080B}.

\(^{269}\) See Maximus, \textit{Ambig.7, 1077A-B}.

\(^{270}\) Through an unknowing knowing or aphaeretic experience, as exemplified example in Gregory of Nyssa, \textit{V.Mos.}, 333B; see also Martin Laird, \textit{Gregory of Nyssa and the Grasp of Faith} (Oxford: 2004) p.34 and footnote 3. From the Greek \textit{aphaeresis} meaning to ‘take way’.

the person is restored to a former noetic condition and attains a recapitulated consciousness. The inability of the natural human mind to translate the experience into adequate theological terms in Greek Patristics keeps the truth of deification hidden and thus allows the cognition of deification to be understood in ways that are unknown in the ordinary human experience.272 The only way to gain access to this knowledge is in the cognitive experience of the essential reality of being. The cognitive experience of this reality is understood here to be correlative to an Ātmanic experience, as will be discussed in the next chapter, which can also be considered beyond the ordinary awareness and accessed through a Cid-ātmanic condition or recapitulated consciousness. Within the hypostasis a change of being in deification facilitates a change of consciousness expressed in a different mode of existence that is not only Ātmanic, not only indicating a static essence, but is active through the will, power and conscious awareness of that condition. This consciousness, equated to the experience of deification, allows a dual consciousness, which is simultaneously experienced and attained in the hypostasis. The nature of consciousness as understood within a dual context can be said to have been expressed in the New Testament when Paul stated: “we have the mind of Christ” (1 Cor. 2:16).273 In this context a simultaneous knowing within the mind points to a static experience and the possibilities of a higher consciousness within the mundane. This mundane consciousness relates to a common nature contained within the word “we” but is also connected to a spiritual nature, which when restored facilitates an experience and awareness of the Christ mind.

Thus the word for the intelligible soul, nous, in Greek Patristics,274 expressed a knowing of both potentiality and actuality, so as to indicate something more than mundane thought ἐπινοέω275 ἐννοεῖ (intelligence),276 διάνοει (understanding, reasoning)277 and λόγισμός (reasoning).278

272 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN, 7.3, 872A.
273 Or νοοὶ χριστοῦ ἐξουμν.
274 For an example, see Gregory of Nyssa, Hom.Opif., 153C-D.
275 For a very good explanation of ἐπινοεῖ in Gregory of Nyssa, see ‘ΕΠΙΝΟΙΑ in NPNF 5, p.249.
276 Ibid.
277 For an example, see Gregory of Nyssa, V.Mos.,333B; and also Martin Laird, Gregory of Nyssa and the Grasp of Faith (Oxford: 2004) p.34 and footnote 3.
278 For an example of see Gregory of Nyssa, V.Mos.,329A and 353C.
In Gregory of Nyssa the attaining of awareness beyond normal consciousness was related to the *apaeretic* experience.\(^{279}\) As the mind of the individual comes closer to the mind of God it transforms, loses its ordinary sense of *self* and becomes what it should be.\(^{280}\) In this model, the differences between “earthly consciousness”\(^{281}\) and heavenly consciousness can be considered as reconciled through the *hypostasis* where through this ontological condition a way is opened that allows for the mundane and the incomprehensible experience of the divine vision.\(^{282}\) This flexible approach to accepting both experiences is exemplified in Gregory of Nyssa’s mystical theology. In this theology the mind, as it moves to the divine, experiences a movement outwards of its ordinary condition, which he calls *epektasis* (“expansion”)\(^{283}\) where the growth of the soul leads to a stripping of its earthly identity.\(^{284}\) It allows a letting go (apaeresis)\(^{285}\) of discursive reasoning (natural mind or dianoia),\(^{286}\) and the “common limits of our human nature”.\(^{287}\) Gregory stated that in illumination:

> as the soul makes progress, and by a greater and more perfect concentration comes to appreciate what the knowledge of truth is, the more it approaches this vision, and so much the more does it see that the divine nature is invisible. It thus leaves all surface appearances, not only those which the mind itself seems to see, and keeps on going deeper until by the operation of the spirit it penetrates the invisible and incomprehensible, and it is there that it sees God. The true vision and the true knowledge of what we seek consists precisely in not seeing, in an awareness that our goal transcends all knowledge.\(^{288}\)

This ‘true vision’ can be correlated to an experience in which the original awareness intended for human persons is recapitulated, where a person attains a *recapitulated consciousness*, which reflects an ontological fulfillment in *deification*. This does not

\(^{279}\) Ibid., pp. 65, 90.

\(^{280}\) Gregory of Nyssa, *V.Mos.*, 327B-429D.


\(^{284}\) Ibid.

\(^{285}\) See Martin Laird, *Gregory of Nyssa and the Grasp of Faith*, pp.65, 90, 109, 119, 144, 170

\(^{286}\) Ibid., p.34.

\(^{287}\) Gregory of Nyssa, *V.Mos.*, 376C-377; translation by Danielou, *From Glory to Glory*, p.118.

negate a limited self-awareness, but rather fulfills it where the person becomes aware of this fulfillment through an expansion or movement to the "presence of God". In this movement the mind penetrates the "impenetrable and enters the darkness where God dwells", and thus the intended consciousness for human persons is recapitulated. The outer person becomes informed, restored and united to its true condition through the inner personal experience, which is translated outwards within the hypostasis in the deified person.

This transformation is due to a participation that occurs in a meeting or a divine event (theophany) and reflects the type of existence (hyparxis) that should be experienced by persons. The ordinary consciousness, or outer awareness, is transformed where a person re-cognises his or her authentic inner state of being and shifts to a divine conscious awareness, changing the understanding of person. The natural 'I' ceases to be contextualised in the restrictive sense of isolated self, and through a theocentric correlation attains its telos. Consequently, deification allows, in a recapitulated consciousness, the focus in personhood to move away from the animalistic and the ordinary awareness, and is an outward expression of a profound inner experience through Christ. As Gregory of Nazianzen reflected concerning the deifying work of Christ: "being so human as to make me God instead of human". The human nature and υόντος is restored to the former image of God, which according to Gregory Nazianzen proceeded from God and "to God returning again".

2.10 Conclusion

In this chapter a model of person (through deification) was sought in which existential difference (or hypostasis) was qualified through the notion of unity identified in the term ousia. There was also evident the beginnings of the correlating of Ἀιμα to the highest part of soul, which will be examined in the next chapter. It was considered

290 Ibid.
291 Gregory Nazianzen, 'De Christi Incarnatione', Carm.1.1.11, 470-471 (Gilbert).
292 For examples, see Gregory of Nyssa, Hom.Opif.11 (153C-D), and 14 (175D).
293 Gregory Nazianzen, 'De animae suae calamitatis Carmen lugubre', Carm.2.1.45, 1353-1378 (Gilbert).
that the notion of hypostatic difference attains a full sense of what it is to be a person through deification or union with the divine in the essential reality of personal being. It was argued that a model of person that does not affirm that the metaphysical reality of a person confines this metaphysical reality as merely part of the hypostatic subject. The notion of the essential reality of being has to be intimately related to subjective awareness; otherwise personhood becomes correlated to outward existential acts.

Hence, a notion of person was developed through a union of essential being and the concrete person, which attains its telos in deification. The question was posed whether the Greek Fathers had a concept of person in order to focus the rationale for the model argued herein by utilising the Cappadocian notion of hypostasis and evolving those ideas to include a stronger focus on ousia to indicate the essential reality of personhood. This was then integrated with the notion of deification, and again with a strong emphasis on the essential reality of being-ness or the immaterial stuff of being. The contemporary Eastern Orthodox models of person were examined giving special attention to Zizioulas in order to argue for a contrary model of person that includes the notion of essential being. Paradoxically, the Cappadocian notion of concrete particularity was utilised to incorporate ideas relating to deification which are achieved through the Christ hypostasis. However, the Cappadocian focus on the subject of existence as hypostasis manifested problems in that it seemed to predicate the metaphysical reality of being (Ātman) to the subject or hypostasis. This was resolved by correlating the notion of deification within a material and immaterial (substantialist) context, which qualifies the Cappadocian use of hypostasis through the focus on the metaphysical essential reality as primary in being, rather than only the outer subject.

But it seems that in the Cappadocian model, it is difficult to reconcile notions of the existential, or outer physis, and the interior physis. This problem was overcome by utilising Zizioulas' notion of relacionality with a focus on a type of existence that reflects the highest level of being, which is be correlated to a Cid-ātmanic mode of hypostatic existence. This indicates a way of being not only within an existential context but also allows for an awareness of the essential reality of being (Ātman). This

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294 As stated in part 1.4.5 and will be further elucidated in 4.5.2.
model will be further examined in the next two chapters. A model of person was affirmed in which the outer person is informed through the inner experience of *deification* which transforms both the inner and outer, leading to a true understanding of *being*. This could however, result in a model of person that is perceived as having Platonic overtones or as elitist, in only focusing on an experience which is had by the sacred few. Not so, as such a model was presented as the *telos* for all human persons in a soteriological context, which could be understood either, personally, ecclesiologically or eschatologically.

What was important was the stress on *ousia* in the *hypostatic* model in *deification*, or the *stuff* of being-ness, which allows a union of both the outer and inner, difference and unity, in the human person. Consequently, the notion of person constructed within this chapter would seem to veer to a model that has more in common with that of Augustine, Boethius and Duns Scotus, hence it may be asked, why were the Greek Fathers utilised at all? The answer to this is two-fold. Firstly, the Greek Patristic notion of *deification* needed to be incorporated in a model of person that stressed concrete and particular human existentiality, but also allowed the incorporation of *ousia*. Secondly, it was necessary to be demonstrate that the Cappadocian notion of *hypostasis* did not indicate a polemic against a concept of individual as argued by contemporary Eastern Orthodox theologians but that the use of *hypostasis* itself lends to an evolution of ideas which must include *ousia* and *deification*.

What has been extrapolated from the Greek Fathers is that a human individual or person is to be understood as a concrete and real person (*hypostasis*) and that a human person can become more than his or her natural *physis* in *deification*. This model does not reject the notion of the world, but values ordinary existence as an expression of the divine and I shall expand on this aspect of divine revelatory activity in the next chapter so as to create a bridge between the metaphysical notion of *Atman* and the concrete human person.
3.1 Introduction

In this chapter I will examines person in the Pratyabhijña tradition in relation to: a concept of individual; relationality; deified person as discussed in the Chapter 2; and in relation to re-cognition. Re-cognition will be considered through unity and the term Ātman.¹ The notion of person/hypostasis will be equated with puruṣa and evolved in such a way to include not only a sense of difference, but also unity. The relationship of Ātman with puruṣa (person), within the Pratyabhijña tradition, will also be placed in relation to consciousness or Cit,² which will qualify not only separation or difference, through the divine activity, but also Ātman where Ātman and consciousness will be intimately related to each other. The examination of person will thus be placed in relation to an experience of the unity-of-being, where unity will be qualified through unity-in-difference. This is fundamental to the development of a concrete notion of person.

In both the Byzantine and Pratyabhijña traditions much of the theological rhetoric was directed to resolving the problem of reconciling God to the world, without diminishing the truth of either, and so the examination of person will be placed within this context. However, this leads to another important issue, that of how Pratyabhijña itself, understood the nature of the divine reality, what constitutes divine existence and the relationship of that existence to the human condition. While the Byzantine

¹ The Ātman is the metaphysical reality of everything: it is the principle that transcends the phenomenal universe yet immanent in the universe. Kṣemarāja stated that the Ātman is “both immanent in the universe and transcends it”, PBHs, p.68. Kṣemarāja qualifies a total non-dual stance by stating that while the followers of tantra believe the Ātman to transcend the universe and the texts of the Kula to believe that Ātman to be in the universe, the Trika followers (including Pratyabhijña) believe that the Ātman is both transcendent and immanent (ibid.)

² Cit or Citi is the Universal consciousness, which as Kṣemarāja stated is “the form of the limited subject, descending from its stage of Cetana (universal consciousness) disposed to comprehending objects...becomes citta (individual consciousness)” PBH commentary on Sūtra 5; translation by Singh. PBHs, pp.60-61.
tradition came to adopt an *apophatic* approach in relation to understanding the absolute God, highlighting the ontological difference between the human and divine conditions, *Pratyabhijñā*’s approach focused on unity and consciousness and a singular “knowing subject”. One could know of God, not through mundane consciousness, but through an experience of an awareness of divine *being* through *re-*cognition. It is through this experience that the individual comes to understand that the nature of everything, including one’s own limited condition, is nothing other than the divine reality. This experience highlighted unity rather than difference, but also accepted the simultaneity of both.

Due to the theistic implications in *Pratyabhijñā*, the human condition was recognised as not self-caused or self-contained but so completely related to the divine, that non-difference is *re*-cognised as the ultimate ontological condition. When considering person, the starting point is not a focus of finite individuality or separation but from the perspective of unity, which has apparently been lost through false identification and has resulted in delusion. Consequently, both traditions tried to overcome the notion of separation in different ways, and it is through the overcoming of this notion of separation that an examination of person in *Pratyabhijñā* will be placed.

*Pratyabhijñā* philosophy emphasised unity or non-difference to explain difference and was not concerned with ignorance, but an emphasis was paradoxically placed on difference as the *Ātmanic* experience was not considered in isolation. Its monism was placed in relation to the world and thus a focus on the divine activity or *Citi* also became important, where its monist position was qualified through the term *Citi*. Notions of separation and ignorance consequently became important aspects of *Pratyabhijñā*. This was due to an affirmation that separation and ignorance are not considered unreal, but states in which the higher truths come to be revealed and ultimately viewed as the divine itself. Within this qualifying of the mundane, *Citi* becomes the mediating activity by which revelation is made possible and by which

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2. Although *Citi* was, in *Pratyabhijñā*, generally considered as an aspect or extrusive power emanating from the divine monist reality, (*PBHs* 3 and 4, pp55-.59) it was sometimes personalised as ‘she’, as the *PBH* states “by the power of her own will, she unfolds the universe as a screen (consciousness)” *śvēcchaya śvabhittau viśvam unmilayati* (translation by Singh, *PBHs*, 2, p.51), where the power of God has this feminine aspect. This was common in the *Tantric* and *Āgamic* traditions.
human persons attain unity with the divine consciousness. Pratyabhijñā equated the differing states of existing with the modes of existence or guṇas.⁵ Here the Byzantine notion of mode or tropos will be utilised and equated with the Pratyabhijñā use of the guṇas, which highlight the importance of being in relation to a way of existing in relation to the unity of being. The model of tropos hyparxeos, taken from the Cappadocians and Maximus the Confessor and adapted by Zizioulas to indicate an existential outcome as shown in Chapter 1, will be qualified to show how the essential underlying reality relates to the existential character of a particular concrete individual.⁶ The notion of modes of existing will be transferred to Pratyabhijñā’s model of re-cognition, and affirm the place of mundane existence as a mode within the context of the highest level of personal being as a mode of existing. The type of existence experienced within the spiritual condition will also be equated with a Ātmanic⁷ mode of hypostatic existence, or a mode of existence that relates to an Ātmanic consciousness within the hypostasis, without negating the place of ordinary existence.

3.1.1 What is Pratyabhijñā?

What is Pratyabhijñā, what does it mean, where did this philosophy arise and how does that meaning relate to human personhood? The word Pratyabhijñā means re-cognition,⁸ the re-cognising of who one is, and the philosophy of Pratyabhijñā was

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⁵ Utpala stated in the IPK, 4.4, p.71, that the “knowledge and action of a pati or enlightened master are aimed towards objects taken by him as his own, as well as his power to manifest the viewpoint of diversity and become respectively (the three guṇas) sattva rajas and tamas of a bound being”, स्वगुणगृहेषु भावेव पत्त्वोज्ञान क्रियाय यद्। मयदृततिये ते एव पशोः सतवं जानस्तस्मिः।४॥, svānag-rūpeṣu bhāveṣu patyur jñānam kriyāca yā/ māyā-trīfyet eva paśoh sattvam rajas tamah//; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 4.4, p.194.

⁶ This context in Pratyabhijñā is explored through such terms as puruṣa, jīva, anu, paśu, and nara, concerning puruṣa see IPK, 2.19-20, p.44; concerning jīva, anu see IPKp, p.168, but not directly mentioned in the text; concerning paśu see IPK, 3.7, p.61, and 4.4, p.71; also see Sanderson, ‘The Doctrine of the Mālinīvijayottaratana’, p.297.

⁷ This is taken from the IPK which argues that all manifestation and existence is due to Ātman-consciousness (cid-ātmani) which is responsible for the world “appearing diversely”, IPK, 2.51, p.57; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 2.4.19, p.149.

⁸ Pratyabhijñā. Jaideva Singh defines as, “Prati + abh + jña = Pratyabhijñā...though known, now appearing as forgotten through delusion ‘Abhi’ means facing i.e. close at hand. ‘Jña’ means illumination or knowledge. So Pratyabhijñā means re-cognition of the real self” (PBHs, p.117. For a similar definition see Tagare, The Pratyabhijñā Philosophy, p.46). See A Descriptive Analysis of the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, p.5. The word Pratyabhijñā according to Gopinath Kaviraj, “literally means a flash of light, - a revelation, is usually found in literature in the sense of wisdom
intimately related to an epistemological and ontological quest to uncover the truth of being, emerging out of the Trika Śaivism of Kashmir in the ninth to twelfth-thirteenth centuries in Kashmir.

Pratyabhijñā refers to a self-recognition, to an experiential event where the person discovers who he or she is, by grasping the essential reality of being (or Ātman); through knowledge or awareness that one’s self is the true Self.9 Re-cognition thus infers Ātma-Pratyabhijñā (the re-cognition of Self) or Ātma-jñāna (knowledge of Self),10 but the word also implies a remembering (smṛti) of things and a knowledge of being already known by the true knower or true subject, as Utpala stated;

A memory although risen out of the impression of a past experience, is essentially limited to its own self. It is therefore not the knower of that previous experience.11

This is not mere memory but a flash, a throb (spanda)12 of an inward metaphysical reality (or Ātman) within the individual puruṣa. In this context two natures and cognitions are evident, that belonging to the lower natural physis and that of the higher in which true participation takes place. Hence, the whole philosophical system of Pratyabhijñā can be understood to be dedicated to understanding how the highest spiritual experience relates to the concrete individual. While Pratyabhijñā viewed the notion of separated individual within a negative context through the terms puruṣa, jīva. āṇu, paśu., indicating a bound, limited ignorant and finite existence, the experience of re-cognition unites the mundane with the highest reality. To develop a notion of person in Pratyabhijñā both the metaphysical and the concrete have to be

characterised by an immediacy and freshness”, see ‘The Doctrine of Pratyabhijñā in Indian Philosophy’, Annals of the Bhandakar Oriental Research Institute, 5, 1921, pp.1-18, 133-132. Pratyabhijñā is also stated as meaning “intuitive light” (see PBKf, 1.7.1, p.136).

9 Abhinavagupta stated that: “Recognition means shining (Jñā-jiñāna) as facing oneself (abhimukhyena) of what was forgotten...not that the consciousness of the Self has never before been a fact of experience, because it always shines; but that...through His own power, it appears as though cut off, or limited. Recognition consists in the unification of what appeared once with what appears now”, IPV.1.1 (commentary); translation from Pandey IPVp, p.6.

10 Pratyabhijñā is not only a theological system and school but also is a philosophical term, see K. Mishra Kashmir Śaivism (Delhi: 1999), p.80 and pp.253-6.

11 सर्वत्र किंतु स्पृष्टिजन्य पूर्व-मुख्यपक्षः | जातमय्यात्मनिन्य तत्रायात्मनिन्यस्वेदवेक्षः ||१७१||, Satyaṃ kimtu smṛti- jñānam pārvānubhava-samśkritenā jātām api ātma-niśtham tan nādyānubhava-vadakam||. IPK, 1.17, p.7; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.2.3, p.27.

12 The Spanda theory forms an integral part of Non-dual Kashmir Śaivism, see Spanda Kārikā (KSTS 5). Also see: Jaideva Singh, Spanda Kārikās (Delhi:1980); S. Mukhopadhyaya (ed.), Spandanirnāya by Kṣemarāj (Delhi: 1986); Mark S. G. Dyczkowski, The Stanzas on Vibration (Varanasi: 1994).
considered within a unity of both. This is achieved through the construction of a model of *puruṣa* (as an Ātman-hypostasis) that considers personhood in terms of modes of existence that are informed by the essential reality of that existence, where the mode of that natural existence becomes transformed through divine participation within a *Cid-ātmanic* mode of hypostatic existence. In this context, relationality is not only to be considered in terms of intercommunicative hypostases, but through an essential reality that binds and informs hypostases of their true nature and mode of existence. The notion of hypostatic existing through modes of existence will also be correlated to types of awareness, that of the mundane consciousness (*citta*) and that of the divine consciousness or *Cit*. Within a concept of person, a unity of both is to be attained where the focus is ultimately the highest conscious experience of recognition, which is related to the highest experience and knowledge of God.

### 3.1.2 Did Pratyabhijñā have a Notion of Person?

The question then has to be asked whether Pratyabhijñā had a notion of person in relation to a modern understanding. The answer to this question is probably no, but this does not negate the quest to relate Pratyabhijñā’s notion of individual to a person, developed through the term *puruṣa*. The notion of person will also be qualified through types of existing and consciousness, where the type of existence of person that a person experiences mirrors a type of consciousness that comes to define the individual. This approach to person will ultimately be considered as juxtaposed to unity. The concept of person will not be confined to a specific type of consciousness but will indicate that many levels of person are possible within personal existing, culminating in an Ātmanic awareness.

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13 In using the word *Cit* here, I am incorporating ideas relating to the whole of the Pratyabhijñā corpus and accepting the influences of Abhinavagupta and Kṣemarāja on such terms, considering in particular the influences of Kṣemarāja on many of the Kashmir Śaivite works. Sanderson has been critical of academic research that has not considered such nuances, see Sanderson’s book review of Lillian Silburn’s work *Śivasūtra et Vimalārṇī de Kṣemarāja*, in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 46/1 (1983), 160-161, [http://alexissanderson.com/aboutus.aspx](http://alexissanderson.com/aboutus.aspx).

14 Sanderson makes the point that such an experience of enlightenment in Śaiva practise have not been related to liturgical and cultural norms as, “for most will occur only at death” (see Sanderson, ‘The Doctrine of the Mālinīvijayottaratantra’, who cites Abhinavagupta’s *Tantrāloka*, 1.43). However in the *IPK* this is not what generally being expressed, but it points to an existential attainment while alive (see *IPK*, 4).
The notion of individual in *Pratyabhijñā* was situated within a complex philosophical system, which underlined non-duality and yet accepted the world as real, through a complex cosmological system of *tattvas* (principles). This places a notion of person, as the *puruṣa-tattva*.,[15] firmly within its system and allows person to be considered through its acceptance of concrete phenomena as manifestations (*ābhāsas*).[16]

Through the *puruṣa-tattva*, the notion of person, which has already been established as synonymous with *hypostasis* in chapter 2, will also be equated to the term *puruṣa*. The term has been historically accepted as equated with person within Indian Christian approaches to personhood.[17]

*Puruṣa* in *Pratyabhijñā* was an existential determination indicating the outward individual (*jīva*) and as such, inferred: limitation, egoistic ‘I’ (*ahamkāra*); finite-ness (*amūnara*); and bound-ness (*paśu*/*beast*).[18] As such, *puruṣa*, when understood as separate, finite individual and beast seemed to be used in a pejorative context, especially when considered in relation to *Pratyabhijñā*’s non-dual ideal, for it implied a sense of distinction or difference and thus separation rather than unity or non-difference. This is exemplified in the word *paśu*, which denoted a bound animal.

Utpala stated: those under “delusion and seeing objects as different from him is called a *paśu* or a bound being”. Abhinavagupta had also argued that the *paśu* has to be considered as a reflection of the Lord, stating that: just as “a pure and colourless crystal takes up the appearance of different types of hues reflected in it, so does the Lord also take up the different types of gods, human beings, animals, and plants”. However, Abhinavagupta overplays his non-dualism, which is not so much the case in Utpaladeva, who allowed for a concrete sense of person but which attains fullness in the context of the Absolute awareness who “feels like this ‘I am He’...all this is my own being”. [21] Utpala shows that the individual person is not negated but has a

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15 Implied in IPK, 3.9, p.62.
16 Utpala stated that the world’s activities “whether pure or impure are experienced within the Lord, who shines, decorated by the manifestations of various different phenomena”, *Itthāyaśīlānāthāyamabhāsākhichīthāyathivā* “ittam aty-artha-bhinnārthāvabhāṣa-khacite vibhau/ samalo vimalo vāpi vyavahāro ‘nabhāyate/’. IPK, 1.77, p.32; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.7.14, p.92.
18 See IPK, 4.4, p.71.
19 IPK, 3.14, p.64; translation from Pandit, IPK, 3.2.3, p.173.
20 *PSA*, 6 (Pandit).
21 IPK, 4.12; translation by Pandit, IPKp, p.201.
concrete sense of existence, where the *paśu* attains a higher condition through the
divine and comes to understand a true reality. This higher condition is attained
through the reception of grace or *Śaktipāta*, which allows for a full sense of person to
be developed. Abhinavagupta stated that:

> Just as one’s face appears clearly in a clean mirror, so does this Ātman shine as
> pure consciousness in a mind purified by the bestowal of grace (*Śaktipāta*) of
> Lord Śiva.  

Hence the terms *jīva*, *paśu* and *puruṣa*, while indicating a sense of isolation, do affirm
what is existentially real and imply the same as a notion of person when viewed from
an ontological perspective and so allow for a sense of person to be explored through
these terms. However this notion of concrete existing, in *Pratyabhijñā*, was qualified
through an experience of unity. This sense of unity in *Pratyabhijñā*, implied through
the term *pati* (lord), can also be correlated to person because the differences between
*puruṣa* and *pati* do not imply ontological difference, but a change in consciousness.
The word *pati* indicates that the *paśu* is transformed through a relationship with the
divine and hence the term person can include ideas relating to both the terms *puruṣa*
and *pati*, where person indicates the whole human *being*. It is in this context of whole
person that I argue, that *Pratyabhijñā* developed a model of human existing and *being*
that can be equated to a concept of person.

3.1.3 Person and Ātman

A concept of person, however, is not to be considered in the same way as in the
Byzantine tradition, as highlighted in the previous chapters where the focus was on
specificity, but has to be developed firstly by focusing on unity, which does not
displace difference but rather qualifies it through the Ātmanic experience. In
*Pratyabhijñā* models of existing were considered through the Ātmanic reality, but this

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22 आदर्श मलरहिते वददृ वदन विभाति तदद्वयम्। सिवशक्तिकालिनि धीतत्वे भाति भास्क:। ॥ १॥, *Adarśe maraha-
rhite yadvad vadanam vibhāti tadavadayam/ Śiva-śaktipāta-vimale dhī-tattve bhāti bhārāpuḥ, PSA, 9*
23 *IPK*, 3.14, p.64.
reality was not situated within a closed monist isolation, but in relation to the world through Cit. Nevertheless Pratyabhijñā argued that any models of individual (person) hinged on how one understands cognition in relation to specific existing, who is the true “knowing person”, and this will be examined in part 3.6 of this chapter. Pratyabhijñā argued that since the individual is completely dependent on some other reality, for plainly no human can cause themselves or another’s existence or consciousness due to mere will: human existence and cognition is a condition of dependence and this dependency allows for a focus on the cause of existence. This distinction between dependency and non-dependency, non-eternity and eternity in Pratyabhijñā is important, for it highlights the superiority of the one as compared to the other. If knowledge or consciousness were related to non-eternity then it would be correlated to an unconscious nature and as Utpala stated, if consciousness was “unconscious by nature, then how can it illumine anything”. It could also be argued that the faculties of person such as buddhi, “bears in it the consciousness of the Ātman”. But this is refuted by Utpala, as such an outcome would necessitate that Ātman would become sentient, that is bound to material nature, or be understood as insentient not having existence in itself, but in either case “it cannot illuminate anything”. For both Ātman and person to gain significance, the characteristics of each must be preserved, where the former brings meaning to the latter.

Hence, the focus on cause is not from a position of ignorance but of knowledge, for while certain knowledge of the body and other bodily existences may allow “a means to infer the existence of knowing” this knowing is conditional, where “the real significance of the Self is not usually grasped because of delusion (moha)”. The divine Cause is continually illuminating through its divine powers to raise or restore the consciousness through re-cognition and it is in this context that a notion of person will be sought through the Ātmanic experience.

24 PBH, 1.  
25 IPK, 1.5, p.3; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.1.5, p.11.  
26 IPK, 1.4-5, p.2-3.  
27 IPK, 1.12, p.5; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.2.7, p.20.  
28 IPK, 1.13, p.6.  
29 IPK, 1.13, p.6; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.2.8, p.21.  
30 Ibid.  
31 IPK, 1.5, p.3; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.1.5, p.11.  
32 IPK, 1.3, p.2; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.1.3, p.9.  
33 Ibid.
This experience is possible because of two factors, firstly because of the Atmanic reality within each person, and secondly because of the ability to cognise such an experience within the human condition, which is due to the activity of the divine consciousness or Cit. Without consciousness, the Atman would be a "useless lump"34 of immaterial substance having no connection with material phenomena and generating a gnostic outcome. So it could be argued that through person the significance of Atman is really appreciated in the conscious awareness to perceive such a reality within the human condition, which reflects how the Atmanic reality experiences consciousness as an out flowing of divine will and purpose. The activity of Cit allows consciousness to be considered as an outward movement of the divine, where the rational element within the human person mirrors equivalent dynamics within the divine. This rational element will be equated with the soul within a substantialist model through Atman.

The focus on rationality shows that material existence reflects types of consciousness that become aware of a harmony of individual existence through a unity with the Atmanic nature. The highest mode of person expresses a freedom to be, not only in an existential context but in relation to the essential nature not dominated by the natural physis or the bound nature. A defence of this model will be provided by emphasising the Christ model as an example, where the hypostatic union of natures, as already examined in chapters 2A and 2B, shows how in divine unity, the lower natures are transformed through the higher within the human person. The Christ model emphasises the importance of considering three points in relation to person; firstly that there is possible within the existential person both unity and yet distinctiveness; secondly, unity in the higher nature does not detract from a complete union with the lower; and lastly the unity of the lower nature with the higher infers a simultaneity of a higher awareness within the lower.

Within the human person the unity of consciousness can be considered as expressing an awareness of the essential reality of being, or Atman through the faculties of the individual. Although the Atman can be experienced through these faculties, the

14 Also as Pandit argues, IPKp, p18.
faculties are not to be viewed as the Ātman, as discussed above; otherwise Ātman becomes reduced to thing of nature. There is a continual stress on the concept of doer, who is the real doer, and dependency. Hence, through the perception of the divine, through the faculties of perception, the Ātman is eventually understood to be the very subject of existence and a substratum of person. This allows a unifying condition, through those faculties, to be expressed and thus intimately related to a process of transformation, where the faculties change and are transformed within that process.

The faculties of person can be equated with the mind (manas), intellect (buddhi) and the senses of perception (jñānendriyas) in Pratyabhijñā, and to the tattvas of manifestation as will be shown in Chapter 3.4.1. The faculties of a person can also be related, within the highest sense, to the highest part of the soul or Ātman. While the highest spiritual nature, in the human condition, can be correlated to the Ātman, in the context of the divine, it shall also be correlated to a Paramātmanic nature. Thus an ontological distinction will be made between the divine ousia or Paramātman and the essential reality or Ātmanic nature of human beings. The latter will be recognised as different according to the measure and awareness of the former, but allowing for participation according to the stuff of being.

Even though such an ontological distinction is not immediately obvious in Pratyabhijñā philosophy, such distinctions between the Supreme and the human can be discerned in Pratyabhijñā's tattvic categorisations and the differing experiences of the pramātras (cognitive subjects) according to their experiences. In other words, the relationship of the Ātman to the cognitive subject is re-cognised as being the same as the divine but in addition there is some level of difference in that the “highest Śiva”

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15 As inferred in IPKp, pp.167-170; see also Tagare, The Pratyabhijña Philosophy, (Delhi: 2002), pp.24-32.
16 This is evident in Kṣemarāja’s commentary of PBH where he describes the levels of experiences of pramātās in relation to ‘I am’ (aḥam), ‘that’ (tāt) and ‘this’ (idam), which shall be examined also later; see also PBHs, pp.52-53.
17 See PBHs, p.55. Also Abhinavagupta in his Vimaršini of the IPK, the IPV, 4.7, which states that while the “pati is identical to Īśvara...there can possibly be no talk of object in relation to the Highest Lord, Paramaśiva”, translation by Pandey, IPVp, p.224. Though this is stated in the context of pure non-dualism, it also provides a distinction between the Absolute and human conditions.
is differentiated in the \textit{tattvic} manifestations. Such distinctions are also apparent in the theistic devotional salutation to \textit{Mahēśvara} by Utpala stating that:

having somehow attained the position of a servant of the Great Lord Mahēśvara, and now being desirerst to do good to other people as well, I am presently expounding the doctrine of His recognition.

This devotional context of some measure of ontological difference is highlighted by Pandit’s translation, where the term \textit{Mahēśvara} is understood as “the great Almighty Lord”. While there is this sense of difference, which is highlighted through the \textit{tattvic} manifestations, the phenomenal universe is ultimately related to the divine as the “different states of the Lord Śiva in His universal aspect” (\textit{paramātmanah Śambho}).

The nature of the divine Godhead as distinguished as a Supreme condition is exemplified in that it was correlated to the \textit{Brahman}. This reality was for Abhinavagupta the transcendental unmoving reality beyond everything, which reveals itself through its \textit{Śakti}. However the lines between this non-different reality and difference, of the nature of \textit{Atmanic} will and activity in relation to the human condition are often blurred. While sometimes the \textit{Ātman} is equated with the divine condition, and indicated an unchanging reality, it also seemed to be conditioned through the human context for the difference between awareness of the higher \textit{Self} and cognition in the individual \textit{self} is not that apparent, otherwise Utpala would not have dedicated so much time in the first chapter of \textit{Īśvarapratyabhijñā} to highlight this difference. This is not evident in words that indicate the divine, such as \textit{Mahēśvara}. This term (\textit{Mahēśvara}) implies a condition that can be correlated to ideas that relate to a notion of God, which also stand independent and outside of the human reality as its Cause. Terms such as \textit{Mahēśvara} and \textit{Paramaśiva} come to indicate points of encounters of divine and the world, as Abhinavagupta stated:

\textsuperscript{38} The power of differentiation as a manifestation of the Lord to create difference was called \textit{Apohana Śakti} in Abhinavagupta’s \textit{IPV}, 1.4; \textit{IPVP}, p.40.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{41} Which will be correlated to the Absolute God (\textit{Paramaśiva}), \textit{PSA}, 26 (Pandit), p.37.
\textsuperscript{42} \textit{PSA}, p.43.
\textsuperscript{43} The \textit{IPK} stated that the \textit{Ātman} “does not change at all during its different functional activities”, 1.11, p.5; translation by Pandit, \textit{IPKp}, 1.2.6, p.19.
\textsuperscript{44} See \textit{IPK} 1.1, p.1.
Sometimes the Lord may Himself unbound and reveal His real nature by means of yoga that illumines the infinite luxury of one’s self-knowledge. Paramaśiva, the Absolute God, plays thus His wonderful game of bondage and liberation. ⁴⁵

These points of encounter are made possible because the human nature shares a pattern similar to the divine, which becomes the real nature of humans and is indicated through the term Ātman. It is through the encounter with the divine that persons come to experience their true nature and understand the true condition of person.

3.1.4 Person as a Point of Revelation and Encounter

In Pratyabhijñā, through an encounter with the divine within the individual, an ensuing change of consciousness takes place in re-cognition, ⁴⁶ where revelation and individual consciousness meet. Through this meeting a restoration takes place where human awareness recognises that it is the Lord that has appeared “as one’s finite Self”, ⁴⁷ within a “renewed understanding”, which is called pratyabhijñā or “the recognition of the divine nature as the Self”. ⁴⁸ This allows for a change in the understanding of individual through that encounter as person. This flexibility in the notion of person allows for a change of what it means to be a person. But the notion of divine revelation was not confined to an inner experience but considered in terms of an outer revelation where divine scripture was given to humanity and in this sense the singular experience is expanded to include all humanity, to all persons, which is exemplified in the Śiva Sūtras being revealed to Vasugupta on a rock. ⁴⁹ Also Utpala stated that the Īśvarapratyabhijñā was composed “for the purpose that people attain perfection”. ⁵⁰

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⁴⁶ See IPK, p.133.
⁴⁷ Ibid.
⁴⁸ Ibid.
⁴⁹ As shown in Chapter 1.4.4
⁵⁰ IPK, 4.18, p.74; translation by Pandit, IPK, p.207
While in the Byzantine tradition, this encounter with the divine was expressed through a downward movement from the divine to the world, where participation with God was afforded through grace, which allowed an ascent to the divine, in Pratyabhijñā there is no real movement but a perceived movement in that the human person is viewed as nothing other than the highest reality. This perception of movement also reflects shifts of awareness in the divine within the transcendent being and is considered in terms of fluctuations of consciousness, from the pure ‘I Am’ to ‘I am this’ and then ‘I Am that’, to allow the appearance of manifestation through the tattvas or principles, which shall be examined in part 4 of this chapter.

These perceived movements of consciousness reflected the will of the divine to create manifested phenomena and thus individual persons. But this creativity also allowed a reciprocal movement where human persons through the power of cognition come to understand their true nature and in this experience the notion of isolated individual comes to be understood through the term person or puruṣa within a relational context. The different levels of cognition, of ‘I see’ allows awareness and knowledge to be become related to the subject of perception. But what is the subject of perception? In Pratyabhijñā it is the Self that is the true Subject of cognition, which allows for all types of knowing and not negating those differing perceptions. Utpala stated that the many cognitions, although "arising at different times, do have mutual unity... unity is actually the single subject (the Self), shining as both 'this' and 'that'". Hence, phenomena are not self caused but it is the divine that manifests subjects, the relative finite individuals, and objects. This allows for the awareness ‘I am’ a limited person and ‘this is’ the world and also a united field of consciousness, where both perceptions come to be understood as having as their cause the divine awareness. This divine awareness allows for a sense of person in a limited and expanded context. The personal is not negated but finds meaning through the higher awareness.

The implications of the relationship of the divine with human persons, allows the nondualism of Pratyabhijñā to be viewed as qualified through the light of consciousness.

51 IPK, 3.1-30, pp.59-68.
52 IPK, 1.26, p.11; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.4.3, p.40.
In this context of the activity of prakāśa the notion of individual attains meaning through this activity or perceived movement from the transcendent God to the world. The world is not viewed "from below",\(^{54}\) where the lower nature can never understand its true reality, but is understood from above, from the highest viewpoint or consciousness or Citi which is the cause (hetu)\(^{55}\) of the world. As Abhinavagupta argued, all phenomena including individual finite beings are "none other than Lord Śiva Himself, having taken up such a form of the bounded being".\(^{56}\)

When considering the implications of the Pratyabhijñā understanding of divine revelation and activity, the notion of person has to be considered through both a sense of difference, or an awareness of concrete mundane reality, and non-difference or an awareness of the highest reality. The awareness of a higher reality experienced through mundane consciousness allows an apparent movement from citta (the mundane mind) to Cit (supreme consciousness), from the deluded cognitive subject (māyāpramātṛ)\(^{57}\) to the personal God (Mahāpramātṛ). This indicates not only a change or shift of consciousness and thus a shift in how the terms are to be considered but a reciprocation, which allows the human person (hypostasis/puruṣa) to be considered within the context of relationality. Within this relationality a person can said to exist within a mode that experiences its own sense of difference, within the hypostasis/puruṣa, while at the same time re-cognising non-difference through the experience of unity with the divine nature, or essential reality, within the human person.

Thus a notion of person will be approached by incorporating aspects of difference, through the terms hypostasis/puruṣa, in relation to the highest reality, or non-difference, which will lead to the construction of a single model of person, the Ātman-hypostasis to be examined in Chapter 4. This single model will adapt a notion of concrete existence (or hypostasis), to consider person through relationality as a mode

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\(^{53}\) PSA, p.30.

\(^{54}\) The distinction of what is below as compared to that which is above has already been discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis; see also Lipner, The Face of Truth, pp. 44-45.

\(^{55}\) See Kṣemarāja's commentary of Śūra 1 of PBH.

\(^{56}\) PSA. 5 (Pandit), p.22.

\(^{57}\) As the PBH, Śūra 6, stated that the "māyāpramātā consists of it (citta)", translation by Singh, PBHs, p.62.
of existence, that explains how re-cognition or the deification experience relates to the transformation of the natural physis and to a model of whole person.

3.2 Philosophical Background

While the model of person developed in this chapter (through Pratyabhijñā), accepts a notion of concrete personhood, qualified through the essential reality of being (or Ātman), it is also accepts that Pratyabhijñā philosophy is ultimately non-dual. But this stance is in itself qualified in that it accepts both the Ātmanic reality and the world as the “Highest Real, (i.e. Śiva)”, where that-ness (tat) of manifestation (the world) is accepted as real. The tension between the metaphysical reality (Ātman) and what is real, in Pratyabhijñā, related to the philosophical tension between non-dualistic and dualistic influences respectively.

Although the philosophy of Pratyabhijñā is thought to be predominantly non-dual, especially in the works of Abhinavagupta, exemplified in the Vimaršini of Utpala’s Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā, it is also considered dualistic terms as having relational elements. This dualism was exemplified in its inclusion of the Trika Śāstra, or the “threelfold science”, where the resurgent Trika, having its roots in the older Tryambaka School, put an emphasis on triadic (thus dualistic) archetypes, concepts and iconography. From this triadism the term Trika evolved, which was religious and philosophical in character, developing constructs of parā (supreme), aparā (lowest) and parāparā (combination of highest and lowest), and which related to deities and also to philosophical divisions. This followed the schema of the Mālinīvijayottaratantra, which developed into the theological distinctions of; non-dualism; the world (indicating dualism); and revelation or the qualifying dualism in

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58 See PBHs, p.61.
59 See also Descriptive Analysis of the Kashmir Series and Texts and Studies, p.2.
60 As highlighted in Pratyabhijñā’s philosophy of dependency, where phenomena are dependent on Ātman, and come to be realised as Ātman, see IPK, p.5. This relationality is not a relationality within difference or of mutual relational entities but relationality that is ultimately expressed through unity or non-difference.
61 See A Descriptive Analysis of the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, p.1.
62 Peter David Lawrence, Rediscovering God within Transcendental Argument (Delhi: 1999), p.29.
63 See Sanderson, ‘Śaivism and the Tantric Traditions’, p.673; and Lakshmanjoo, Kashmir Shaivism, p.129.
unity. The term itself, *Trika*, indicating three-ness, can hardly said to have come from a monist imperative, and must therefore have had ancient roots that pre-date the later pure monism with which it is usually associated.

Thus, the new *Trika* philosophically reflected *Āgamic* influences in its incorporation of a qualified monism which continued the divisions extant in *Mālinīvijayottaratantra*, of the three classes pertaining to Śiva, Rudra and Bhairava. This also reflected a conceptual three-fold division of duality (*bheda*), duality-unity (*bhedābheda*) and non-dual monism (*abheda*). *Trika* established triadic conceptual models and even the ontological triadism of, God, activities and the world. In *Trika* or *Trika-śāsana*, *Trika-Śāstra*, or *Rahasya-Sampradāya* (secret lineage) philosophical approaches were expressed to suit certain philosophical or theological problems and established a basis and methodology of revelation, philosophy and faith through triadic (and thus *dualistic*) archetypes, which the new *Trika* used within a *non-dual* context.

The triadism of *Trika* was also reflected in triadic methods of praxis (*upāyas*), evidenced in Kṣemarāja’s *Vimarsinī* of the Śiva Sūtra of: Śāmbhavopāya (way of the divine); Śaktopāya (energetic way); and Ānandopāya (way of the individual). So even in the *non-dual* text of the Śiva Sūtra, in Kṣemarāja’s *Vimarsinī*, dualistic teachings are evident. This teaching emphasised spiritual practice and thus echoed the teachings of *Mālinīvijayottaratantra*. But as Abhinavagupta argued, there cannot be total *duality* due to the monist nature of the Absolute, and neither can there be *non-duality* due to *duality*, but rather both shine in effulgent consciousness, the *Cidrūpa* of the Lord.

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64 Ibid. However these influences are shown by Abhinavagupta to relate to non-dualism stating, “non-duality is based upon the authority of Āgama” *IPVp*. p.186.
65 *MT*. p.vii.
67 Chatterji, *Kashmir Śaivism*, p.3.
68 *SSVs*. pp.1, 82, 126 and Pandit, *The Trika Śaivism of Kashmir*. The qualifying of *non-dualism* is extant in the influences of the Śiva Sūtra in the new *Trika* schema, in the inclusion of the Ānandopāya in Kṣemarāja’s *Vimarsinī*, *SSVs*, pp.126-127. This reflects the acceptance of the concept of individual *self* or *ānubhūti*, which has *citta* or human consciousness and *buddhi* (intellect), *manas* (mind), and (*‘I-ness’*), but which in truth is *Cit*.
69 *IPV*, 2.4.20-21.
3.2.1. The Contemporary Debate

The tension between *dualism* and *non-dualism* in Kashmir Śaivism has raised consequent problems in contemporary scholastic interpretation, as highlighted by Alexis Sanderson. The *dualistic* tendencies in *Kashmir Śaivism*, as Sanderson argues, have been ignored in contemporary interpretations and have consequently led to *non-dualistic* approaches. This has also led to interpreting human individuality through pure *Advaitic* models. *Pratyabhijñā*, not withstanding the *non-dualistic* influences of Abhinavagupta who as Sanderson shows superimposed his ideas onto the *Mālinīvijayottaratantra*, expresses *dualistic* notions through the admittance of manifested *tattvas*. The *Mālinīvijayottaratantra* was simply for Abhinavagupta, as Sanderson states, the “core-text of the Trika Tantras...embodying the very essence of the *non-dualistic* tradition”. However, as Sanderson demonstrates, the *Mālinīvijayottaratantra* was also *dualistic*, which points to the *dualistic* influences on the new *Trika* and exemplified in *Pratyabhijñā*.

Hence, these influences have to be considered when constructing a model of person in *Pratyabhijñā*. While the *Mālinīvijayottaratantra* had clear *dualistic* implications in its philosophy, its conclusions were ultimately *non-dualistic* in accepting Śiva to be the ultimate monist reality, which allows the incorporation of ideas of difference within non-difference in a concept of person (*puruṣa*). This paradoxical model was continued in the Śiva Sūtra and in the later resurgent *Pratyabhijñā*, which was a theistically *non-dualistic* polemical text composed to refute *dualism* and other “erroneous”

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70 See Sanderson, ‘The Doctrine of the Mālinīvijayottaratantra’. See also Jürgen Hanneder, *Abhinavagupta’s Philosophy of Revelation, Mālinīślokaārīti 1, 1-399* (Groningen: 1998) who shows that it was far from clear whether the resurgent *Trika* of the 8th-12th centuries was *non-dualistic* in that, and he cites Somānanda who in the third chapter of his *Śivadrśtī* seems to condemn pure *non-dualists* (ibid. p.5, footnote 9).
71 Ibid.
74 Sanderson clearly makes a connection between the *dualism* of the *MT* and the impact upon the *Trika* tradition including *Pratyabhijñā*, see ‘The Doctrine of the Mālinīvijayottaratantra’, p.282, footnote 7; also see Koshalya Walli, *A Peep into the Tantrāloka and Our Cultural Heritage* (Delhi: 1998).
76 Ibid., p.293, see also Hanneder, *Abhinavagupta’s Philosophy of Revelation*, pp.5, 89, 172, where Hanneder states that *MT* shared the “basic dualism of many other Āgamas” (Ibid. p.172).
77 I will refer to the resurgent *Trika* of the 8th- to 12th centuries as the new *Trika*.
78 This can also be corroborated by Hanneder, see *Abhinavagupta’s Philosophy of Revelation*, p.5.
79 See Madhusudan Kaul’s introduction of *MT*, in *MT* pp.i-xxxvi.
doctrines". Despite this, Sanderson shows that dualistic influences of the Mālinīvijayottaratantra were apparent in Abhinavagupta’s work and thus in the resurgent Trika. This refutes the claim that the new Trika was completely non-dualistic. Sanderson concludes that non-dualism has thus been superimposed upon Kashmir Śaivism, or Trika, but both Śiva Sūtra and Pratyabhijñā were clearly non-dual. What has to be concluded is that the new Trika, as exemplified in Pratyabhijñā, represented a stronger emphasis on non-dual interpretation than the older Trika.

Because of the theological implications to personhood pertaining to the non-dualism of the resurgent Trika, in the context of the older dualistic systems, the need to refer to the resurgent Trika as new is underlined, for where did this new non-dualism arise? The answer is that the new Trika was not as non-dualistic as it first seems and that the older dualism was not as dualistic as Sanderson maintains. Conversely, although Chatterji dates the Trika-sasana to the eighth or ninth centuries in Kashmir, confusing the older dualistic Trika with the new monist Trika to underline the non-dual association, he also admits that Śivāgama on which Trika is based is far older, which was more dualistic. But he never explains how this new non-dualism sits within the older dualistic corpus.

80 Chatterji, Kashmir Śaivism, p.11; and Pandit, IPKp. p.xxiii.
81 Sanderson, ‘The Doctrine of the Mālinīvijayottaratantra’.
82 Sanderson argues that consequently there were three phases to Trika, the ‘cult of the three goddesses’ (see Sanderson, ‘Śaivism and the Tantric Traditions’, p.696) the ‘Kāli’ phase and then the philosophical phase of the ‘Pratyabhijñā-based Trika of Abhinavagupta’ (ibid.). This last phase also had various developments, that of the Śiva Sūtra: the Pratyabhijñā non-dualism of Somānanda and Utpala; and then the Trika of Abhinavagupta (ibid., pp.694-696). The last phase did not negate dualistic praxis and ritual, but clearly had at its core the theological belief that the ultimate reality, though expressed as a theistic personal pramātṛ (Śiva), was non-dual. This is evident in the MT where in the categorisation of the pramātṛs, the highest is Śiva who is undifferentiated (see MT, p.xxiii) and in IPK where this idea is extant.
83 See Sanderson, ‘The Doctrine of the Mālinīvijayottaratantra’.
84 Chatterji, Kashmir Śaivism, pp.3-5.
85 Ibid., p.5. When trying to clarify ideas within the two different types of Trikas in relation to a model of person, what has to be considered relevant are the influences on both types of Trika and the consequent philosophical stress. Both Trikas drew from Āgama and Tantra, see Flood, ‘Shared Realities and Symbolic Forms in Kashmir Śaivism’, p.226. But as Flood shows, the non-dual focus becomes underlined in the “Trika theologians” (see Flood, An Introduction to Hinduism, p.168) such as Abhinavagupta and Kṣemarāja. He clearly links the Trika to what I call the new Trika schema and yet also he highlights that Trika is a generalistic term that indicated a philosophical ideal, and the “ritual system or basis of Kashmir Śaivism” (ibid., p.167) the former being non-dual and the later dualistic. This contradictory position was also emphasised by B. N. Pandit who argued that the philosophy of Somānanda was both monist and theistic, where the ‘Lord’ has a “theistic nature” and “transcendental unity”, see B. N. Pandit, A History of Kashmir Śaivism (Srinagar: 1990), p.31.
Hence, *Trika* seems to have evolved, emerging out of the landscape of *dualistic Śaivism*,\(^{86}\) and the philosophy-theology also has evolved, gaining a non-dual emphasis especially in relation to Abhinavagupta and his superimposing a non-dual stress on to *Mālinīvijayottaratantra*.\(^{87}\) Hence there are not only two notions of *Trika* but various philosophical models being applied simultaneously. While one could refer to a collective tradition, as Singh does under the umbrella of *Trika*,\(^{88}\) where a synthesis of all systems is developed,\(^{89}\) the philosophical landscape is made clearer if a new schema is offered, that of a new *Trika*. This is also supported by the evidence given by Mark Dyczkowski, who informs us that the form of *Trika* learnt by Abhinavagupta did not even originate in Kashmir,\(^{90}\) so it is not even clear if *Trika* can be stated as being exclusively Kashmiri. Dyczkowski also argues that the landscape of *Tantric* literature had another dimension in which the *Kula* and *Krama* schools played an important part.\(^{91}\) In Dyczkowski’s in-depth study, he highlights that the lines between each school were blurred, and in many instances *Trika, Kula* and *Krama*, though remaining distinct, shared “common roots”.\(^{92}\) Abhinavagupta also seemed to have brought these systems together within a collective basket in a unifying and encompassing system.

Consequently, the new *Trika* schema can be understood conceptually as a monist-cum-theistic doctrine in the post *Śiva Sūtra* age that applies to the doctrines put forward by the new *Trika* theologians, but which utilised *dualistic* ideas from the older *Trika*. The re-introduced form of *Pratyabhijñā* from the resurgent new *Trika* of the eighth to eleventh-twelfth centuries, developed within this sphere of many influences including that of the *Śiva Sūtra* which along with *Spanda*, form a part of the new *Trika* doctrine, as Lakshmanjoo argued, thus forming “one thought”, which was non-dual.\(^{93}\) While Sanderson does not accept this, in that for him the older *Trika* was not completely *non-dual*,\(^{94}\) he does agree that the resurgent *Trika*, culminating in

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\(^{88}\) See SSVs, p.xv.

\(^{89}\) As argued in the *A Descriptive Analysis of the Kashmir Series of Text and Studies*, p.1.


\(^{91}\) Ibid.

\(^{92}\) Ibid.

\(^{93}\) See Lakshmanjoo, *Kashmir Shaivism*, p.129.

\(^{94}\) Sanderson, ‘Śaivism and the Tantric Traditions’, p.703.
Abhinavagupta and Kṣemarāja, was essentially non-dualistic. The vast majority of scholars argue that the resurgent non-dualism was not to be considered in isolation but as a continuation of the non-dualism inherent in Trika, and therefore it would be incongruent to refer to different types of Trika. Moti Lal Pandit also states that the "Trika Śaivism of Kashmir, whose philosophic content and orientation is characterised by a non-dualistic mode of thinking, and has its basic source in such primary revelatory texts that are known as the Āgamas or Tantras". This echoes the views of Chatterji, who stated that Trika was a system that was idealistically monist, but this is not the full consensus for example J. Rudrappa had stated that in the resurgent Trika (Pratyabhijñā), there was a "synthesis of monist and dualistic approaches".

3.2.2. Double Cognition

Consequently, the experience of the non-dual state of re-cognition can be said to qualify the apparent dualism of the new Trika, where the human dualistic consciousness was corrected within the experience of re-cognition. This evidenced a development of a double cognition schema, one of the divine and another of the mundane, where "several cognitions although arising at different times, do have mutual unity". Through unity, true self-awareness arises, which is not the result of an impersonal force or due to a natural consciousness or physis, in Pratyabhijñā is seen as "impure" and cannot reveal the truth. The distinction between what is pure and that which is impure reveals differing levels of cognitions, or a double cognition,
one of purity and another of impurity in relation to phenomenal existence. As Utpala stated that:

Phenomenon, in such a state (of \textit{vidyā}), seem imperfect and inferior because they appear a non-Self (non-\text{Atman}). These are at the same time perfect and superior by virtue of their being invested with I-Consciousness. Such a state of \textit{vidyā} is thus superior and perfect, on one hand, and inferior and imperfect on the other hand since it is a state of unity in diversity, indicating both purity and impurity.

The condition of many levels of perception and cognition is reflected in the acceptance of many levels of knowledge, where the double cognition schema of \textit{Pratyabhijñā} can be viewed as an epistemological basis by which to approach person. It is because mundane knowledge, though revealing some aspects of truth, cannot reveal the whole truth. Hence, another awareness apart from the mundane becomes observable as acting upon ordinary consciousness. This higher cognition reflects a higher willing and acting in person through a unity, which also represents a single cognition in a completed context. Only in the highest condition of \textit{Śiva} there is total perfection, but due to the relationship of the divine will (\textit{icchā}) and activity (\textit{Śakti}) the individual comes to ultimately realise that one’s \textit{self} is non-different to the divine \textit{Self}. While initially a double cognition is apparent and is expressed in the difference between the willing and activity between divine and human conditions, these cognitive differences are overcome through unity in the divine \textit{Self}. This distinction is also apparent in the outward cognition of manifested phenomena as Utpala stated:

It is thus established that two types of phenomena, the relative finite subject and the object, appear within one basic subject while considering: ‘This is’ and ‘this is being seen by me’ or ‘that was’ and ‘that was seen by me’.

Through the awareness of ‘I am’ in relation to ‘this is’, the finite subject comes to reflect a way of cognising and \textit{being} of the divine who manifests diversity through his

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item As Utpala stated that the activities of the world which reflect differing levels of cognition, “whether pure or impure, are experienced within the Lord” (ibid.).
\item \textit{अनामित्वेन भासनात्} भासनात्। \textit{परताहन्त्याच्छादात्परहं} \textit{परिपर्यन्त} हि सा II.19, \textit{अत्रपरारवम्} \textit{भावनं anāmatvaḥ bhāsanāt/ paratāhantyaḥcchādatparam paras pad shar hī sa II.19, at rāparativam bhāvānām anāmatvena bhāsanāt/ paratāhantyāccādat paraparadāśa hisā!/ IPK, 3.5, p.60; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 3.1.5, p.161.}
\item \textit{तन्मया द्विते दृष्टी श्रेयाय स इत्यामृत्तित्यपि।} \textit{श्रवणाहक्ताभिन्नावथाँ} \textit{भासा प्रमातिरिए II.39}, \textit{tan mayā drśyaḥ drśta yam sa ity āmrāty api/ grāha grāhakatā bhīṁnāv arthau bhūtaḥ pramatārī/ IPK, 1.31, p.13; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.4.8, p.46.}
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
own subjective reality. While the cognition ‘this is’, seems to affirm objectivity and thus the separation of individual subjects, it actually reflects a cognitive ability to experience ‘I-ness’, which later comes to be realised as conditional to the divine ‘I’.

It is in this understanding that the term person is placed, within the context of divine movement (or revelation) to the world and how this movement is understood and then correlated to reciprocation and unity, through the experience of re-cognition. The external objects or manifestation (ābhāsa), through “appearing in one’s perception”,¹⁰⁵ come to be re-cognised as part of the divine activity firstly through mundane perception, through the ‘I’ condition and secondly in re-cognition. In re-cognition the pure ‘I’ replaces the impure ‘I’ and as such person attains the fullest mystical condition and the vision of God (Śiva-drśti)¹⁰⁶ within a concrete existential context.

Consequently, in Pratyabhijñā it can be stated that two types of knowing were developed, the ordinary knowledge (vidyā), and jñāna or a deeper level of knowledge and consciousness which qualifies the natural physis. The lower natural physis is not capable of self-revelation (through its own nature) but is understood through a modified form of knowing in which the individual comes to slowly understand a higher experience through the Vidyā-Śakti¹⁰⁷ of the Lord through the Lord’s power of differentiation or apohana-śakti.¹⁰⁸ In other words, through the Lord’s power creation understands itself as different but comes to the divine through modified forms of difference in a movement from māyā (illusion indicating delusion) to vidyā (knowledge), and then to pure knowledge jñāna and “pure consciousness”.¹⁰⁹ There are not many ontological types of persons, but depending on different types of knowing, the modes or types of existence change according to a specific experience or a specific level of consciousness or knowing. The varying forms of differentiation in

¹⁰⁵ IPK, 1.32, p.14; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.5.1, p.50.
¹⁰⁶ Utpala refers to Śivahood, becoming Śiva, and the vision of Śiva, making reference to Somamanda’s work Śiva-drśti, see IPK, 4.16, p.73. In fact Utpala states that the whole the Pratyabhijñā system was created to enlighten an aspirant “about his real character” (IPK, 4.15, p.73; translation from Pandit IPKp, 4.15, p.204), and “for the purpose that people attain perfection without ant arduous effort” (IPK, 4.18, p.74; translation by Pandit, IPKp, p.207).
¹⁰⁷ IPK, 3.6-7, p.61.
¹⁰⁸ Utpala argued that it is the Lord who manifests the “powers to know, to recollect and differentiate”, IPK, 1.23, p.10; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.3.7, p.34.
¹⁰⁹ IPK, 3.6, p.61; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 3.1.6, p.163.
Pratyabhijñā allow for types of existing that comes to reflect a deeper reality of being, both existing simultaneously within the puruṣa (hypostasis) and allowing for a sense of difference and non-difference.

The ability to re-cognise objects in relation to true being and the relationship of divine activity with past actions, present actions and future actions, which consists of affirming a double consciousness. Within this double awareness of the lower and the higher, free will, activity and consciousness of the individual subject depends on the will and power to do so, which ultimately rests in the will and consciousness of the Absolute Reality. As a consequence, when an “object shines” the cognition to perceive the object, and the power of being the object, is due to the will, activity and being of the Absolute Subject or Ātman. The relation of the subject to the object, manifests not a negation of the objects for if that were so, how is duality recognised? Thus two cognitions are accepted, the ordinary and the Absolute where both are considered equal for both are manifestations of the Lord.

The paradox of difference and non-difference existing simultaneously reflects a continuous movement of consciousness from the pure ‘I Consciousness’ (ahamkāra) to this-ness (idantā), and then to that-ness (tat) or the phenomenal universe (object). This movement also constitutes a reciprocal movement back to the pure ‘I’ (Subject) and manifests a relationality between the objects of perception (grāhya) and the subject perceiver (grāhaka), between the relative ‘I’ and the Supreme ‘I’. Through the knowledge and experience of God the object of that knowledge or the individual, comes to know the true subject or divine “Egoity”, the divine ‘I Am’.

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110 *IPY*, p.136.
111 *PBH*, Sūtra 3, describes tat (that) as the universe or differentiation, where “that is manifold because of the differentiation of reciprocally adapted (anurūpa) objects (grāhya) and subjects (grāhaka)”, translation by Singh, *PBHs*, p.52.
112 Ibid.
113 Mark Dyczkowski argues that the influence of Pratyabhijñā on Rājānaka Rama in his development of Spanda, was apparent in the emphasis on “two types of egoity”, *A Journey in the World of the Tantras*, p.36. Dyczkowski also highlights the problems of understanding the texts which referred the term “ātma” when referring to the relative self (ātman) and the divine Self (Ātman or the essential nature of self). I make the distinction between self and the Self to make a distinction between the natural physis and the divine nature (also within the Ātman-hypostasis model), but which also affirms the place of both natures. However, as understood in Pratyabhijñā the relative ‘I’ rests or is completed in the Absolute ‘I’.
114 See Mark Dyczkowski, *A Journey in the World of the Tantras*, p.36.
This becomes related on an intimate level to the human ‘I-am’ within the concrete human experience.

3.2.3 Ātmanic Unity

At the centre of this paradoxical dynamic is the unmoving supreme reality, which allows a sense of unity to be grasped through the term Ātman, which has to be considered at the centre of any model of person developed in Pratyabhijñā. This reality provides the metaphysical backdrop to all philosophical considerations. In this thesis, the notion of Ātman taken from the Pratyabhijñā tradition will indicate the essential nature of the puruṣa (hypostasis), by which the specific individual characteristics are unified within an essential reality of being and consciousness.

While the notion of Ātman provides a sense of unity within human persons it also raises issues of how to overcome the ontological dilemma of bridging the gulf between the monist essential divine being and the world. It also provides a platform to overcome the existential dilemma of the relativist individual but at the same time it infers that person is not denuded in a total absorption with the divine. The isolation of the individual is not overcome at the expense of destroying any real sense of person. Pratyabhijñā resolution was to affirm that the mundane consciousness is not denied, even when experienced in a pati, but is viewed as a manifestation of the divine and thus intimately related to the divine. Utpala stated:

The Lord, being all powerful, manifests spatial sequence by creating wonderful variety in the forms of creation, and He also brings about time sequence by manifesting variations in action.  

115 This is evident in Utpala’s countering erroneous doctrines in IPK, 1.2, p.2, where he argues that the “Godhead” is the independent authority, whose nature is the “pure Consciousness” is the Self of every human person, giving “every person the power to know”; translation by Pandit. IPKp, 1.1.2, p.7. It is the ability of each individual to cognise that shows the reality of Ātman shining through as the true nature of that cognition.

116 मृत्तिक्षित्वप्रश्नो देशक्रमभावस्यते। कृयावैचित्र्यिनिर्मीताः सत्क्रममपीये:। mūrti-vaicitry ato deśa-kramam abhāsayat asau/ kriyā-vaicitrya-nirbhāsāt kāla-kramam apiśvaraḥ/। IPK, 2.5, p.38; translation by Pandit IPKp, 2.1.5, p.110.
The individual person is thus not denied but affirmed as a manifestation of the divine. Difference and non-difference were not disconnected, where the former is dissolved in the latter, but accepted for it is the Lord Himself who assumes forms and at the same time does not deny those forms. As Abhinavagupta stated that, "the act of assuming or entering into different forms"\(^{117}\) becomes possible due to the freedom of the divine whose essential nature is Parāmarśa or the "will in the form of desire to do so".\(^{118}\) In this condition (of unity) the individual lives "within the Lord"\(^{119}\) and not in separation. This model is due to an accepting that creation is a manifestation (ābhāsa) of the Lord and not disconnected from the divine reality. Utpala stated that difference, which is the base of time, is based upon manifestation and non-manifestation and "such manifestations and non-manifestations are due to the Lord".\(^{120}\) Therefore person cannot be rejected within a context of non-being through total absorption, but created by the Lord, and thus has to be accepted as real.

3.2.4 Unity as Conditional Relationality

Through the concept of unity, difference is established as dependent on the subject of manifestation, or the doer (Ātman).\(^{121}\) This doer relates the differing substances as a single substance "residing simultaneously in more than one substance"\(^{122}\) and is essentially one, where phenomena attain a relational condition through "a single real fact".\(^{123}\) The dependence of difference indicates that difference gains a relational context, between subjects and objects and between impure and pure realities, within a condition of unity. The condition of existing as a subject in relation to objects and the divine reality is made apparent by Utpala, who refutes Vijñānavādins (Buddhists) and cites their objections to a concept of Ātman\(^{124}\) to highlight how phenomena are dependent and relational to the divine within the condition of the Ātman. This

\(^{117}\) IPV, 2.4.20-21 (commentary); translation by Pandey, IPVp, pp.186-187.

\(^{118}\) Ibid.

\(^{119}\) Ibid.

\(^{120}\) IPK, 2.4, p.38; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 2.1.4, p.109.

\(^{112}\) See IPK, 1.16, p.7.

\(^{122}\) IPK, 1.16, p.7; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.2.11, p.25.

\(^{123}\) Ibid.

\(^{124}\) Utpala states that the Vijñānavādins believed "what is seen is the rise of some particular objects...and nothing beyond that. Only such is the relation between cause and effect...The concept of doer is imagination", IPK, 1.15-16, p.7; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.2.10-11, pp.24-25.
condition allowed Pratyabhijñā to accept that ābhāsas are real, which qualified its non-dualism through a model of unity-in-diversity (*bhedābheda*). In this model, the focus is on the relationships between subject and object highlighted in the medium by which this relationality was to be achieved.

Pratyabhijñā worked within a double philosophical schema, allowing for elements of the dualistic, such as accepting the world, within a non-dual context. This non-dual context was not divorced from mundane existence and awareness, where “determinate cognitions” of individuals, perceiving the universe and themselves in differentiation and multiplicity, ultimately rested on unity. Without the “right consciousness” only difference or multiplicity is seen. The relative position (*dik*), where objects are cognised as external to the Absolute subject and thus separate, is to be considered firstly in relation to unity, then diversity and then unity-in-diversity.

The relationship of the Lord in respect to objects evidences the concrete reality of objects, not their non-reality, and points to the unity inherent in the relation between subject and object. In this context this relationality is to be conditional to unity and understood in terms of the “manifestation of the universal power of action”.

Within Pratyabhijñā philosophy, a relational approach was also evident in its philosophic categories: non-dualistic; dualistic-cum-non-dualistic; and dualistic divisions within the different schools. Again the triadic divisions of I, you, he/she/it (*aham, tvam, sah*) affirmed a philosophical relationship of the transcendent subject

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125 See IPV, 2.2.5-7.
126 IPV, 2.2.6; translation by Pandey, IPVp, p.135.
127 IPV, 2.2.5; translation by Pandey, IPVp, p.134.
128 IPV, 2.2.6 (commentary); translation by Pandey, IPVp, p.135.
129 Ibid. As stated in the IPK, 2.17, p.42, that “attainment of purpose by means of an object that has both unity and multiplicity, is possible for a subject, who seeks causal efficiency, only according to the view that has been stated above. Therefore, ideas of revelation etc. are not erroneous”, एवम्यायसिद्धि: स्यान्तमातृष्कार्यान्तः। भद्राभेदवार्यण्यं तेन भाषितिसिद्धार्थसः। ते॥
130 Of Śiva, Śakti, and Nara in SSV’s, p.xv; also para (Supreme), parāpara (Supreme-non-Supreme), and apara (non-Supreme); and abheda (non-difference), and bhedābheda (diversity-in-unity) and bheda (difference). See Chatterji, Kashmir Śaivism p.8; see also Gavin Flood, Body and Cosmology in Kashmir Śaivism (San Francisco: 1993), p.12; also see Pandit, Aspects of Kashmir Śaivism, p.18. This philosophy is outlined in IPKp. pp.116-120.
with divine manifestation, but qualified in the unity of being. This relationality was evident in the relationship between the divine subject and objects, where the objects were fulfilled through the essential reality of being and not only in an existential dynamic. This contradictory approach led to the Tantric dictum: “sarvam sarvātmakam, everything relates to everything else”. Hence Pratyabhijñā did not view the dichotomy of dualism and non-dualism as necessarily presenting a philosophical problem, but rather representing different levels of consciousness which are ultimately expressed as the divine reality.

Pratyabhijñā, while using dualistic philosophical constructs, viewed the relationship of subject-to-objects as real confirming the real-ness of human existence and the place for the totality of being. Hence Pratyabhijñā accepted the notion of concrete person but through a non-dual context. This model reconciles notions of transcendence (viśvottīrṇa) and revelation or immanency (viśvātmaka) in a model that incorporated the metaphysical and the concrete person within a single model. This was accomplished by the re-addressing of how Self-realisation or knowledge of Self was to be attained by admitting the place for ābhāsas or manifestations, but which are ultimately re-cognised as non-different to Maheśvara or the Supreme. In this respect Pratyabhijñā was both the path and the goal where “self-re-cognition” is the means and the end in determining the value of both existence and being.

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132 Ibid., p.xvii.
133 See IPK: 1.32; 1.35; 1.40; 1.54; 1.60-61; 1.78-81; 2.4; 2.6; 2.8; 2.35.
134 Ibid., 1.1.; and see IPV, 1.1.1.
135 IPV, 1.1.1. The state of becoming in re-cognition could be had in a “flash”, SK (KSTS 5), as stated in the Spanda philosophy or as a process of awakening (IPK, 4.11-12; IPK1, chp.1, 1.1, p.85; and IPKp, pp.200-210), which allows a correlation to be made to the concept of becoming in deification, see Moti Lal Pandit, The Trika Saivism of Kashmir, (New Delhi: 2003), pp.108-9. The notion of deification in relation to re-cognition is also broached by Motilal Pandit who argues that the state of the perfected one (the Siddha) lives in the state of perfection (deification) in which the body too is deified. In the deified or re-cognised condition, life becomes a “divine wonder” (ibid., p.114) in which the cosmos is seen (drṣṭi) as a vision of the play of the Lord, a “play of consciousness”, see Swami Muktananda, Play of Consciousness. A Spiritual Autobiography (South Fallsburg: 2002). Deification and re-cognition are both words that can conceptually expresses ontological fullness of being and exemplified by Utpala who referred to an awakening in the form of grace through Śaktipāta. see PSA, 9, p.24 (Pandit). Tantrālōka, 5.1, pp.52-53, citation taken from N. Rastogi, Introduction to the Tantrālōka (Delhi: 1987), p.13. This awakening culminates in the telos of human existence, in an experience of fullness or rather an ontological re-cognition of union with the Lord, and this experience of re-cognition represents the fullness of being, of what it is to be a person.
3.3 Developing a Concept of Person in Pratyabhijñā?

It is due to the Pratyabhijñā double schema, of accepting both dualistic and nondualistic models, that a concept of person can be developed. This double schema did not however, indicate a bipolar philosophy, or when contextualised to the ideas in this thesis, a bipolar approach to personhood. Such a schema highlights unity in the face of multiplicity where the “ordinary every day life”\(^\text{136}\) is not negated, but accepted and raised to the divine level. The deification or transformation of the thought processes within a re-cognition of the truth of divine unity is very similar to those ideas already expressed in Chapter 2B in relation to the Byzantine model of deification, where what is above raises up that which is below. Pratyabhijñā in re-cognition also accepted that which is below by allowing for a transformation of consciousness. In this context both that which is pure or impure is accepted, as Utpala stated:

Thus the whole world’s activities, whether pure or impure, are experienced within the Lord, who shines, decorated by the (reflective) manifestations of various different phenomena.\(^\text{137}\)

Thus as Abhinavagupta argued, “practical life is experienced as resting on the omnipresent Lord\(^\text{138}\) whose “essential nature”\(^\text{139}\) is not changed by manifested phenomena. In the experience of re-cognition the ordinary life is not dismissed but re-cognised to be “identical with the level of Śiva, which is characterised by the realisation of the essential nature of the subject”.\(^\text{140}\) As a consequence, difference is in itself impossible, as argued by Abhinavagupta, “unless there be one substratum of all

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\(^{136}\) IPV, 1.7, 13-14; translation by Pandey, IPV\(p\), p.110. As Abhinavagupta stated: “Not only relations of cause and effect, of remembrance and of contraries, which characterise all the general transaction of ordinary every day life, but the particular transactions also such as purchase and sale, which are impure, and relation of teacher and taught etc., which are pure, depend upon one subject, because transactions depend upon some kind of unification” (ibid).

\(^{137}\) इत्यतःतपस्यभिः, भौगोलिक-समाजसंरचना विद्यमानमेते। समलोकमेव विचारणसम्बन्धिते विभि। समलोकविचारणसम्बन्धिते विभि।

\(^{138}\) IPV, 1.7.14 (commentary); translation by Pandey, IPV\(p\), p.110.

\(^{139}\) Ibid.

\(^{140}\) Ibid.
these”, whereby difference when intimately related to non-difference, which is accepted as having both concrete existence and meaning.

When considering a notion of person or puruṣa in Pratyabhijñā this simultaneous accepting of two natures, pertaining to the divine and the objectified world, indicates that in the human person there exists a double nature of essential being and outward existence. There must also be affirmed a double consciousness of willing and acting, where the two are unified in the experience of re-cognition. This is very similar to Maximus the Confessor’s dyothelite Christology, which argues that in Christ there is a natural human will and an “essential divine will”. Both are simultaneously united in Christ without separation or change to the divine nature. In the same way in the human individual there are two natures, which are united through the divine activity. In the natural physis, a feeling of bound-ness (pasu) exists which is overcome when united to the essential divine nature or the Ātman within the human person (hypostasis/puruṣa), through divine grace. However, the distinction between the divine and human, although remaining in Byzantine theology, is dissolved in Pratyabhijñā, as Abhinavagupta explains that Bhagavān (God) is both the “knower and doer”, and continues:

Although in reality there is only one Saṃvid, which is nothing else than pure light of consciousness and free consciousness, yet this difference has been brought about by Himself in order to make others understand (true nature of Śiva).

3.3.1 Personhood through Means of Knowledge

The single entity or individual subject (pramātr) reflects a person’s ability to cognize the essential reality, from which self-shinning, self-awareness (vimarsa) extends and from which comes jñāna (knowledge) and kriyā (act). The individual subject (pramātr) experiences his or her personhood because of the Supreme Person, the

141 IPV, 1. 8. (commentary); translation by Pandey. IPVp, p.111.
142 Opse.7, 80D-84D, and Opse.345B-56D; also see Bathrellos, The Byzantine Christ, pp.99-174, who significantly highlights the strengths and shortcomings of Maximus’ Christology.
143 Opse.7, 80C (Louth).
144 IPV, 1.8 (commentary); translation by Pandey, IPVp, p.111.
145 Ibid.
absolute Subject (*pramātṛ*), who manifests persons through His own personal existence. Utpala explained:

> It is only He (*pramātā* the Absolute Subject) who is almighty God (*mahēśvarah*), by virtue of His constant Self-awareness (*vimarśa*), because Self-awareness is the pure knowledge (*jñāna*) as well as the pure action (*kriyā*) of the Lord.\(^{146}\)

Human personhood, therefore, is a reflection of the divine personhood, having self-awareness and the ability to be and act, having also freedom, volition and power. This awareness, *being*, freedom and action though limited in the individual and bound by the lower nature indicates the possibilities inherent through the higher or divine awareness, *being*, freedom, and action. The ability to act and be acted upon, reflected through the ontological condition of *being* a human person, affirms that the bodily existence is manifestly real but does not exist in isolation. It exists in relation to the divine reality where the higher ultimately informs that condition of its truth, as Utpala stated: “exterior existence of such entities is the eternal Truth”.\(^{147}\) Consequently, an individual entity has to be considered in terms of material existence or “determinate consciousness”,\(^{148}\) which relates to the attainment of exterior knowledge. This exterior knowledge is attained through *pramāṇas* (means of valid knowledge), whereby knowledge indicates not only the nature of subjective cognition, but also the limitations to this knowledge and awareness. But there are limitations to *pramāṇa* and Pandit relates the term to “mundane activities”\(^{149}\) not capable of revealing God. However, as Abhinavagupta argues that *pramāṇa* although they express certain exterior qualities, “shine determinately as dependent upon another...having the nature of *Samvid*”,\(^{150}\) and are not separate from *Cit. Pramāṇas* are not independent in that they do not shine independently but are fundamentally dependent on the divine, and related to that which allows them to shine. This Dependence on the divine indicates the nature of the cognition of the limited subject, and to that to which it is related. Thus the *pramāṇas* are related to the relative consciousness; as Abhinavagupta goes on to state that:

\(^{146}\) स एव वन्मृशाल्येन निवासते महेश्वरः। विमाश्य एव देवस्य शुद्धे ज्ञानक्रिये यतः॥ ॥ ॥ *IPK*, 1.88, p.36.

\(^{147}\) *IPK*, 1.5, p.34; translation by Pandit, *IPKp*, 1.8.5, p.95.

\(^{148}\) *IPV*, 2.3.1-2 (commentary); translation by Pandey, *IPVp*, p.142.

\(^{149}\) *IPKp*, p.121.

\(^{150}\) *IPV*, 2.3.1-2 (commentary); translation by Pandey, *IPVp*, p.140.
If this pramāṇa be not related to the limited subject, the consciousness ‘I who had consciousness of Nila, am now having that of Pita’ will not be possible. But such personal experience is undeniable and is never contradicted. This the Ābhāsa (extrovert light) which shines as related to the limited subject and appears every moment in a new form, because of its facing object, is called pramāṇa because it operates to bring about cognition.151

While pramāṇas indicate exterior knowledge, they relate also to self-determinate consciousness, which has as its characteristic the ability to “produce the determinate knowledge”,152 to determine “this” (idam).153 The ability to allow an external recognition of another condition outside of the initial cognitive awareness, infers an ability to attain other types of consciousness in relation to individual awareness, the attaining of higher knowledge. The relationship of knowledge to manifestation (tat or ābhāsa) and the relationship of such ābhāsa (that-ness) to cognitive subject will be examined later, but it is the determination of such objectification, which consequently leads to an awareness of something other than “this” (idam), a reality by which “this” comes into being. The relationship of individual conscious awareness to manifestation (ābhāsa), or that-ness, indicates a movement of exteriority, which through a means of valid knowledge, allows an inward movement and awareness to ‘this-ness’ (idam) and ‘I-consciousness’ (aham) or ‘I am’, confirming a sense of personal awareness. In this personal awareness a sense of difference is attained through the power of differentiation or apohana-śakti.154 It is because this difference is the Self-luminous

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151 Ibid., p.141.
152 Ibid., p.142.
153 Utpala stated: “The means of right knowledge (pramāṇa) is that because of whose power the object shines determinately as “this” (idam) and “of such nature”. That is also self-luminous and rises afresh every moment. That (tat or pramāṇa) as determinately cognising within itself (this light, whose essence is the inner reflective awareness, vimārṣātāmā) an object, for which a single expression stands and which is free from temporal and spatial limitations, is the cognition (miti), provided that it is uncontradicted or invalidated (not an illusion)”. Ī.2.14.8, II.15.16.17.37; translations from: Pandey, IPV, p.43; Torrela, IPK, p.161; Pandit, IPKp, pp.27-35; Rudrappa observes that in Kashmir Śaivism, being seems to be “bifurcated as Brahman and Jiva” (Rudrappa, Kashmir Śaivism p.69). However this bifurcation represents a unity-in-manifestation, a unity in the nature of differentiation, for all cognitions are the shining luminosity of divine consciousness (IPV, 1.4.8). Rudrappa notes, in Kashmir Śaivism, “everything is the manifestation of the Godhead Paramāśiva” (Rudrappa, Kashmir Śaivism p.19) hence the unity of person is also safeguarded. The “individual self is none other than the Lord Himself with limited powers” (ibid.112).
principle (Samvedana), a notion of personal difference comes to indicate a sense of non-difference, in that, difference cannot stand independently outside of unity, but is dependent on the divine.

3.3.2 Person as a Mode of Existence

The reality of being a person, having a sense of difference, and the consciousness of a particular individual on a particular level, in Pratyabhijñā, depends on the mode of existence (guna) of that individual. Thus the type of existence of a person reflects the guna in which that person exists. In the higher guna (mode of existence) exists, pureness through knowledge (jñāna) is attributed, even in differentiation. In the lower modes of rajas and tamas existence is related to action (kriyā) and bound-ness or illusion (māyā) and to impurity, implying negative attributes to these types of existences. While the Supreme Person (puruṣa) remains beyond the gunas, the human person can be expressed through types or modes of human existence in which the highest existence, as already stated, can be called a Cid-ātmanic mode (tropos) of hypostatic existence.

This mode expresses the freedom to overcome the natural physis or lower gunas in a tropos which relates to the subject of pure consciousness (cid-ātmanah), where a person (pati) experiences divine consciousness. This model utilises Cit to develop a

154 IPK, p.41.
155 The philosophy of the three gunas are accepted and developed in Pratyabhijñā, see IPK, 4.4-5, p.71.
156 Utpala stated “the knowledge and action of a pati (liberated one) aimed toward objects taken as his own, as well as his power to manifest the viewpoint of diversity, become respectively (these gunas), sattva, rajas and tamas of a bound being. These gunas, becoming transformed into instrumental and objective elements, are not spoken of as the powers of the powerful One (puruṣa) because (as tattvas) they are separate from puruṣa” Svānga-rāpesu bhāvesu jñānam kriyā ca yā / māyā-itiye te eva pāsoḥ sattvaṃ rajās tamāḥ// bheda-sthitāḥ saktinām nāpadisyaṭe/ esam gunānām karana-kāryatva-parināminām// IPK, 4.4-5, p.71; IPKp., pp.194-195. Because of this sense of the personal, Mishra concludes that the “whole Pratyabhijñā system centres round the concept of person”, see Kamalakar Mishra, ‘Person in the Light of Pratyabhijñā Philosophy’, Indian Philosophical Annual, 8 (1972), 206-214. However, Mishra never quite states what this means other than developing a broad notion of person. In my opinion he uses general philosophical and psychological terms to establish that, in Pratyabhijñā, God should be understood in an Absolute, theistic, personalist sense, having a personal consciousness, which significantly reflects the need for a personhood category (ibid., pp.207-208).
157 IPV, 4.4-6.
158 See Chapter 1.4.6.
159 IPK, 3.23, p.67.
link between being and existence within an event of Cit, where the hypostatic tropos cannot be divorced from the essential reality of Ātman. Citi or the Citi-Śakti thus establishes an existential and ontological link between the divine being, having will (icchā) and the power of action (kriyā), in relation to the world. In a mode of essential being this infers a relational context of essential subject to object, of God to the world through the activity of Citi, where the “common” manifestation comes to understand the “uncommon” through the activity of Citi in a mode of divine existence. This represents a model of unity within diversity, of being within a mode of existing, where the “light of consciousness (prakāśa)” becomes existentially available to the individual (narab) who attains an awareness of non-difference, and thus can relate to a Cid-ātmanic mode of existence.

Through existing as a mode, a person comes to know the nature of his or her personhood, through the dynamic activity of Citi, which reveals the true nature to the person. Citi, the conscious activity of Ātman, the luminous being-ness (Prakāśa) of the Absolute as Para-Samvit (supreme consciousness), or vimarśa (shinning free-consciousness), purifies the lower modes of existence or gunas, raising up the consciousness, while at the same time being all levels of consciousness and gunas.

Utpala explains that Citi is non-different to His own Self-awareness as the Absolute Pramātr (divine experient or Maha-Pramātr) and this fundamentally relates to how to understand human personhood, being and conscious existing. Citi has a revelatory function in informing relative consciousness and modes of existence of its true nature in the individual pramātrs (experients), it also has the ability to cognise divine unfoldment (unmesa) or manifestation (ābhāsa) of the universe, which highlights the relationship of divine activity to revelation. Through transcending “modes” of existence, the divine exists as these modes as a “mass of prakāśa (light of

161 IPV. 4.11.
162 Within this mode an experience is had as Sanderson states where: “the result is said to be the state of duality within nonduality (dvaitādvaitam, bhedādbheda). Śiva consciousness arises when the objective universe...dissolves entirely into non-dualistic self-representation (aham-vimarśa)”, see Sanderson, ‘The Doctrine of the Mālinīvijayottaratantra’, p.295.
163 Ibid., p.295.
164 Ibid.
165 PSA. 7. p.23; and Chatterji, Kashmir Śaivism, p.47
166 Tagare, The Pratyabhijīnā Philosophy, p.75.
167 IPV. 1.5.14-15; translation by Pandey IPVp. pp.74-76.
168 IPK. 1.88, p.36.
169 IPK. 3.3, p.60.
170 IPK. 1.83, p.34.
171 PBH, Sūtra 4 (commentary); translation by Singh, IPKs, p54.
consciousness), for the states or “modes” are only “the form of prakāśa”.

The revelatory or extrusive aspect of the divine (unmeṣa) as compared to intrusive (unmeṣa) divine inwardness indicates how Pratyabhijñā overcame the problem of being and act through the notion of prakāśa, by including the revelatory medium of Cit to overcome any ontological gulf.

The overcoming of this ontological gulf within the human person can be correlated to a consciousness, as stated above, to a Cid-ātmanic mode of personal, or hypostatic, existence which lives in the divine consciousness. This existence can be said to relate to a bodily existence through the term puruṣa, where the puruṣa attains the highest level of consciousness. The term puruṣa itself is considered a principle of the extrusive divine activity as a tattva and this shall be the subject of the next part of the chapter.

3.4 Puruṣa Tattva

The notion of person is equated with puruṣa, as the twelfth principle (tattva) of the thirty-six principles (tattvas) of manifestation (ābhāsas), consequently, it is important to examine this term in relation to the tattvas. The puruṣa tattva becomes important not when considering a notion of person in Pratyabhijñā, but also in terms of revelation, of how the divine reveals Himself to the world. This process of

172 Ibid.
173 Ibid.
174 IPK. 3.3, p.60. Unmeṣa means “opening of the eye” and nimeṣa indicates “losing of the eyes” (ibid).
175 Even though in the term puruṣa can be correlated to a notion of person and expressed as such in the tattvic categories, the preferred term to indicate individual is not puruṣa which is only mentioned once directly in the text of the IPK (see IPK, 2.19, p.44). Neither is it jīva which is mentioned once in IPK (ibid., 1.4, p.2); or paśu, which I could only find mentioned four times (ibid., 3.7, p.61; 3.14, p.64; 4.4, p.71; 4.6, p.71); or anu, of which I found six references (ibid., 1.3, p.2; 1.8, p.4; 1.9, p.4; 1.39, p.17; 2.24, p.46; 2.47, p.55) not including the references to the ānava-mala or coverings of finitude (ibid., 3.15, p.64); but pramātr (experient) which is mentioned at eighteen times (IPK. 1.57, p.24; 1.65, p.27; 1.67, p.27; 1.69, p.28; 1.70, p.29; 1.76, p.31; 1.83, p.34; 1.85, p.35; 1.88, p.36; 2.12, p.41; 2.31, p.49; 2.38, p.52; 2.44-45, p.54; 2.48, p.55; 3.9, p.62; 3.13, p.63; 3.14, p.64). Also Abhinavagupta in PSA seemed to prefer the term paśu (PSA, 5-6, p.16) to indicate individual, though he does utilise puruṣa at least once in the same text (ibid., p.36)
176 From tat or that, hence the tattvas describes that-ness. The PBH stated that, “Tat (that) means the universe” (translation by Singh, PBHs, p.52), or the exterior aspect of divine action in relation to personal consciousness. See also, A Descriptive Analysis of the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, p.4; Chatterji, Kashmir Śaivism, p.89; Swami Lakshmanjoo, Kashmir Śaivism, (USA: 2003), pp.1-10; Tagare, The Pratyabhijñā Philosophy, pp.24-31.
revelation through the *tattvas* also related to the movement from the divine ‘I-consciousness’ to that-ness, or manifestation (*ābhāsas*). This relationship of the divine to the world comes to indicate on the human level types or modes of existence and consciousness by which the divine is expressed. As such the *tattvas* were related to the divine act (*kriyā*), or revelation, as principles of manifestation (*ābhāsas*) in the *Āgamaādhikāra* of Utpala’s *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā*, which included the *puruṣa-tattva*. However, the term *puruṣa-tattva* is not expressly stated but inferred through the word *pramātṛ* which indicated finite subject. Utpala stated:

That subjective condition, void, having entities other than itself as its objects, and being wrapped by five limiting elements known as time and so on, is itself an objective element, appearing as a subjective one.  

This part of the chapter examines the relationship of how the experient (*pramātṛ*) relates to the *tattvas*, especially the *puruṣa-tattva*, to understand how concrete existence is to be understood in the light of *Pratyabhijñā* seeming negation of individuality.

### 3.4.1 The *Tattvas* of Manifestation

The *tattvas* of manifestation or cosmological categories of Utpala in the *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā* were not given as a straightforward list, but were expressed through a philosophical-cum-theological context. Within this context, the notion of person related not only to principles of manifested existence, but how individual consciousness is raised to a level where divine participation changes the mode of the *puruṣa* from impurity to purity. The definition of a notion of person also has to be considered within this context, where any term does not rest at a certain level but evolves until placed within a context of pure existing within the category of *tattvas*.

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177 *IPK*, 3.9, p.62.
179 *IPK*, 3.1-3.31, pp.59-69; *IPKp*, pp.155-188.
180 Ibid., pp.159-163.
181 The *tattvic* categories related to the first five “pure”, the first being *Śiva*. The second *tattva* was the divine *Sakti* which expresses the desire and power to create which is dynamic, having movement.
The first tattva was Śiva, who as the highest deity (Anuttara) was ontologically and existentially undifferentiated with the highest Ātman or Paramātman. This divine state was not to be considered an unconscious substance but was “the very essence of Consciousness”, having the highest ‘I Am’ awareness. This conscious awareness allows for the second tattva, which was the dynamic aspect of the first tattva. The second tattva, Śakti, was also ontologically undifferentiated to the “divine essence” but becomes existentially differentiated in that it indicated how the activity (act or kriyā) of the Self-contained Absolute reality comes to express itself in an outward movement, creating the world and then revealing itself to the world. Here, the notion of person comes to be better understood in this dynamic of non-difference and difference, and in the observed downward movement or unfoldment of the divine activities by which person (puruṣa) attains being.

In the third tattva (relating existentially to Sadāsiva or Sādākhyā), interior divine movement increases, where the interior aspect of the divine knowledge and action are further revealed, and where the revelation, aham asmi idam (‘I am this’) is born. This movement allows expansion to the fourth tattva, Isvara, where the extroversive aspect of divine unfoldment (unmeṣa) is reflected in the understanding

where there is both ‘I am’ (ahanta) and this-ness (idanta), but where divine activity is still intrusive. Through God’s infinite consciousness and kriyā-śakti, tattvic manifestation occurs. The first two tattvas are expressed in the first stanza of the Āgamsadhikara of IPK where Śiva is inferred by evam (thus or alone), see IPK 3.1, p.59; see also S. Vasudeva working on the seven perceivers’ in The Yoga of Mālinīvijayottaratantra, p.152.

182 Which states that consciousness indicates “Self-sufficiency of God as well as His extraordinary divine essence (paramātmā), IPK, 1.44, p.18; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.5.13, p.62.

183 IPK, 1.44, p.18; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.5.13, p.62.

184 IPK, 1.44, p.18; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.5.13, p.62.

185 Utpala states: “Thus the divine action, vibrating inwardly as well as outwardly in accordance with time sequence, belongs to none other than the infinite Subject of knowing. Therefore infinite knowledge and action are mutually inseparable”, evam antar-bahir-vidhā kriyā kāla-kramāṅgā mātut eva tad- anyonya-vyākhyate jñāna-karmanī/, IPK, 3.1, p.59; IPKp, 3.1.1, p.155; see also MT, p.xiii. IPK, 3.1, p.59; IPKp, 3.1.1, p.155. There has to be made a distinction between eva and evam, the first emphasises really, actually, just, alone, entirely, while evam means like this, thus, in this way. The text actually states evam to mean thus, as to support what went before, which is the conclusion of Raffaele Torella, see IPKt, p.189, and then eva to indicate “knowing subject alone” (ibid.)

186 IPK, 3.2, p.59.

187 It is, as Tagare states, “the first creative aspect or vibration of Parama Śiva (Anuttara, the highest deity), see Tagare. The Pratyabhijñā Philosophy, p.26.

188 IPK, 3.3, p.60.
"this is I (idam asmi aham)". The Īsvara tattva had also been correlated to tatpurusa by Abhinavagupta to underline this extrusive activity of divine consciousness which comes to indicate, in the notion of divine person (puruṣa), a concrete sense of movement to the objectified universe, but which manifests a consequent gulf between the divine and the world. The subject of how this gulf was resolved in Pratyabhijñā will be examined in the following parts of this chapter.

In relation to the tattvas this gulf begins to allow the notion of individual to become more concrete, but at the expense of participation with the divine. In the fourth tattva or the Īsvara tattva the notion of divine person becomes specifically related to how the divine comes to communicate with the world and hence there is a context of relationality, which paradoxically resolves the dilemma of an uncommunicative unmoving essence in relation to the world, through the revelations of personal divine principles. This relationality is expressed in the further outward movement from the divine centre, and expressed in the fifth tattva, suddha-vidya (correct knowledge or sad-vidyā), which allows knowledge of the divine to be grasped. At this point Utpala refers to individual entities experiencing these types of consciousness, yet retaining some form of individuality, where partial unity is experienced in a state of diversity.

(This viewpoint is pure and correct knowledge) because one may see even entities that are well known through an idea of ‘this-ness’, through the correct perspective; that is, Consciousness is seen as their essence.

In the suddha-vidya tattva there is a distinction between ‘I-ness’ and ‘this-ness’. This tattva is the last pure tattva, which represents a dual consciousness of both unity, of pure ‘I’ and this-ness, where there is purity and impurity. The sad-vidyā tattva indicates a state of qualified unity or parāpara (highest-non-highest-knowledge). It is in sad-vidyā that a model of unity-in-diversity comes to be apparent (bhedabheda).
which allows individual personhood to be expressed in terms of concrete existence in relation to unity. This points to the qualifying of subjective awareness, the pure ‘I am’, with some impurity, which allows the paśu (bound creature) to discover his real nature in the connection between the pure knowledge and impure consciousness.

Although these five principles are often taken to indicate the first aspects of revelation, actually only the last three represent true tattvas as the first two, Śiva and Śakti do not represent a dualism, but aspects of Absolute being. But this too is incorrect for from an absolute point of view in Pratyabhijñā, all manifestation is nothing but the light of divine consciousness. Hence in Pratyabhijñā, as Pandit poetically remarks, there is “a beautiful and satisfying unity between theism and absolutism of a monistic character”.

While the first two tattvas indicated purity, the next three indicated purity-impurity, all the rest related to impurity. As the divine unfoldment becomes greater so the principles (the sixth to the eleventh tattvas) become equated with the metaphysical coverings of ignorance (kaṅcukas) that have wrapped self-awareness in finitude and limitations as Utpala stated:

All bound beings, including the gods in heaven, are undergoing rebirth and are defiled by the three impurities; but among these, the defilement caused by past deeds is the most important cause of their transmigratory existence. Subjective consciousness, being wrapped in finite creative power (kalā, counted among the kaṅcukas), and appearing finite in character, stands here as a quality of unconscious elements like the void (śūnya).

It is due to these coverings that the deluded souls come to experience reincarnation.
From a position of consciousness, reincarnation only points to the path of bound-ness, to limited consciousness, and does not relate to fulfilment and thus is irrelevant from the position of completed consciousness. Nevertheless, in relation to the concrete identity of a single and unique individual, reincarnation seems to denude such a concept, especially the relationship of that identity to the physical body. But this should not be considered as an unmoveable obstacle, for what is argued in this work is a qualified sense of individual through the term person, where the emphasis is first on unity which negates the stress on reincarnation. As the focus in thesis is upon the relationship between a notion of person to consciousness and essential being, reincarnation points to an incomplete notion of person, a deluded individual, and as such only indicates the natural physis. The natural condition has to be overcome through a union with the highest nature which can be experienced within a “flash of true knowledge” through the activity of the “brilliance of the real subject pure Consciousness (samāveśa)”. 

In the light of consciousness, reincarnation is dissolved, as within a notion of deification. In the experience of samāveśa while in the body, the yogi lives in what is called the turyā state (or turyātīta), which can be called a Cid-ātmanic mode of existence, and because it is in the body that it can also be affirmed as hypostatic, relating to a concrete existence. The relationship of the transformation of consciousness and thus the overcoming of the bound state, or reincarnation is confirmed in Pratyabhijñā’s focus on the release from bondage. This release is also expressed through the four states of consciousness, waking, dream, deep sleep and the turyā state. In the bound condition, relating to the coverings of māyā, the individual experiences the first three states of consciousness, where there is an erratic and unequal rhythm of being in the forces of existence (prāna and apāna), to the energies of the body, mind and breathing. This is rectified in the upward energetic freedom of grace and salvation, and God’s creation of each new individual soul at the human birth. However, from a philosophical point of view, the individual consciousness reincarnates or changes many times even in one life and as discussed in the last chapter, Maximus referred to many types of births of a single person, of the physical birth, baptism and new birth in the resurrection, see Maximus, Ambig. 42 (PG 91) 1316A-1349A.

199 IPK. 3.23. p.76; translation by Pandit, IPKp. 3.2.12, p.181.
200 Ibid.
201 Ibid.
203 IPK. 3.29-30, p.68, which also relates to inhalation and exhalation.
movement (of *udāna* force) which was “fiery in character and functions”\(^{204}\) and refers to the *kundalinī* energy,\(^{205}\) which rises up in the central spiritual channel to the *sahasrāra-cakra* and *brahma-randhra* giving enlightenment. This points to the secret experiences of the *Siddha Yogis* and *yogic* texts dealing with such ideas.\(^{206}\) The upward movement of this energy and union with Śiva establishes the *yogi* within the *turyā* state.

These practices relate to the process by which enlightenment is experienced and had within a concrete individual or *puruṣa*. The term *puruṣa* was equated with the twelfth category of the *tattvas* and also related to types of sentient creatures. Hence the generic term *puruṣa* indicated a category of life, not particular human life.

The thirteenth *tattva* was *prakṛti* or nature, which allowed a generic category for the lower or impure nature of objects and finite beings. The impure *tattvas* represented levels of *māyā* descending from the finer aspects to the subtle and the gross aspects of existence.\(^{207}\) Also the impure *tattvas* were not systematically explained in the *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā*, but were considered in the text in verses 10-11 of Chapter 1 of the *Āgamadhikara*.

The fourteenth to the sixteenth *tattvas* related to mental operations, *buddhi* (intellect), *ahamkara* (ego) and *manas* (imagination, concepts of mind); the seventeenth to twenty-sixth *tattvas* were related to the senses and activities of living and deal with the five senses, objects of action and perception; the twenty-seventh to the thirty-first to the qualities of the elements; and the rest of the *tattvas* dealt with principles of materiality, the earth, or the five *bhūtas*.

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\(^{204}\) IPK, 3.31, p.69; translation by Pandit, *IPKp*, 3.2.20, p.187.

\(^{205}\) As it states in the *Hathayogapradīpikā*, 1.27, that “with daily practice it arouse the *kundalinī*”.

\(^{206}\) As highlighted in the *Śiva Sūtras*; the *Hathayogapradīpikā*, and the *Kulārvana Tantra*.

\(^{207}\) See *IPKp*, p.209.
3.4.2 The Tattvas and the Seven Pramātrs

The levels of tattvas also correlated to levels of consciousness within seven classifications of experients (pramātrs) or types of souls, which experienced specific cognitions on specific tattvic levels. When correlating these classifications to person, the focus is to be placed on many types of awareness possible in categories of person. The first type of experients in the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā related to purity\textsuperscript{208} and those souls who experienced unity with the Śiva pramātr. On this level, everything is Śiva and there is no differentiation. This level also corresponded to the Śakti tattvas and Śakta pramātrs, where beings experienced Śivahood or aham-vimāraśa. The Śakti pramātrs were incorporated into this first experiential mode of existence as non-different to Śiva. These levels correspond to non-difference within a concept of person.

The second level of experients corresponded to the tattva (Sadāśiva) and to purity-impurity. These were the mantra-mahēśvara experients (pramātrs) who had a dim consciousness of the world. The next level (third) of experients were the mantrēśvara pramātrs who corresponded to the Īśvara-tattva having self-perception (aham), and consciousness of the world (this-ness/idam). Both the mantra-mahēśvara and the mantrēśvara pramātrs related to pure knowledge or Vidyā. The last, or fourth level of pure pramātrs, were called the vidyeśvaras who experienced partial impurity, having pure-impure knowledge. They were called Mantra beings, having both ‘I-ness’ and this-ness, and related to the Śuddha or Sad-vidyā-tattva and represents a focus on relationality in person, which is exemplified in Utpala’s arguing that Śuddha or Sad-vidyā pointed to pure knowledge qualified through impurity and represented purity-impurity qualifying the unity of these subjects as unity-in-diversity.

\textsuperscript{208} According to the PBH (PBHs, p.30) the pure pramātas are: (1) Śiva (Śakti), (2) Sadāśiva, (3) Īśvara, (4) Śuddha vidyā and (5) Mahāmāyā, correspond to the first five pure tattvas and divine operations. After this come the remaining pramātas within māyā. These 5 levels relate also to differing levels of pure souls: (1) Śiva Pramātā; (2) Mantra-Maheśvara; (3) Mantrēśvara; (4) Mantra; and (5) Vijñānakala-pasu covered with slight individuality (pralayakāla-paśu covered with individuality and kārma, sakalapāśu covered with individuality, kārma and slight delusion). The impure pramātas have total individuality, kārma, delusion and total difference. The first five pramātas also relates to conscious awareness of: (1) pure ‘I-ness’, Aham vimāraśa, ‘I Am’ Śiva; (2)’I-ness’ with faint this-ness (idam); (3) ‘I-ness’ with more this-ness and notion of that-ness; (4) balance of ‘I-ness’ and this-ness with that-ness; (5) this-ness and that-ness; and then in the impure universe only that-ness and deluded or impure ‘I-ness’. For a full list and chart of categorisation see Tagare, The Pratyabhijñā Philosophy, p.80.
The fifth level of souls related to impurity, to souls who begin to experience a mode of existence under the power of Mahāmāyā and thus difference in manifestation. Although these souls are under the control of māyā, they too have to be considered in relation to divine unity as Abhinavagupta highlights that this level has to be considered in non-dual terms through the highest experience of consciousness. At this level, the experiencers are also ultimately non-different to the divine and identical to Cit, which is the reality of “both perceiver and doer”. The souls under Mahāmāyā are able to experience the lower states in relation to considering the higher. At the māyā pramātr level the experiencers can be correlated to a sense of individual and were divided into four levels. The first had a “finer aspect” of consciousness and were called Vijnānakalas or Vijnā-kevalins (kevalin indicating alone-ness) who were bound only by coverings of ignorance or ānava-māla. This also represented a dualistic category. The next category related to impure beings, who were called pralayākalas, which represented a type of existence of bound (paśus) with ānava-māla and kārma-malas. The third category of impure pramātrs were called Sakala beings having a gross aspect and related to bound paśus having ānava-māla, kārma and māyīya-malas, and the last level indicated those beings having gross bodies.

The sixth level of pramātrs, were under the māyā tattva and related to śūnya (void) pramātrs, experienced lower states relating to void. The last experiencers in the seventh category experienced the remaining tattvas and see complete difference, having a beast like consciousness.

3.4.3 Philosophical Implications of the Puruṣa Tattva

The notion of person or puruṣa cannot be reduced to an object, or mere principle of

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209 IPV, 3.1.6 translation by Pandey, IPVp, p.195.
210 See IPKp, p.208.
211 The term puruṣa was well understood as indicating the individual person, and mentioned in the Rig Veda 10.90.1-2, stating “a thousand heads hath puruṣa, a thousand eyes a thousand feet...this puruṣa is all that yet hath been and all that is to be”, translated by Griffith (Pelikan). This refers to the embodied spirit of “Man” as a collective term, a principle of the personal in all animated humans, hence referring to “a thousand”, see footnote. The term puruṣa is also mentioned in the Upaniṣads, exemplified in the Kātha Upaniṣad, 1.iii.11, in a theistic context stating “the Puruṣa is higher than the unmanifested.
manifestation (ābhāsa), hence further explanation is needed to describe how the tattvic categories related to a real and concrete concept of person. This approach was affirmed by Utpala who argued that conscious awareness (of the pramātr or puruṣa) and existential life is intrinsically related to the “Subject of knowing”, which provides meaning to a concept of person. This meaning allows person to be considered as something more than an isolated, material and “self dependent entity” as argued by the Vijñānavādins. The individual or person is dependent on the divine and thus is relational, but also real. This does not detract from what is spiritually real or negate person as existentially real, for without the divine, person could not attain its sense of real existence. There is a relationship quality of pramātr, as a created being, to the divine being (Paramātman), power (Śakti), will (icchā-śakti) and activity (kriyā-śakti) of divine consciousness (Citī), which informs the experient of the true nature of itself. Also Citī is not a material cause for that would bind God and individuals to that nature and deny divine freedom, consequently Kṣemaraja stated, “Cit and free will are inseparable”. This freedom is not bound by the natural physis or created principles, but allows the conscious subject to rise above that nature to attain an awareness that moves from that-ness (tat), to ‘I am this’ (this-ness or idamā), or a bound mode of existence to a mode of existence that expresses the true ‘I am’ state. This represents not only a reciprocal movement of human persons to experience the divine, but indicates in the divine (Śiva) the desire and freedom to create.

The desire to create allows a higher mode of existence to be attained, which is intimately related to the divine being in that it is God Himself who desires to manifest Himself as creation:

There is nothing higher than the Puruṣa. He is the culmination. He is the highest goal”. Mahāt: paramātmatva-kārat: Pārthā bhūtyā bhavāni tv ananyātah-sthānī bhūtānī yena sarvam idam tatam Bhagavad Gītā, 8.22 (Vaidik). This notion of Supreme Person or or Parama Purusā will be correlated to the Supreme or Parama Śiva in Pratyabhijñā, see PBHs, p.54.

For the philosophy of Abhāsavada see Rudrappa, Kashmir Śaivism, p.44; Tagare, Philosophy of Pratyabhijñā, p.37.

The model was also taken up by the Bhagavad Gītā (8.8, 10) which refers to the Supreme Person (paramam purusam) and stating, “This is the Supreme person, O Son of Pritha! In whom abide all existence and by whom all this is pervaded, who is attainable by answerving single minded devotion”. Puruṣa: sūryā guṇamān scrāvitaḥ ātmāni jñānaṁ ātmanāni jñānam etat buddhitaṁ jñānam etat buddhistānāt tatmaḥ. 211. puruṣah sa paraḥ pārtha bhūtyā labhyas tv anamavā yasyāntah-sthānī bhūtānī yena sarvam idam tatam Bhagavad Gītā, 8.22 (Vaidik). This notion of Supreme Person or or Parama Purusā will be correlated to the Supreme or Parama Śiva in Pratyabhijñā, see PBHs, p.54.

For the philosophy of Abhāsavada see Rudrappa, Kashmir Śaivism, p.44; Tagare, Philosophy of Pratyabhijñā, p.37.

111 IPK, 3.2, p.59.
114 IPK, 3.1, p.59; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 3.1.1, p.155.
115 See IPK, 1.12, p.5.
116 PBH, Sūtra 2 (commentary); translation by Singh, PBHs, p.51.
Sadāśiva and other appropriate forms flashes forth *(prakāśamānatayaā sphurati)* at first as non-different from the light (of consciousness) *(prakāśābhedena)* but not experiencing the unity of consciousness... He unfolds Himself in the totality of manifestation *(tattvas)*, worlds *(bhuvanas)*, entities *(bhāvas)* and their respective experiants *(pramātāras)* that are only a solidified form of *(āśyānatārūpa)* of Cit-essence.217

The mode of the higher existence then becomes the divine mode of existence intended for the lower modes and *tattvas*. When relating the movement of one mode to another to consciousness, the movement from *tat* to pure I-consciousness indicates a disturbance in which pure consciousness *(vimarśa)* itself becomes pure-impure consciousness *(parāpara).*218 This *vimarśa* then reveals itself to itself. The pure consciousness experiences a throb or movement *(Śaktī)* which re-cognises this-ness *(idantī)* and then the pure 'I am' state. The levels of a descending movement of consciousness, from non-difference to levels of difference (pure 'I-am' to that-ness), corresponds to descending levels of *tattvic* manifestations and created phenomena. As the process of divine unfoldment *(unmesā)* continues, the descending movement within the divine, or outward movement from God *ad-intra* *(nimeśa)* to God *ad-extra*, manifests a greater space and distinction between the divine subject and the objectified world and a difference between modes of existence.

There is also in the beginnings of *tattvic* manifestations within the divine, a corresponding distinction between ‘I-ness’ *(ahanta)* and this-ness *(idantī)* so as to fulfil the free will to create. The movement outwards from the divine being allows the *vidyā-Śaktī* *(revelatory operations)* to manifest, which are then juxtaposed to manifested phenomena. This also corresponds to the differentiation of awareness in the movement from ‘I Am’ to ‘I am this’ or an awareness of otherness, in which unity-in-diversity is expressed. In this awareness the notion of person comes to be related to an inner reality through the outward expression of concrete existence. In the awareness of otherness, there is purity and impurity in the middle level of manifested

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217 *PBH*, Sūtra 4 (commentary); translation by Singh, *PBHs*, p.55
218 Utpala stated that “such a state (of *vidya*) is thus superior (to phenomena) and perfect, one hand, and inferior and imperfect, on the other hand since it is the state of unity in diversity, indicating both purity and impurity. परताहन्तगुरुवासदतपरत्वद्वायं हि सति, paratāhāntyaścādātātparamparādaśā hi sā/. IPK. 3.5, p.60.
diversity\textsuperscript{219} in which this-ness indicates a move from pure consciousness to an outward awareness. The outward expression of consciousness, or an outward looking individual, represents a movement in which total difference (indicating also impurity) is experienced. Difference indicates that individual conscious awareness of manifested phenomena is experienced, or that-ness. That-ness (the \textit{tattvas}) or a complete identification with objectified universe results in a continued identification with impurity and levels of concrete identity with the lower \textit{physis} (\textit{tat}). The movement from pure ‘I-consciousness’ to this-ness and that-ness is attributed to differing operations of \textit{vidyā-śakti} and \textit{māyā-śakti}\textsuperscript{220} which are equated to differing levels of experiencers (\textit{pramātrs}). Through these descending levels of consciousness, consciousness itself moves from pure divine awareness to a limited condition. It is this true knowledge or \textit{vidyā-śakti} that allows an ascent to the divine where the aspirant begins to understand his or her divine nature while living as a bound being. While the divine activity of knowledge that allows a movement to the divine, it is another divine activity, the \textit{māyā-śakti} that “conceals the truth under ignorance”.\textsuperscript{221}

It is in a concept of person that both knowledge of the divine or ignorance is experienced and thus becomes a vehicle of the divine to express the divine in both conditions.

As a consequence, the individual soul (\textit{jīva}), or \textit{puruṣa}, that comes to represent a principle of being and consciousness by which the divine is understood within a concrete individual, and by which an existence is had. This existence can be called personal,\textsuperscript{222} but also reflects the possibilities of many types of consciousness,
culminating within a full sense of unity while existing as a person. However, even in
gnornance, at the core of tattvic diversity is unity. Unity is vouchsafed even in tattvic
distinctiveness through the activity of Citi-śaktī, which is the light of consciousness
(prakāśa). The prakāśa allows a sense of freedom (svātantrya) within the
individual to be experienced as it mirrors the freedom of the divine, which is the very
nature of the divine existence. This freedom is expressed in the active Citi, will and
luminosity of the Ātman, which is continually active, unfolding itself as the tattvas,
including the purusa tattva.

Within these complex models of principles, experients and types of consciousness, the
model of pure and impure manifestation (ābhāsa) in Pratyabhijñā allowed the term
purusa to take on a dual role, indicating bound-ness and also limitless in re-cognition,
within a dual cognition. To underline this point Kēmarāja gave a long list of
philosophical traditions to argue that Pratyabhijñā accepts a paradoxical position,
of the one and the many, accepting both the immanent and transcendent (Ātman),
where unity is simultaneously expressed as multiplicity.

He is a single centre in universal consciousness but he becomes twofold form,
threefold, fourfold (ātma) as a subjective reality, and appears as seven pentads
(tattvic pramāṇās) in the expression of his inherent nature in manifestation.

In the state of unity amid tattvic diversity, the empirical self (individual purusa) is to
be understood as the Absolute Self, where “mundane manifestation” relates to the
unfolding of His nature (Paramātman). This unfoldment is also continuous through
divine maintenance (sthāpakata) where the act of grace (anugrahārtha) allows a

developed between Īśvara and jīva making true participation difficult to argue. For this reason Panikkar
stated: “in fact neither dualism, nor pure monism can solve this problem. Dualism digs a gap that it
cannot afterwards overcome. Monism over simplifies the issue, and does not so much explain the
problem as it explains it away”, see Panikkar, ‘Īśvara and Christ as a Philosophical Problem’, p.10.

From the Cārvākas (who believe that the self same as body), to the Nyāya (materialists who
consider self as the intellect), the Vedāntins (who view prāna as Self), and the Sāṅkhya’s (who see
duality), see PBH, Sūtra 8 (commentary), PBHs, pp.65-68.

sa caiko dvirūpas trimayapas trimayaś caturātmā
saptapañchakasvabhāvah, PBH, Sūtra 7; translation by Taimini. The Secret of Self Realization (Adyar:
1997).

PBH, Sūtra 10 (commentary); translation by Singh, PBHs, p.74.

Ibid., p.75.

Ibid.
continuous relationship between the manifested world and the “unfoldment of the essential nature (of consciousness)”\textsuperscript{229}

This continuous relationship or communion of the essential nature of the divine in relation to phenomena, followed on from the teachings of \textit{Mālinīvijayottaratantra} where the manifested world becomes intimately related to non-difference. As Kaul shows, the \textit{ji\texttimes as} were included in the list of ontological “acceptables” (pure universe) for the \textit{ji\texttimes as or puru\texttimes a} and can participate in the pure universe and in an undifferentiated experience.\textsuperscript{230} The notion of \textit{puru\texttimes a} indicates a subjective and concrete existence, in an immaterial-material sense, and thus juxtaposing the individual existence to the divine reality. Hence the human level becomes informed by the divine, which changes the way in which the type of existence of the \textit{puru\texttimes a} is understood. Even the term \textit{puru\texttimes a} indicated a certain type of limited existence as the twelfth \textit{tatt\texttimes va} in the relational capabilities of that existence to experience the higher. However, the lower nature cannot by itself understand the divine without the grace of the divine. It is Śiva who, as the supreme \textit{Puru\texttimes a}, gives this grace, and it is grace which allows the observation that it is God who enters into a state of becoming so that individual \textit{puru\texttimes as}\textsuperscript{231} can attain a pure consciousness. The bound soul realises his Śivahood, which at the same time does not detract from the concrete human experient.

In this context the concept of person can be equated with the term \textit{puru\texttimes a}, where the nature of the divine person or \textit{puru\texttimes a} informs the human person or \textit{puru\texttimes a} of his or her true nature, so that the human experient rises above the natural \textit{physis} in the experience of divine consciousness.

There is consequently a relationship of the personal God to the human person (\textit{puru\texttimes a}) where the \textit{puru\texttimes a} becomes more that an empty principle, evident in the free divine power (\textit{Śakti}) and love of the divine \textit{Puru\texttimes a}, through the extrusive \textit{Citi}\textsuperscript{232} to commune with the created world through the creation of individuals. Also the light of

\textsuperscript{229} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{230} \textit{MT}, p.xvii. Tagare argues though that \textit{puru\texttimes a}: “means not merely human being but includes all sentients, \textit{Puru\texttimes a} is Śiva who has subjected himself to the Ka\texttt{\texttimes}\texttt{\texttimes}kas of Māyā like Kalā, Vidyā etc. and due to the absence of his original omniscience, omnipotence etc., got himself reduced to an atom (\textit{anu})”, see Tagare, \textit{The Pratyabhijñā Philosophy}, p.29.

\textsuperscript{231} See Hanneder, \textit{Abhinavagupta’s Philosophy of Revelation}, pp.63, 93.

\textsuperscript{232} Or “the power of \textit{unmesa (cid)}”, Abhinavagupta, \textit{Mālinīslokavārtkā} (206-207); translation by Hanneder, \textit{Abhinavagupta’s Philosophy of Revelation}, p.93.
consciousness (prakāśa), becomes intimately related to the subject awareness of the puruṣa (person). This relational and thus outward motion of God was expressed by Abhinavagupta, who referred to the “face of God which is consciousness”, recognising the relationship of objects to the divine, but which remains “unstained” by them. Abhinavagupta stated:

When therefore God through the power of his will truly wishes the objects, they become grounded in his will, yet the will remains unstained by them, for they are in contact (sprśanti) with the unity of consciousness, by being identical with it. The objects, however, are then hidden by the will that is affected by limitation as a cover. But God remains in his own will. This face of God, which is consciousness, is turned away from the light is not occupying the highest, replete state and therefore appears to be in deep sleep.

The term ‘face’ as an ābhāsa (manifestation) qualifies the single Self of Maheśvara, as the ‘face’ in manifestation, which becomes the ‘face’ of the individual (puruṣa). The term puruṣa in this context, as the ‘face’ of the Self, becomes the outward ‘face’ and indicates the possibilities of the concrete person. This is affirmed by Abhinavagupta who argued that the “highest face”, is of Śiva.

Pratyabhijñā’s categorization of the individual reflects this sense of difference and unity, through the term pramātṛ (experient), for “every pramātṛ is Śiva in a contracted form”, the “Highest Lord”. God consistently experiences His own aham or ‘I-ness’, as an “unbroken consciousness, ‘I am this universe’”, and manifests existence (ābhāsas) as idam or this-ness, which is the object of the “Lord’s consciousness”. Through Śiva entering into a becoming as the world, in a

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231 Ibid. p.63.
232 Ibid. (216), p.95.
234 Ibid.
235 Ibid., (20); commentary, p.143.
236 See IPKp, 3.1.9, p.167; and PBH, 4. For a good analysis of pramātṛ and the seven experimenters or perceivers, see Vasudeva, The Mālinivijayottaranī, pp.151-178.
237 PBH, 4.
238 IPV, 4.1; translation by Pandey, IPVp, p.219.
239 Ibid.
240 Ibid., 4.7, p.225.
241 Ibid.
simultaneity of *common* and *uncommonness*, experients come to understand their bound-ness and also their true identity.\textsuperscript{244} This indicates simultaneity of modes of existence which does not point to confusion, but a layering of existence on multi-experiential platforms united through the *A†man*. While the bound individuals see difference,\textsuperscript{245} the liberated, the Siddha experiences Šivahood and experiences non-difference\textsuperscript{246} This Šivahood also has a revelatory context for Šiva's being (Satta)\textsuperscript{247} and is also non-different from the "mass of endless Tattvas".\textsuperscript{248}

### 3.5 Personhood and Unity of Being

In the remaining three major parts of this chapter a notion of person will be correlated to: the unity of being (*A†man*); conscious awareness (*Cit*) within divine activity (*Citi-šakti*), which discloses levels of consciousness; and revelation in manifested phenomena (*ābhāsa*) through a model of unity-in-diversity. Each part will correlate to the theological discussion of Šiva, *Cit* (Šakti), and manifestation (*ābhāsa*) respectively in relation to person. These divisions also correlate to modes of personal existence within the *purusa* and which have, on each level, a basis in unity. The three parts constitute an apparent downward or outward flow of consciousness. The emphasis is firstly upon the reality of being (or *A†man*) and then secondly, on how this level of being reflects unity within manifestation. The focus will be upon revealed levels of consciousness within person, from *Cit* to *citta* and then back to *Cit*, and how separation is overcome or at least accepted in a qualified model.

\textsuperscript{244} Ibid., 4.7-4.12; pp.224-228.
\textsuperscript{245} Ibid., 4.13; p.227.
\textsuperscript{246} Ibid., 4.16; p.229.
\textsuperscript{247} Ibid., p.75.
\textsuperscript{248} Ibid., 4.14; p.228. While the first *tattva* can be said to represent philosophically that which is non-dualistic, the rest of the categories evidence *dualism* in varying degrees (see *MT*, p.xvii; see also Vasudeva, *The Yoga of Mālinīvijayottaratantra*). The first five classes of beings in the *Mālinīvijayottaratantra* were the list of acceptables, as Šiva, Šakti, Vidyesa, Mantra, Manireśvara; and the *Jīvas*, which were added to the list. The last two, the avoidables, were the impure experients and actions, who experienced modes relating to Māyā and the world. Within the seven levels of experients of the *Īsvarapratyabhijñākārikā* and *Pratyabhijñāhrdaya* the souls corresponded to the *pramāṇ* levels in the *Mālinīvijayottaratantra*, see *MT*, pp.xxi-xxii; *IPKp.*, pp.157-163; *PBH*, Kṣemarāja's commentary of *sūtra* 3; and Tagare, *The Pratyabhijñā Philosophy*, p.80; see also Vasudeva, *The Yoga of Mālinīvijayottaratantra*, pp.151-167.
In this part of the chapter, I will examine a concept of person (purusa) in relation to unity through Ātman. Although the Ātman can be viewed as a monist static reality, it is also, in Pratyabhijñā, connected to everything as the substratum of being and thus also has this quality of reflecting activity. Abhinavagupta describes the Ātman in relation to the world in the following way:

Just as the disk of the moon appears to be moving when reflected in flowing waters and just as it looks to be static in still waters, so does this great Ātman appear in multifarious variety in the different categories of bodies, senses, organs and worlds. Just as Rāhu (shadow of the earth) shine and appear in the disk of the moon, though otherwise invisible, so does this Ātman shine only in the mirror of psychic apparatus while witnessing objective reflection, though it is present everywhere.

The essential reality of Ātman as viewed from below, or in relation to being a unique but separated person, is to be considered in three ways: firstly, as a generic term that can be applied as the metaphysical centre of all persons and secondly, in relation to the world, where the Ātman is to be considered as having a revelatory and thus relational value. Lastly, the Ātman is to be considered in relation to the personal experience, which informs the person who she or he is and thus allows a change in the way in which that individual perceives the concept of person itself.

The Ātman, while ontologically appearing beyond material being having a non-dual centre, has from a position of individual “an appearance of duality” in that it is viewed as distinct from the individual. This vision of the individual allows Ātman to be considered not only as the form of absolute being, or being beyond being, but allows a sense of divine relatedness to the world. Relatedness is not constricted within

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49 गर्गस्ति गर्गस्ति जल ह्व हिमकरस्बिम्बं स्थिति याति। तनुकरण्मुद्वर्गं तथायमात्मा महेिश्यं॥५॥
गहरस्योषयं यथा शब्दकरस्बिम्बस्य: प्रकाश्ये तद्भवं। सर्वगतौस्त्वयमात्मा विषयायश्यं जीमुकुरे॥६॥

50 SS, ‘First Section’; translation by Singh, SSs, p.1.
a static substance, but has the quality of freedom, the freedom to act, and in relation to
the bound individual. Abhinavagupta stated that:

He (the Lord) is free...and that His freedom is manifold and consists in
bringing about diversity in unity and unity in diversity by internal
unification.\textsuperscript{251}

This passage includes the three aspects of the Ātmanic reality in relation to person or
diversity; the value of diversity through unity and how unity expresses itself within
itself as an expression of freedom; and the character of that freedom (in unity) from
an ontological perspective, which implicitly relates to the existential characteristics of
person. The nature of this freedom can initially be said to expresses a dynamic of
unity in relation to an internal movement within the divine person allowing person in
the human context to express individual characteristics. These characteristics, even
when considered through an experience of unity with the divine, are indicative of the
general ontological disposition of person that are expressions of the divine being.
While this appears to be tautological it shows how Ātman leads to person which leads
back to Ātman. The movement within the divine manifests a stir, pushing outwards
from the divine reality and manifesting the world, which cannot be viewed as separate
or self-created but is created by divine will and power.

The movement of the divine as an expression of free will (svātantrya) to create and to
reveal itself is initially expressed through a divine pulse (spanda).\textsuperscript{252} This pulse or
throb of the divine is not due to an indirect impersonal force but a free act of the
divine being. This implies that the Ātman is not to be considered as an impersonal
nature, only capable of expressing itself to itself, but related to a movement of itself
outwards through its consciousness (Cit).\textsuperscript{253} Within this understanding, a notion of
person is conditional to the Ātmanic reality and thus consciousness.

The conscious awareness of the Ātman, as the Śiva Sūtras state, is the very
characteristic of Ātman,\textsuperscript{254} and expresses the Absolute \textquoteleft I Am\textquoteright in an outward flow in
the desire to create within a personal Self-aware existence. Thus implicit to a model

\textsuperscript{251} IPV, 1.1, p.11; translation by Pandey.
\textsuperscript{252} Spanda is the Sakti or power of God to create the world. It is the essential nature of the divine and
the creative pulse, svārūpaspanda (Spanda Kārikā, ed. J. Singh, Delhi: 1980, p.3).
\textsuperscript{253} See the \textquoteleft Commentary\textquoteright of the text of Sūtra 1 of SS; SSs, p.7.
\textsuperscript{254} Caitanyamātmā, SS.1; translation by Singh, SSs, p.6.
of person, developed through Pratyabhijñā philosophy, is the qualifying of the Ātmanic ontological condition through consciousness. Ātman is static and yet has an extrusive activity and thus a relational dynamic. This relationality expresses the dependence of creation upon the Lord’s will and grace. Consequently, there is always this relational dynamic between the extrusive activity of God and the world, of subjects and objects in relation to the true subject, through the admittance of the real-ness of creation. By considering the divine freedom, will and activity of the divine to create, and the “One develops multiplicity” through the Ātmanic nature, a sense of person is developed in the admittance of multiplicity, where person also reflects those same qualities due to the inherent nature of person. This affirms the importance of person to express concrete existence as an act of unity in multiplicity, while also indicating the inherent nature Ātman. This nature allows person to be considered as not superficial or outward looking but having ontological depth. Even though this is approach to person is tautological, where Ātman allows the nature of person to be revealed which in turn points to the truth of Ātman, it allows person to be considered as the field of experience, within a concrete existence, by which Ātman is revealed as the underlying reality of existence. This is possible due to person being an expression of the Ātmanic effulgence or the “light of consciousness” or prakāśa.

3.5.2 Person as an Expression of Prakāśa

The constructing of a model of person through Pratyabhijñā, as a concrete entity, is also supported when considered through the ‘light of consciousness’ (prakāśa). It is the theological use of prakāśa which upholds a relational condition of the divine activities to the world, while affirming the validity and concrete identity of both. The prakāśa is the support of creation, which is the pure ‘Self-awareness’ of the divine and:

\[255\] This argument is developed in the first chapter of the IPK from verses 12-30, pp.5-13, through its epistemology which rests on the premise of the unity of phenomena through a single entity, the Absolute God.

\[256\] IPK, 2.10, p.40; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 2.2.2, p.116.

\[257\] IPV, p.187.

\[258\] IPK, 1.42, p.18.
described as a (shining) pulsation, as supreme existence not conditioned by
time and space, and as the very heart of the Supreme, because it is the real
essence (of all existence)."259

The "Lord manifests His own Self... the objective world is not a thing existing
separately from Him".260 Here the objective world is affirmed and so too a sense of
person must also be admitted, while yet confirming person through prakāśa as
intimately related to the divine. Through prakāśa, the activity of the highest reality
expresses itself as the aspect of divine consciousness, or vimarṣa, by which
"phenomenon becomes evident".261 This illuminates the manner by which ordinary
knowledge (vidyā) gives way to jñāna in an inward informing of the nature of being,
where the discovery of Self leads to a re-cognition of the true nature of being in an
event of Ātman within the puruṣa. It is within the experience of re-cognition that the
value of person, of moi, is comprehended as an expression of prakāśa, which allows
the other, that is other persons, to be comprehended through prakāśa. This does not
negate concrete person but places person within a context of a true value and
qualifying person in the same way as hypostasis qualifies individual in the first two
chapters of this thesis. This value underlines that, within an ontological context,
person indicates the possibilities of being through the condition of having not only a
mundane nature, but a higher nature. This higher nature is not an unconscious lump
within the person, but the substance of eternal conscious being. The higher nature
allows person to be what it should be, for it has at its very core, Self-awareness which
is reflected within each person and allows the notion of finite self. As Kṣemarāja
stated:

"Therefore this (i.e., Caitanya or consciousness which is Absolute Freedom) is
Ātma or Self, not anything else of varied nature as assumed by pluralists
(those who propound the doctrine of bheda or difference among selves) (Are
these different selves conscious beings or non-conscious beings?) If Ātma or
varied nature is assumed to be non-conscious, then it would be inconscient
matter and thus not Self. If it be considered to be of the very essence of
consciousness, then there can be no valid reason for considered to be of the
very essence of consciousness, then there can be no valid reason for

259 सा स्फुरतामहासतादेशकालविशेषिणी| रेषात्सात्त्वाप्रोक्ता इत्यवर्गः परमेष्ठिनं IPK,p.156, 176, 233.
260 IPK, 1.46, p.19; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.5.15, p.64.
261 IPKp, pp.156, 176, 233.
considering on ātmā or self as different from another self. Difference in the case of cit or consciousness cannot be established either by means of space or time or form, for if these are different from cit or consciousness then being deprived of the light of consciousness, they cannot appear at all and are thus unreal; if they appear, then they are consciousness itself (for it is only consciousness that can appear).²⁶²

For this reason the Śiva Śūtras state that the very nature of the Ātman is consciousness (caitanyamātmā),²⁶³ and thus at the very core of selves is the activity of divine consciousness. This definition of the Self is at the heart of Pratyabhijñā and thus at the heart of a theology of person. Utpala himself cites the Śiva Śūtras, stating that the “Self has been defined as Consciousness as the activity of awareness”²⁶⁴ and due to the reality of Absolute being, the Ātman.

In each conscious being, this essential reality and awareness manifests the unique consciousness specific to that experient (prāmātra), which in turn is a reflection of the highest awareness and reality, even in mundane consciousness. This is because the mundane consciousness shines as the light of consciousness (prākāśa). But what is prākāśa? Firstly, Utpala approaches this question by affirming that matter has no independence, stating that “independent existence cannot be proved even through inference”,²⁶⁵ and argued that matter is due to prākāśa, where the “entire phenomenal existence (is) contained within Himself (His divine potency); otherwise the throb of His will (icchā) to manifest it outwardly could not proceed”.²⁶⁶ If this were not the case then prākāśa “even though bearing the appearance of an object, could at most be compared to some insentient elements like crystal”.²⁶⁷ Divine awareness is the “essential character of consciousness”,²⁶⁸ which itself has the character of divine luminosity expressing itself as each person, for every conscious being, or person, is aware of himself/herself. This consciousness then is a reflection of the divine consciousness or vimarṣa.

²⁶² ‘Commentary’ of the text of Śūtra 1 of SS.
²⁶³ As already stated above; SS, Śūtra 1.
²⁶⁴ IPK, 1.43, p.18; translation by Pandit IPKp. 1.5.12, p.61.
²⁶⁵ IPK, 1.40, p.17; translation by Pandit, IPKp. 1.5.9, p.58.
²⁶⁶ IPK, 1.401 p.17; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.5.10, p.59.
²⁶⁷ IPK, 1.42, p.18; translation by Pandit, IPKp. 1.5.11, p.60.
²⁶⁸ Ibid.
Hence, this double dynamic is expressed in relation to person, firstly, in the condition of a specific consciousness in each person, and secondly, where this consciousness reflects the power and capabilities of the divine consciousness. If prakāśa implied a mundane consciousness and an ordinary luminosity “devoid of vimāraśa” then it could be likened to a reflective light or an insentient nature. Consequently, prakāśa itself highlights the condition of the divine essential reality contained within the Self and the divine awareness contained within that nature. This also indicates the capabilities of person and the ultimate resting place of consciousness within person. As a result Utpala stated:

To be Self-aware is the very essence of Consciousness. It is the supreme speech, rising out of its own ecstasy, and is itself the special Self-sufficiency God as well as His extraordinary divine essence.

When correlating this notion of person to the divine Person and to the awareness of supreme consciousness, there is evident within the divine essence the awareness and freedom to act in relation to objects or the world. Utpala declares that this apparent movement is due to the Lord Himself objectifying Himself where “objective existence is not a thing existing separately from Him”. Through the capabilities of free will, the Absolute essence (Maheśvara, Paramaśiva) creates all things, manifesting all phenomena. However, the Ātman entering into the process of creation does not get “enmeshed in any sort of diversity”.

Here, Utpala expressly indicates that the Ātman is not a static reality and is perceived through movements, where the Ātman enters into manifestation but does not experience change within the many activities such as individual consciousness (buddhi or intellect) within a person. Thus there is a succession of perceived movements within a process and single intention. This makes apparent, in the many movements or series of movements, a dual cognition, will and activity within a united cognition, will and activity of the divine. There is one relating to ordinary or mundane

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269 IPKp, p.60.
270 IPK, 1.44, p.18; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.5.13, p.62.
271 IPK, 1.46, p.19; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.5.15, p.64.
272 IPK, 1.1; 1.2; 1.7; 1.64; 4.1.
273 IPK, 1.48, p.20; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.5.17, p.65.
existence and that relating to the divine, but where both are intimately related to the 
Ātman. In these movements an indissoluble link, or relationship, is established 
between being (Ātman), act (kriyā), and will (icchā).

While Pandit argues that "at the level of the limited self (puruṣa), the sense of non-
duality is totally lost",274 this is not the case in Pratyabhijñā as it accepts that 
mundane existence is intimately related to the non-dual state, whether it is re-
cognised as such within the dualistic condition. A sense of person does not negate the 
highest reality but is confirmed through that reality for Pratyabhijñā accepts many 
types of existences. Abhinavagupta’s Vimarśinī endeavors to explain this antinomic 
model through a balance between being, awareness, and act, stating:

The Lord is naturally self-luminous and preserves the world by bringing about 
its existence…His being freedom…That is transcendental motion —
characterized by a slight flutter, quiver or motion.275

This motion is to be correlated to the light of consciousness (prakāśa), which is 
inseparable from Self-consciousness (vimarśa) as the power of action.276

Due to the dual aspect of being, awareness and activity, the bound individual 
experiences both aspects, though they are unaware of the higher. Thus Abhinavagupta 
argued that “the limited subject has both being and its negation, bliss and its 
negation”277 because of the apparent power of limitation or obscuration, emanating 
from the lower nature. It is only the revelatory activity of the Ātman, through Cit-śakti 
that allows both a sense of individual and whole or deified person, of a limiting 
condition and an unlimited awareness, where all conditions are accepted as the 
prakāśa.

274 Pandit, The Trika Śaivism of Kashmir, p.215
275 IPV, 4.6 (commentary); translation by Pandey, IPVp. p.222.
276 Ibid.
277 Ibid., p.223.
3.5.3 Allowing for Modes of Person

Thus through Pratyabhijñā the notion of person has to be accepted as an activity of prakāśa and that person also indicates concrete existence, otherwise a negation of either statement negates the purpose, will and activity of the Lord who manifests the conditions for both. This allows person to be expressed as a material and concrete existential experient and yet allowing for an essential reality underpinning its existentiality. Hence, a person has the freedom to exist and to be in truth, reflecting the freedom and being of the divine, which through the prakāśa, reveals the true nature of being to the person (puruśa), and a way in which persons should exist.

The prakāśa, while conferring a sense of personhood, allows a person not to be dominated by the lower nature, but encourages ascents to the higher. This freedom is constitutive of the nature of Ātman, and allows the person to live within a consciousness and type of existence in the world that is relative and also Ātmanic. In the highest condition the person can be said to exist within an Ātmanic consciousness that is reflected within a Cid-ātmanic mode of (hypostatic) existence through the experience of re-cognition. The prefix Cid, implies that the Ātmanic nature exists within an awareness of its own reality and having awareness of the world. This implies, within the human condition, that there exists within each person a dual consciousness, one pertaining to the limited awareness and the other pertaining to the divine state. The experience of re-cognition, of the divine reality (of being) as the true reality of existence, does not preclude cognition of the ordinary life but allows mundane existence to be considered in a true way as a play of the light of consciousness. In this sense the human person living in the Cid-ātmanic mode of hypostatic or personal existence, as an Ātman-hypostasis, attains an awareness in re-cognition of the divine reality that can also be expressed in terms of a communion of substance, through this Ātmanic nature. This experience indicates a sense of unity within the individual experience of the Ātman through the communion with the essential reality of being. In Pratyabhijñā the ontological reality of the Ātman allows God to force Himself into the world through the divine consciousness, piercing the

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As stated in chapter 2.4.6 of this thesis.
levels and coverings of ignorance through the active awareness of God’s *Self*, allowing a communion or relationship with the world.

The very fact of *being* pushes the notion of the world into a sense of objectification in relation to the subject (*Ātman*), but in *Pratyabhijñā* the world is not to be considered in terms of separation as an outer object, or something different to the *Ātman*, but intrinsically related to divine *being*. The objectification of phenomena from a viewpoint of the divine reality does not hinder a sense of real existing, or a type of existing, from the perspective of the object but affirms two things. Firstly, the object is real having a real existence apart from the divine condition and secondly, that the true sense of reality of that object relates to its interior nature, the *Ātman*. The conscious awareness, of the subject, objectifies the world as that-ness (*idāntā*), which has as its backdrop the *Ātman*, or the what of *being*, but which is not divided or separated from “that” or objectified phenomena. Thus the way in which persons come to understand themselves relates as much to their own existence as a material type or mode of existence, which is comes to be understood in relation to the light of *being*, and to the underlying reality or the what of *being*. Through the experience of the higher consciousness, a person comes to live in a higher type or mode of existence. Thus there are not different types of *being* but types of existing, where all modes of existence reflect a particular existence within a specific nature, but which exist through the essential reality of *being*. The type of existence a person experiences reflects the level of consciousness of a particular subject (*person/puruṣa*), where consciousness allows an awareness within the existential condition or type of existence a person is experiencing, and then the evaluation of the nature of that existence.

The conscious awareness of an individual can experience a movement towards accepting a notion of unity, but this initially does not disclose a higher level of or a change in the type of existence. Through the limited cognition in the individual, true cognition underpinning that existence comes into the field of the person’s consciousness. It is important here to underline again that consciousness is informed by *Ātman* and not itself, for if that were the case, unity would be based on a consciousness associated with the natural or biological *physis*. In this condition consciousness would not be able to disclose truth to existence, and unity would stand
distinct and separate from multiplicity. The lower nature would also not be able to create itself for this would make unity impossible to attain within an inescapable prison. The natural *physis* can neither reveal the truth to itself or manifest itself to itself without the activity of the divine *being*. Consequently, in the natural model individuals could not attain knowledge or awareness of themselves but exist within a mode of existence that would be incapable of experiencing another. Hence it is the divine consciousness, whose nature is self-awareness and has the characteristic of consciousness (*Cit*) that allows not only for awareness of individual persons, but of the highest *being*. It is the luminosity and activity of *Cit* in manifestation which overcomes the gulf between the divine and creation, where the natural *physis* becomes a “reflection” (*pratibimba*)\(^{279}\) of the divine.

3.5.4 Existence and Non-existence

The correlating of creation to *prakāśa* and does not indicate the non-existence of objects or person, or non-being, but rather it reflects the fullness of objects and persons. *Pratyabhijñā* does not imply a non-existence of manifestation or person as with a reflection of the moon in a mirror, it affirms that objects have a dependency. This does not denude a sense of *being* or existence but rather confirms that the ontological existence of a thing or person is affirmed in its difference, through the will and power of the Lord to create. The Lord (*Parameśvara*) is the ‘cause’\(^{280}\) of substances and objects, which do not have themselves as cause. Utpala stated:

> It cannot be within the power of any inanimate object to bring into existence anything that is non-existent. Therefore the essence of the relation between cause and effect is in fact, the relation between a manifesting subject and a manifestable object. A non existent entity is always non-existent; the existence of a non-existent entity is not possible...even when the cause-and-effect relation is talked about in the world, (the effect) can (at the most) be just an exterior manifestation of some internally existent entity (the cause, which assumes) the position of an object of knowing through (a persons) interior and

\(^{279}\) Abhinavagupta, *Tantrāloka*, III.11, (Walli).

\(^{280}\) *IPK*, 2.40, p.52; translation by Pandit, *IPKp*, 2.4.8, p.140.
exterior senses. Such a thing can happen only through the divine power of that unknowable Authority (God).\textsuperscript{281}

In other words persons do not manifest God: God manifests persons and through this relational position a sense of person acquires meaning. It is because all substances and objects have as their cause the divine substance and radiance, which reflects through those substances and objects, that the solidity of material form is accepted. The world has to be thus considered real and existent due to the cause and reflected through the activity of \textit{prakāśa}.\textsuperscript{282} This reflection is not the type perceived within a mirror, where in that reflection forms are confused and having no true reality. But as Abhinavagupta shows, through \textit{Cit},\textsuperscript{283} hollow objects gain significance where just as in a mirror, the mirror acts as a medium by which the exterior object is perceived. So too it is through \textit{Cit} that reflected objects attain significance. But the notion of reflection may cause some problems due to an inherent lack of concrete existence of the reflection. Conversely, the clarity of the image of the reflection in the mirror may indicate that an object has a real or self-caused nature. Another dynamic relates to the perception of objects by the senses of the human person, which allows individuals to gain a concrete sense of themselves and through false identification with the objects, a sense of separation and ignorance.

However, objects and the subject perceiver, all shine with the light of consciousness and are consequently able to be perceived and perceive through divine consciousness. In this sense person, while in one condition can be viewed as a reflected object, becomes related to the source of reflection and attains a sense of true \textit{being} through that context. It is the nature of perception itself which allows objects, and thus persons, to reflect the nature of the true \textit{Self}. They may appear to be false from a position of truth, but are themselves true having concrete existentiality due to the activity of \textit{Cit}. \textit{Cit} manifests as such objects and due to the nature of \textit{Ātmā}, allows

\textsuperscript{281} \textit{Eka} \textit{kṣaṇīya} tu \textit{n}a \textit{sā} \textit{sakhi} \textit{sati} \textit{yadseta:} \textit{sat}: 1 kṣaṇīya-kāraṇatvāt \textit{kāryakāraṇatva} \textit{tataḥ}: \textit{IPK} \textsuperscript{2.34-36}, pp.50-51; 2.34-36, translation by Pandit, \textit{IPKp}, p.136-137. \textit{IPKp}. 2.4.2-4, p.136-137.

\textsuperscript{282} \textit{IPV}. 3.4.19 (commentary); translation by Pandey, \textit{IPVP}, p.185.

\textsuperscript{283} \textit{IPV}. 3.4.19 (commentary); translation by Pandey, \textit{IPVP}, p.185.
objects to be considered real. Consequently, the reality of objects is not conditioned through their own existence for otherwise how could objects be perceived outside of a self-awareness and reflected through the divine awareness? Objects do not attain a sense of reality through sense perception, but because of the essential nature inherent in the perception of objects, allows for such objects to be perceived as real and yet highlighting the reality of the essential nature of the subjects and objects.

It is because unity shines through the objects, due to the radiance of the divine being and the activity of the light of consciousness radiating from the Ātman that objects attain a sense of real-ness and this is not due to self-causation or material causation. Due to the true cause of objects, God, perceived as non-existence, becomes real because of the real-ness of that causation. If objects were unreal then the source of that unreality would also be unreal. As a consequence objects are to be considered real, as is the perception of them and of the perceiver. However, if any sense of falseness arises, this also due to the Ātman, for nothing arises or exists without the Ātman whether good or bad, pure or impure, for without this luminosity no objectification would be perceived at all. But when the mind shines as the light of consciousness all objectified manifestation is viewed as related to the Lord. In this sense the objectified world and concrete persons can appear to be real but at the same time unreal, and attain a true sense of reality through the light of consciousness. As Utpala stated, the world’s activities whether pure or impure are experienced “within the Lord decorated by the (reflective) manifestations of various different phenomena”.284

Conversely, if oneness and unity of the Self were to be argued without affirming the reality of manifestation, then the world would have to be admitted as unreal or māyā or avidyā. But it has to be asked, to whom does this non-knowledge belong? Not to Brahmā which is pure being, or to itself, for an unreality cannot be real to itself. There cannot be non-duality in itself for there is plainly duality, or duality in itself for duality cannot support itself. Even the admittance of non-duality implies an exterior element in the affirming of the non-ness of duality in the first place. In other words it

would seem duality is prior to non-duality for non-duality would not manifest avidyā on account of its own perfect being and knowledge. But even this would be true if it were not the activity of Citi-śakīti creating duality. The Supreme personal Lord, Maheśvara, desires to manifest and does so out of His will and capacity to do so.

As such, the human experiencer, person, cannot be called a product of māyā or avidyā, but as his or her essential being is Ātman, the human person is intimately related to the divine Citi-śakti. However, the individual consciousness may be covered with a lack of awareness of this truth (kañcukas), living certain types of modes of existence (gunas) that support a limited view, and thus is unaware of the true nature of his or her reality. Indeed any awareness that supports finitude (ānava-mala) is only due to an apparent “ānava-impurity”. It also seems that separateness and bound-ness or individuality has come to be considered as a proper definition for a human person, when according to Utpala the opposite is true. The human person is not truly a whole person in the natural condition, where an entity experiences a loss of an “independent active power and active identity”. In the deluded and separated condition the individual cannot understand its true condition due to the “loss of the awareness of one’s real nature”.287

This loss of ones real nature, due to perceived coverings (relating to kañcukas) of ignorance, can be correlated, in the Byzantine tradition, to the coverings of Adam and Eve with “garments of skins” (Gen 3:21). This, Maximus the Confessor argued, could be correlated to the covering of the true nature of human persons in the blending of the soul and body together.288 This blending of the immaterial and the material natures, due to transgression, paradoxically allows for a capacity for change, and it is this capacity for change that allows an existential movement from individual to person. The notion of change, a change of awareness and existential conditions in both traditions, were at the root of an incorrect mode of existence, which is full of irrational love (ἐρως), and opposed that mode of life which leads to truth and fulfillment.

284 IPK, 3.16, p.65; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 3.2.5, p.175.
285 Ibid.
286 Maximus, Ambig. 8 (PG 91), 1104B-C (Blowers).
287 Ibid.
The fulfillment of the human person, the moving out of a natural condition in Pratyabhijñā terms, was equated to an experience of re-cognition of one's true condition, as being non-different to the luminous shining Self of the Lord. But if one's being is divine, then is one's ego, Śiva's ego? This is the crux of the ontological dilemma in the qualifying of the non-dual condition in concrete existence and the need not to completely nullify dualistic existence in non-dualism. In complete non-dualism a kind of gnostic dualism becomes evident in the separation of the divine from the world, or the development of a complete monist unity, which dissolves individuality. In a qualified dualistic model however, as in Pratyabhijñā, duality is affirmed but then contextualized through the light of consciousness (prakāśa). Utpala argued that prakāśa is the “essence of an object”, otherwise, objects would remain unmanifest, thus they have “consciousness as its very soul”. Indeed, all existence would be non-existence if it were not for the light of consciousness, or the activity of Ātman which remains the basis for all “mundane activities”.

It could be argued that the Pratyabhijñā model, which views everything through the light of consciousness, may denude a notion of concrete person in reducing a person to a divine manifestation, but as already shown, a notion of concrete person is only understood as such when the person experiences the freedom of true being rather than conditioned through ānava-mala. Hence, personal egoity attains a sense of true being and freedom only when related to divine “Egoity”. But ānava-mala and egoity do not imply a kind of non-being even though the teaching of non-being (abhāvavāda), in Trika has been applied to the divine. Dyczkowski argues that the philosophy of abhāvavāda in the Śaivism of Kashmir is more common than previously thought. He demonstrates that in Pratyabhijñā the concept of “absolute ego” reflects a positive ontological context, ‘I am’ being (ahambhāva) rather than ‘I am’ not being. This sense of being, allows for a full sense of being where the ego experiences its selfhood, and yet unity when related to divine ‘Egoity’ through the light of consciousness.

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290 IPK, 1.33, p.14; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.5.2, p.50.
291 Ibid.
292 IPK, 1.37, p.16; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.5.6, p.55.
295 Ibid.
296 Dyczkowski, ‘Self-Awareness, Own Being and Egoity’, p.29.
consciousness. This type of existence (*Cid-ātmanic*), which is had in a “flash of true knowledge”, 297 gives rise to pure Consciousness of the “real Subject”. 298 or the true knowing person.

### 3.6 Knowing Person

In this part of the chapter the question is asked, who is the knowing person or “knowing subject” 299 and what are the implications to person? These are difficult questions for while *Pratyabhijñā* affirmed that subjects and objects are dependent on the divine cause and this dependency infers that perceptions, non-perceptions, reasoning, faculties of existing, all emerge “fundamentally out of one common knowing subject”. 300 As Pandit stated that according to *Pratyabhijñā*:

> all knowing is thus in fact, an inseparable quality of the inner divine knower who alone shines as Himself in the form of such activities as perception, conception, recollection, imagination, contemplation, recognition, realisation and so on. 301

The question of how knowing relates to person and a single *Self* becomes not an ontological question in the sense of awareness, but dependent on how one perceives consciousness within a concept of person. The consciousness of person when directed to false perceptions becomes incomplete in those false perceptions, but when directed to the divine consciousness, to a relationship with divine consciousness (*Cit*), 302 the individual consciousness becomes transformed through a union with the true knowing subject. The question of a knowing subject, as person, does not become constrained within mundane consciousness (*citta*), but related to the real subject or person. This model considers a notion of concrete person 303 in relation to a unifying field of

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297 *IPK*, 3.23, p.67; translation by Pandit *IPKp*, 3.2.12, p.181.
298 Ibid.
299 *IPK*, 1.67, p.27; translation by Pandit, *IPKp*, 1.7.4, p.84.
300 Ibid.
301 *IPKp*, p.46.
302 Or Supreme Consciousness, see *PBHs*.1, pp.46-51. But *Cit* can also be understood as *Citi* (singular). as the Śakti of the divine within a sense of conscious aware energy (ibid.). *Citi* is viewed as the cause of the universe as the Lord’s power (ibid.).
303 B. Pandit never explains how *purusa* indicates person. In one instance he tends to see the terms indicating “finite persons” (*IPKp*, p.193) and in another in absolute terms without satisfactorily
consciousness or unity within an *Ātmanic* experience and how this experience is not in conflict with, or invalidated by, a simultaneous condition of divine consciousness and mundane consciousness. The knowing person at once indicates the vehicle by which mundane awareness and a true cognition takes place, the material condition, and the nature of true knowing, where the person is transformed, within an experience of unity with the divine and attains an awareness or consciousness of the “knowing Subject”.304

3.6.1 Difference and Subjectivity

In *Pratyabhijñā*, the stress on difference and subjectivity was to affirm the nature of dependency in those conditions, and to highlight where doer-ship belongs. The notion of concrete person, while partly relating to a concrete material existence also includes an aspect of awareness, or the identification of doer-ship. In this identification, objective phenomena become can be considered as isolated and disconnected or established through and in relation to a unity of being. Without this unity, materiality and the body becomes a fleshy lump of useless substances. It is the unity of awareness that establishes a link between material substances and cognition, even that of finitude, which is established through the unity of *Self*. Hence there has to be a focus on how particular subjectivity relates to awareness in relation to doer-ship. Who is the real doer? Of course most persons would affirm that they are the doer, but the task of *Pratyabhijñā* was to question this assumption. If finite beings were the real doers they would become independent beings, which would have two effects. Firstly, they would be self-caused, and secondly, they would not be able to communicate or even be aware of other self-caused entities, for what would be the unifying relational constituent by which relationality could be affected. Hence, *Pratyabhijñā* asserted that worldly activities are conditional to unity, which is provided by the “unity of prakāśa: Prakāśa is the common Subject”,305 whereby subjectivity and objectivity are existent and conditional to a single ‘I-consciousness’ or “knowing Subject”306 established

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304 *IPK*, 1.83, p.34; translation by Pandit, *IPKp*, 1.8.6, p.96.
305 *IPK*, 1.87, p.36; translation by Pandit, *IPK*, 1.8.10, p.100.
306 *IPK*, 1.83, p.34; translation by Pandit, *IPKp*, 1.8.6, p.96.
through an inherent unity. All observable phenomena attain subject-to-object relationality or “mutual unity” due to the dependency on divine unity and divine doer-ship. Consequently, when relating doer-ship to a “single cogniser: the Self” individual doer-ship is negated, which may seem to negate the place for concrete individual and consciousness, but this is only from a position of ignorance.

In Pratyabhijñā, cognition thus was intimately related, not only to ordinary knowledge, but to divine cognition, where the divine power of differentiation (apohana-śakti) manifests in knowing subjects (pramāṇas) the notion of difference (bheda). But even within a concept of difference there are acceptable levels of difference and unacceptable levels of difference. This is highlighted by Utpala, who develops a complex cosmological system, based on already accepted constructs as exemplified in the Mālinīvijayottaratantra, where Śiva and Śakti form part of the

[1.26, p.11; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.4.3, p.40.]

[As highlighted by Peter David Lawrence, see D. P. Lawrence, ‘Aspects of Abhinavagupta’s Theory of Scripture’, Satya Nilayam; Chennai Journal of Intercultural Philosophy 5 (2004), pp.5-26; and D. P. Lawrence, Rediscovering God with Transcendental Argument (Delhi: 1999). Lawrence focuses on the role of word (Vāc), speech and syntax (Lawrence, Rediscovering God with Transcendental Argument, p.24) mantra, ritual and gnoseology (Lawrence, ‘Aspects of Abhinavagupta’s Theory of Scripture’, p.5) in the role of ‘self-recognition’, and in relation to the ‘transcendental argument’ as a “contemporary interpretation of monist Kashmiri Śiva Philosophy” (ibid.). He highlights that any new interpretation has to be placed within the prevailing theological discourse and philosophical narratives such as postmodernism, relativism and “non-epistemic factors” (ibid. pp.2-33) of Jean-Francois Lyotard, Thomas Kuhn, and Michael Foucault. Lawrence offers an adapted form of epistemological relativism to understand Pratyabhijñā through “cross cultural dialogue” (Lawrence, ‘Aspects of Abhinavagupta’s Theory of Scripture’, p.24) in which he highlights the deconstructive role of Pratyabhijñā, which undermines previous discourses of other traditions without denuding the truths of those traditions. He places his approach to Pratyabhijñā within a model (Lawrence, Rediscovering God with Transcendental Argument, pp.14-16) where epistemological categories (pramāṇas or ‘means of knowledge’; see Lawrence, ‘Aspects of Abhinavagupta’s Theory of Scripture’, p.7) are self-informing principles, and this becomes the foundation of his methodological approach. Lawrence seeks an interpretation which relies on the external, the phenomenological, where transcendence is disclosed in “philosophical rationalisation” (Lawrence, Rediscovering God with Transcendental Argument, p.23) and identifies relation and action as constantly the manner in which Pratyabhijñā is understood in a “narrative or mythico-ritual narrative ontology” (ibid.). But in using Western philosophical models to contextualise Pratyabhijñā, does he miss the ontological implications of Pratyabhijñā? It can also be asked whether he reduces Pratyabhijñā to a narrative of syntax of the metaphysical and transcendental, capable of being accessed merely epistemologically, viewing Pratyabhijñā as “an exercise in ‘pure reasoning’” (Lawrence, ‘Aspects of Abhinavagupta’s Theory of Scripture’, p.17) where the Āgamic epistemological categories inform the experient of re-cognition. While Lawrence understands ontology in Abhinavagupta in a Heideggerian type model where a relationality becomes the focus in understanding being, where form, action and relation are coalesced through scripture and syntax, I will relate person in Pratyabhijñā to true being, to a re-discovery of being and consciousness. Lawrence in his over-stating of the epistemological argument, develops his interpretation of Pratyabhijñā to accomplish an over-nuanced narrative as a polemic for a postmodern deconstruction of the metanarrative, but does not inform us how to approach a whole model of being and existence.

[1.22-23, p.10.

See Mālinīvijayottaratantram (KSTS, 37), ed. P. M. K. Shastri.]
“pure” planes of existence and the pure-impure universe correlated to Sudāśiva, Iśvara and Sadvidyā. The impure universe was related to the rest of the tattvas including puruṣa. The important point here, which will also be explained in the next part of this chapter in relation to manifestation (ābhāsas), is that a dual aspect of purity-impurity (or non-difference-difference) is incorporated within a single model, enabling me to argue for a simultaneous acceptance of multiple cognitions. Even though the notion of individual (anu) initially indicates finitude and separation, it also indicates the possibilities of a higher consciousness through a process of purification and prayer (mantra repetition). Through this process the anu begins to change its perception and thus the relationship of individual to the divine changes, as does the perception in relation to the world and God. This intimate relationship between cognition and ābhāsas reveals the philosophical depth of Pratyahhijñā to overcome the dilemma of the divine reality and revelation in relation to apparent diversity.

There is, in this revelation a perceived movement from the divine to the world where the divine consciousness (Cit) comes to participate on an intimate level of activity (kriyā) with individuals and thus raises the level of individual awareness (citta) to the divine awareness (vimarśa). This divine activity is exemplified in the force of mantras or mātrkā-sakti which “brings about knowledge in a limited form such as ‘I am imperfect’ (ānnavamala)” in the covering of finitude. This is highlighted in the Śiva Sūtras which stated that the “subtle basis of mundane knowledge lie in the properties of sound”. Consequently, it is the Lord’s power or covering (ānava mala) that makes an individual believe himself or herself to be incomplete and have a sense of mundane difference as compared to other objects of manifestation. In this context of Śakti, which is the power of the mantra, ordinary awareness (citta) through the repetition of the mantra allows a person to attain an identity in the highest reality (Annutara), whose power is contained in the mantra and thus “becomes identical

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112 IPK, 3.1, p.59; and also Pandit’s ‘Cosmology of Kashmir Śaivism’, IPK p. (‘Appendix’), p.209.
113 IPK, 3.2-6, pp.59-61; also see part 3.4 of this thesis.
114 IPK, 3.7-29, pp.61-69.
116 Jñānādhiṣṭāna mātrkā II: Jñānādhiṣṭānam mātrkā, SS.4; translation by Singh, SSs. p.25.
117 As it states in SS that the mind-consciousness is the nature of mantra, cītmantram, SS. 2.1; translation by Singh, SSs. p.82.
118 Abhinavagupta stated, that “the anuttara or the unsurpassable one is the unsurpassable even to the proximate one” or “anuttara means even the answer amounts to no answer”. The plan of creation in
with that Reality.”319 Cognition then becomes related to the perceived movement from Para (Supreme) to aparā (non-supreme) which come together in a model of parāpara (supreme-cum-non-supreme).320 This allows, in the experience of the Supreme, a unity of consciousness and change in cognition. In the parāpara cognition there is both the experience of the concrete personal existence and the cognition relating to difference, which allows for the possibilities of Absolute consciousness (indicating non-difference) and difference. Both levels of consciousness are possible through parāpara for they simultaneously exist within a person.321 It is within the higher consciousness, relating to Para, that there is both the experience of concrete identity and re-cognition or divine consciousness.

In the aparā state the cognition of a particular experient (pramātr) is bound within an “impure” state and to a perception which views objects and God as completely distinct from itself. This does not indicate that there are different types of persons but that there are different levels of consciousness within the human condition. But as Abhinavagupta argues, that if such a limited cognition rests not on pure ‘I-consciousness’, then that pramātr would not be able to experience a cognition outside of its own subjectivity or would only be able to assert “I am this” or “I am that”.122

Cognition is always expressed through the words ‘I-am’, which reflects the self-luminous expression of the ‘I’ (Aham) of the divine and through the determinative knowledge which follows. In determinate knowledge there is an awareness of the specific reality of an individual and the objects of perception, which come to be expressed through and eventually as the cognition of the divine as luminous expressions of the true subject. Utpala stated:

Whether the form of determinate knowledge be ‘I see this’ or ‘this is jar’, it implies that the indeterminate cognition rests on the subject as one with it. Because the experience or perceiver has various cognitions: ‘I see’, ‘I saw’.

119 Singh, SSs, p.82
120 Parā-Trīṣikā-Vivarana (Singh), p.209.
121 K. Mishra sees equates personhood only with cognition and personality, confusing a notion of person with aspects of personhood such as personality, or abnegation of the concrete person in divine union. He states that, “Pratyaabhijñā is the total spiritual transformation of the person...a transformation of the personality” (Mishra, Kashmir Saivism, p.259). But he does develop a complex epistemology, identifying two types of ignorance and two types of knowledge or illumination to explain types of knowing in human personhood (ibid.).
122 IPV, 1.4.1 (commentary); translation by Pandey, IPVp, p.41.
‘this’, ‘that’, therefore, it is clear that both the knower and the known in their distinctive nature, shine in the subject.\textsuperscript{123}

3.6.2 Non-Difference and Subjectivity

Utpala continued to argue that if the objects are not one with the light of consciousness (prakāśa) then objects would remain unmanifest. Consequently, the “subjective light is not essentially different from the objective”\textsuperscript{124} and this light is the essence of objects. Knowing cannot be divorced from the subject of knowing otherwise knowing would only be related to a limited knowledge of the object. If an object were only able to know itself, then it would be constrained to the limits of that knowledge. Hence, that knowledge arising from the light of consciousness is the basis of all cognitions as Utpala stated:

If the light of consciousness (prakāśa) be different from the object and homogenous in itself, then confusion of one object with another would follow. Therefore, the object, that is made manifest, is not different from light. For, what is not light cannot said to exist.\textsuperscript{125}

If the subject perceives objects as “the other (bimba)”\textsuperscript{126} and as other than itself and unrelated to itself, then the subject become isolated within a self-conditioned reality and not able to observe anything outside of the subjective experience. Another result would be that the subject would become dependent upon other objects for its own identity and knowledge. However, the objectified or determinate knowledge is not known or experienced in isolation but related to the universal ‘I-consciousness’, being the divine conscious light (prakāśa). This universal consciousness, which has the freedom (svātantra)\textsuperscript{127} to act, allows the objects to be, as the object and the objects are not divorced from this activity. As Utpala argued, there is the possibility of “both

\textsuperscript{123} IPK, 1.30-31, p.13; translation by Pandey, \textit{IPVp}, pp.50-51.
\textsuperscript{124} IPK, 1.33, p.15; translation by Pandey, \textit{IPVp}, p.55.
\textsuperscript{125} IPK, 1.34, p.15; translation by Pandey, \textit{IPVp}, p.57.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{127} IPV, 1.6.8; IPV, p.95.
the jar and not-jar, which are essentially different from each other\textsuperscript{128} and although these objects seem different from \textit{prakāśa}, the \textit{prakāśa} shines in these objects and the objects exist in the light of consciousness. Therefore differentiation (\textit{apohana}) is due to both objectified difference and yet indicates the reality behind this differentiation.

Utpala stated:

Thus there is no doubt about it that the objects shine within the universal subject in remembrance, determinate knowledge, which depends upon the differentiation, and in indeterminate cognition.\textsuperscript{129}

Thus individual \textit{pramātras} and objects are “one with the knowing Subject”\textsuperscript{130} for they are one with “pure Consciousness”\textsuperscript{331} and it is due to this consciousness, by virtue of His “Self-awareness...pure knowledge...pure action,”\textsuperscript{132} that the \textit{pramātras} not only attain cognition but attain a higher cognition through the absolute subject (\textit{Pramātr}).

But in relating the concept of person to knowledge and to cognition, which is actually God’s cognition, the question has to be asked whether those \textit{purusas} who have not attained true knowledge, are to be considered as non-persons? \textit{Pratyabhijñā} does not have a concept of non-\textit{purusas}, or non-persons, it is just that different experiences of knowing indicate different levels of awareness or consciousness. This view is supported in Abhinavagupta who affirmed that, regardless of the levels of experience, we are all “persons”\textsuperscript{333} for persons are from the Lord and do not exist in isolation.

Abhinavagupta argues this from the point of “Universal Consciousness”,\textsuperscript{114} which is responsible not only for fulfilment but also obscuration or relative cognition, due to the divine freedom of the Lord to create. In manifestation relative cognition reflects this freedom within the concrete person. However true freedom is reflected in a way of existing where union with the divine reflects in a particular cognition, the ‘I-consciousness’ of the divine.

\textsuperscript{128} \textit{IPK}, 1.54, p.23; translation by Pandey, \textit{IPVP}, p.87.
\textsuperscript{129} \textit{IPK}, 1.84, p.34; translation by Pandit, \textit{IPKP}, 1.8.6, p.96.
\textsuperscript{130} \textit{IPK}, 1.83, p.34; translation by Pandit, \textit{IPKP}, 1.8.6, p.96.
\textsuperscript{131} \textit{IPK}, 1.84, p.34; 1.8.7, p.97.
\textsuperscript{11} \textit{IPK}, 1.88, p.36; 1.8.11, p.101.
\textsuperscript{132} \textit{IPV}, p.9.
\textsuperscript{114} \textit{IPV}, p.2.
It is freedom that allows the act of re-cognition, where the Self or Ātman brings into existence of the one who has had the experience of re-cognition the freedom to be, for the individual by himself or herself cannot alone achieve true Self-hood or even perfect knowledge of the relative self. It is not any ordinary act that brings re-cognition, but only the grace or Śakti (power) of God for the Lord is both the subject and the object of grace, or individual pramātrs. The light of knowledge is imparted through the activity of Citi-śakti as the light of consciousness (prakāśa), by which knowledge informs the nature of being through the Self-luminosity of Citi, for without this, all manifestation would be in darkness and no cognition could occur. The awareness of ‘I’ reflects this activity and of Citi, which also has the quality of a divine throb (spanda). This allows a movement from the divine to the limited ‘I’ (citta) and then to a true ‘I-consciousness’. In this activity, of Citi, the individual person is able to experience his/her own sense of individuality and at the same time experience true personhood in a unified experience with the divine pramātr (Śiva).

The notion of person is therefore to be conceived on many levels and intimately related to the divine functions, which manifests a sense of person in the first place within the individual in a self-cognition, or knowing person. The ability of the person to recognise his or her true personhood, as the “knowing subject”¹ is due to the relationship of an individual with the divine. It is the divine person who reveals His a true sense of knowing within the knowing human person. Through this relationship an individual experiences relational self-awareness, which become expanded to include re-cognition, or an awareness of one’s true condition. This again is due to the activity of divine Self-awareness (vimarśa), which pushes outwards from its own condition to reveal jñāna and kriyā to limited knowing, to the limited knowing person. This activity reforms limited knowing through the experience of re-cognition within a non-dual cognition, even though experiencing degrees of difference. Within a concept of person, this acceptance of difference through non-difference indicates the place for multi-cognitions to be accepted. But the experience and awareness of the divine becomes the true experience meant for human persons, whose very nature and existence reflects the divine nature and existence.

¹ IPK, 2.11, p.41; translation by Pandit, IPKp. 2.2.3, p.117.
3.7 Unity-in-Difference: Revelatory Context

In the last part of this chapter I will examine a notion of person in relation to difference (diversity/ bheda) or created manifestation (ābhāsa). This highlights that Pratyabhijñā allowed for a sense of what is concrete through the admittance of ‘this-ness’\(^{336}\) and ‘that-ness’, where “the relative and finite subject and the object appear (manifestation) within one basic subject”\(^{337}\) (the Ātman). The metaphysical focus in Pratyabhijñā is not disconnected from the concrete but becomes the concrete essential nature and the principle of existence, allows for a real revelatory principle and context. Utpala stated that: “it is because of this that the Lord manifests His own Self objectively. Objective existence is not a thing existing separately from Him”.\(^{338}\) Hence dependency not only becomes a feature of difference, and thus of person, which is to be viewed from a context of finitude as conditional to the divine, and also relational. This allows revelation to become fruitful in that phenomena attain fullness through that dependency.

In the context of relationality, between ‘mundane objects’, objects become ‘justified’ only through relations with the divine, “established in one and the same knowing subject”.\(^{339}\) From the perspective, of being justified through a single ‘knowing subject’, person becomes directly related to a single reality and pure ‘I-consciousness’. This may seem to denude the notion of person, and indeed in the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā the tone in the latter part of Chapter 1 (Jhānādhikāra) shifts, stressing more dynamically a non-dual stance where “exteriority is just an outward attribute”.\(^{340}\) Here Pratyabhijñā philosophy seems to become Platonic in its stress on interiority as a focus for “eternal existence” and the negation of exteriority, where objects “are brought into outward manifestation by māyā”.\(^{341}\) This seems to negate a previous stress on the divine will creating the universe, not as a predicated principle. It certainly has repercussions for a notion of whole person, but this will be

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\(^{336}\) ‘This-ness’, or ‘idantya’ (IPK, 1.51, p.21) is an important issue in Pratyabhijñā in relation to awareness, which shows how individual consciousness of otherness (objectified universe, ābhāsa) reflects the divine movement from pure ‘I am’ to ‘this is’ and thus accepts the universe as real as ‘that’ (tāt). ‘This-ness’ reveals the true nature of Self behind ‘this’.

\(^{337}\) IPK, 1.31, p.13; translation by Pandit. IPKp, 1.4.8, p.46.

\(^{338}\) IPK, 1.46, p.19; translation by Pandit. IPKp, 1.5.15, p.64.

\(^{339}\) IPK, 1.65, p.27; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.7.2, p.83.

\(^{340}\) IPK, 1.82, p.34; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.8.5, p.95.

\(^{341}\) IPK, 1.84, p.34; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.8.7, p.97.
broached in the Chapter 4. This view is later qualified by Utpala in a unity-in-diversity model where a relationship between ‘self limited’ objects and Self is established because of the single reality and not through a limiting condition, where Utpala’s monism or “absolute realism” is clarified. This clarification is based upon dividing existential reality into three categories: ‘absolute realism’; conditional realism and that which is non-real. The first category conditions manifested phenomena through the Absolute reality.

The Lord, being all powerful, manifests spatial sequence by creating wonderful variety in the forms of creation, and also brings about time sequence by manifesting variations in actions.

The second category admits that subjects, objects, actions, substances time, and the like, are real, and emphasizes the real-ness of entities, while the third category considers thoughts such as imaginations to be unreal because they have no substantial reality. As a consequence, the whole tone of Pratyabhijñā is qualified to allow for difference, while contextualizing difference through non-difference or the “one knowing subject”, through a model of unity-in-diversity (bhedābheda). Pratyabhijñā argues that the “objectives of a person desirous of mundane attainments are fulfilled” having both “unity and diversity as their character. Such a thing is not illusion”. The model of bhedābheda allows a sense of concrete person to be argued while at the same time qualifying existential person (puruṣa) through the completed state of re-cognition. Through this model, difference, or bheda, is qualified through non-difference within a simultaneous acceptance of both conditions. It is the admittance of the divine activities in the world and the intention behind those activities that allows person to especially gain significance through the relational context implied in those activities.

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142 IPKp. p.115.
143 Ibid.
144 मूर्तिवैचित्र्यते देस्तक्रमाभाससत्यस्य। क्रियावैचित्र्यनिर्मातास्तक्रमपार्थः॥२॥, mūrti-vaiścītra ato deśa-kramam ābhāsavat asau kriyā-vaiścītra-nirbhāsāt kāla-kramam apiśvarah//, IPK. 2.5, p.38; translation by Pandit, IPKp. 2.1.5, p.110.
145 IPK. 2.12, p.41; translation by Pandit, IPKp. 2.2.4, p.118.
146 See IPK. 2.15, p.42; 2.51, p.57. Bhedābheda is central, for it allows an acceptance of all relational activities and mundane activities in relation to the Absolute being and activities. For a full understanding of the philosophy of bhedābheda see, P. N. Srinivasachari, The Philosophy of Bhedābheda (Madras: 1934, 1996); see also Mishra, Kashmir Saivism, p.166; and Sanderson ‘The Doctrine of the Mālinīvijayottaratantra’, p.295, who shows that this development comes from the MT.
147 IPK. 2.15, p.42; translation by Pandit, IPKp. 2.2.7, p.120.
148 Ibid.
3.7.1 Revelatory Activities

Through the divine activities or revelatory activity (kriyā-śakti)\(^{149}\) of the divine the world comes to be accepted in Pratyabhijñā as real. This real-ness allows person to be accepted as a real ontological condition, without denuding that condition by relegating person to a mere principle of manifestation. Although the concept of person can sit within such a category, the reality of being a person must have existential and ontological significance. This significance is vouchsafed through the free will (Śvātantrya-Śakti)\(^{350}\) and activity of the Lord, divine consciousness (cid-ātmani)\(^{351}\) to create each unique person. But person cannot be left in this isolated condition as a separate individual within a material nature, which is taken in Sānkhya to be the cause and effect,\(^{352}\) but attains true significance through a relationship with the divine. This relationship is established through the divine will and activity, as are the relations between persons, due to “their dependence on the knowing subject”,\(^{353}\) for the Absolute Consciousness is the basic cause and source of all phenomena”.\(^{354}\) This activity is not ‘justifiable’ in the case of the nature (prakṛti),\(^{355}\) because it could not allow both unity and diversity, only diversity, and is justifiable through Ātman, which “consists of pure consciousness (cid-ātmani) cid-ātmani with the capacity of appearing diversely”.\(^{356}\) Through the experiencing of the divine state, the truth of this position is re-cognised by the person who “becomes a citpramātā”\(^{357}\) and attains full personhood. This becomes possible through the movement of the divine to and in the world through the kriyā-śakti. The Śiva Śūtras stated:

The divine consciousness with a desire to display the variegated panorama of the universe, at first adopts the principle of contraction, assumes the state of limited experiencers (jīvas) who are a form of prāṇā – the universal life force which brings about the manifestation of the entire universe in a limited form and also appears in the form of the world as grāhya or object.\(^{358}\)

\(^{149}\) IPKp, p.105, which establishes the divine active power of the Lord to negate atheistic or Buddhist arguments of non-being or creation by some natural condition (ibid.).

\(^{350}\) SS, III.43; translation by Singh, SSs, p.225.

\(^{351}\) IPK, 2.51, p.57.

\(^{352}\) IPK, 2.49, p.56.

\(^{353}\) IPK, 2.48, p.55; translation by Pandit, IPK, 2.4.16, pp.146-147.

\(^{354}\) IPKp, p.147.

\(^{355}\) IPK, 2.51, p.57; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 2.4.19, p.149.

\(^{356}\) Ibid.

\(^{357}\) SSs, p.1xx.

\(^{358}\) SS, III.43; translation by Singh, SSs, p.225.
It is the Lord who becomes so related to the world so as to allow the world to be expressed in a real way and in turn provides meaning to person for the world is not negated as in a Advaitic model but is viewed as real. Hence a dual approach was evidenced, which allowed for both unity stressed in the Ātmānic experience and difference through the levels of ābhāsas. However, this view was also qualified for the world cannot reveal truth to itself, as Utpala stated, “the activity of creation is not possible at all on the basis of the two apparently different realities (Ātmān and world)”. Utpala also argued that “such a thing is not justifiable in the case of an insentient entity (matter), on account of contradiction between unity and diversity”, but this dilemma is overcome in that the Ātmān, which is pure consciousness and has the capacity to ‘appear diversely’. Utpala stated that:

The Lord, by virtue of His divine power, manifests these apparent phenomena simply through the power of His divine will (without resorting to the use of any other cause or means). That is what is known as His active nature and His creative aspect.

It is because the manifested world is due to divine activity, and not is separated from God, that the mundane activities are fulfilled by the divine, where entities have both “unity and diversity (bhedābheda) as their character”, which are not illusions.

However, such a viewpoint is only from below for in the highest awareness, all manifestations (ābhāsas) are viewed as intimately related to the divine, as Utpala stated: “God is taken to be numerous types of finite persons”. The sense of finitude infers that a dual consciousness and will is apparent, that of relating to the divine experience and that of the entity experiencing his or her existence as the object of existence or the egoistic ‘I’. This sense of finitude or aṇava-mala indicates that ordinary or mundane thoughts and life are not rejected but ultimately are also considered as the divine. There is an implicit relationship of the divine consciousness

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1 IPK. 2.52. p.57; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 2.4.20, p.150.
2 न च युक्तः जड़स्यादेब्धेतद्वरोपः | आभासस्वादेकत्र विदात्मनि तु सुन्यते ||41||: na ca yuktam
jaḍasyavām bhēdābheda-virodhatah/ ābhāsa-bhēdād ekatra cid-ātmānī tuvujyate//, IPK, 2.51. p.57; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 2.4.19, p.149.
3 एष चानुवप्त्यक्तवदेवमाभासत्यत्वमूः। भावानित्त्वाश्चादेशा क्रिया निर्मातृत्वस्य सा ||33|| eṣā
cānanta-śaktitvād evam ābhāsasyatvām/ bhāvanā ichchā vaśād eṣā kriyā nirmātṛtasya sa//33//IPK, 2.33, p.50; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 2.4.1. p.135.
4 एष IPK, 2.15. p.42; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 2.2.7, p.120.
5 IPK. 4.3, p.70; translation by Pandit, IPKp, p.193.
to the world and so the Ānāvopāya of Śiva Sūtras develops a process by which the individual comes to know his or her true state.

While Pratyabhijñā developed a more sophisticated philosophical explanation of the divine activities in relation to the world than the Śiva Sūtras, the Śiva Sūtras did begin to express how the divine comes to be related to the mundane condition through the aphorism, “Atmā is Citta”.364 This statement allows the divine nature to be directly correlated to the lower condition without confusing either. In the individual consciousness (citta), the Self becomes self, where knowledge in that condition becomes bondage (ṁñānam bandhah).365 The Ānāvopāya thus concerns itself with the yoga of the individual, so that the individual can attain the consciousness (Cit), which is its true reality. Cit becomes “reduced to citta” in the apparent movement to the world from the divine, and then there is an apparent reciprocal movement from the world or individuals to the divine in which the yogi experiences “over and over again the awareness of the divine both inwardly and outwardly”.367 This view is confirmed again in the Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam, which affirms that the individual experients (pramātras) are “Citi in a contracted form” or a “solidified form (āśyānatārūpa) of Cit-essence”.

3.7.2 From Individual to Person

The movement of the divine to the world is reciprocated in an upward movement. These movements can be viewed as continuous expressions of the divine activity and at a certain point seem to attain a sort of stasis in which a pause is evident. There is a simultaneous affirmation of all conditions. At this point there is evident, difference and non-difference, absolute being and individual human existing. This allows individuals, as ābhāsas, to be considered as real, having as their cause the divine Cause. The real-ness of individual in Pratyabhijñā is not denied but confirmed in the
context of abhāṣas, as Abhinavagupta argued, because of the knowledge of
differentiation or determinate knowledge, \(^{370}\) difference is expressed. However, due to
the continuous activity of the divine, individuality does not rest but changes within a
continuous movement, and can be viewed as evolving to a sense of person, where a
divine mode of existence becomes the goal. Individual (anu) becomes person/puruṣa
(hypostasis), which allows a sense of true being (Ātman) to be experienced.

In differentiation, abhāṣas do not to appear to have any relational context to the
divine in themselves, which is true of human individuals who exist according to the
nature of each specific individual. It is because human individuals experience
themselves in difference that the quality of difference continually changes due to the
force acted upon it by the divine activities. If this were not the case the material nature
of individuals would not allow a fluctuation or change of consciousness.

Nevertheless, initially individuals only exist as a form of manifestation as does the
knowledge relating to difference. Abhinavagupta stated:

The abhāṣas of time and space impart particularity and exercise the function
of as it were destroying eternality and omnipresence...among the best known
abhāṣas mentioned above, the abhāṣa ‘man’ is the best known, because in
‘man’ are found many abhāṣas. \(^{371}\)

Consequently, there are abhāṣas relating to love, desires, greed, and the intellect, in
short, relating to all things that indicate differentiation. Even the power of
differentiation or apohaṇa-śakti\(^{372}\) is an abhāṣa of the Lord. But it is because all
abhāṣas are a consequence of the true ‘I-consciousness’, becoming objectified
manifestation, fluctuations, changes and movement occur in individuals, even when
considered as abhāṣas, which in turn allow for changes in awareness. These changes
allow an individual to be considered as relational to the divine as a person and then as
a deified person.

As the perception of manifested phenomena comes to be recognized as “that” and
different to the cognition of ‘I Am’, a space is created between objectified phenomena
and individual consciousness. This initially is observed as such affirmations as cogito

\(^{370}\) IPV, 2.3.4-5 (commentary); translation from Pandey, IPVp, pp.148-149.
\(^{371}\) Ibid.
\(^{372}\) IPVp, p.40.
ergo sum,\textsuperscript{373} which relies on a sense of separation and observance of objects (\textit{ābhāsas}) outside of one's own existence. These observations provide conclusions with regard to the nature of objects and individual subjects in relation to existence. In addition, the power of differentiation allows the beginnings of an exterior perception and awareness of the divine reality. Through this differentiation the individual comes to perceive an awareness of 'I am' in relation to 'Thou Art', and so the 'I-Thou' relational model begins to develop in which a sense of relational person allows the individual to develop a relationship with the divine. In addition, Utpala relates the notion of individual to a context of \textit{prakriti}\textsuperscript{374} and shows how individuals enter into a process of becoming for the \textit{Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā} elucidates how to understand this process. The aim is to "initiate a concern with God"\textsuperscript{375} so that, through the revelatory divine power (\textit{sākta}), the world can be overcome and the delusion of false perceptions, fall away. Utpala explains that it is the Lord Himself through his infinite power (\textit{sākta}) and will (\textit{icchā}) who creates the world, and it is His power and will that allows a human reciprocity.\textsuperscript{376} Even though there is the affirmation of the individual consciousness and a distinction between the states of consciousness, such as the \textit{pāśu} (bound), there is also a recognised movement from this state to that of the \textit{pāti}, or realised\textsuperscript{377} condition of super-conscious, the \textit{turyā} or fourth state.\textsuperscript{378} In this state of awareness mundane knowledge and experience comes to be fulfilled in divine Self-awareness, which permeates all realities.

The outward flow of the divine \textit{kriyā} or activity manifests a link between the internal divine state and the outer world, or \textit{ābhāsas}. Within a sense of difference, non-difference allows the individual to attain the highest consciousness. This is because within the depth of a person/\textit{puruṣa},\textsuperscript{379} there is an ontological relatedness to the

\textsuperscript{373} Descartes, Key Philosophical Writings, (UK: 1997). p.198.
\textsuperscript{374} See IPKp, p.149.
\textsuperscript{375} IPK, 2.32, p.50; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 2.3.17, p.133.
\textsuperscript{376} IPK, 2.33, p.50; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 2.4.1, p.135.
\textsuperscript{377} IPK, 4.6.
\textsuperscript{378} IPK, 3.31, p.69.
\textsuperscript{379} The difficulties of interpreting how person relates to \textit{puruṣa}, is exemplified by Bede Griffiths who determined that \textit{puruṣa} in the \textit{Brahman} and \textit{Ātman non-dual} model points to an impersonal underlying Reality. Bede Griffiths ('The Adwaitic Experience and the Personal God in the Upanishads and the Bhagavad Gita', \textit{Indian Theological Studies} 15/1; 1978, pp.71-86), where personhood is correlated through an impersonal experience of \textit{Ātman}. Even though Bede Griffiths presented an \textit{Advaitic} Christian perspective, he highlighted the problem of the antinomy generally present in \textit{Advaita}, that of the personal in relation to the impersonal.\textsuperscript{379} See \textit{Chandogya Upanisad}, 6.2.1. It could be interesting also to correlate ideas relating to personhood in \textit{Pratyabhijñā to Vedānta} in the context of Neo-
divine, who as the Cause allows difference as a reflection of divine freedom.

Mundane or individual consciousness is not denied, but as an ābhāsa, is related to the divine act. Utpala stated:

His individual creation, not being common to all beings, remains dependent on God's creation. But even such a phenomenon, though appearing erroneously, is 'true' because of its being created by God appearing in the form of this individual being. 380

Thus Pratyabhijñā in its accepting of the world as an ābhāsa of the Lord and thus real, had to incorporate notions of revelation, within a theocentric model, to allow reciprocation, otherwise the ābhāsas would only be relational to themselves. To accomplish this revelatory activity, Pratyabhijñā, as already shown in Chapter 3.6, utilised the notion of Citi. 381 The ābhāsas, as the contracted form of Citi, come to reflect the divine reality because of the awareness of Citi in ābhāsas, which can be said to leak out and it is this leaking or outward flowing of the divine consciousness in ābhāsas that starts to reveal how ābhāsas are related to the divine consciousness (Citi).

In this respect the individual starts to attain an existential condition more related to relational person. It was not sufficient to express Citi purely within a non-dual doctrine, but God and the world were to be brought together through the outward flowing activity of Citi-śakti, which ultimately reveals the true nature of the ābhāsas.

This relationship between ābhāsas and Citi was underlined through the philosophical

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Vedāntic understanding of the concept of person where the Ātmopaniṣad's, notion of puruṣa could be utilised, see Swami Madhavananda, 'Atmopanishad', in Minor Upanishads (Calcutta: 1988). In this model, puruṣa has three Ātinīc components, the “Outer-Ātman, the Inner-Ātman and the ParamĀtman”, Swami Madhavananda, Minor Upanishads, verse 2, p.12. The Outer-Ātman refers to the body, the Inner-Ātman to the individual perceiver or the one who experiences, and the ParamĀtman to the Supreme Lord who dwells within. The Supreme in the Ātmopaniṣad is non-dual, non-being, but also has a personal quality in Subjective awareness, and thus it is stated: “He is the Puruṣa who is called the ParamĀtman” (ibid.). He is the awareness of being ParamĀtman. Thus the Ātman indicates what a person truly is and how the person in truth reflects an essential reality of being. What distinguishes this model from that of Pratyabhijñā is that in Pratyabhijñā the all-pervading Citi of Self distinguishes being from act, though at the same time upholding unity, and that it is this Supreme ‘I-Consciousness’ that informs the person of his or her true identity. Thus the Lord enters into participation with the individual through the activity of Citi, although the individual or puruṣa may not understanding in what way, but ultimately participating as Citi.

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107 Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 2.6.18-19.
109 PBH, 1-20.
usage of bhedābheda, which allows difference within the non-different state. It must be stressed here that bhedābheda does not impinge on the non-dual outcome of Pratyabhijñā, but rather complements it by incorporating it in a sense of the dualistic and the accepting of ābhāsas as an aspect of divine condescension, where the presence of the Lord exists in those ābhāsas. This exemplifies an acceptance of both unity and diversity, and the admittance of the real-ness of the world. Manifestation (as ābhāsas) in the context of revelation and immanency (visvamaya) is not unreal or dreams of the impersonal, but rather is a tangible and luminous manifestation of the divine Cit-Śakti, and due to this luminosity are ultimately non-different to the transcendent (visvottirnna) personal Absolute. Abhinavagupta states that “Paramasiva, the Absolute God, thus plays His wonderful game of bondage and liberation”. All ābhāsas are not independent but dependent upon the divine luminosity which reflects within the ābhāsas not only the objectification of manifestations but within each

382 K. Mishra refuses to accept that the Absolutism of Kashmir Śaivism (new Trika), can be considered in a qualified manner. He also seems to centre his criticism of qualified models through Hegelian and Viśistadvaitic notions (Mishra, Kashmir Śaivism, p.101). In the former model the notion of free act is negated through evolution of matter, and the latter distances the Divine from creation. While I accept this, I would state that the bhedābheda of Pratyabhijñā is not of the type considered by Mishra, in that, it views the world as a luminous expression of Supreme consciousness. While Mishra negates a model that would affirm a qualified position and a Hegelian type interpretation, Manoranjan Basu embraces a comparison of Hegelian doctrine with Pratyabhijñā (Manoranjan Basu, Fundamentals of the Philosophy of Tantras, Varanasi: 1986, p.141). I believe that such a comparison only reflects Basu’s interest in Hegel and Kant and is not viable, for Pratyabhijñā does not purport an impersonal moral imperative or a phenomenological cosmogony (as in Sāṅkhya), but allows the place for divine will and freedom, which is not evidenced in a law of “logical necessity” (Mishra, Kashmir Śaivism, p.101). Nor does the qualified nature of Pratyabhijñā imply a dualistic role in its concept of the divine act (Śakti). As Sudhendu Kumar Das shows, Śakti is a “sort of reflex relation of self-Identity” (Sudhendu Kumar Das, Śakti of Divine Power (Calcutta: 1934), p.600. Śakti is an appellation of the divine power, but it also came to take on its own existential character, representing a dualistic consort to Śiva, but as Kumar Das argues in MT, Śakti “belongs to the one unified Self of Śiva, and is not really a distinct principle at all” (Ibid., p.72). In Pratyabhijñā, Śakti is the ‘vimarśarūpa’ or “the vibration of Consciousness of real Egoity” (Ibid., p.60). For Mishra the notion of kriyā-Śakti does not necessarily indicate dualism as in the case of the qualified non-dualism in the Vira Śaivism of Southern India which gives a dualistic character to revelation. This is not what is being developed in non-dual Kashmir Śaivism. Mishra states that “Śakti is not an attribute, or quality, of Śiva, but the very nature of Śiva” (Mishra, Kashmir Śaivism, pp.101, 102). But the very affirmation of kriyā-Śakti in itself seems to qualify in some way Mishra’s absolutist view of non-dual Kashmir Śaivism (new Trika) and so in Pratyabhijñā we too have to conclude that divine act and the world are not at odds, and while there is non-differentiation, there is at the same time some kind of differentiation at play.

383 See IPK, 2.14, p.42.
384 David Peter Lawrence argues that the dichotomy of immanence and transcendence is overcome through a model of “unity to unity-in-multiplicity” (David Peter Lawrence, Rediscovering God Within the Transcendental Argument (Delhi: 1999) pp.136-137). Lawrence interprets appearance through emanation and addresses the issue of manifestation and being in a relational context through "soteriological return" through the unity-in-multiplicity paradigm. The Supreme engages in a descent through principles in unity-in-manifestation, which firstly involves being, it is the Lord who descends and is conscious in that descent, and secondly through act, through the will (icchā) of the Lord to descend.

subject, individual cognition and the possibilities to experience true ‘I-consciousness’. It is this experience of true ‘I-consciousness’, reflected through mundane cognition, that allows the ability to observe objects as different, but ultimately allows a recognition of Self. The sense of difference that a subject experiences, paradoxically becomes the medium by which manifested phenomena and finite subjectivity are qualified through non-difference in the highest experience through the nature of Cit, which establishes the bridge between ābhāsas and the world.\textsuperscript{386}

Hence, Kṣemarāja concludes that what is important is the focus on the perception or awareness of a subject, that “when the bliss of Cit is attained, there is stability of the consciousness of the identity with Cit even while in the body”.\textsuperscript{387} The consciousness attained in Cit, in the attainment of samāveśa or the experience of unity of consciousness with the divine Self (Ātman) within the body, paradoxically allows the observance of manifested diversity and limited consciousness. In the experience of the mundane consciousness of the individual, the force of impressions, due to an association with manifested phenomena, prohibit the consciousness of Cit to be experienced. But in the experience of unity with Cit, these impressions are “left behind in the unity-consciousness”\textsuperscript{388} by the jīvanmukti or the one who is liberated (saved) while alive. In this consciousness, Samvit or universal consciousness is experienced in which the manifested world ābhāsas are experienced. Also in this condition, the role of māyā-sakti is dissolved and the various types of ābhāsa mechanisms, which Kṣemarāja considered as having a “descending” movement, from Brahman to the “rib of a palāśa leaf”,\textsuperscript{389} and are cognized, not through the lens of differentiation, but through universal consciousness. Being is therefore, not a question of considering ontological difference, but of how types of consciousness are expressed, and how individuation relates to becoming as person. One type recognizes (individual) material manifestation as different to the divine, and another (person) perceives the possibilities of participation with the divine.

\textsuperscript{186} See IPK, 2.18-20, pp.56-57.
\textsuperscript{187} Pittamānusāme dehādibhiḥ teṣāyamānasyeṣāpya pīḍikāraṇa-priyaptirādyāni jīvaṇmanuktiḥ: 1; citānandadalābhhe dehādiṣu cetyamānasyeṣāpi cidaikāmāya-pratipatti-dārghyām jīvanmukthāḥ, PBH 16; translation by Singh, PBHs, p.91.
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid. (commentary), p.92.
\textsuperscript{189} PBH 17 (commentary); translation by Singh, PBHs, p.93.
3.7.3 Relational Person and Re-cognition

The hermeneutical approach to person in this chapter has been constructed by qualifying a notion of outward looking person, or what has come to be known as concrete person in contemporary personhood studies, so as to consider person as related to both difference and non-difference. The development of a model of whole person will be considered in the next chapter, but here the notion of whole person is focused within a relational context through an experience of unity through re-cognition.

In Pratyabhijñā the world has to be as considered as intimately related to the divine activity and presence, as equated with “manifestations of a single, changeless entity”.390 As such, when placing person in a relational context to the divine, the notion of relationality has to be re-considered. A Pratyabhijñā type of relationality based on unity does not indicate a person-to-person type of relation but of person as Ātman. Pratyabhijñā does not consider this as a contradiction, for while a person-to-person model is usually constructed to place person in relation to others, or as an objectified manifestation, Pratyabhijñā structures its relationality through unity. It questions the validity of seeking a relational construct, of objectifying others, when considering the lack of inherent unity between objects. It argued that unity and thus relationality can only be developed through an existential realism391 of the true subject, through dependence, where the notion of concrete person becomes, not isolated or self-reflective, but unified through a “unitary awareness”392 within an essential nature.

Personhood reflects the divine condition through the Ātmanic reality and the will of the divine to bring individuals out of their state of isolation otherwise there could be no self-cognition and no perception of the divine state. Self-cognition cannot therefore be only related to an inward condition of divine consciousness but also to observable manifestations. An awareness of manifestations also reflects a relational context to person, for the ability to be aware of these objects within a sense of self, in

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390 IPK, 2.18, p.56; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 2.4.18, p.148.
391 IPKp, p.115.
392 IPK, 2.52, p.57; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 2.4.20, p.150.
Pratyabhijña, is due to the nature of self-awareness reflecting the capabilities of divine awareness. In a purer or higher form of awareness the natural individual condition can be said to be raised to another, which can be correlated to a notion of relational person. This does not mark the end of awareness of person but the beginnings and culminates in an experience of re-cognition.

In the pure state of consciousness the world and oneself is re-cognised as existing as the light of consciousness, while still admitting the reality of those cognitions that seem to be outside of this re-cognition. Without limited perception there could not be a cognition of the Ātman, which would be self-reflective, having an inward perception and not able to consider the world. Hence, there is a need to affirm the place for the outer perception in the individual as well as the inner in the highest cognition (of Ātman) by which the hypostatic existence comes to experience its sense of worth. There comes to be evident existence (diversity or difference) and also unity through the Ātmanic experience within a model of person which can be called an Ātman-hypostasis, but this shall be examined in the next chapter.

Through differentiated cognition there is the admittance of the differing states of experience because of the nature of the revelatory activity (kriyā-śakti) of the divine. This activity manifests the world and then interacts with the world in the most meaningful way where there is also the acceptance of difference and objectified phenomena. The human person comes to be correlated to a form of manifestation, yet the human person having self-cognition is able to understand its true sense of person and allows the notion of person to change and be restored, thus changing the way manifested phenomena are viewed. The model in this thesis, allows the cognition of Ātman, within a Cid-ātmanic mode of existence, to affirm that the personal consciousness of individual soul deified does not detract from both the specific concrete existence and also unity. The notion of unity within manifested diversity can be argued through the words “while in the body”, so as to make clear that the divine state is not divorced from the somatic existence. The bodily existence reaches

\[\text{IPK}, 3.53, \text{p.58.}\]
\[\text{As already stated in Chapter 1.4.6.}\]
\[\text{PBH.16.}\]
its pinnacle in true ‘I-consciousness’, which affirms the true reality of the human person, as Kṣemarāja stated:

Then is attained the awareness of the ultimate reality as a result of entering the perfect I-consciousness or Self which is in essence Cit and ānanda (bliss) and of the nature of the power of the great mantra. There is the attainment of the lordship over the one’s group of deities of consciousness that brings about emanation and re-absorption of the universe. All this is the ultimate reality or the nature of Śiva.\(^{396}\)

Consequently, mundane existence is ultimately due to the divine Cause (Śiva), who accepts that such manifestations are due to Himself as a perfect expression of “His own Self”,\(^ {397}\) where the spatial sequence (objects), pertaining to finite subjects, appear to be “the infinite Subject, His Self...and filled with His own existence”.\(^{398}\) In this condition the (interior) reality is one, and that “One alone develops multiplicity”.\(^ {399}\) Objectification does not infer a disparity between mundane consciousness, or objects and the divine, for such objectification is the external unfolding of the divine,\(^ {400}\) and thus the universe and persons are in essence the nature of Śiva.\(^ {401}\)

### 3.8 Conclusion

At the start of this chapter it was asked whether Pratyahājñā had a concept of person and how can such a concept be understood within Pratyahājñā philosophy? There was a focus on the term *puruṣa* to correlate ideas of concrete personhood to that term, whilst recognising that this notion of personal concrete existence (*hypostasis*) is

\(^{396}\) Translation by Singh, *IPK*, 2.7. p.106.

\(^{397}\) Ibid.

\(^{398}\) Translation by Pandit, *IPK*, 2.2.2. p.112.

\(^{399}\) Translation by Pandey, *IPV*, 2.2.2; translation by Pandit, *IPK*, 3.1.3, p.159.

\(^{400}\) Utpala stated: “Iśvara is the extroversive aspect of the Absolute and Sadāśiva is the introversive one, the former being known (in the Āgamas) as unmesa and the later as nimesa...”, *IPK*, 2.10, p.40; translation by Pandit, *IPK*, 2.1.7, p.112.

\(^{401}\) Utpala stated “The introvert reality is unity. The same, being unified with the manifestation of time and space and essential nature, appears as multiplicity, when it becomes the object of sense-perception” see *IPV*, 2.2.2; translation by Pandey, *IPV*, p.129.
qualified through an experience of the essential reality of being (or Ātman). It is in this experience of the Ātman that a sense of person was developed and correlated to a spiritual mode of existing, which allowed for both individual existence and unity in the divine experience. This manifested a model which qualifies non-dualistic aspects of Pratyabhijñā and the dualistic within the model of unity-in-diversity. In this model the world is viewed as the light of consciousness (prakāśa) and as such the human person gains significance to freely be a person in the highest condition and not be restrained by what Zizioulas called “ontological necessity”.402 where the human person is dominated by instincts and lower impulses.

However, while Zizioulas was dependent on an existential model to overcome the lower nature of human personhood, or the biological hypostasis, it was argued that this model should be qualified through an experience of the essential reality of being or Ātman. In this experience the lower natural physis of the human person is overcome through grace to attain a mode of life in the experience of Ātman, having conscious awareness of this state in the material life within a spiritual mode of existence. This approach allowed me to present a model which accepts the place for individual concrete existence as a mode or type of human existing and the overcoming of the natural physis in another type of existence or conscious awareness, an Ātmanic existence and awareness.

The notion of person is not dissolved in that experience, but on the contrary it allowed a sense of freedom where a human person attains a true sense of personhood in that state as an Ātman-hypostasis. If a person were not able to have this experience he or she would be bound to the biological condition and have no freedom to escape the prison of the natural existence. This will be argued in the next chapter in relation to the Ātman-hypostasis model of person, where this model will allow for a real sense of being as a human person without displacing the important stress on essential being. It was also argued in this chapter that Pratyabhijñā does have a sense of the personal in the stress on divine awareness of the true subject (Śiva-pramātr), which when translated into the human level allows for a sense of true personal cognition, made possible through the Ātmanic reality. The Ātman reality has at its core both pure being

402 BC, p.50.
and pure awareness or Cit, which implies that on the divine and human levels, personhood includes notions of existence within an essential reality of being.

The Ātmanic model when correlated to human personhood affirms the place for personal consciousness on both a limited and a deified or re-cognised level, which is made possible through the divine unity and the divine expansion of the Supreme Puruṣa (Śiva). The many levels of human consciousness considered in Pratyabhijñā did not divide personhood but allowed for a harmonisation of many types of consciousness through the Absolute Consciousness. Despite the admittance of both citta and Cit in human personhood, concrete existence was not denied but affirmed. In this sense Pratyabhijñā can be said to have an understanding of person/puruṣa, harmonising the sense of ordinary existence and the possibilities of what can be in human personhood through the experience of re-cognition. These ideas will be correlated to a notion of person within a single model, the Ātman-hypostasis model, which in the next chapter through a convergence of terms will allow for a notion of person to be explored through a synthesis of ideas from both traditions.
CHAPTER 4

CONVERGING THEOLOGIES

4.1 Introduction

In the last chapter I will converge ideas from both the Byzantine and Pratyabhijña traditions relating to a concept of person within a synthesis, through a single model, the Atman-hypostasis. The considering of a synthetic model is not to force comparison\(^1\) into rigid parameters, but to explore the possibilities of theological development through convergence and synthesis.

As a consequence of this exploration, the boundaries of theological approaches to person will be approached in such a way so as to consider areas relating to the personhood debate throughout this thesis, of individual, relationality and unity, through the Atman-hypostasis model. It is through this model that the monism of Pratyabhijña is qualified within the Byzantine concrete sense of person, while utilising the notion of Ātman to consider person within a substantialist context through deification, which qualifies any existentialist approach to person. By exploring the Atman-hypostasis model I establish a conceptual bridge between being and becoming, between existence and an essential reality, between mundane individual awareness and relational hypostasis, within a concept of deified/re-cognised person.

\(^1\) I will build upon the comparative theological attempts exemplified by Francis X. Clooney see, *Theology After Vedanta* (Delhi: 1993), p.1, but most especially utilising K. P. Aleaz’s model of convergence see, *A Convergence of Advaita Vedanta And Christian Thought* (Delhi: 2000). This type of convergence has also been developed by M. Dhavamony in his, “Indian Christian theological method”, see M. Dhavamony, “Indian Christian Theological Method”, *Studia Missionalia* 45 (1996), pp.57, where he outlines how Indian Christian theological method is validated though a correct hermeneutical approach, in which convergence might take place. These hermeneutics are based upon the legitimacy of convergence which is founded upon the primary place of Christ as the ultimate reality who “illumines all people in different ways and in a variety of forms” (ibid.). While I agree with this sentiment, I would question what variety of forms means. Nevertheless I affirm that the notion of cosmic revelation allows the place for convergence though the many activities of divine revelation.
The explorations of theological possibilities inherent within the term *Ātman-hypostasis*, affirms the place for a theological space of convergence (in part 4.2) or a theology of convergence, where Christianity (the Byzantine tradition) and Indian Philosophy (*Pratyabhijñā*) can meet in a fruitful encounter, where ideas from each tradition can inform the other. ²

While the convergence of traditions is placed within a Christian schema, where types of revelatory events will be related to the divine *economy*, to the divine revelatory activity and divine condescension, this allows for an inclusive approach yet upholding the dignity of any given revelatory activity. The notion of many types of revelation, considered through the divine economy, permits a synthesis of ideas to relate to the very nature of revelation, in that the notions of many types of revelation allows many approaches to uncovering truth, and thus affirming the place for convergence and synthesis.

Ideas relating to personhood, or *hypostatic* difference (or otherness), and unity is brought together within a focus on unity-in-diversity through the *Ātman-hypostasis* model. This model is constructed to overcome two dilemmas, pertaining to the ontological and the existential. The ontological dilemma relates to a seeming

² Comparison and convergence in India can correlated to a genealogy of models of convergence (The idea for such a genealogical methodology was taken from Paul M. Collins’ use of genealogy in relationality in the development of the term “hermeneutic of relationality”, see P. M. Collins in ‘The Nature and Mission of the Church Communion: God, Creation and Church’), where the historical development of Indian-Christian ideas have manifested a genealogy and theological evolution of ideas. This represents a type of tradition and Indian Christianity (see A. Mookenthottam, *Indian Theological Tendencies*, p.29). See Robin Boyd, *An Introduction to Indian Christian Theology* (Delhi: 1969, 2005); Anthony Mookenthottam, *Indian Theological Tendencies*; Jacob Parappally, *Emerging Trends in Indian Christology* (Bangalore: 1995); K. P. Aleaz, *Religions in Christian Theology* (Kolkata: 1991); also see Mookenthottam, *Indian Theological Tendencies*. A short genealogy follows: Ram Mohan Roy (1772-1833) who was the founder of the Brāhma Samāj or Brahmo Samaj; Ram Mohan Roy who developed links with Unitarians in England; K. M. Banerjea (1813-1885) who sought a common origin of Hinduism and Judaism. K. C. Sen (1838-1884); Keshab Chandra Sen who was deeply influenced by Christianity and introduced a Christian type of liturgical dimension to the Brāhma Samaj; Nehemiah Goreh (1825-1895) refuted Hinduism as a Christian traditionalist; B. Upādhyāya (1861-1907), who was an important figure in inter-religious dialogue in India, and may be considered the “first Indian Catholic Theologian” (Mookenthottam, *Indian Theological Tendencies*, p.34); M. C. Parekh (1885-1977) also was another important contributor; Swami Abhishiktananda, (1910-1973) developed some of the most significant work in relation to the dialogue between Christianity and Hinduism in modern times see ‘The Depth-Dimension of Religious Dialogue’, *Vidvajyott* 45/5: 1981, pp. 202-221); Richard De Smet also highlighted important theological points in relation to Ātman, see ‘Focusing on the Brahman-Ātman’, in Anand Amaladass ed., *Christian Contribution to Indian Philosophy*, Madras: 1995); Bede Griffiths (b.1906) equated *Satcidānanda* with the Trinity; J. N. Farquhar was also an important figure in comparing Hinduism and Christianity, as was Sarah Grant who considered a “world view” as an Advaitic Christian.
separation of essential being and material existing. This is why the focus has been on the Atman in this thesis as the essential reality of being, to address the lack of ontological depth in existential models of person. However, this focus on Atman is qualified to argue that Atman does not indicate a monist "single changeless entity" or "single monist Self", but the highest spiritual reality of the human person. Both aspects of person, the outward characteristics of hypostasis, and the inner hypostatic essential nature is equally stressed within a model of whole and concrete. The focus is on whole person through the Atman-hypostasis to overcome the existential dilemma of individuum, as highlighted by Zizioulas, and the need to overcome the natural physis or "ontological necessity" within the natural life.

Thus in the Atman-hypostasis these dilemmas are confronted within a single model that includes the notion of essential being, the what of being, to qualify the existential or the outward looking person, by considering person as a way of existing through a Cid-ātmanic mode of hypostatic existence. Here the stress is on the essential being and awareness of the essential reality (Atman) within concrete person. This model includes within it a sense of deification and an aspect of conscious awareness of this higher life within the world. The tropos of existence is not to be considered in isolation as an activity without ontological substance, but fundamentally related to the true nature or the Atman within the hypostasis.

4.1.1 Seeking a Common Ground

This chapter seeks a common ground between the two traditions hence an approach to person are sought by linking substantialist models from both traditions in relation to person and the essential nature of person. Consequently, the concept of the soul is equated to the Atman, while utilising notions of a reasoning soul in the Byzantine tradition and adapting the model of consciousness (Cit) from Pratyahihāṇā. This

\(^1\) IPK, 2.50-51, p.56-57, translation by Pandit IPKp, 2.4.18-19, pp.148-149.
\(^2\) Ibid.
\(^3\) Zizioulas, BC, p.28.
\(^4\) BC, p.50.
\(^5\) This term has already been explained indicates a mode of existence that shares both the essential nature (Atman) and pure Consciousness and taken from IPK, 2.51, p.57, which describes being in terms of cūd-ātmani in relation to manifestations (ābhāsas).
substantialist model is correlated to the divine essence (ousia), the nature of the Godhead, with Paramātman, where the divine model helps to understand the human, by showing how unity and difference are not at odds with each other but complement each other within a model of unity in diversity. Common ground is sought by equating the Ātman with the highest part of the human soul as a portion of the divine within the human being, having likeness with the Godhead (Paramātman), but not equality. The Ātman is equated with a metaphysical substance akin and similar to the Paramātman but different according to measure, will and activity.

However, there are some obvious problems in bringing together ideas from the Byzantine and Pratyabhijñā traditions. One of the most important relates to the notion of ontological separation or the gulf between humanity and God in Byzantine theology as compared to ontological non-difference in Pratyabhijñā. This gulf has been overcome throughout this thesis by stressing that the divine theologia is not divorced from divine economia, but the two are intimately related when understood from the point of Ātmanic unity within the hypostasis. The notion of unity or non-difference allows a reference point to understand difference and the two can be brought together in the human condition within the Ātman-hypostasis. In this model, simultaneity of difference and unity is argued but ultimately resolved in deification in the Ātmanic experience or the event of being within the hypostasis, and reflected outwardly in a Ātmanic mode of existence. In this mode or tropos, the human person can be said to participate with the divine in the Ātmanic state, having an awareness of the divine, due to the sharing of a nature of being, which is akin or like the divine. While the notion of deification is correlated to re-cognition, it has to be noted here that deification and re-cognition are terms that cannot be made totally synonymous. Re-cognition implies cognition of a truth that already is, not a deifying of the person who enters into a state of becoming, a becoming of something that was.

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8 As stated in the IPK, 1.44, p.18; and implied by Kṣemarāj in the PBH, commentary to Sūtra 10, referring to the “Exalted One (Śiva)” who is the Highest reality (PBHs, p.74). The term is also synonymous with the Absolute personal Godhead or Paramaśiva, see IPKp, p.65, however the word Ātman was also taken to meant the Absolute Reality (ibid., p.66).

9 See Staniloae, Orthodox Spirituality, pp.32-3. Dumitru Staniloae states that: Christian teaching adopts a middle ground between the mysticism of identity and the irreducible separation between man and God...Christian teaching rejects both identification and absolute separation (ibid.). Nevertheless Staniloae’s views are not an accurate appraisal of Greek Patristic notions of unity, for in the Greek Fathers in the mystical union of deification, the lines between anthropological identity and separation, and complete unity with the divine are often blurred (see K. Ware, ‘Deification in St Symeon the New Theologian’, Sobornost 25/2; 2003, pp.7-29).
not, and now is. What can be affirmed is, that both the terms *deification* and re-
cognition imply the fullness of the human being as far as is possible for a human
person. This indicates the *telos* or perfected\(^\text{10}\) end of person as an *Ātman-hypostasis*
wrought by the perfecter.\(^\text{11}\)

*Hypostasis* is also equated with *puruṣa* and through *puruṣa/hypostasis*, human
existence is understood to be correlated to the individual and limited natural *physis*,
but also correlated to a higher existence through the nature of *hypostasis*. This allows
a concept of *puruṣa/person* to be related to a category of the common human
experience and also to an experience in which the highest mystical condition is
attained.\(^\text{12}\) While *Pratyabhijñā* did not distinguish ontologically between the divine
and the human but related the human condition to a single knowing person,\(^\text{13}\) I do not
denude the unique cognitions of individual persons within a suffocating union, but
stress a certain amount of ontological difference to the divine, while also focusing on
union with the divine as far as possible without destroying the concrete specificity of
each person. This view is argued through the Trinitarian model, while utilising the
notion of *Ātman* to stress an essential reality in the human person, to affirm an
ontological distinction between the *paṣu* and the Lord, where ideas relating to both
difference and non-difference can be incorporated within the notion of
*puruṣa/hypostasis*, united through *deification*. In this model, *Pratyabhijñā*’s notion of
revelatory activity (*kriyā-Śakti*) is correlated to the economy of Christ’s revelation,
where the *Citī-Śakti* of the divine is equated to the *Logos-Christ* activity. This part of
the thesis will not examine the pneumatological implications in relation to Śakti other
than to state that there is much scope for examination in this area. The external divine

\(^{10}\) The term “perfect” in the New Testament is better understood as ‘completed’ for it indicates the end
of being: from, τέλειος (perfect, complete), τελειότης (completeness, perfection), τελείω (I perfect,
complete), τέλος (end). Theologically I prefer the translation complete or completed as the word
perfect has ethical associations while completed has a fuller ontological implications.

\(^{11}\) Or the Paramātman hypostatic-Puruṣa. In Hebrews 12:2 Christ is described in terms as the
completer (τελειωτήν). It is Christ the Logos (Jn. 1:1-14) who completes all things which in
*Pratyabhijñā* can be correlated to the activity of God to *Mahēśvara* (महेश्वर) or the Great God, see IPK.
1.1. p.1.; and in the Hindi Bible described as *Parameśvara* (परमेश्वर) or highest God in Genesis 1:1.

\(^{12}\) As Utpaladeva stated that “a person who sees objects as his own form is called a paṭi (a master),
while one lying under the effects of delusion of seeing objects as different from him are called paṣu (a
bound being)”. *IPK*, 3.14. p.64.स्वदार्पण स्वप्न धर्म दास प्रसमान कन्याय कपोल पाति:।
भायते प्रदेश कलशकाशिकायुप:।

\(^{13}\) See *IPKp*, p.147.
activity, when situated within the term, Logos, is to be understood within a synthetic model that includes the conscious awareness within divine activity, or Cit, as the Logos-cit-hypostasis.\(^{14}\) This highlights how difference and yet unity is to be understood within a single hypostatic model as the Logos-cit-hypostasis, which is unified within its Paramātmanic nature, while focusing on awareness to qualify an overt stress on essential substance. When translating this model to a human condition, each person or hypostasis can be said to experience individual existence and consciousness or uniqueness, but having an essential reality of being correlated to the term Ātman and indicating a potentiality for a higher state of being or cognition. This correlation of the divine model to the human highlights a pattern by which the human condition can be understood, having at the centre of the hypostatic existence, an essential Ātmanic nature.

4.2 A Space for Convergence: A Theology of Convergence

It is proposed in this part of the thesis is that what is needed in the present theological debates between religions and traditions is a theological space for convergence and dialogue. A theology of convergence could provide a structure by which theological convergences and synthesis could take place, such as the use of Sutcidānanda within Trinitarian models. In the forum of a theology of convergence, the examination of Sutcidānanda could be taken out of the discourse of comparativism and analysed more fully in convergence, as could the model of Ātman-hypostasis. A theology of convergence would allow fuller theological examinations and open dialogue through synthesis and convergence without concern of recrimination or ridicule within a space of discourse and reciprocation. Given that many terms and theological correlations

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\(^{14}\) This model is given by Vekathanam (in, Indian Christology. p.395, who cites Brahmabandhav use of “Cit-Logos” to argue against a monist interpretation of Brahman in the activity of the Logos and equated with Cit to give an Indian Christian perspective in Christian theology) as Cit-Logos, but I will argue for Logos-Cit-hypostasis, where the consciousness of the Logos is highlighted within a hypostatic model. I qualify the awareness of the essential nature (Paramātman) of the Logos through Cit or consciousness. Hence the notion of Cit uncovers the relationship of the unmoving Paramātman to the world through the activity of the Logos-cit-hypostasis, which also provides a mode for human persons, made in the image of God, to understand the nature of their own being (Ātman) through a deified awareness in a Cit-ātmanic mode of existence.
exist between Byzantine and Pratyabhijñā traditions, these traditions would greatly benefit from such a space of discourse and convergence.

Consequently, this part of the thesis develops a convergence within a theology of convergence, which offers a space for convergence between Byzantine and Pratyabhijñā traditions, even though dissimilarities between the two traditions remain. Despite these dissimilarities, on a basic level of comparison there are many examples of terms that can be equated from the Byzantine and Pratyabhijñā traditions within a space for convergence, such as: energēia and kriyyā-Śakti; Logos and Vāc; hypostasis/prosopon (indicating person) and puruṣa; the general category of anthrōpos (man) as a zōon logikon (rational animal) and puṣu (beast); nous (here used in a spiritual, metaphysical noetic context indicating the soul) and Ātman (indicating the Self or soul); dianoia (mind) and manas; logismos (reasoning) and buddhi (intellect); atomos (indivisible particle) and anu; and gunas (mode of being or existence) and tropos hyparxeos. It is the intention of this part of the chapter to examine the compatibility of some of these terms within a space for convergence, focusing on Ātman-hypostasis.

4.2.1 Logos and Cit

Within a space for convergence, correlations between terms, such as Logos and Cit, within the Byzantine and Pratyabhijñā narratives are possible through a shared focus on intentionality and divine awareness. In a Christological context the word Cit does not imply a mode or principle, but the united consciousness of God and in Trinitarian terms, to each hypostasis, not only to the Son. Cit would have to be considered as the

15 Some terms have already been examined to manifest a model of convergence dealing with fullness. see Bettina Bäumer (ed.), Mysticin in Saivism and Christianity, and Bettina Bäumer and John R. Dupuche, Void and Fullness. 16 The Logos-cit model has already discussed in Chapter 1.4.6 in this thesis. According to the commentary of Kṣemaraja of the PBH, “Citi (consciousness) used in the singular denotes its non-limitation by space, time, etc., shows the unreality of all theories of dualism. The word svatantra (free will) points out the fact that supreme power is of the essence of Cit, and thus distinguishes it from the doctrine of Brahman (i.e. Sankara Vedānta, where the Cit is considered to be non-active). The word viśva etc. (in Sūtra 1) declares that Cit has unlimited power, can bring about every thing”; translation by Singh, PBHs, p.50. 17 A correlation between these terms is also developed by Vekatanam, Indian Christology, p.395, but very superficially.
very awareness of the united being of the Godhead. Nevertheless Cit in the sense of Pratyabhijñā also implies a mediating activity (kriyā) of Citi-Śakti18 between God and the world. This has an existential dimension similar to the Logos in the Byzantine tradition19 where both become the mediating principle of the divine to the world. Both Logos and Cit are terms that imply a metaphysical bridge between the transcendent and the world through the will (thelima/icchā) of the divine “Egoity”, expressed as ‘I-Am’.20 in an outward flowing of divine existing through the divine operations (energeia/kriyā-Śakti). But this model considers the divine activities not in relation to a Palamite type model but through a substantialist context. The divine revelatory activities can thus be understood through the Logos-cit-hypostasis model,21 which indicates the ontological relationship of the Logos to the divine nature and the supreme awareness of consciousness (Cit) of the Logos through a revelatory context in the world (as Christ).

However, the Logos-cit model has problems for the two terms are not completely equivalent. Cit relates to the consciousness of the Absolute reality that begins to be extrusive and as Citi-śakti is an activity of the Supreme Śiva22 and does not have, in Pratyabhijñā, a separate ontological existence and identity in itself, which the Logos existentially has as one of the hypostases of the Trinity. The Logos (Word) also implies speech (Vāc-Śakti),23 while Cit relates to the Supreme Consciousness. Perhaps a better term for correlation would be Vāc.24 While Vāc would imply a certain

18 The PBH states: “By the power of her own will (alone), she (Cit) unfolds the universe upon her own screen (i.e. in herself) as the basis of the universe”, svēcchaḥ svabhītānu visvam unmiśayati, PBH.2; translation by Singh, PBHs, p.51.
19 The development of the Logos as the mediating principle, especially by the Middle Platonists is highlighted by H. F. Hāgg who stated that: “while the concept of Logos has a wide range of applications as a designation of the mediating principle between the transcendent God and the world”, Clement of Alexandria and the beginnings of Christian Apophaticism, p.230.
20 As exemplified in LXX, Exodus, 3:14.
21 As explained also in Chapter 1.4.6 of this thesis.
22 As it states in Kśemarāja’s commentary of Sūtra 4 of the PBH that: “The magnificent highest Śiva desiring to manifest the universe, which lies in Him as identical with Himself, in the from of Sadāśiva and other appropriate forms flashes forth (prākāśānimānaṁayā sphaṇati) at first as non-different from the light of consciousness (prākāśābhedena) but not experiencing the unity of consciousness (in which the universe is identified with consciousness) (citādikya-ākhyaṁimaya), of which state anāñrita-siva is only another name”; translation by Singh, PBHs, p.55.
23 Vāc-Śakti is the power of the divine power of speech, see Mishra, Kashmir Śaivism, p.159, which is undifferentiated and related to paśyanti (3rd person plural, from the verbal root der to see) or the divine view of the universe, “going forth and ‘seeing’”, in Tagare, ‘Glossary’ in The Pratyabhijñā Philosophy, where there is no difference between vācyā (object) and vācaka (word).
24 As used in IPK, 1.44, 18, and correlated to Paramātman, the Supreme essence and Self, as the highest speech, or ‘Parāvāk’. See also André Padoux, Vāc: The Concept of the Word in Selected Hindu
modalist quality (in Trinitarian terms) to divine activity, it does come very close to what is conceptually understood by the word Logos. In the context of revelation and the ability of the term to convey ontological gravitas, Vāc simply does not have the same weight and thus there has to be a return to Cit. Cit is capable of expressing ontological depth and existential meaning, as a mediating divine activity between that (tat) or manifest principles tattvas, which indicates the objectified manifestations or ābhūtas. Cit, as with the Logos, is the bridge between divine ‘I-consciousness’ and the world and thus allows an ontological and existential qualification of unity-in-diversity (bhedabheda), as discussed in the previous chapter. The term Cit can also be correlated to the Logos, as the conscious awareness of the divine revelatory activity and how the divine consciousness unites with the world to express a double consciousness, of the world and divine without confusing either.

4.2.2 Principles of Revelation

Another important term that can be incorporated in models of convergence in a Christological context is the term Īśvara, which in Pratyabhijñā is a divine principle, the fourth tattva of revelation and relates to the divine economy. But Christ is not to be understood merely as a principle of the divine revelation, for that would predicate Christ to a mode of the divine being, which is unacceptable in Byzantine Trinitarian theology. Christ is the One by whom the tattvas become manifest. What can be

_Tantras_ (Delhi; 1990), p.ix; and Lawrence, _Rediscovering God With Transcendental Argument_, p.21; also K. Mishra, _Kashmir Saivism_, p.158.

_3_ See _IPK_, 3.2, p.59.

_4_ See Chapter 3 of this thesis.

This represents a double consciousness and will and the uniting of wills and consciousness expressed in Maximus’ dyothelite theology. Maximus stated: “let no-one censure the doctrine that forbids a duality of gnomic wills, when they find that nearly all the glorious teachers say that there are two wills...For the divine Fathers do not speak of quantity in relation to gnomic wills, but only in relation to natural wills, rightly calling the essential and natural laws and principles of what has been united wills... so being able to speak always belongs to the nature, but how you speak belongs to the hypostasis. So is it with being disposed by nature to will and willing...Then the Incarnate Word possesses as a human being the natural disposition to will, and this is moved and shaped by his divine will”. _Opusc. 3_, 4SC-4RB; translation by Louth, _Maximus the Confessor Maximus the Confessor_, p.193. See also Maximus, _Ep. 19_, 592C. As Bathrellos states: “For Maximus, the Logos is the same before and after the incarnation, namely God a divine person...Maximus says that the flesh became one with the Logos according to hypostasis. However, although the Logos is identical with the human nature according to hypostasis, he is not identical with it according to nature”, see ‘The Dyothelite Christology of Maximus’, in _The Byzantine Christ_, p.111.

_2_ The Īśvara-tattva has already been discussed in Chapter 3.4 of this thesis.
asserted, from a Byzantine point of view, is that Christ (the enfleshed-Logos) manifests principles (logoi), which come from Him (God) and are non-different to Him, and which includes the “pure” tattvas (also the Isvara tattva). The impure tattvas can be correlated to the natural physis of manifest phenomena. In this Christological model the Logos becomes identified with the Supreme unmoving One which is the “Highest Reality” or Śiva, where the Logos-activity can be correlated to divine principles (tattvas) or logoi, and can be understood as uncreated and “Preexistent” activities of the divine. Again, as in Chapter 2B, reference is made to Maximus the Confessor’s notion of logoi or principles of uncreated divine operations in relation to the Logos, to argue that the Isvara can be understood as an economic principle, and as an exterior aspect of the divine. As such, the Isvara can be understood in terms of a manifested logos or principle of Christ. The divine principles can thus be considered in relation to the Supreme or unmoving transcendent God (Paramātman), who can be considered as ontologically non-different from the Logos-cit.

The notion of divine economy also helps to resolve the riddle of whether Christ is to be viewed as another Avatar or the only perfect total bodily Incarnation of the divine. To resolve this issue, this thesis utilises Pratyahhijna’s concept of principles (tattvas), as described in Chapter 3.4 of this thesis, in conjunction with the Maximus notion of principles (logoi) to affirm Christ as the author of such principles. It is argued that Christ is not to be considered as another Avatar, but the source of all principles, including the Avataric principle or Isvara-tattva. This principle, related to the term Isvara (God personified in Pratyahhijna) and the fourth tattva of divine manifestation as shown in Chapter 3.4.1, is to be considered as an extrusive revelatory aspect of the Absolute. The Incarnate Christ as the second person of the tri-hyostatic

30 See Maximus, Ambig. 7 (1077C-1081C).
31 The “pure tattvas” belong to the first five tattvas and the “pure universe” whilst the remaining tattvas belong to the “impure universe”, see Chapter 3.4 of this thesis.
32 See PBHs, p.118.
33 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN, 5.5-5.8, 820A-824A.
34 See Maximus, Ambig. 7, 1077C-1081C: and see Chapter 2B of this thesis.
35 See IPKp, 3.1.2.
36 This word is used in IPK, 1.44, p.18. According to the PBH, Śiva is the “Highest Reality...His Self (which is also the Real Self of each individual) that is a mass of consciousness and bliss” (Singh), PBHs, p.46
37 Which is argued by Torwesten in, Ramakrishna and Christ, pp.5-15, 23, 174.
Godhead becomes the source from which Avataric forms or divine revelatory principles manifest. As such Avataric manifestations can be correlated to the Isvara-tattva and economic manifestations of the Absolute Godhead. While historically the Avatar principle or personified divine revelations are equated with the Isvara-tattva, it also indicates a type of revelation of the Absolute within the wider Hindu tradition. This is exemplified in the Bhagavad Gītā where the Isvara is called the “Supreme Puruṣa (param puruṣam)”, which ultimately points to the Paramātmic reality.

Another point that must be raised here relates to the notion of Godhead in Pratyabhijñā, which did not have a precise doctrine of Godhead. Nevertheless, the notion of the unmoving divine essence of Paramātmā has been correlated to a Judeo-Christian notion of Godhead, and to a personal sense of Paramātmā contained within the term, Śiva. But there is again some confusion as to what constitutes the Absolute Reality in Pratyabhijñā for sometimes some terms such as Maheśvara and Pārameśvara are related to a notion similar to that which is understood by a personal Godhead and at other times in relation to an extrusive principle of the Absolute Reality. In addition, contemporary translations of Pratyabhijñā texts use such words as Godhead, superimposing theological ideas that were not originally present in

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18 The Bhagavad Gītā states: “Who meditates on Me with his mind controlled by constant practice of Yoga and not wandering astray, O Son of Pritha! He attains to Him, the effulgent self: the Supreme Purusha”, ābhāyasūrya-yuktan ca tārta sukhavīram pārtho puruṣottama yo nāma-vāyu-sūryānām 8.8 (Vaidik). The nature of this Supreme person though is non-different to the reality of that personhood or Ātmanic radiance, thus in this context there is no difference between the Ātman, Supreme Person or the radiance of the divine Self, but in the Byzantine tradition, because of trinitarian theology, there is a need to qualify how divine difference is to be understood in relation to non-difference.

19 As exemplified by Pandit throughout his translation of the IPK. Nevertheless the absolute being is described as the “highest Śiva desiring to manifest the universe”, PBH. 4; translation by Singh. PBHs. p.55.

20 See IPK. 1.2, p.2, which states “Other than the person taking some insentient entity as his Self, who would try to either deny or establish the existence of the eternally existent Almighty God (Maheśvara), who has the independent power of doing and knowing, and who, in fact, one’s own (real) Self?” (Pandit). kartari jñātārī svātmānī viśuddha mahāsvarā/ ajañātām nisedhaṁ v ādidiham vīdhiham tāḥ/ IPKp. 1.1.2, translation by Pandit. p.7.


42 This word or God, is used by Pandit not only in his commentary but also in the translation of the text (see IPKp. 2.4.4, p.137) where he refers to the “unknowable Authority (God)” (ibid.). He again refers to God in the translation of the text stating “God has been accepted as the case” (IPKp. 2.4.8, p.140)
Pratyabhijñā, but which now have come to indicate a contemporary notion of Godhead. Certainly, in the text of the Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam the description of the Brahman and words indicating the Absolute Lord do indeed seem to be correlated to an idea of Godhead, and sometimes equated with light of essential being (prakāśātmā) of manifestation. But how far this monist reality can be equated with a Judeo-Christian theistic God is still open to question.

4.3 Ātman-hypostasis: A new Model of Person

In the concluding part of the thesis, I synthesise ideas relating to person from both traditions, within a space for convergence, relating to Ātman and hypostasis that have been discussed throughout the thesis, within a single term the Ātman-hypostasis. Through this term the Ātmanic monism of Pratyabhijñā is qualified and also the existential stress on individual. This allows a flexible approach to person, so as to argue that the individual can be considered as able to rise above the natural condition, through grace, and thus able to experience the fullness of personhood. This is based upon the model of person developed by Zizioulas, where he divides person into existential categories of biological mode of hypostatic existence as opposed to an ecclesial hypostatic existence. However, unlike Zizioulas' I do not stress the existential to explain person, but utilise the outer to point to the inner which then reflects outwards to transform the outer condition. I do not only rely on outward looking existential models to explain person, but consider a substantialist context within person, where hypostatic communion with the divine implies a material and immaterial substantial union with the divine.

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when the actual word is Pārameśvara (IPK, 2.40, p.52), and many times refers to the “Absolute God” in his commentary, see IPKp, p.141.
43 See PBH.1.2, ‘Commentary’; on this also see also IPKp, p.150.
44 See IPK, 1.1, p.1.
45 It is also correlated to the human condition, see IPK, 1.41, p.17, where Utpala equated the Ātmanic experience of the Swāmi with the divine stating “the divine master (svāmi) surley has the knowledge of the entire phenomenal existence contained within Himself (in his potency of Ātman); otherwise the throb of his will to manifest could not proceed”; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.5.10, p.59.
46 IPK, 1.34, p.15.
47 BC, pp.16-50.
In the Ātman-hypostasis the focus is be upon the existential individual and essential immaterial nature (Ātman), bringing together ideas relating to both hypostasis and Ātman. The Ātmanic nature and the individual are united in the hypostasis, where both are so completely bound to each other so making an indissoluble bond. Through this ontological union, the possibilities inherent in those natures allow person to attain to a restoration of those natures within an experience of union with the divine. The Ātman-hypostasis allows the restoration to be explained in the hypostasis within a context of restored natures, which then impacts on a specific individual life. It reveals how the specific hypostatic life should exist, its type of restored existence intended for a person. This type of life then comes to be reflected in a type of consciousness within the hypostasis.

It is because each person can be known as an Ātman-hypostasis having an Ātmanic reality within the hypostasis, the potentiality of being is underlined within a specific existence through the prefix, Ātman. This prefix indicates an immaterial substantiality with the existential individual, but which is usually unknown by the individual and so initially these parts seem to be disconnected from each other. This disconnection is existential and not ontological, for in a higher experience of this ontological unity is perceived, where through the reception of divine grace, the individual begins to become of aware of this essential nature and attains a wholeness not previously open to the individual.

It is through the Ātman-hypostasis model that the possibilities of fullness are thus made apparent. While each term independently indicates an aspect of being and existence, together they imply a whole condition of person. The term Ātman-hypostasis in human persons allows ideas of an immaterial nature and material existence to be brought together within a single term (Ātman-hypostasis) in the same way the word Christ implied, within a Chalcedonian context, a uniting of the Logos nature and the material nature of the Incarnation. In the Council of Chalcedon a model of whole Christ is argued as having certain qualities within a single person. The focus is on a unity through the term Christ, while having two natures, a rational soul (ψυχὴς λογίκης) and material body, while being the Son and only begotten.

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48 Albergio et al. (eds.), Conciliorum Oecumenicorum, pp.57-63; and Norman Tanner, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, p.86.
of the Father. These properties come together within a single property bearer, a single person (πρόσωπον) and single subsistent being (ὑπόστασιν). The word hypostasis here is not completely synonymous with person but also indicates an underlying substantial context with the prosopon, which becomes the personal bearer of these properties. In this model of person all the above properties are contained within a single entity, properly named Jesus Christ. Through this model, hypostasis has come to be equated with person, which then can be applied to the human model. The word hypostasis denotes an ontological condition within a person that highlights specific characteristics and an underlying nature. Christ becomes the personal bearer of these properties and it is through this singular existential condition that the notion of person has come to be ascribed to the term hypostasis, which contains certain ontological qualities. The quality of Ātman is however, not to be considered as predicated to the existential or outward individual but, as the higher spiritual nature, informs person of its true condition, just as in Christ his nature allows us to consider Him God. In the same way, the Ātman has a certain quality of being and awareness as a potion of the divine stuff, which unites with the person on a mundane level and then fully to the hypostasis through deification.

When the divine hypostatic model or specificity is translated to the human condition, the term hypostasis can thus be used to denote whole person in a way which underlines the specific properties of a person. This is exemplified in specific properties in the Trinity where the Logos-hypostasis differs to the Father-hypostasis and both differ to the Holy Spirit-hypostasis, but are united within a single nature. The equating specificity of hypostasis, within a united nature of the Trinity, allows person to be considered through an ontological union but also highlights the importance of specific characteristics.

However, while the prefix Logos in the Logos-hypostasis denotes a particular quality of each hypostasis, this correlation cannot be fully ascribed to the human for each proper name of a particular individual would then have to come before the term hypostasis. The prefix can be used to ascribe in the human person a unifying ontological condition within the hypostasis. As the appellation Logos, implies in the

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49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
Christ that there is a unity with the Father, being ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρὶ, so human persons (hypostases) can be said to be homoousion with their essential Ἁτμανικ nature. Consequently, when using Ἁτμαν- WARRANTIES the Ἁτμαν implies an essential ontological nature within the human hypostasis. The term has a unifying dynamic inherent within it that allows for an ontological unifying of natures with hypostasis, that of the mundane and that of the spiritual. However, the unity inherent within the ontological condition of the person is not experienced by most people, but only comes to be experienced through a restoration of this unity in an experience of deification. Thus deification allows for an experience of unity within the restored person, whether in a soteriological and eschatological context or as a mystical experience.

The Ἁτμαν-hypostasis also indicates that within hypostatic condition there exists the possibilities of many types of consciousness, pertaining to the mundane and the Ἁτμανικ reflecting the two natures within the Ἁτμαν-hypostasis. A person has a life and awareness that directly reflects the nature of the life and awareness that a specific person lives within, pertaining to either higher or lower natures. In the lower nature only the natural life and consciousness is experienced, while in the higher, there is a unity of the natural condition with the spiritual or Ἁτμανικ. In the unified Ἁτμανικ condition, the individual becomes aware of his or her hypostatic value and recognises the true nature of that existence.

The Ἁτμαν-hypostasis also allows for correlations to both difference and non-difference, where individual concrete existence implies difference and yet through Ἁτμαν, allows non-difference to always be expressed. Thus the Ἁτμαν-hypostasis model represents a qualifying of difference through unity. What is inferred in the term Ἁτμαν-hypostasis is that in an individual (which indicates the natural physis), a potentiality for fulfilment of the natural physis in deification is expressed.

Hence, this part of the last chapter four areas relating to the Ἁτμαν-hypostasis model will be examined, that of: unity, through the notion of Ἁτμαν and an Ἁτμανικ event within the hypostasis; Ἀθ (consciousness), which will relate to an Ἁτμανικ unity expressing difference with the hypostasis, and relating to subjectivity; relationality.

Ibid. 272
where difference manifests a quality of otherness and yet participation through an *Ātmanic* mode of *hypostatic existence*; and lastly unity-in-difference, which qualifies both unity (*Ātman*) and difference (*hypostasis*).

### 4.4 Concerning *Ātman*

Here I focus on what is specifically meant by *Ātman* in the *Ātman-hypostasis* context. The word *Ātman* indicates not a singularity at the expense of specific and concrete persons, but a spiritual nature, a consciousness aware reality that has the character and awareness of a singularity, but at the same time allowing for diverse and concrete persons. This paradoxical approach mirrors the Trinity, where there is evidenced an equal stress on both specificity and unity. In the human context, this dual approach also mirrors the *dyothelite* Christology of Maximus, who argued that in Christ there were evidenced two natural wills, one relating to his bodily incarnation and another of his divine *physis*. In the human condition this relates to a natural or bodily will and a "'deliberative (or 'gnomic') will"", implying intention and consequent possibilities to overcome the natural will through a higher condition. The possibilities to overcome the natural *physis* in the human through participation with a higher divine will and nature is ultimately related to an *Ātmanic* nature and will within the person.

Through the awareness of the *Ātmanic* nature, a dynamic of volition is brought into the equation, where the whole person becomes properly united, overcoming the intentions of the natural *physis*, or the deliberate intentions of lower state through the spiritual or that which has the capability of being deliberately spiritual. Through the spiritual nature, persons have the capabilities of deliberately overcoming the natural through grace and rising above the natural condition through the divine willing of deification. Thus there is reciprocity of wills. However, the lower human nature condition is not capable of restoring itself due to its insentience, and if it were sentient it would become a pantheistic or gnostic monstrosity, and so human nature is dependent on the divine will and activity to become restored. This restoration is made

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53 Ibid., p.193.
accessible through the reciprocal intention of the individual to wish to be restored, but made possible through the divine will and operations. Restoration is only possible through grace, which also represents the intentionality of the divine, because the portion of the divine acts within an awareness in accordance with the divine intention. The dependency on the divine marks the ontological distinction between the divine and human realities. It allows a sense of the possibilities of human persons as portions of the divine within divine participation, but also marks the limitations of the human person.

The correlation of *Ātman* with a portion of the divine is defended by equating the *Ātman* within a pneumatological context of spirit and to the divine breath, "God... breathed upon his (man's) face the breath of life (πνεῦμα ζωῆς) and the man became a living soul (ψυχὴ ζῶσαν)"; where the human partakes of the divine nature (2 Peter 1:4) through that breath. This participation of the spirit within was opened up to humanity through the Incarnation, which makes accessible the previous condition. The partaking of the divine through a restoring of what was and now is, allows a focus on the indwelling divine reality as the true centre of the person within a concrete existence.

The notion of *Ātman* is also placed within a substantialist context as the true *Self*. It has been argued in Chapter 3 of this thesis, that in *Pratyahāri* the *Ātman* was the highest reality of all existence and that human personhood, whether understood in terms of the individual or *hypostasis*, has as its centre of existence, the *Ātmanic* nature. The *Ātman* was considered as a single entity as the 'subject of knowing', but in the *Ātman-hypostasis*, this is qualified. Through the accepting of dual willing, as stated above, there is evident a dual awareness within person, but when restoration is experienced, this is unified within the whole person. In the individual, there is an existential disconnection from this awareness, but in *deification* this condition is restored.

In the *Ātman-hypostasis* model a correlation is also made between the *Ātman* and the highest part of the soul (ψυχή) or *nous*. This correlation allows not only a rational

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4 L.XX, Gen. 2:7. In German *atmen* means breaths, which provides a tantalising connection between breath and *being* within the Indo-European languages.
element to be considered within the soul, but also the soul within a substantialist context. I do not, as stated above, relate Ātman to an ontological singularity, a notion of a single "knowing subject", but an essential nature and awareness as a portion of the divine. The Ātman is not to be considered equal to the Paramātman, but shares in a type of nature of the divine. Through a union with God a soul participates with this Ātmanic nature, which changes the consciousness of a person, but although the specific subject or person (hypostasis) experiences a type of knowing similar to the divine subject when experiencing union with the divine through this nature, and is divinised as far as possible, but is not totally God.

This correlation of the Ātman with the soul, which has already been accepted within Indian Christianity and expressed through the term jīvatman, existentially unites the notion of concrete jīva (individual) with the indwelling metaphysical portion of the divine or Ātman in the human person. However, this model, juxtaposed to a dualistic or qualified non-dualistic model, leaves an unsatisfactory resolution between the jīva and Ātman especially when considering a substantialist type union with the divine. This is why Pratyabhijñā has been utilised to help correlate an essential reality with the soul, as the metaphysical stuff of being, in a context of deification.

The term Ātman while expressing non-difference is considered through difference (person) and therefore should not to be considered disconnected from difference. However, in difference phenomenal manifestation appears different to the Ātman, but the Ātman is not disconnected from the natural individual but as the underlying reality of existence which unites material manifestation to itself through the divine luminosity. This luminosity shines in all aspects of creation and is the "very heart of the Supreme, because it is the real essence of all existence". Hence each particular hypostasis indicates the possibilities of a relationship with God implied in the general category of human person through an ontological condition, but is not necessarily existentially available within a notion of separated individual. The possibilities of understanding this Ātmanic nature becomes reflected in a reciprocal movement to the

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55 IPK. 1.67, p.27; translation by Pandit, IPKp. 1.7.4, p.84.
56 See Mathew Vekathanam, Indian Christology, p.88. The jīva is expressed in Pratyabhijñā, in Kṣemaraja’s commentary of Śūtra 4 of the PBH, as “the individual experient” as “Siva”; translation by Singh. PBHs, p.57.
57 IPK, 1.45, p.19; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 2.4.13, p.144.
divine within a God-related person. It is through *hypostatic* reciprocity that the ability to experience a change of conscious awareness in the *hypostasis* becomes apparent and thus results in the end fulfilment in the Ātmanic state.

4.4.1 Ātmanic Freedom

Within the Ātman-*hypostasis* model, the Ātman comes to reflect a sense of true freedom, which mirrors the freedom of the divine Paramātmanic nature and allows the individual to experience total freedom in overcoming the natural state. The human person has the freedom to *be* and a way of existing which was initially intended by the divine. It is the notion of freedom, the freedom of the Lord to create individuals and allowing the freedom of individuals to *be* that is central to understanding the nature of the Ātmanic condition. Freedom is not to be considered a condition dominated by the natural condition but allows the expansion and fullness of human cognition. This full sense of freedom allows human persons to enter into a state of becoming on many levels, firstly of a biological becoming, then of a spiritual becoming and then a fulfilled or *deified* becoming.

Kṣemarāja stated that through “His free will, pervasion of non-duality, He assumes duality all around, then His will and other powers though essentially non-limited, assumes limitation”. Here Kṣemarāja highlights the difference between Paramātman as the Cause, which is localised in a human sense as the Ātman relates to freedom that allows a response to that Cause. The individual is not an aspect or insentient object but has a real life and freedom, which is the very nature of the Ātman. Without the Ātman, the human individual would have no capabilities for freedom, bound by its natural *physis* and unable to escape the ontological prison of the biological nature, but the possibilities of Ātmanic freedom within the *hypostasis* allows the person to truly *be* free. Freedom is not the ability to do this or that but allows the person to escape its biological prison and attain perfection. Through true freedom, the human the person is existentially able to break the bonds of isolation and difference through participation with the divine within or non-

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*translation by Singh, *PBHs*, pp.71-72*
difference. But as Kṣemarāja considers that if "Ātman (Self) has total freedom and
greatness, how is it said to be equated with the anu (jīva) and covered with mala". 59
The answer is provided in the next Sūtra: "in consequence of its limitation of Śakti,
reality, which is all consciousness, becomes the mala-covered sāmsarin". 60 Out of the
Lord's own will and freedom, being and existence become possible for it is He that
creates and becomes, allowing also for a sense of individuality, but which is in truth
nothing other than the Lord.

4.4.2 Substantialist Implications

The Ātmanic part of the Ātman-hypostasis indicates the possibilities of person within
a substantialist context. Each person has at his or her core, or soul, an essential reality
of the hypostasis, or the divine within each person, which allows a person to become
what he or she should be. This becoming can be translated to a process of deification,
as Rolt stated "God is present in each separate deified soul". 61 The characteristic of
this essential reality is how a 'likeness' can be considered as correlating to the deepest
nature of the person and yet is intrinsically related to each unique individual in a
personal way, as Gregory of Nyssa stated:

"The kingdom of God is within you (Lk.17:21)", by this we should learn that if
a man's heart has been purified from every creature and earthly affections, he
will see the image of the divine nature in his own beauty... for God imprinted
on our nature the likeness of the glories of His own nature. 62

This implies that at very core of person there is in the soul, a portion of the divine, a
metaphysical Ātmanic substance, which is the preconceived state for human persons,
when restored to the human person, and allows the person to experience the fullness
of being within a concrete existence. This Ātmanic nature does not imply that there is
a negation of the hypostasis within a monist reality, but rather both aspects come
together in the living person. The Ātmanic reality implies an essential non-

59 PBH 8 (commentary); PBHs, p.71.
60 PBH 9, "themajju (śakti) samkocat: malavitthah samsāri,
translation by Singh, PBHs, p.71.
62 The Beatitudes, Semon I (ACW 18:89, 90, 95), in Holy Apostles Convent, The Orthodox New
differentiation which has as its attributes, transcendence, unknowability, permanence yet also consciousness indicating the total or true moi. As in the Christ hypostasis where the two natures and wills were united in the Logos (or divine reality), so the natural physis of the human hypostasis when deified, comes to re-cognise its true condition in the Ātmanic reality. Just as in the Christ there were two natures and wills which did not indicate a division of natures and wills but a united consciousness and being, where the material nature deified in the Logos becomes conformed to the divine nature and will, so in the human hypostasis the natural physis deified experiences a single consciousness and experience. While there seems to be an apparent discontinuity between the Ātmanic metaphysical condition and the individualistic distinction of the concrete and unique person, there is in the re-cognised unity, simultaneity of both. Hence there is a need to qualify both the terms hypostasis, which cannot stand by itself in its indicating difference, and Ātman which also cannot stand by itself outside of the human condition due to phenomenal manifestation. As a result, in the Ātman-hypostasis both terms are reconciled in a single model of person.

4.4.3 Ātman and Paramātman

The notion of Ātman correlates to the essential reality of the human being, which has been understood in this thesis as indicating a certain amount of non-difference but is not equal to the Paramātman (Godhead). While the Ātman is similar to the Paramātman in relation to its nature, it can be considered different according to measure and capacity. The model of the Godhead (Paramātman) in Dionysius provides a context to better understand the Ātman in human beings from an ontological perspective. The Godhead is expressed in terms of a “Super-Essential Godhead”⁶⁴ (ὁ θεός ὑπερούσιος).⁶⁵ This implies that a supreme unity is evident in the divine Super Essence, but which is also understood as beyond the human nature

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⁶¹ These qualities are described by Pseudo-Dionysius (DN, 2.11, 649B; translation by Rolt) as related to the Supreme Godhead, but these qualities also can be attributed to the notion of Ātman in a proportional context as being like that of the Godhead yet reduced in measure as a small pond may be compared to an infinite ocean where all the characteristics are present but not the same in dimensions or existence.

⁶⁴ Rolt, Dionysius the Areopagite, p.4.

⁶⁵ Pseudo-Dionysius, DN, 2.11, 649B.
(physis) and thus above the human essential reality (ousia). This notion of a beyond state, beyond the Ātman, allows the Ātman to remain as the metaphysical bridge to the divine and yet this model also retains a certain sense of the divine reality being beyond the human condition. The prefix ὑπερ denotes a higher ousia, beyond the ordinary human experience, and indicates that in the Trinity the highest Subject relates not to an outer existential character but a "Super-Essential Godhead". So too in the case of human personhood, the highest expression of subjective awareness is ultimately expressed as the Ātman through the particular hypostasis. The Ātman is the metaphysical ousia of the human soul, the highest reality of unity in human personhood, united completely with the hypostasis and not disconnected. Even though humans may believe they experience separation due to the influence of their fallen nature, this separation is reconciled through the fullness of hypostatic life.

It, the Absolute Essence, is Absolute consciousness and awareness and yet it is personally tri-hypostatic, united in its unity of being in the subject of that being, which is the Super Essence, having Super Essential consciousness and yet having differentiation in the characteristics of the Trinity. Thus the paradox of unity and difference in the divine allows for a model to be expressed in a similar way in the human being, where there is difference, individual characteristics, and yet a divine essence of that existence in the form of the Ātman. This remains unknown until the experience of deification, but this does not infer that there are ontologically different types of persons. The human person is of a generic type, having body and soul where the highest part of the soul is equated to the Ātman, and specifically existent as a unique person. This specificity has ordinary awareness and the possibilities of extraordinary awareness through developing an awareness of the true nature of hypostasis. Each person is capable of experiencing the simultaneity of both, but Christ reveals to each person this experience in many differing ways in an unfathomable activity.

Thus the Super Essence, correlated to the Paramātman, expresses the highest divine reality (Śiva), which in the human person is localised as a portion of the divine as an emanation of the Supreme Godhead, as Dionysius stated:
For bestowing upon all things and supernally infusing Its Communications unto the goodly Universe, It becomes differentiated without lose of Undifference; and multiplied without loss of Unity; from its Oneness it becomes manifold while yet remaining within Itself.66

The Ātman thus represents unity with the divine and yet also expressing difference in relation to measure, will and activity of the Absolute. This distinction is also made in Pratyabhijñā in the distinguishing of tattvas or principles in the divine; which represents models moving from sameness, to this-ness and that-ness as shown in Chapter 3.4, where it was shown, how non-difference is related to difference even in the context of unity with the divine being. From this movement in the divine being, movement comes from God to the created universe through vimarśa67 or the aspect of divine consciousness by which the manifest universe is evident, while simultaneously unity is preserved in the Paramātmanic consciousness (of itself) in the manifested universe. Using Byzantine methodology unity within difference can be understood, in relation to the human person, as expressing a unity of being through the Ātman, as a portion of the divine as the “breath of God”68 and “mingled in an unseen way”69 with the divine, within hypostatic difference. This mingling represents unity-in-distinctiveness. The person who attains awareness of the highest reality, within the hypostasis, experiences an event of Ātman where the individual consciousness recognises its true reality of being and as such lives in an Ātmanic mode of hypostatic existence70 as a deified person.

67 See IPK, 1.42, p.18, which states that the divine awareness is the “essential character of consciousness being aware of himself...other wise Prakāśa even though bearing the appearance of an object, could almost be compared to some insentient element like crystal” (IPK, 1.5.11, Pandit). God’s power is not insentient, and thus a movement in the divine awareness becomes related outwardly as an aspect which humans in their ignorant state understand as the created world. The vimarśa is the second tattva or sakti-tattva (see IPKp, p.156) and the existential awareness of the Absolute reality.
69 See Ibid., 453A.
70 This term is borrowed from Zizioulas’ term mode of hypostatic existence, see BC, p.50, which will include the term Ātman within a context of deification.
4.4.4 Possibilities of Person

The context of Ātman, in relation to a model of hypostasis, indicates the spiritual reality within a concrete person, and will not be equated with a single entity or metaphysical reality that overwhelms the natural physis of the individual or paśu. It will be equated with the highest reality of being and cognition of person, while allowing for mundane cognitions. In this schema of Ātman and hypostasis within a single person, there will be affirmed a simultaneous condition of double willing, consciousness and being within a single person, where in the deified person both aspects are united.

Through a unifying condition the sense of person, puruṣa/hypostasis, is altered in the inclusion of the term Ātman to indicate the possibilities of a change of awareness and transformation of being through grace rendered in the deifying activity of the divine. This activity is also correlated to the union of natures in the hypostatic union of Christ, which allows for deification on a cosmic level while in the pre-Incarnation era this can be said to have been facilitated in the few by the activity of the Parampuruṣa or the Logos. Such activities can be said to be evident in such traditions as Pratyabhijñā and the Byzantine due to the divine economy. Through the Byzantine model it can be argued that after the Christ hypostasis such divine activities were expanded to include not only a few ascetics but all persons. The fallen nature itself is wholly restored and thus the experience of deification is open to all persons and therefore the experience of the Ātmanic nature in the hypostasis, through the hypostatic union. Maximus stated:

> for the incarnation is an effective demonstration of both nature and the economy, I mean of the natural logos of what has been united, confirming the mode of the hypostatic union and 'instituting afresh the natures', without change or confusion.\(^1\)

The hypostatic Ātmanic experience has become available to the whole human race, for each person now, has in the Ātman-hypostasis the potentiality of experiencing this reality in the Christ. Before the Christ there was a distinction between the paśu (beast) and the pati (the realised master) which has been rectified. This distinction was made

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\(^1\) Maximus, Opusc.3, 48.C (Louth).
in the *Iṣvapratyabhijñākārikā*, which argued that someone who experiences non-difference in the enlightened condition is called a *pati*, while the one who is "under the effects of delusion...is called a *paśu* (a bound being)".\(^{72}\) The biological or natural condition of the *paśu* is distinguished by a covering of *māyā* (illusion), or *ānava-mala* (covering of self, limitation), or the "defilement of finitude".\(^{71}\) This biological condition, equated to Zizioulas' notion of "hypostasis of biological existence",\(^{74}\) has a mode of existence that is separated from God and contrasts to a relational person or a "hypostasis of ecclesial existence".\(^{75}\) This ecclesial existence represents a soteriological type of life highlighted in the *Ātman-hypostasis*, where grace allows access to the divine life, and where the *Ātman-hypostasis* indicates the potentiality for communion in the relationship with the divine. This is not possible through the natural *physis* of the biological individual alone, but becomes open to all persons through the *hypostatic union*. Inherent in the word *hypostasis*, are the possibilities of *deification* within the human person through the sharing of an underlying stasis (standing) of *being*, where the *Ātmanic* experience becomes open to the *hypostasis* in the experience of this stasis through the Christ *hypostasis*.

The *Ātman-hypostasis* model clarifies the natural condition and explains that what is happening in the body condition in *deification* is a transformation of *physis* within the *hypostasis*. There are not two types of *hypostases*, which are inferred in Zizioulas model,\(^{76}\) one of the biological and another of the ecclesial, but a single *hypostasis* with two natures, where the higher transforms the lower through the *hypostatic union*. The *hypostatic union* unites the natural human *physis* to the *Ātmanic* on an individual level and also on a cosmic level, for all.

The possibilities of person, allows *deification* to represent the true ontological condition of the person, whether through a soteriological or through an eschatological context, which informs the person (*hypostasis*) of its true nature. Within this experience, the individual reality is not to be considered unreal, it is not *māyic* (illusionary), but real and yet the truest condition of the individual is understood

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\(^{71}\) *IPKp*, p.173.

\(^{74}\) Zizioulas, *BC*, p.50.

\(^{75}\) Ibid.

\(^{76}\) Ibid.
through a deified or Ātmanic mode of hypostatic existence. This position allows for a paradoxical model of person, reconciling deification/re-cognition and concrete material existentiality, of the metaphysical Ātmanic reality and the real world. The flexibility of Byzantine and Pratyabhijñā tradition in allowing antinomic models can be appropriated in the development of an Ātman-hypostasis model of person in which the human person experiences in the body, an Ātmanic event in the soul. This event results in the experience of deification/re-cognition, which involves human restoration, participation of and within the hypostatic being where the telos of human personhood is experienced within an event of the inner being. This ontological Ātmanic event can also be correlated to the inner eschaton and to the outer revelatory eschata where the final restoration of human personhood is experienced by some persons whilst alive but yet promised for all persons (in a soteriological context) in the eschatological restoration of all things. In terms of deification/re-cognition, the eschaton or inner event can be understood in terms of the completion of being in the now.

The inner event also relates to the outer hypostatic existence and is not only a single experience, but reveals the true cognitive subject, the true ‘I Am’, where the experient (pramātr) becomes aware of the true nature of his or her existence in a single event revealing a true awareness in Ātman consciousness. This event flows continuously in time revealing a unity of being throughout time, which also affirms the place for revelatory and soteriological multiplicity, yet having unity with the divine. In this experience of unity of hypostatic existence in the essential reality of being (or Ātman) the conscious subject moves from an ordinary experience to a maximalist or completed awareness in a perfected ontological condition in the telos of personhood. Perfection can be called the true state intended for humanity through the fullness (plerōma/pūrṇa) of being where the fullness of the Ātman-hypostasis is re-cognised as non-different to the divine as far as possible in the human person.

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77 Related to a Christ event, see Zizioulas, BC, p.130; see also Collins, Trinitarian Theology West and East.

78 Though Pratyabhijñā does not have a theology of restoration to speak of, it does distinguish between what is experienced as a paśu (understood to be a bound soul, jīva/purusa) a finite experience as compared to a pāti (lord) who has an infinite experience in the realisation of aham idam (“I am this”) or “I am Śiva”. see IPK, 4.1-6, pp.70-71.

79 For a good account of the comparison of plerōma and pūrṇa see Bettina Bäumer and John R. Dupuche, Void and Fullness.
The notion of fullness can be considered as a consequence of the divine will (thelima/icchā) and act (or operation, energeia/kriyā-Śakti), and in the Byzantine tradition as already stated, due to the hypostatic union.\(^{80}\) Another way of putting it, is that through Pratyabhijñā, because of the doctrine of āḥhāsavādu, in which the universe as the luminous expression of the divine is the outward manifestation of Cit (divine consciousness);\(^{81}\) the human person as a manifestation of the divine, is to be considered in truth nothing other than this (Ālmanic) perfection. This divine will to perfect creation, which is actually perfection but not re-cognised as such, is reflected to the concept of principles (logoi/tattvas),\(^{82}\) which makes perfection or fullness (pleroma/pūrṇa) possible.\(^{83}\) This notion of perfection of the hypostasis (person), becoming aware of his or her true condition, of the recovery of the perfect telos of each person is not merely an eschatological ideal, but can be considered within the immanent now. All that a hypostasis (person) should be is already attained in the fullness of the eternal Ālmanic condition. This idea of the paradox of simultaneous being and becoming is to be understood in relation to the fullness of the divine (“One”)\(^{84}\) who has fulfilled, fulfils, and continues to fulfil all at the same time, restoring all things to itself, to its divine perfection\(^ {85}\) simultaneously.

In this context, Maximus argued that the perfection to be wrought for everything by the Logos is already existent as the potentiality of that perfection, as the logos of perfection (as far is possible) in each hypostatic being.\(^ {86}\) This potentiality or potency

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\(^{80}\) Example of see Maximus, Thal.60, 73.

\(^{81}\) See IPK, 4.1, p.70.

\(^{82}\) The relating of the notion of logos to principles in the context of Pratyabhijñā has already expressed, but see Pseudo-Dionysius, DN, 709D; and Maximus, Ambig, 7, 1077C-1084D.

\(^{83}\) This possibility of fullness or perfection is summed up in Śrī Ṛṣipanisad, “Om that which is perfect is perfect, the perfect arises from the perfect, when the perfect is taken away from the perfect, the perfect alone remains”, Śrī Pūrṇīmatā, pūrṇam pūrṇam pūrṇam pūrṇam pūrṇam pūrṇam.

\(^{84}\) Where Pseudo-Dionysius stated that “the name One means that God is uniquely all things through the transcendence of one unity and that he is the cause of all without even departing from that oneness”, “Ev de, ὥσιν ἑνιαῖοι ἐστὶν κατὰ μίας ἑνότητος ὑπεροχὴν, καὶ πάντων ἑστὶν τὸν ἑνὸς ἄνεξαρτήτως ἀνίκητος ἀξίων, DN, 13.2, 977C-977D, translation by Luibheid, Pseudo-Dionysius, p.128.

\(^{85}\) “Within its total unity it contains part and whole, and it transcends these too and is antecedent to them. This perfection is found in the imperfect as the source of their perfection. But it also transcends perfection, and in the perfect it is manifest as transcending and anticipating their perfection”, ὥσιν καὶ κτέρος καὶ ὅλον ἐν ἑνωθησθεῖσιν ἁρμόσθω, καὶ ὑπερέχωσθαι, καὶ ἐπερέχωσθαι, τελειά μὲν ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς ὀρθέοις, ὡς τελείας ἐτέλεις δὲ ἐν τοῖς τελείοις, ὡς ὑπερέχει καὶ ὑπερτελείοις, see Pseudo-Dionysius, DN, 2.10, 646C, translation by Luibheid, Pseudo-Dionysius, p.65.

\(^{86}\) See chapter 2B of this thesis which cites Maximus notion of deification see Thal.6, 69-71.
(δυνάμει) comes to be fulfilled through the grace of the hypostatic Logos, transforming being. In this transformation and perfection, the person attains a state of "likeness" within the human hypostasis who, as the "image" of the God, experiences an awareness of the divine within a Cid-ātmanic mode of existence. In this experience the hypostasis comprehends existence through a cognitive knowledge gained in the experience of Ātman, or jñāna. This is not mere ordinary or natural awareness or knowledge (vidyā), but true knowing. In this condition the state of perfection is cognised within oneself as the Self (Ātman) for the logos of perfection in each person allows the individual to enter into a state of becoming as a "portion of God", through the potency and grace of the Logos, where a uniting to the Logos brings perfection.

The concept of fullness is also exemplified in the works of Gregory of Nyssa who utilised a paradoxical model so that fullness comes to indicate incomprehensibility. The notion of unknowing-knowing allows for an antinomic model through a notion of apophasis in a mystical unknowing-knowing where in that experience epistemological constructs fail. God makes perfect all things even though the world seems imperfect, where God unites all things to this perfection. Another way of considering this position is in terms of love. Dionysius stated that "out of love he has come down to be at our level of nature and has become being". He is also beyond being and human comprehension where his "fullness was unaffected by that inexpressible emptying of self". Dionysius stated:

87 Ibid.
88 Maximus, Ambig. 7, 1077B.
89 Ibid., 1084C-D, translation by Blowers, On the Cosmic Mystery of Christ, p.58-59.
90 Concerning this relationship of the experience of deification grace Maximus stated: "By his gracious condescension God became man and is called man for the sake of man and by exchanging his condition for ours revealed that elevates man to God... by this blessed inversion, man is made God by divinization" (Ibid).
91 See Gregory of Nyssa, V.Mos., 376C. For an examination of plerōma see L. G. Patterson, 'Pleroma: The human plenitude, from Irenaeus to Gregory of Nyssa', SP (2001), pp.529-540.
92 See Pseudo-Dionysius DN, 7.3, 872A; also see 'Divine Unknowing', in Hans Urs von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy, p.91.
93 For a contemporary Byzantine correlation of fullness to unknowing, see Yannaras, On the Absence and Unknowability of God.
94 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN, 2.10, 646D; translation by Luibheid, Pseudo-Dionysius, p.65. Note in Luibheid’s translation Chapter 2.10 of the ‘Divine Names’ has been incorrecled placed at page number 648C-D of Patrologia Graeca (PG 3), however the correct page number is 646, and then Chapter 2.11 continues on page 649
95 Ibid., 2.10 646D; translation by Luibheid, Pseudo-Dionysius, p.65.
He transcends the unity which is in beings. He is indivisible multiplicity, the unfilled overfullness which produces perfects and preserves all unity and all multiplicity. Furthermore, since there are many who are by his gift raised, so far as they can be, to divinization, it would seem that here there is not only differentiation but actual replication of the one God.96

In the notion of the perfection of being the Subject of perfection is not the individual experient but the conscious reality by which union takes place, which when united with the ordinary experient, unites the nature, will and awareness of the divine with the experient.97 It is the divine who becomes the experience amid differentiation as Dionysius stated. "He remains one, nothing less than himself. He remains one amid the plurality, unified throughout the procession, and full amid the emptying act of differentiation".98

4.5 Concerning Consciousness

The context of Ātman within hypostasis allows not only for a substantiality of the soul as stated in part 4.4.2, but awareness within this condition. This qualifies the monist implications of Ātman through divine consciousness (Cit), where the ‘knowing person’ indicates not just the divine active awareness within the soul but also allows a sense of rational person to extend within and through the divine awareness. In the Byzantine theology of Gregory of Nyssa, the soul was related to a vital faculty having three varieties; that without perception; perception without the reasoning activity; and third being rational and extensive throughout the whole faculty.99 The soul, which is

96 ὑπὲρ τὸ ἔν. τοὺς ὑπὸν ἔν. καὶ πλὴθος ἀμέρες, οἷα πλὴν ἐορτοὶ ὑπερπλήξ. πᾶν ἔν καὶ παράγων, καὶ τελειοῦν, καὶ συνέχου. Πάλιν τῇ ἐς αὐτοὶ θεώσει, τῷ κατὰ δύναμιν ἐκάστοτε θεοίδει θεόν πολλῶν γιγνομένων. (ibid.). 2.11, 649C; translation by Luibheid, Pseudo-Dionysius, p.67.
97 Or pramātā “is the knowing subject which is distinguished from known object (prameya), and the Supreme Pramātā is Paramāśīra, the divine conscious Lord, for whom the entire universe is His subjective Self”. See Pandit, IPkP, p.226. The PBH shows that the nature of the pramātā is māyā in that its consciousness is citta or individual consciousness, stating in Sūtra 6 of PBH: “The māyā-pramātā consists of it (i.e. Cittā)”, तम्यो मयायप्रमाताः, tanmayo māyā-pramātā; translation by Singh, p.62.
98 Pseudo-Dionysius, DN, 2.11, 649B; translation by Luibheid, Pseudo-Dionysius, p.67.
intellectual and rational for Gregory is a “living operation” (ἔνεργεια ζωτικῆ), which allows existing to be expressed through the faculties of reason. This in turn allows for many types of rational expressions, including an awareness of Ātmanic operations. The allowing for two types of awareness within the person, one of re-capitulated consciousness, as discussed in Chapter 2.9, and a mundane consciousness, both united within a single deified person, does not indicate a bipolar person but that through deification the whole person experiences both aspects within a united construct. While before deification there can be said to be manifest a fracture of cognitive states, in deification this fracture is rendered whole through the operations of the Christ.

Within the Ātman-hypostasis, consciousness is thus expressed through the mundane faculties and the higher faculties, which are united, in varying degrees, within a person. In the highest awareness, the Ātmanic faculty unites within the whole person a sense of perfection and completion. Again a way to better understand the human model, can be provided through the Christological, where there was evident a uniting of natures within the whole Christ. The awareness of Christ reflects this unity within a double schema where the rational soul of Christ is expressed through the natural willing of his earthly and human natures but which are also united. In the same way in the perfected person, there is evident a double rationality, of the natural condition and that of the Ātmanic within a single personal awareness, where the higher informs the lower. This informing, for most, is on a level not observed as the Ātmanic reality and consciousness can never be divorced from the individual soul in which it resides, but constantly acts and wills in the individual until the individual comes to experience that perfection through grace. It can even be attested that without the Ātman, mundane consciousness would not be possible for it is this out flowing of ‘I Am’ that is the operation that becomes the finite ‘I am’, and constitutes a pattern of the divine awareness within. It is because the Ātman is not merely a static metaphysical substance but having pure awareness (vimarśa), or true subject awareness, that this awareness implicitly relates to the individual subject and awareness. As such, in the Ātman-hypostasis model there is a perfect union of both the particular characteristics of the unique person and particular awareness, and of the Ātmanic consciousness. It

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100 Hom. Opif. 15, 177A.
101 This simultaneity of being and consciousness is expressed in the Śiva Śūtra, 1.1, which states cutumāyamātāmā, चत्तन्यमातिम, which indicates that the Ātman has as its nature, consciousness
is the incarnational grace that allows the gulf between the two points of awareness to be unified, and mirroring a pattern of Trinitarian awareness and being in specific and unified conditions.

The subjective unique and particular characteristics or persons of the Trinity which have their set roles, indicates a consciousness that is specific to each in that role¹⁰² and yet they have a united consciousness due to their Paramāṭmanic nature in relation to the Godhead. This highlights a model in which distinctiveness (or difference) is evidenced in a united being (of the Godhead), especially highlighted in the two wills of the Christ.¹⁰³ Unity is maintained through the shared nature which is not a static substance or an impersonal mass of being, but is personal, that is, it is the Self-aware essential divine reality having its own consciousness (Cit). This may seem to affirm that there are two types of consciousness, one relating to each specific divine hypostasis and one of the divine substance. But this is not the case for consciousness in divine hypostatic difference is non-different to the united consciousness of the divine essential nature. The nature of the consciousness of this non-different otherness is expressed, in Pratyabhijñā terms, through the light of its own consciousness (prakāśa), which is the united consciousness of otherness and becomes the true consciousness of human otherness. The understanding of the nature of this sense of unity within the consciousness of hypostatic difference or otherness becomes very important when translating this model into the human condition. In the human state there are two consciousnesses within a single person, one pertaining to the mundane consciousness of the deluded state in the natural ‘I am’, and the other of the inner divine consciousness. This inner awareness comes to be accessed through the deified state where the person comes to re-cognise his or her true consciousness in the Ātmanic or deified condition.

expressed in the most profound of ways. This profundity indicates that in the individual selves the natural consciousness is an awareness of a deluded or unnatural condition when compared to that of the Ātman which is the purest expression of consciousness. This unnatural condition to the human person put upon human beings in Byzantine theology as consequence of the fall, represents a limited consciousness or a consciousness of bondage. This is why in the second sūtra of the SS, 1.2, it states, ज्ञानं बन्ध्यः: "शानं ज्ञानं बन्धः (knowledge is bondage), that is all knowledge that does not relate to the Ātman is bondage. This then leads on to a description of how to gain that experience through the practice of yoga. In the Byzantine tradition this practise is called hessychasm. ¹⁰² Of the Unbegotten (γεγονητος), the Begotten (γεγονότος), and that which comes from the Father (καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον, see Gregory Nazianzen, Or.29.767C). ¹⁰³ See Maximus Opse.3.45C-48B (Louth).
In *deification*, the higher awareness overcomes the sense of separation in the natural *physis* not accomplished by the natural *physis*, through grace, which unifies difference to itself through the activity of Ātman. In relation to divine participation through *deification/re-cognition* with the Christ *hypostasis*, the human person attains a true *self*-identity gained within an Ātmanic awareness. As Utpala stated:

For this very reason the Self has been defined as Consciousness as the activity of awareness, in order to express its independent authority with respect to the activity of becoming conscious. This difference accounts for its being different from an insentient entity.  

The notions of *deification/re-cognition* indicate a *noetic* cognition which goes beyond the natural knowing and willing of the human person and allows the person (*hypostasis/purusə*) to understand the nature of his/her true *being* and existence. This cognition reveals a change not only of knowing but of *being* and understood in both traditions through the relationship of *being*, act and consciousness. The Supreme Person,  

through God’s will (*thelima/icchā*), and power (*dynamis/Śakti*), manifests creation (*ābhāsas*) and then brings creation and human persons (*hypostases/purusas*), through God’s activity (*ēvēryca/kriyā-Śakti*), back to God’s own personal being. This return constitutes a change in conscious awareness, which in turn reveals not only the true nature of *being* but a relational context of the divine to the world.

4.5.1 Self-Awareness

In the Ātman-*hypostasis* the question ‘who am I’ becomes resolved, as highlighted throughout the thesis, not in the natural *physis* or the natural consciousness, but where difference (or *hypostasis*) and unity (or Ātman) are expressed simultaneously: ‘I am’ because Thou (God) are. ‘I am’ who ‘I am’ but at the same time ‘I Am’ in the highest awareness ‘That’. There is within the Ātman-*hypostasis* reflected capabilities of the divine Paramātmanic awareness in ‘I Am That’ (*being*). This is expressed in a

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104 IPK, 1.43, p.18, आत्मन एव शैलन्य पित्रिक्याचतिलकृतातात्मय्योपिन्स्तते ज्ञात्स हि विलक्षणः.  

105 In Neo-Vedāntic models person is indicated in the term *Sat-Purusə*, see Śrī Aurobindo, *The Life Divine*. *Sat* indicates both truth and *being*. See also the *Katha Upanisad* (1.3.11).
revelatory context, in relation to the other, to difference or human persons, so as to show that human personhood does not exist in isolation. This relational context to human personhood allows the other to come to understand his or her true awareness. This true awareness cannot be anything other than, in the highest state, reflected within ‘I am-Thou’ consciousness.

The natural condition deified, is expressed in difference as ‘I am’ other than the divine, and then as ‘Thou’, to qualify difference in divine unity. If this were not the case, there would be no expression of the divine ‘I Am’ within, but a closed and isolated ‘I’, or it would be expressed in a close monist context. The declaration to the other of the divine ‘I Am’, represents not only ‘I Am’ here whilst you are there, but highlights that gulf between the two is resolved in an inner event. Through participation in deification the divine ‘I Am’ is disclosed in an event of revelation to the natural ‘I am’ of the human person. Through this inner event, the individual comes to understand his or her true ‘I AM’ through an Ātmanic event, which is the consequence of the divine commune. The revelatory dynamic of this event experienced within the person allows, within the context of human personhood, a resolution of Ātman with hypostasis so as to come together within the person in a homogenised context. If there were no inner revelation but just created beings distinct and divorced from the divine, then there could be no Ātman-hypostasis but just isolated individuals. It is because of the divine revelatory activity that the broken ontological condition of the human person is made whole.

Through this healing of the human condition the human consciousness becomes intimately related to the divine, otherwise human beings could only attain an awareness of the divine, a knowing about God as phenomena outside of the human condition, which is no disclosure at all. Hence in the Ātmanic event there is a disclosure of the true nature of being within the hypostasis, where the natural mode of existence is transformed into an Ātmanic mode of existence.
4.5.2 Cid-ātmanic Mode of Hypostatic Existence

It is because as discussed above, the Ātmanic condition has a rational element within the hypostasis, that the mode of existence of the perfected hypostasis has to include this dynamic through the inclusion of the world Cit. This implies that the mundane consciousness, citta, becomes transformed into a divine pattern, Cit. Hence such a person can be said to live within a Cid-ātmanic mode of existence and a true conscious awareness, where the nature of being is attained and experienced whilst in the body.

The finite individual is moved from a natural mode of existence to a higher mode. The words, the ‘individual is moved’, implies that movement is not self-caused, but as a consequence of the divine mover. The notion of mode also allows an existential relation to being, where the inner ontological dynamic of the Ātmanic experience reflects outwardly and allows for a type of existence that reflects the Ātmanic condition. In this condition, particular characteristics of the hypostasis are not dissolved but perceived through the lens of unity. This mode itself, in expressing specificity, also allows the Ātmanic condition to be expressed for without the hypostatic condition, the Ātman could not be known, for otherwise who would be the knower of the known?

Both conditions of difference and non-difference are needed to express inner being and outer existing, so that being, true being and existing are unified within a mode of being and existing. It is not the outward changing individual existence that provides stability to an existing person, but the unchangeable reality within. Conversely the Ātman is experienced through the hypostasis, and by itself would only be a lump of insentient metaphysical stuff, hence both aspects are needed.

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106 As Utpala argued that the “only the interior existence of phenomenon entities is their eternal existence, because they are one with pure Consciousness. Their existence is an exterior phenomenon as well, because they are brought into outward manifestation by māyā”, IPK. 1.84, p.34.

vinmayaśvabhāsasannāntarev sthititam. mañjya bāsmanānām bāhārayitaṁ bāhir api asau”, translation by Pandit. IPKp. 1.8.7, p.84.
The \textit{Atman-hypostasis} also mirrors the divine mode of existence exemplified in the \textit{Paramātmanic-hypostases} of the Trinity where unity is expressed through difference in the individual characteristics of the divine \textit{hypostasis}. A mode of material existing through unity is also more easily shown through Christ, who indicates a \textit{way} a human person should live. This \textit{way} indicates that Christian life there is a casting away of the \textquote{old life} (the natural \textit{physis}), which was as consequence of the \textit{Fall} in a unity of existence in the \textit{Atmanic} condition. In this mode of life, each person becomes \textquote{a new creation; the old has gone, the new has come...so that in him we might become the righteousness of God} (2 Cor.5:17, 21), where the lower is transformed in a higher mode of life. The righteousness of God here refers to the restoration\footnote{As Irenaeus stated, \textquote{\textit{Adam and his wife eve being expelled from Paradise, fell into much trouble and tribulation, wandering around the earth with much sorrow and hard labour groaning}}, \textit{P.Ap.} 17, 671 (Mekerttschian).} of the natural \textit{physis} to its intended condition, which is an \textit{Atmanic} condition within the \textit{hypostasis}. Irenaeus stated:

Because the created man was placed upon the earth as one having the divine image and that he might be living, he breathed in his face the breath of life that, both by his creation, man might be like God.\footnote{Irenaeus, \textit{P.Ap.} 11, 667 (Mekerttschian).}

In the restored state of communion with the divine, as previously experienced in paradise,\footnote{\textit{P.Ap.} 16, 671 (Mekerttschian).} the natural condition and consciousness attains a \textit{type} of existence, where a spiritual life of \textquote{like} with God and indicates a similar nature and consciousness \textit{akin} to the divine pattern. This previous condition of perfection indicates that the perfection is already attained in Paradise and all that is necessary, is a \textquote{reconciliation between God and man}\footnote{See Irenaeus, \textit{P.Ap.} 16, 671 (Mekerttschian), where Irenaeus refers to a perfected state of \textquote{man} who fell from this perfection.} established in Christ. Thus the \textit{Atman-hypostasis} model of person indicates a kind of life, or a mode of existence, which is exemplified in the Christ \textit{Paramātman-hypostasis}, where both material existence and absolute metaphysical consciousness are united and not divided. To be a true person, is thus to live in \textit{Atmanic} consciousness within a \textit{Cid-ātmanic} mode of \textit{hypostatic} existence, which is not only for the few, but afforded to all in the salvific activity of Christ. The
question arises, what is the nature of cognition within the Cid-ātmanic mode of hypostatic existence?

When considering the dynamic activity of the divine reality within the human condition, conceptual knowledge becomes expansive and also relative where the subject who knows, “this is” and “this is seen by me”,\textsuperscript{112} and understands the difference between the relative ‘I am’ awareness and objectified manifestation due to a sense of limited ‘I-ness’. But where does this consciousness originate from? Not from its own natural physis, but from a higher awareness shining from the highest part of the soul (Ātman), which allows the individual awareness to attain a Cid-ātmanic mode of hypostatic existence and thereby attain a unified awareness in difference. In this mode of existence the awareness that all subjects and objects have at their core, is experienced as ultimately “non-different from the interior I-consciousness”.\textsuperscript{113}

In the Cid-ātmanic mode of hypostatic difference, a person moves away from a limited consciousness to a divine mode of life. While a limited conditioned individual existence experiences lower modes of existence and cannot attain the higher mode of existence without divine grace, the Cid-ātmanic mode of existence implies that in difference a unified state is experienced. This unifying state is not divorced from the lower modes even though mundane consciousness in these modes is unable to perceive the innate perfection unifying those modes. Through the perfecting activity of unity within the differing states of mundane existence the lower consciousness is raised to a sattvic or pure life, which allows the individual consciousness to experience an awareness of the Ātmanic state. The Cid-ātmanic mode of hypostatic existence does not negate the place for the lower consciousness but that through the unity of the Ātman both types of consciousness, both pure and impure states, are accepted in a model of unity-in-diversity. But such a unity within a higher consciousness is ultimately inevitable, where the force of the Ātmanic consciousness leads the human person to a state of perfection. This inevitability is due to the outward flowing of the consciousness of the Paramātman or the Supreme Godhead which not only accepts manifested phenomena but is the Cause of all phenomena.

\textsuperscript{112} This follows the argument of Utpala to identify the true Subject of knowing, see IPK, 1.31, p.13; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 1.4.8, p.46.
\textsuperscript{113} Utpaladeva, IPK, 2.24, p.46; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 2.3.9, p.127.
4.6 Concerning Relationality

Throughout this work the notion of relationality within the context of personhood has been considered in relation to Zizioulas’ model, but what does relationality truly indicate? In Zizioulas’ model relationality is juxtaposed to a sense of communion and a mode of existence which indicates an intimate space between two subjects (persons) or between subject and object (God and human persons). But it is unclear as to what connects the subject-to-subject or subject-to-object by which a bond of relationality is established. Hence Zizioulas’ recourse was to diminish the separation between two concrete individuals by stressing that the subjects or persons can have an interrelated mode of existence established through the ontological condition of communion.\(^{114}\)

The person or hypostasis enters into an existential becoming through a mode, which allows the hypostasis to re-cognise his or her true mode of being through an ecclesial communion. Zizioulas’ model is also based upon Byzantine Trinitarian relationality, where Zizioulas interprets being, through a communion of hypostases that participates in a certain existential mode of existence.\(^{115}\) This existential approach to relationality, through the language of mode or tropos of existence, while breaking down the sense of autonomous self within the limited consciousness of the human individual revealing a higher communion, limits the revelation of the true self to an outer act in communion. This reveals not the inner reality of the true Self (Ātman) or the real subject awareness but just the activity or mode by which being is to be fathomed.

Consequently, through the Ātman-hypostasis, this position is rectified in that the ontological reality of being a essential person, as well as existing in a certain conscious awareness, and is affirmed through the Ātmanic reality in the Ātman-hypostasis model. Being is not only interpreted as a material condition of being here or there in relation to other persons, but has a metaphysical dimension of being the conscious Ātman within the bodily life. The notion of consciousness adds to the Ātmanic condition of being relative to the other, or hypostasis, within a hypostasis by affirming that in the state of true being an awareness of being allows the state of being to be fully understood. The Ātman is not predicated to a metaphysical substance of the

\(^{114}\) BC, pp.16-50.
\(^{115}\) Ibid.
hypostasis, but becomes the true consciousness of the hypostasis. In a relational context the conscious movement from the inner reality to the outer existence indicates the true nature of a relational bond where all relationality has as its fixed point, the Atmanic reality within the hypostatic existence. The nature of the relationship of the Atman to the hypostasis is uncovered in the Atman-hypostasis model which points to how being and existence come together in a united sense of person.

Relationality implies a sense of participation and sharing of a common life, which shall be correlated not to the outer hypostatic life, but also the inner life. The person experiences relationality with the divine nature, because of the inner nature of the human person. Just as in the Cappadocian model, as shown in Chapter 2 of this thesis, relational participation can be Atman correlated to a sense of what is shared or a communion through the notion of ousia, so this model can be transferred to the Atmanic. In the same way Basil of Caesarea referred to a "community of substance" (οὐσίαν κοινότητος) to underline the unity within the divine hypostases through the common sharing of an essential nature, so too a communion through hypostases can be applied in the same way. This provides the focal point in the relationality of hypostases. In this type of relationality, the distinctiveness (or differences) of the individual characteristics of the persons, as in the Trinity, are not diminished or confounded in that unity, but experience an "inconceivable communion" through the essential nature. In this model hypostatic difference does not diminish the sense of unity, but allows unity to be expressed. In the same way that it is impossible to conceive of difference without considering unity in the divine condition, so too human hypostases cannot be considered outside of the Atmanic nature which binds those hypostases together.

116 See Basil, Ep. 38, 332D-333A (Deferrari).
117 Basil stated: "In like manner he who accepts the father virtually accepts along with the Him the Son and the Spirit also. For it is impossible in any manner to conceive of a severance or separation whereby either the Son is thought of apart from the the Father or the Spirit is parted from the Son; but there is apprehended among these three a certain ineffable and conceivable communion and at the same time distinction, with neither the difference between their persons disintegarting the continuity of their nature, nor this community of substance confounding the individual character of their distinguishing notes" (όωσαυτός δὲ καὶ ὁ τὸν πατέρα δεξάμενος καὶ τὸν Υἱὸν καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα συμπαρεδέχετο τῇ δύναμι. οὐ γὰρ ἐστιν ἐπινοηθαι τοις ἤ διαφερεσκεν κατ’ οὐδένα τρόπον. ὡς ἢ Υἱὸν χωρὶς πατρός νοηθαι. ἢ τὸ Πνεῦμα τοῦ Υἱοῦ διάξυσθαι· ἀλλὰ τις ἄρπητος καὶ ἀκατανόητος εὐ τούτως καταλαμβάνεται καὶ ἡ κοινωνία καὶ διάρκειας. οὕτε τῆς τῶν ὑποστάσεων διαφοράς. τὸ τῆς φυσικῆς συναγερμὸς. διασποράς. οὕτε τῆς κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν κοινότητος τὸ ἱδίαζον τῶν γνωρισμάτων ἀναχειρισθη). ibid.
The Ātman-hypostasis model also allows relationality to be expressed in terms of movements from the divine being to the world, which through the Ātmanic nature come also to be expressed in the human condition. Through the Ātman-hypostasis model there can be identified two types of relationality, which can be expressed in terms of a horizontal movement and that of a vertical movement. Each movement can also be related to the divine and human cases, intimately linking God to the world within that relationality. The horizontal movement takes place in the divine between the divine hypostases or Self-awareness expressed through ‘I Am’ and the nature of this awareness, the ousia or the Paramātmanic nature. In the human case through deification this horizontal movement within the person exists between the hypostasis existence and the Ātmanic. This movement can said to be unceasingly in effect due to the incarnational activity of the Supreme Puruṣa (Christ) and is due to the uniting of natures in the hypostatic union.

The relational context between the hypostatic existence of the human person and the Ātmanic reality indicates that an event of Ātman takes place within the hypostasis, indicating the possibilities of communion within the Ātman-hypostasis. Through the Ātman-hypostasis, the possibility of union in the human person mirrors the nature of divine perfection and harmonises the outer existential life with the inner reality. The vertical movement relates to the revelation of God to the world and in that descent, how human hypostases come to ascend to the divine through the horizontal or inner movement. This inner movement or state can be correlated to an ecstatic condition within the hypostasis indicating a reality by which the natural mode of individual existence changes to a Ātman-hypostatic existence.

However, this mode of existence is not the ontological basis for that existence but rather the Cid-ātmanic mode of existence is as a consequence to the ontological reality of being the Ātman. It is because of the conscious activity and will of this reality within the human existence that a mode of Ātmanic existence is possible in which a restoration of the human condition is established which provides the basis for all relational constructs. Within this understanding the person-to-person relational formula indicates not only my being here in relation to you being there existentially

118 An example of the use of ‘ecstasis’ can be found in Irenaeus’ P.Ap. 13, 669 (Mekerttschian), which denoted a deep sleep or mystical state, where Adam was placed into a deep sleep by God.
but that the notion of Almanic being underlines how and why the encounter between persons takes place.

The divine will behind the encounter between persons sets up an ontological condition, and an awareness of the inner spiritual reality, the "Atman, which makes apparent the limiting condition of human consciousness. This Atman is the force that binds any relational characteristic of hypostases existing within a relational mode of hypostatic existence. Consequently, the Almanic reality of the hypostasis gives the true significance of the encounter between persons. It indicates the importance of viewing the hypostasis not in isolation or in relation to other hypostases, but that hypostases are intimately related to each other because of the nature of being Almanic-hypostatic creatures, which allows a re-cognition of the Almanic nature of other persons, giving significance to the other.

4.6.1 Relationality and Otherness

A sense of relationality includes not only a dynamic of unity but also considers in a notion of difference, concrete existence, where the other as expressed as hypostatic other, is engaged with through an encounter or an "event of otherness". The concrete person meets the other, face-to-face which informs the person not only of the other but also in an "event of hypostasis", a space for reciprocity. This space for reciprocity becomes implicit to a notion of communion, especially in relation to the divine hypostases, which allows God to be considered in a Trinitarian context as "the Other". But where hypostatic difference underlines in the communion with the other, otherness through specificity, this represents only an outer context of otherness. In the context of the sharing of an inner reality, the shared nature becomes the true other. When correlated to the human model the true other becomes the Atman, which establishes an essential unity in otherness. Others then are related to moi not only

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119 Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness, p.49, which builds upon E. Levinas' otherness see, Time and the Other (Pittsburgh: 2000), p.74, in that it considers the relationship of persons in respect of other persons and not just the fact that a person exists with other persons.

119 E. Levinas, Time and the Other, pp.41, 79.

121 Ibid., p.52.

122 This is argued by Zizioulas, see Communion and Otherness, p.51, and pp.43-56.
because of a hypostatic value, but also because of the true value of the other, which is their Atmanic condition. Here the other can be viewed as the Atmanic other, where an inner context to otherness is established.

Through the model of Atmanic otherness, otherness becomes intrinsically related to being and becoming and is expressed through a mode of existence by which the other also comes to live within. Through this outward sign of hypostatic existing as true other, the Atmanic other is valued as the true person, while at the same time recognising the value of persons who also have the capability of becoming as Atmanic others. This perspective gives, within a person, a respect and love for the other as icons of divine other.

The outer hypostatic other comes to be viewed as the inner reflection of the divine other and thus also takes on a dynamic of non-difference through Atmanic otherness within hypostatic difference. This indicates the possibilities of Atmanic otherness through the Atman-hypostasis. When understanding Atmanic otherness in a relational context, Zizioulas' assumption that in the Greek Fathers, God can be referred to as the “Other par excellence” allows the Atman to be considered as the very nature of the other (person) which is the true ontological value of moi. In the encounter of other with Self, where the individual self has an encounter with the true other (or Atman), the self finds its own sense of being and becomes informed of itself and otherness. Being is not objectified but as the pure subject, reveals itself as the true other in the hypostasis in an event of Atman. The event of Atman then becomes an event of otherness within the hypostasis, which allows, in a relational encounter with the other, outward events of Atmanic otherness.

Yet this type of otherness is only possible because of the stress on a substantialist context highlighted in the divine context of ousia/Paramātman. Through the ousia/Paramātman, hypostatic otherness is not disconnected from specificity but rather allows otherness to be considered through unity. Consequently otherness comes

\(^{121}\) Ibid., p.51.
to be equated with the essential reality of the hypostasis as much as the hypostasis itself.

When correlating Paramātmanic otherness to human otherness, Ātmanic otherness relates to what is unified, where specificity relates to the other within a relational unified context. The sense of unity provided by the Paramātman on the human level, allows Ātmanic otherness to have an extrusive quality in relation to other hypostases. As in Pratyabhijñā, through the model of the Iśvara pramātā, or the extrusive activity of the divine in relation to the phenomenal universe, the extrusive aspect of the Ātman becomes localised as a particular hypostasis, but also experiences itself in relation to other hypostases. It is only when through deification or re-cognition that this Ātmanic other is understood as the true other, that the value of other becomes apparent, because the Ātman is the very nature of those hypostases, which is also consciousness (cid-ātman) and has "the capability of appearing diversely".

4.6.2 Relationality as Movements

The notion of Ātmanic otherness when applied to relationality, through the Ātman-hypostasis model, shows that a movement from non-difference to difference and then back to non-difference is evident. The divine overcomes difference through the act of revelation and highlights the paradox of transcendence (viśvarūpa) and immanence (viśvamaya), where there exists the simultaneous contradiction of fullness and emptiness (kenosis). The overcoming of this paradox can be understood in terms of a movement from the internal fullness of the Paramātmanic divine state of the introverted nimesa (lit., closing of the eye) condition in relation to the divine

124 See IPK 3.2-3, pp.59-60, which states that the Iśvara Subject is the exterior aspect of the Absolute (Pārāmeśvara).
125 विदात्मनि, IPK, 2.51, p.57.
126 Ibid.
127 This is examined by John R. Dupuche 'Themes of Light and Dark in the Greek Fathers', in Bettina Bäumer and John R. Dupuche, Void and Fullness, pp.171-185, who argues that the two positions are not incongruous.
unfolding (*unmeṣa*, lit., opening of the eye)\textsuperscript{128} of the created universe, as Utpala stated:

So the Ātman coming into the process of creation does not become enmeshed in any sort of diversity, although it is called different names (such as Paramāśiva, God or Paramātman). This is because these point toward one and the same end, (infinite) I-Consciousness.\textsuperscript{129}

This view is also similar to Maximus’ view that the *Logos* nature did not get polluted or confused by the fallen human nature in the *hypostatic* union but that the human nature was *deified* in that becoming.\textsuperscript{130} This represents an outpouring of divine *being*, in an emptying (*kenosis*) of the divine for the cosmos, but also represents a relational context in the human becoming through fullness, in the perfecting of the human condition in the experience of divine union (*deification*) through a movement of the divine to the world.

The relational movement from the divine *Paramātman* to the world indicates that there can be considered movements within a vertical descent, or relational categories of God to the world: firstly, in the creation of the world and secondly, in the bodily condition and encounter with the divine *hypostasis/puruṣa*. This allows for a relational context on a personal level, where each person experiences a personal encounter with God. Within this relationality a further category can be added where the person experiences, in the highest union, a further movement and union as the experience of *deification/re-cognition*. These movements from divine to the world begin with a movement within itself from the divine unmoving reality (*nimeṣa*) to the divine outward act (*unmeṣa*), which can be equated to a movement from the divine essence to the divine *hypostase*\textsuperscript{1}x. This movement then continues to manifest created phenomena and the creation of life, which can be correlated to Maximus’ notion of the divine “in-breathing”\textsuperscript{11} into Adam. This in-breathing was then correlated to the

\textsuperscript{128}See *IPK*, 3.3, p.60, which states that the *Īśvara* is the, “extroversion aspect of the Absolute and *Sadāśiva* is the introversion one, the former being known as *unmeṣa* and the latter as *nimeṣa*”.

\textsuperscript{129}Naḥānādhiparāmarśī bhedatvāyaḥyaḥ *bhavat* 1 *Aham śāntivatvāvastivastivatsaṁyaktvam* \textsuperscript{118}, nāhutādi- *parumāsa-bhedāḥ aśvayataṁavanah abham mrṣyatayaivāya srśte tin-vācyaya-karmavyah\textsuperscript{119}, *IPK* 1.48, p.20; translation by Pandit, *IPK*, 3.1.3, p.159.

\textsuperscript{130}See Maximus, *Opsc*. 3 (PG 91), 48A-56B (Louth).

\textsuperscript{11}See Maximus, *Ambig*. 42 (1316C); translation by Blowers, *On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ*, p.80.
incarnational life of Christ by Maximus, which allows human restoration. Maximus makes a direct correlation to the notion of in-breathing with the human person having the divine likeness and the soteriological activity of Christ stating that Christ himself received “the vital inbreathing of man”\textsuperscript{112} and thus receiving as man what was created in the divine image”.\textsuperscript{131} Through the divine in-breathing the divine imparts the essence of Himself, which allows a reciprocal inward return where the fullness of being is realised. In such a movement the context of relationality in the wish of the divine to engage in a relationship with human persons, becomes revealed, and shows that relationality should not only be considered in terms of outward hypostatic meetings but related to the inward Ātmanic experience.

4.6.3 Relationality and Awareness

Within the notion of the Ātman-hypostasis, relationality is not confined only to outward modes of hypostatic existences, but can be considered through an inward change of awareness through the relational encounter. This type of relationality is primarily indicated in the I-consciousness of the Ātman within the hypostasis which radiates outwards and manifests the outer limited ‘I-consciousness’ (aham). The true ‘I’ (aham) is not the individualistic and separated notion of individual but the deified ‘I’ of the hypostasis which becomes intrinsically relational to the Ātmanic ‘I’ or the true awareness. The Ātmanic ‘I’ reflects the true nature of its deified reality and in the hypostasis, while allowing a sense of difference, constitutes a relational movement of unity from the divine I-consciousness within the human to the individual awareness.

Through this awareness of Ātman, the individual experiences a shift in awareness in relation to other individuals, firstly, experienced as relativistic ‘I’, then as relational being as ‘I-thou’, and then as ‘I am-thou’. This corresponds to a movement from individual to hypostasis which allows a sense of a deeper being. Levinas argues that relationality, in the context of personal being, overcomes the dependency on static

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
being, of being there (Dasein),\textsuperscript{114} stating that the "epiphany of exteriority ... exposes the deficiency of the sovereign interiority of separated being."\textsuperscript{115} However a resolution of this deficiency is not really explored either as Levinas does not explore fully another ontological condition, of being as I should be (sein wie ich sollte) in relation to others being and the divine being. In this context a further movement can be explored in the Ātman-hypostasis, which resolves how being and existing can come together in allowing for outer condition to be qualified through the inner. The inability of the outward individual to convey a sense of what is true was conceded by Levinas in his recognising that the face cannot disclose interiority.\textsuperscript{116} The relationship and movement from the face to the interior condition indicates how hypostatic difference is resolved in the unity of Ātman while maintaining the concrete existence of the hypostasis.

This premise for relationality highlighted in the Ātman-hypostasis and the overcoming of separated exteriority through interiority, allows for simultaneity of both unity and difference, where specific personal existence and the essential reality of that existence are affirmed without negating either. Thus, a relationality of persons is not a relationality of isolated individuals who have something in common, whether in a context of being or in an existential context, but fundamentally infers cohesion through an essential reality of being that connects human persons with the divine and each other. In this sense relationality is a relationship of difference (otherness) with

\textsuperscript{114} That-being or existence. The notion of being there (Dasein) of Heidegger should be expanded into, "being here" as argued by Raymond Tallis, see I Am: A Philosophical Inquiry Into First-Person Being (Edinburgh: 2004), pp. 142-145, 190-191. Being there cannot be considered outside of a sense of the personal in which being is affirmed in a relational context, but not at the expense of understanding the subject. The cognate or person comes to understand himself/herself through his/her own sense of being which as an embodied existence is in context with other persons. Thus Levinas approach to otherness accepts the place of personal relationality face-to-face, the responsibility for the other and "proximity of neighbour". see Levinas, Otherwise than Being, pp. 121-129 where self-hood is not considered at the expense of the other.


\textsuperscript{116} Ibid. While the Levinas-Zizioulas schema, if we can refer to such a thing, establishes a bridge to overcome the static ontologies in the movement provided in the relationality of personal existing and the consequence of that existing in relation to other persons, the Ātman-hypostasis model qualifies this exterior notion of person. The task of Zizioulas is hindered by his inability to accept the role of physis in his equation, while Levinas’ task is closed in his inability to reach beyond the physics of the metaphysics and death (See, Emmanuel Levinas, Time and the Other, p.51). Levinas’ works have however helped to somewhat resolve the gulf of otherness by recognizing the importance of the personal relationship of persons “face-to-face” (See Emmanuel Levinas, Time and the Other, p.79) which overcomes the impersonalism of Dasein. Levinas’ model then has been transposed by Zizioulas into the Trinity, where otherness expresses an intimate intercommunicative reality. However, Zizioulas model, in bringing otherness into the ontological (trinitarian) debate to revise the existential context of individual through trinitarian personhood, has become a victim of the existentialist debate.
non-difference or the unity that connects the hypostatic others together in a unity of being and awareness through the Ātmanic condition. In this Ātmanic relational model difference expresses not separation but cohesion through unity and a model of unity-in-difference which shall be the subject of the last area discussed in relation to the Ātman-hypostasis.

4.7 Concerning Unity-in-Difference

In this last part of the thesis, the notion of Ātman is qualified through the Byzantine model of unity-in-difference or distinction. In the Byzantine tradition the way of viewing unity-in-difference or distinction has come to be understood as M. Törönen describes, within “a principle of simultaneous union and distinction... things united remain distinct and without confusion in an inseparable union”. In the Byzantine tradition there is a movement “from above” to the world which allows human persons to be deified and a movement to the divine “from below” and then a divine ascent. In the Byzantine tradition unity and distinction were expressed by highlighting an ontological gulf between the divine and human conditions, which was resolved through the hypostatic union of the Incarnation.

137 See IPK. 2.15, p.42, which states: “In this way the objects of a person desirous of mundane attainments are fulfilled - with the help of entities (in the world) that have (both) unity and diversity as their character. Such a thing is therefore not an illusion”, evam evārtha-siddhiḥ syāṁ mātṝ artha-kriyārthinaḥ bhedābheda-vatārthena tena na bhrāṁ ni ldrītāt, translation by Pandit, IPKp. 2.2.7. For an in depth examination of bhedābheda in Vedānta, see P. N. Srinivasachar, The Philosophy of Bhedābheda (Madras: 1996).

138 Pratyabhīṣā took up this model from Advaita Vedānta and incorporated ideas of Saivism of Kashmir, the three aspects of: abheda (unity), bheda (diversity), and bhedābheda (unity-in-diversity); see also J. C. Chatterji, Kashmir Saivism (Delhi: 2004). P.8. Alexis Sanderson shows that this view of unity and diversity was inherited, in the resurgent monism of the Trika of Kashmir Saivism expounded by Vasugupta, Abhinavagupta and Kṣemarāja, from the Mālini-vijayottaratantra, see Alexis Sanderson, “The Doctrine of the Mālini-vijayottaratantra”, in T. Goudriaan (ed.), In Ritual and Speculation in Early Tantrism: Studies in Honour of André Padoux (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992).

139 See M. Törönen, Union and Distinction in the Thought of St. Maximus the Confessor.


141 See Maximus Ambig. 42, 73.11, 1325B-C , where he argues that existence, the material and immaterial, is unified in the hypostatic union which unifies the world (difference), to the divine in the uniting of Christ’s natures, body and soul. This economic hypostatic union also represents a model by which union and difference are vouchsafed. Maximus stated “preserving the difference perfectly and its effects in respect of the natural logos, and again saving union, in the manner of the economy, firmly and hypostatically, so as to confirm the matters that essentially exist in the one and sole Christ God in accordance with the inseparable union”. OpSc. 7, 84B (Louth).
Conversely, in Pratyabhijñā philosophy, the notion of unity and difference or unity-in-difference was developed, not by considering difference (or diversity), but in terms of unity to show that difference was in reality non-different to the divine. This did not negate the notion of difference, for otherwise there would just be the concept of unity, but rather difference was qualified through the light of consciousness (prakāśa) to relate that sense of difference to a centre of unity. Rather than understanding the world from the viewpoint of the world, the world was explained through the divine reality.

In both traditions the divine is connected to the world on an intimate level, which manifests a relational context to person. The world is “not a thing in itself existing separately from Him”, but intimately related to the divine being and awareness (Cit), and therefore difference must always be considered in relation to unity.

In Pratyabhijñā, as already stated in Chapter 3.7, unity-in-difference (bhedābheda) is fundamental in explaining the paradox of the fullness (unity) of God in relation to the world. This provides a model to understand the nature of hypostatic difference in relation to objectified manifestation (ābhāsas), of divine revelation in relation to unity or non-difference, of Ātman in relation to hypostasis. This is considered through a model of unity-in-difference within the Ātman-hypostatic model. As previously stated in Chapter 3, manifestation cannot be self-caused or be responsible for release from its natural condition, or from experiencing difference in relation only to isolated difference. For difference to escape its state of isolated difference, it has to be considered through a reality that can overcome its sense of difference otherwise it is trapped within a gnostic prison. This overcoming of isolated difference in Byzantine theology is paradoxically accomplished through God incarnating as difference.

Through divine difference, difference is overcome through the unity inherent within

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142 See IPKṣ, p.115.
143 IPK, 1.46; p.19; translation by Pandit, IPKṣ, 1.5.15, p.64.
144 As Utpaladeva stated that: “such light cannot be different from it (world), as the object has consciousness as its very soul” (āmārthasya prakāśatā). IPK, 1, 33, p.14; IPKṣ; translation by Pandit, 1.5.2, p.50.
145 Utpala argues that manifestations cannot be understood from the point diversity because of the “contradiction between unity and diversity”, IPK, 2.51, p.57; translation by Pandit, IPKṣ, 2.4.19, p.149. but from the view of Ātman which “consists of pure consciousness with the capability of appearing diversely” (ibid.).
divine difference. But difference (bheda) does not have priority over unity, but is
dependent on unity, where difference or manifested phenomena (ābhāsas) are due to a
force creating and acting upon them, the will and reality of God.\footnote{As Utpala stated: "mutual difference is the base on which the sequence of time and space stands. That difference is based on the manifestation and non-manifestation (of particular entities). Such manifestations and non-manifestations are due to the Lord, who brings these wonderful displays into (apparent) existence", क्रमो भदीष्याभाससदसत्तत्व तु वित्तग्रासत्तूतः प्रवोऽविवल, bhedāśtrayo bhedo 'py ābhāsā-sad-asattvatah ābhāsā-sad-asattve tu cītrābhāsā-kṛtah prabhoh'. IPK, 2.4, p.38; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 2.14, p.109.}

Thus difference (bheda) cannot be understood from the viewpoint of difference, or
that which is from below, the phenomenal manifestation (ābhāsas), but from a notion
of unity. A model of unity-in-difference in relation to the Ātman-hypostasis model,
the Christ hypostasis, where hypostatic specificity is juxtaposed to divine unity, can
be applied to the human model, where hypostases comes to be understood through a
sense of unity in the Ātmanic condition. Just as difference, indicated in the Christ
hypostasis, cannot be divorced from divine unity in relation to the divinity of the
Father, so too human hypostases cannot be divorced from their essential reality of
being or the Ātman: in both cases there is simultaneity of unity in-difference.

The nature and awareness of a particular existence attains a sense of self through
unity, which allows awareness to exist in a unique and specific way. The notion of
specificity or difference is not crushed or dissolved in the unity underpinning that
existence but paradoxically, is the basis for that very individual existence. When
considering the Christ model for the human, the notion of concrete existence attains
fulfilment within unity (with the Father). The Christ model shows how human beings
are to be and provides a relational dynamic in which the encounter with God unites
the outer with the inner. As Christ’s existential reality is qualified through unity with
the Father,\footnote{As exemplified in Hebrews 1:5, which states, “for which of the angels did God ever say ‘you are my Son today I have become your Father’. Or again ‘I will be his father and he will be my Son’?”} so too human personhood becomes truly significant through an
emphasis on unity not only on a general soteriological level but when considering the
ontological implications within the human person.

The importance of juxtaposing the hypostatic differences of the Trinity in relation to
divine unity is also exemplified by Gregory Nazianzen who argued that:
We recognise the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit as God, and these as not being mere appellations determining inequalities of ranks or powers, but we recognise that as there is one and the same title so is there one and the same nature, substance and power of Godhead.  

This unity does not to undermine the specific characteristics of the each hypostasis but highlights that unity within the divine nature does not denude a notion of difference, but that the notion of difference can exist simultaneously within unity.

When this model is translated into the human case, hypostatic difference is also based on the underlying ontological unity inherent within each person due to the human person being created in the image and likeness of God as discussed in Chapter 2B.

Consequently, difference can only be properly understood from a viewpoint of unity and then difference. Difference cannot understand itself, otherwise there would be no perception outside of itself and an isolated introverted vision would be the result, where even a perception of the world would be impossible, for how would separated difference communicate its sense of reality to anything outside of its reality. The answer lies in a notion of unity within difference or a divine consciousness that allows difference within the human person to experience its own reality and others through a unity, but which is not immediately experienced in that limited condition. In this context it is possible to understand the how unity in the incarnate Logos rose up human nature “like by like” so that the lower might attain the higher. In this situation the natural sense of difference is displaced by a divine notion of difference. This is not to state that human hypostatic difference is identical to divine hypostatic difference, but that human hypostatic difference not only is transformed and participates with the divine through unity in the Àmanic experience, but that it attains its very mundane awareness through the divine activity. In both traditions, in a human context, the lower cannot properly comprehend itself or experience a higher reality within itself but the limited self is transformed. Consequently, in the term Àmanic-hypostasis, the word Àman is prefixed to qualify a notion of hypostatic difference, which allows the term hypostasis to be understood in relation to a higher Àmanic

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150 As Gregory stated that the “meaner element has been assumed so that it may be hallowed...leavened and blended anew with God, deified by the Godhead”, ibid, Ep. 101.8.
nature. As Utpala argued that “the interior Reality is only one and that One alone develops multiplicity”.

4.7.1 The what of Existence

The model of unity-in-difference affirms not only the outer existential difference but highlights the nature underlying that existence or the reality underpinning difference. The Ātmanic reality is the metaphysical what of existence, this something (the tōde ρτ), of the hypostasis, which informs the hypostasis of its true value. The metaphysical what of existence indicates a deeper context to the outer life and through the conscious awareness of itself in relation to the world, reveals how to attain a depth of existence through the what. The metaphysical what informs the how of existence, as its true reality, by establishing a bridge between the outer and inner life through the Ātmanic activity of consciousness (or Cit) through the hypostatic existence. This consciousness reveals itself, not only through the mystical state, but also in mundane life through revelatory events, and in the person confirms the individual as an Ātmanic-hypostasis and as such indicates the possibilities of a Čid-ātmanic mode of life. The unity expressed in the Ātmanic reality through a Čid-ātmanic mode of life allows the sense of difference, within mundane existence, to gain significance in the possibilities of the higher mode without denuding the dignity of the lower mode, which too becomes an expression of that same reality.

The intimate relationship of non-difference to difference can be understood as an act of revelation in a movement from the awareness of the Absolute subject to this-ness (idam) and then to the objectified world or that-ness (tattvas). The movement from Cit-aham to tattva, from Supreme Consciousness to the world shows how the true I-consciousness relates to objectified manifestation or difference and how the individual experients can attain unity, through the divine manifestation and unity-in-

\[1\] IPK, 2.10, p.40; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 2.2.2, p.116.

\[2\] As Utpala states in IPK that the nature of Cit (infinite I consciousness) under the seeming effect of māyā as cit-tattvam, is not revealed and seems to be identical to “deha (physical body or with prana (the animating life-force or with vacuous individual consciousness) and is taken to be the (individual knowing and acting) subject”, IPK, 1.56-57, p.23-24; IPKp 1.6.4-5 (Pandit). This individual subjective existence has been correlated to the notion of the natural physis of human existence in this thesis.
difference as an *Ātman-hypostasis*. Unity is vouchsafed through the conscious activity of the essential reality of *being* (or *Ātman*), which is understood as such because of the awareness of *being* as an *Ātman-hypostasis*, where unity is expressed through hypostatic difference.

It is in the *Ātman-hypostasis* model, that unity awareness is experienced as the *what* of existence, or the nature behind hypostasis within the *Ātman-hypostasis*, while allowing for specificity to be experienced. This model highlights perfect unity and the divine presence experienced in the *Ātman-hypostasis* and at the same time mundane existence. Hence, there is expressed a paradox of form and beyond form; of mind and beyond mind; of imperfection and beyond imperfection; of part and whole; and of nature and beyond nature, where impurity, delusion and ignorance are qualified in the unified activity of the *Ātman*. As Utpaladeva stated "the Lord by virtue of His infinite divine power manifests this apparent phenomenon, through the power of his divine will". Here all types of phenomena exist in relation to the unity of divine awareness, will and power and not by their own existence.

4.7.2 Difference through Unity

Existence then comes to be expressed perfectly through a condition of difference, where a sense of differentiation does not indicate separation or even some sort of outward relational belonging wrought through a common sense of existing, but indicates that at creations very core, even in difference, there is expressed the essential reality of that existence. The ability of difference, or created persons, to even to gain awareness different to others and specific in unique individual consciousness is only possible due to the will and activity of divine. At the very centre of difference, and the core of mundane existence, is an awareness that focuses outwards in such a way as to indicate that such limited and isolated consciousness that should not be able to even conceive of itself within the phenomenal existence. How could a consciousness force itself upon an unconscious universe? The answer is found in that both the Byzantine and *Pratyabhijñā* traditions there is an intimate relationship.

\[\text{1}^{14} \text{IPK. 2.33, p.50; translation by Pandit, IPKp, 2.4.1, p.135.}\]
between manifested or created phenomena and the Cause by which creation is made manifest. The divine comes to express itself through the very nature of difference as an expression of the luminous activity of Čiti-Śakti, allowing individual consciousness to be expressed and to express itself. This luminosity brings into creation a consciousness out of non-form and an awareness where even the lowest forms of consciousness come to be understood as expressions of the supreme consciousness having as the very nature of that consciousness the divine awareness. Form and expression of that form through consciousness attains awareness of itself because of the very nature of the divine presence and activity within phenomena. This conscious activity of the divine within mundane consciousness allows the very concept of difference to be expressed as non-different to the One who has manifested that very difference. The basic expressions of consciousness can then be understood as developing within phenomena, which become more complex until awareness encompasses all levels of being where a consciousness, which sprung from the divine, experiences itself in a unified condition while experiencing the conscious awareness of difference. The experience of unity while in difference is paramount, for without this condition the divine would be unable to break the bonds of its own reality in relation to the phenomenal universe being an impotent force.

Hence, the divine will and power to manifest creation and then to let creation be, experiences firstly: as a conscious awareness of itself through human persons; and secondly where difference becomes aware of the divine. This affirms the complete authority and perfection of God to overcome the bonds of difference, which has been set into place by God in the first place. To negate difference would then be a negation of the divine will and power. Difference within the human consciousness cannot be divorced from the individual experience, in which consciousness is expressed or the divine reality, which creates that consciousness and allows it to be what it is and to become what it should be. This becoming is to be linked to a movement within the individual who moves into a true awareness within the hypostatic condition where the person re-cognises his or her Ātman-hypostasis and perceives that difference is to be understood as intrinsically related to divine unity. Thus implicit to the term Ātman-hypostasis are the possibilities of being in difference and becoming within difference through the inherent unity implied in the ontological condition of the Ātman-hypostasis. This unity, expressed through the Ātman, does not negate the place for
**Hypostatic** difference but rather rejoices in it, for that difference is viewed as a luminous manifestation of the *Cit-Sakti* or divine operations (*prakāśa*).\(^{154}\)

Unity in difference implies a movement from God to the world and a reciprocal movement from the human individuals (world) to the divine, for it is the Lord who is the Cause of both difference and unity. Dionysius argued that God is the cause of the movements of what is perceived and preserved\(^{155}\) indicating a simultaneity of the “One and the many”.\(^{156}\) In the context of the *Ātman-hyposlasis*, unity is vouchsafed in the *Ātmanic* experience within hypostatic difference. This notion of difference is not to be considered in relation to a self-informing natural condition, but related to the divine, who “remains One in the act of Self-multiplication; undifferentiated throughout the process of emanation and fullness in the emptying process of differentiation”.\(^{157}\) So too in the *Ātman-hyposlasis*, it is the divine itself that reveals a specific existence of the true nature of that unique existence,\(^{158}\) of both distinctiveness and union due to the character of *Ātman* in the human *hyposlasis*, as the true image and likeness of the Super Essential Godhead.

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\(^{154}\) As Abhinavagupta stated: The pure consciousness, having adopted Māyā as a part and parcel of its self becomes impure but is pure and appears as the finite subject known as Purusa who is bound like a beast with the chains of bondage consisting of kāla, the sense of time, kāla, the limited capacity to do just a little, *nivātita*, the law of natural causation, rāja, the limited interest in particular something and *Aviññā*, the limited capacity to know just a little.

\(^{155}\) Pseudo-Dionysius, *DN*, 4.10, 705B-C; translation by Luibheid, *Pseudo-Dionysius*, p.79. Dionysius goes on to say that; “it is the source, the origin, the preserver, the goal, and the objective of rest and of motion. The being and the life of the mind and of the soul derive from it. Also from it come the small, the equal, and the great in nature, the measure and the errorishment of all things, the mixtures, the totalities, and the parts of things, the universal one and the many, the links between parts, the unityunderlying everything, the perfection of wholes”, *bhumati* Kāla-kalā-nityati-vaśād rāgāvidyā-vaśena sambuddhāh. Abhinavagupta, *PSA*, 16 (Pandit).

\(^{156}\) Pseudo-Dionysius, *DN*, 2.11, 649B; translation by Rolt, *Dionysius the Areopagite*, p.79.

4.8 Conclusion

Through the \textit{Atman-hypostasis} model, a synthesis of ideas, developed from the two traditions in Chapters 2 and 3, has allowed the human person to be considered in both terms of a concrete person \textit{(hypostasis)} and yet intimately related to the divine through the context of an underlying essential reality to that existence. When the individual nature (what is \textit{below}) is raised to a higher level of \textit{being} the consciousness of the person changes and so reflects the divine consciousness within an \textit{Atmanic} mode of \textit{hypostatic} existence. The synthesis of terms from both traditions allowed an evolution of the Cappadocian and contemporary ideas which has led to an over emphasis on the existential negating a focus on the \textit{physis} of personhood. The re-addressing of these ideas in this chapter underlined the importance of stressing the notion of difference to retain the notion of concrete personhood in relation to the higher \textit{(deified) physis} of the \textit{hypostasis} through the \textit{Atmanic} nature, as examined in Chapter 2B.

Conversely, the notion of \textit{Atman} was taken out of a purely monist category, explained in parts 3.1-3.2, and related to a model of \textit{hypostasis} that allows a sense of difference within a model that also accommodated a sense of unity. Thus in the \textit{Atman-hypostasis} model there is the movement from \textit{above} (God) to the world, to that which is below, while at the same time a movement from below to God. However all movements are ultimately considered as aspects of the divine manifestation and activity for without this context, all movement is self-informing and thus trapped within a prison of its own lower nature. Thus \textit{being} and existing are not dislocated or separated into diverging categories, but are considered together within a single model. The model of \textit{Atman-hypostasis} successfully juxtaposes \textit{being}, within a context of restoration of the natural \textit{physis} of humans, and the existential that includes a sense of absolute consciousness expressed in the \textit{Cid-\textit{Atmanic}} mode of \textit{hypostatic} existence. This provides answers to the question ‘who am I’ from a view of absolute \textit{being} (or \textit{Atman}) and consciousness within the existence of concrete personhood.

In this thesis, the \textit{Atman-hypostasis} model has indicated something more than the ordinary condition or the natural human \textit{physis}, where human being-ness is restored
and elevated, body and soul, to a state of becoming of "everything that was".\textsuperscript{159} Hence, in the experience of union with the divine through the \textit{Atman} or the highest nature of the soul, the person/purusa achieves the fulfilment of being, as an \textit{Atman}-hypostasis. While in Pratyabhijñā in this cognitive experience the individual pramāṇa experiences either delusion (as \textit{paśu}) or enlightenment (as \textit{patti}) leaving no room for a simultaneity of both, the \textit{Atman-hypostasis} incorporated ideas of both. This allowed for a flexibility of recognising both conditions without negating either. In such a model, unique characteristics are affirmed as is the possibility of deification. However, unlike the Byzantine model of deified hypostases this is not confined to an existential mode, even though it is expressed through a mode of \textit{Atmanic} existence, but affirms the place for an essential reality as the foundation of deification. The notion of hypostasis is not confined to an outward activity, but includes the notion of essential reality highlighted in the term \textit{Atman-hypostasis}, where the person understands that his or her own \textit{self} is ultimately non-different to the supreme \textit{Self}.\textsuperscript{160}

\textsuperscript{159} Dumitru Staniloae, "Deification", in \textit{Orthodox Spirituality}, p. 269.
\textsuperscript{160} IPK, 4.1, p. 70.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This thesis has sought to construct a model of person within a theological narrative that affirms the place for a real and concrete *hypostasis*, considered in Chapters 2A and 2B, with the inclusion of an awareness of the essential reality of *being* (*Atman*), examined in Chapter 3. It has addressed issues in the Byzantine tradition how the terms *hypostasis*, *ousia* and *deification* related to person, and then how these ideas related to the *Pratyabhijñā* tradition, to the essentiality of *Ātmā* and *Cit*. While there is much more that should be considered and many areas that still remain problematic, such as Trinitarian issues, and a need to expand on resolving the problem of an experience of the *Ātmā* had by the few, this thesis represents a point for converging the Byzantine and *Pratyabhijñā* traditions within the context of person. While in this thesis some of the major points relating to the Byzantine tradition have been addressed, especially in relation to individuality, as exemplified in parts 2.1.1, 2.2.2 and 2.4.2, and in relation to Zizioulas' interpretation of Byzantine theology, I also have to concede that much more can be done, especially in relation to the context of the notion of otherness. Issues were considered, in parts 2.2-2.3, around the problem of overcoming the lack of a stress on the essential reality or substance of *being*, which is particularly evident in contemporary interpretations of Byzantine theology as highlighted by Zizioulas. To overcome this the focus on a substantialist context to person through *Ātmā* was developed in Chapters 3 and 4.

It was argued that in the model of the *Ātmā-hypostasis* both the concrete existence (or difference) and metaphysical reality (or non-difference) were important and that a notion of person culminates within a certain type of existence, a *Cit-ātmanic* mode of *hypostatic* existence. In parts, 1.4.5 and 4.5.2, the notion of person is fulfilled in the experience of *deification/re-cognition*. The use of *hypostasis* from the Byzantine tradition related to developing a type of personhood, which affirmed the place for what is concrete and unique without detracting from the affirmation for the place of fulfilment. Also the notion of fulfilment was correlated to the experience of *deification* in the context of converging ideas in relation to *Pratyabhijñā*'s notion of
the metaphysical reality of being (Ātman), where fulfilment also related to a change of consciousness and not only to a partial sense of unity as discussed in parts 3.2.2, 3.6.1, and 4.5 - 4.5.1.

The thesis has outlined some of the problems relating to the existential debate of person through contemporary Eastern Orthodoxy and has highlighted issues raised by Zizioulas. Even though in Zizioulas’ model the individual human person was correlated to the outward person, highlighted in Chapter 2.1, and to an outer experience, especially in relation to an ecclesial communion, this thesis sought to balance the inner state within the outer condition. The outer notion of person was qualified by re-introducing the context of substance or the essential reality of being in part 2.3, where communion and participation included not only an outer context but an inner experience through a unity with the Ātmanic reality in Chapter 3. By considering the dimension of outward-inwardness in relation to a notion of person through the experience of deification/re-cognition, in parts 2.8.4 and 3.2., it was considered that this experience relates to the true notion of freedom. The notion of freedom, as expressed in part 4.4.1, includes not a subordination of the divine nature to the natural biological condition, but indicates a life that has become or should become full in the Ātmanic experience. While it was shown that contemporary Eastern Orthodox approaches to the West have presented a model of person that was opposed to individuum as highlighted in part 2.1.1, which paradoxically also developed outward looking existential models. This thesis therefore looked to balance existential models of person by incorporating both inwardness and outward-ness, of non-difference and difference. In this qualified model the concrete existence is informed through the essential reality of person.

Hence, the thesis has provided an examination of the concept of person within the Byzantine and Pratyabhijñā tradition by focusing on contemporary interpretations of hypostasis and puruṣa. While it was recognised that the scope of the examination goes beyond what could possibly be accomplished in this single study, this study offers a model of person which hopefully goes some way highlighting the issues surrounding person in the two traditions, and how possible convergences could be approached in Chapter 4. Was this work successful in converging and synthesising ideas or was the outcome an unhappy mutation, not satisfactorily addressing many of the unresolved
differences? It is proposed that this thesis did offer a model of person through convergence that presented a unique resolution to existential approaches to *hypostasis*, within a *space* of convergence, where ideas were examined and should continue to be examined to further aid dialogical and converging theologies. It is hoped that this examination will add to the research relating to personhood and the examination of person within both traditions and that ideas expressed in this thesis will be further developed in future collaborations between Indian philosophies and Christianity. Within this field of study this research could be of use to outline a direction for future theological convergences between Byzantine and *Pratyabhijñā* traditions in that the model of *Ātman-hypostasis* brings a unity of ideas between the two traditions. No doubt there is much to discuss in the precise determinative use of the concepts of *hypostasis*, *Ātman* or *purusa*, and in the theological interpretation of the terms, but this work could be a starting point.

Hence, the result of this work is a construction of a model of person which qualifies the focus on the *hypostatic*, through the inclusion of the terms *Ātman* and *Cit* in the construction of the new term *Ātman-hypostasis* as examined in Chapter 4. Even though ideas relating to these terms were kept within the boundaries of the explored traditions, these ideas were evolved in Chapter 4, and allowed the terms to be expanded so that in the *Ātman-hypostasis* model the encounter between the divine and human existences could be better understood. This research also discovered that the influences on contemporary interpretations have impacted on the use of theological terms such as *hypostasis*, and are just as important as considering the original understanding of the terms. Such was the impact of contemporary scholarship on determining the way the terms should understood, that it was initially impossible to separate the two and only after some effort did it become clear how extensive that influence was. It was recognised that the terms discussed in the study evolved from the original use in the contemporary debate and that the terms and ideas should be evolved further so as to continue the examination of person. The quest to understand the nature of the human person and to understand what a person can *be* as icons of the divine should be continued as should the examinations in relation to existential and ontological implications of a notion of person.
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